Wow...how about this apparent lack of judgement

[BoilerUP]

He must have been an active CFI, since he had kept that certificate valid.

There's lots of folks who aren't active CFIs but keep it active...$150 every two years for the renewal is pretty darn cheap for a professional certification.

 

[AIR2MUD]

There's a whole lot more to the story than most Monday-morning quarerbacks would surmise. Here is the NTSB factual...including a full 5 pages under the 'Additional Information' section:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=ERA09LA469&rpt=fa

Here is the docket that contains the substantiating information:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/ERA09LA469/default.htm

 

[Bleeds On]

After consulting with an attorney, the copilot recanted all of his previous statements

Interesting.

 

[RipCurl]

Current and former Quest Diagnostics employees were asked if they were familiar with the "no reprisal" policy feature of the SMS program adopted by the aviation department, and if they believed the pretense. Several employees stated that they were directly targeted for voicing safety concerns, others laughed at the question, and others just stared back at the interviewers, and would not reply. Only employees in management positions stated that they believed the no-retaliation policy was valid.

When asked to explain a 35-hour duty day that included 13.3 hours of flight time, and only a three hour nap, the assistant chief pilot attempted to recount the conversations he had with the DOL [Director of Logistics], and the director of safety, in an effort to explain his rational for accepting the mission. When the assistant chief pilot was again asked to rationalize assuming such a risk, he replied, "We said, 'This is [expletive]…Why would I do that? I have a mortgage payment, I have a job, and if I don't do this, I don't have a job anymore."

The DOL was asked who approved the 0700 mission on July 30, 2009, after the crew had already flown 9.1 hours over an 18-hour duty day that spanned both the 29th and 30th of July, he stated, "I approved this." In an interview with an NTSB investigator during the investigation of a previous fatal accident by the Quest Diagnostics flight department, the DOL was asked why he upgraded the accident pilot to captain, when that pilot failed to meet the qualifications outlined in his own FOM. The DOL stated that he "possessed the authority to deviate from the manual."

On more than one occasion, the DOL was quoted as having yelled at pilots for their unwillingness to attempt instrument approaches in weather below the published minimums. Examples were: ..."You don't have to go missed approach at Dulles because they have CAT three approach lighting!"

On October 27, 2009, Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) contacted the Quest Diagnostics flight department and advised them of a critical safety-of-flight issue that involved rapid wear of hydraulic lifters in a specific population of engines. TCM made these telephonic notifications inadvance of a mandatory service bulletin (MSB09-8A)...

When asked why he ignored the manufacturer's guidance to ground the airplane immediately, the DOL said:
"I told one guy who was already on the ground that he was done, and I diverted the other guy to Lawrenceville. It was an extra two hours to Lawrenceville, but I thought it was an acceptable risk. I thought worst case the affected engine blows up, and he can make it on the good engine."

Sounds like a class act.

 

[ackattacker]

Even with all the extra info, still doesn't really adequately explain the accident. Best I can gather what the NTSB is implying is that they were both high on CO2, FO pulled the props to feather by accident and then they fought over the controls? Or, FO does everything normal but captain has an acid flashback and seeing a power reduction, feathers the props himself? Basically a giant WTF. CO2 may be the only explanation.

 

[AIR2MUD]

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=132522876

 

[AIR2MUD]

Article from Business & Commercial Aviation - 'A Failed Culture of Safety':

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener...%20of%20Safety