Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
  • Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
  • Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
  • Share the passion for aviation
  • Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun

USAir 1549 CVR transcript

Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
  • Invite your friends
  • Share the passion of aviation
  • Friendliest aviation community on the web
The CVR transcript shows them following the checklist that would call for thrust levers to be at idle for a restart. They never mention pushing them up.

Do you mention everything you do in the cockpit?

I'm just playing devils advocate here...you may be right. But claiming they didn't do something because they didn't verbalize it is kinda amateurish.
 
The CVR transcript shows them following the checklist that would call for thrust levers to be at idle for a restart. They never mention pushing them up.

I can't remember the last time I verbally anounced that I was advancing the thrust levers. And you're sure it didn't happen because.....they didn't MENTION it????
 
The words" Try going to TOGA" would have been a tipoff that they had tried that, but those aren't in there. Also, does the cockpit mic pick up a Master Warning CRC that would correspond to a ENG DUAL FAILURE ECAM? If it did, I missed it.
 
errrr.... since when is Airbus French? It is as multi-national as Boeing. Got some anger to vent?

Non, je ne suis pas fache, mais la plaisanterie est plus drole avec un avion français. "Mulit National Consortium" n'est pas tres drole.

In other words - lighten up, I'm no francophobe. The bus is a fine machine, and it served its crew well that day. Is that PC enough for you?
 
Non, je ne suis pas fache, mais la plaisanterie est plus drole avec un avion français. "Mulit National Consortium" n'est pas tres drole.

In other words - lighten up, I'm no francophobe. The bus is a fine machine, and it served its crew well that day. Is that PC enough for you?

No offense, as I stated earlier my post was slightly inspired by a great movie (excerpt). It's all cool, no need for PC, amigo.

"Don't you oppress me" ... lol
 
Last edited:
Do you mention everything you do in the cockpit?

I'm just playing devils advocate here...you may be right. But claiming they didn't do something because they didn't verbalize it is kinda amateurish.

USAir jumpseater said he was told no ditching PB pushed and thrust levers were never pushed to TOGA, for what it's worth.
 
Yes, suppose one of them instinctively knew they were too slow for an unassisted air restart and at least tried something that may have worked, like opening the APU bleed to assist in a restart. Or advancing both thrust levers to TOGA to see if either engine could produce more than the IDLE that they were set to.

Perhaps you should get some facts before you spout off. Here's the think to the FDR data:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA026/418135.pdf

After the impact, N1 on both engines falls off to windmilling levels despite the climb power setting. Vibration goes through the roof. EGT's on both engines shoots to 900C. The power levers for both engines remain at climb power for 1 minute after impact, when they are retarted to idle for the restart checklist. 30 seconds later they advance the power lever on number 1 but get no response except the high EGT again. You can see that N2 on the number 1 engine remains up, there's EGT, the engine is still lit and turning. However there's little to no thrust. There's no way any "restart" procedure is going to work, APU or not. Number 2 engine is even more toast, N2 vibration is extreme, and eventually quits completely (N2 at zero prior to impact).

And, I'm not entirely familiar with the way the ECU works on the Airbus, but I doubt that you would get any increased fuel flow from setting TOGA seeing as how the ECU is already commanding a much higher thrust setting than it's getting
 
Thanks for the link. At first glance, I don't agree with your assessment of vibration, but I'll take some time and look at it. And EGT could spike due to low N1 (guts and slow IAS) with fuel still flowing to the engine. Could an APU bleed have overcome the clog and allowed the engine to spin sufficiently to start again?
 
Yes, suppose one of them instinctively knew they were too slow for an unassisted air restart and at least tried something that may have worked, like opening the APU bleed to assist in a restart. Or advancing both thrust levers to TOGA to see if either engine could produce more than the IDLE that they were set to.

The outcome could have been different.

Sully did a fine job with what he had, no argument. Skiles was in over his head, disappointing considering he is a former Capt.

In their defense however, when it became apparent they were committed to an off airport landing, they did not allow themselves to be distracted from flying the airplane. I'm just not convinced (from my interpretation of the CVR data released by the NTSB-my only source of info) it necessarily needed to be an off-airport landing.
You're an idiot.
 
Perhaps you should get some facts before you spout off. Here's the think to the FDR data:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA026/418135.pdf

After the impact, N1 on both engines falls off to windmilling levels despite the climb power setting. Vibration goes through the roof. EGT's on both engines shoots to 900C. The power levers for both engines remain at climb power for 1 minute after impact, when they are retarted to idle for the restart checklist. 30 seconds later they advance the power lever on number 1 but get no response except the high EGT again. You can see that N2 on the number 1 engine remains up, there's EGT, the engine is still lit and turning. However there's little to no thrust. There's no way any "restart" procedure is going to work, APU or not. Number 2 engine is even more toast, N2 vibration is extreme, and eventually quits completely (N2 at zero prior to impact).

If the nose was below the horizon and the crew never disconnected the auto-thrust, then idle thrust would have been commanded with the trust levers in the climb detent. That is the difference between moving them to TOGA and leaving them in the auto-thrust range.

And, I'm not entirely familiar with the way the ECU works on the Airbus, but I doubt that you would get any increased fuel flow from setting TOGA seeing as how the ECU is already commanding a much higher thrust setting than it's getting
The climb thrust detent is an auto-thrust active range setting. If the nose was down and the speed higher than the speed target the system would command idle thrust. Moving the levers to TOGA would send a signal commanding full thrust to the EECs. There is a possibility that the #1 engine may have been capable of producing thrust but it was never given a command to do so. This is the point of most posters.

Personally I don't think it would have made a difference but we may never know for sure.
 

Latest resources

Back
Top