It is NOT up to the courts to Interpret the Law.
We may safely discount anything further you have to say on the subject, owing to the inaccuracy and ignorance of the above quoted statement.
You might wish to avail yourself of an opportunity to read A "Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law," by Antonin Scalia.
Judge Richard Posner (7th Circuit US Court of Appeals, Chicago) wrote:
The framers of a constitution who want to make it a charter of liberties and not just a set of constitutive rules face a difficult choice. They can write specific provisions and thereby doom their work to rapid obsolescence, or they can write general provisions, thereby allowing substantial discretion to the authoritative interpreters, who in our system are the judges. The U.S. Constitution is a mixture of specific and general provisions. Many of the specific provisions have stood the test of time well or have been amended without much fuss. This is especially true of the rules establishing the structure and procedures of Congress. Most of the specific provisions creating rights, however, have fared poorly. Some have proved irksomely anachronistic-for example, the right conferred by the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial in federal in all cases at law if the stakes exceed $20. Others have become dangerously anachronistic, such as the right to bear arms. Some have turned topsy-turvy, such as the provision for indictment by grand jury. The grand jury has become an instrument of prosecutorial investigation on, rather than being the protection for the criminal suspect that the framers of the Bill of Rights expected it to be. If the Bill of Rights had consisted entirely of specific provisions, it would no longer be a significant constraint on the behavior of government officials.
Many provisions of the Constitution, however, are drafted in general terms. This creates flexibility in the face of unforeseen changes, but it creates the possibility of alternative interpretations, and this possibility is an embarrassment for a theory of judicial legitimacy that denies judges have any right to exercise discretion. A choice among semantically plausible interpretations of a text, in circumstances remote from those contemplated by its drafters, requires the exercise of discretion and the weighing of consequences. Reading is not a form of deduction; understanding requires a consideration of consequences. If I say, "I'll eat my hat," one reason why my listeners will "decode" the meaning of this statement in nonliteral fashion is that I couldn't eat a hat if I tried. The broader principle, which applies to the Constitution as much as to a spoken utterance, is that if one possible interpretation of an ambiguous statement would entail absurd or terrible results, that is a good reason to reject it.
Even the decision to read the Constitution narrowly, and thereby to "restrain" judicial interpretation, is not a decision that can be read directly from the text. The Constitution does not say, "Read me broadly," or, "Read me narrowly." The decision to do one or the other must be made as a matter of political theory and will depend on such things as one's view of the springs of judicial legitimacy and the relative competence of courts and legislatures in dealing with particular types of issue.
While you may have your personal opinions on the interpretation of legislation, to include the United States Constitution proper and the ammendments thereto, your opinion holds no weight or valuein the face of current judicial constitutional interpretation. You may not like it, but the law stands as it is until you or someone else elects to expend the effort and cost of changing it.
You think the law is illegal; you have no right to violate the law whether you think it's illegal or not. Your narrow views regarding the original issue of the US Constitution, and quotations which are outdated and do not represent current law and the application thereof, mean nothing. What is meaningful is the current application of the law, to which both you and I are subject. Beyond that you can flap your lips in the wind until you're blue in the face or numb, and it will change nothing.
So far as the purpose of the courts, in particular the Supreme Court, interpretation is foremost and solemn duty. The courts do not enforce. Law enforcement exists to enforce the decisions, orders, and interpretations of the courts.
The US Constitution's 8th ammendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but is silent in a definition thereof. In 2005, the Court addressed this topic and interpreted it with respect to the execution of minors under the age of 18, in Roper V. Simmons.
The US Constitution's 1st ammendment protects free speech, but is silent on the definition thereof. In 1989, the Court addressed this topic and interpreted it with respect to burning the Flag of The United States of America, in Texas V. Johnson. That same year, the 1st Ammendment was also addressed in a case involving nude dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theatre. In the first example, the court upheld burning of the flag as protected under the 1st ammendment, but rejected nude dancing as protected by freedom of expression, in the second case.
The US Constitution's 1st ammendment grants freedom of religious expression, but doesn't define or interpret what this means. Can one sacrifice young girls on a stone alter under this ammendment? Smoke marajuana? Oppress non-believers? The Constitution doesn't say. The US Supreme Court does say, however, in Employment Division v. Smith, 1990...with respect to the use and consumption of peyote as a function of freedom of religion.
You state that the Judiciary was established to enforce the law, but nowhere in the US Constitution is this given. The judiciary is there to judge, to weigh controversy, and to render a judgement, a decision, and an interpretation of the law applicable thereto. The purpose of the judiciary, then, is to interpret the law and it's application to the people. You'll find it written in Article 3 of the Constitution, should you take the trouble. Should you not take the trouble, of course, it's still there.
It was Alexander Hamilton who wrote:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution, is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
As you have failed once more to address the topic at hand of crewmembers carrying weapons under 14 CFR Part 135, and as your views are so deeply flawed as to represent little more than a non-credible annoyance, you too are relegated to the ignore list.
