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UPS Airbus down in Birmingham

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I'm not sure what UPS's procedures or the A-300 vnav capabilities are but in general-

Having a published FMS vnav glidepath (not sure how their boxes were loaded), a papi, vasi or ILS to a runway should provide terrain clearance.

For constructed vnav glidepaths the existence of a vasi, papi or ILS indicates the runway is surveyed and terrain clearance is supposed to be assured for constant descent vnav operations to a DA in lieu of a MDH...
 
Airport trid to reopen runway before UPS jet crash

http://news.yahoo.com/airport-trid-reopen-runway-ups-jet-crash-145409984.html

BIRMINGHAM, Ala. (AP) ? An audio recording from the control tower at Birmingham's airport shows workers were trying to reopen the main runway when a UPS cargo jet crashed while trying to land on an alternate runway, killing two pilots.


The recording, posted on the Federal Aviation Administration's website, shows an air traffic controller asked a Birmingham Airport Authority worker about reopening the runway less than two minutes before the Airbus A300-600 jet went down shortly before dawn Aug. 14.


The main 12,000-foot runway was closed for maintenance at the time and the UPS aircraft crashed while attempting to land on a shorter 7,000-foot runway at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport that lacks the most advanced guidance equipment. The jet clipped trees and slammed into a hill less than a mile from the end of the runway.


The recording shows a cargo jet from UPS competitor FedEx landed safely on the main runway just a few minutes after the crash.


The recording will be part of the evidence as the National Transportation Safety Board conducts a hearing set for Feb. 20 in Washington to determine the likely cause of the crash.


The main runway, which had a more complete guidance system, was closed for maintenance on its lights during the crash, which occurred about 15 minutes before the main runway was supposed to reopen.
Pilots consider the approach to the shorter runway to be more tricky because of the lack of full instrumentation and a large hill at the end of the runway, but the NTSB has not indicated whether the runway's configuration might have been a factor.


On the audio recording, UPS First Officer Shanda Fanning is heard talking with an air traffic controller in the Birmingham tower about the aircraft's approach. The controller tells her the primary runway is still closed and asks if they want to land on Runway 18.


"Yes sir, the localizer 18 will work," Fanning says.


About 45 seconds after he clears the UPS flight to land, the controller is heard asking an airport worker about getting the main runway back in operation.


"Airport 12 are, uh, we, uh, on schedule to open back up at (5 a.m.)?" he asks.


"Affirm, they're very close to the end right now," answers the airport worker, apparently speaking from a vehicle near the runway.


Less than two minutes later, the airport worker calls back to the tower: "Tower, Airport 12. Did you see that?"


The tower responds: "Airport 12, there's a crash. UPS 1354 heavy crashed, uh, on the hill."


The pilot of a FedEx cargo jet that also was in the air approaching the airport radioed in that he had reduced his speed. That aircraft landed safely on the main runway just moments after it reopened.


The UPS wreckage was in flames by then, lighting up the sky on a drizzly, overcast morning. As airport vehicles rushed away from the central part of the field to the site, one worker struggled to understand what had happened.


"Are we clear to go to our standby positions?" asked a worker from the fire unit at the Alabama Air National Guard installation.


"The aircraft is not coming to the airport," the controller answered.
"So it's already crashed?" asked the Guard worker.


"Affirmative," said the controller.


Investigators from the NTSB have said they did not find any mechanical problems with the A300-600, manufactured by Airbus. The NTSB has said the hearing later this month will review landing procedures, training, adherence to standard operating procedures and proficiency.


The hearing also will examine human factors including decision-making, communication between pilots, fatigue and fitness for duty. The board said it will review UPS dispatch procedures and software limitations.
 
Amazing hours after the Asiana crash we had plots, tapes, all the data presented to us...still silent pretty much about this accident...
 
Well it looks like the good ole boys just flew into the ground.


Yahhh.. I would GUESS...nobody was monitoring inside during the latter stages of the approach...common cause of CFIT during non-precision approaches
 
Pilots reported fatigue, erred in UPS jet crash

WASHINGTON ?
The pilots of a UPS cargo jet that crashed last August complained of tiring work schedules at the start of the fatal flight, and then made errors shortly before the plane flew into a hillside and burst into flames, according to information presented at a hearing Thursday.

The plane was also equipped with an outmoded warning system to alert pilots when they are in danger of flying into the ground, according to information presented to the National Transportation Safety Board.

Both pilots were killed in the predawn crash as they attempted to land at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport in Birmingham, Ala. The airport's main runway was closed for maintenance, so Captain Cerea Beal Jr. was trying to land on a second, much shorter runway that wasn't equipped with a full instrument landing system to help keep planes from coming in too high or too low.

UPS pilots land at airports without the aid of a full instrument landing system only about once or twice a year, company and union officials testified.

Beal may also have become confused by the Airbus A300-600's automated speed controls as the plane was descending, testimony indicated. The plane descended below the minimum safe altitude for its flight path. Moments later, there was an alert the plane about to collide with the hillside.

The pilots also failed to complete a last step in programming the plane's computer system for the landing. Without that step, the computer couldn't provide critical navigation help, witnesses said.

Beal had complained to First Officer Shanda Fannin shortly after the flight left Louisville, Ky., that cargo pilots aren't given as much time to rest between work shifts as federal regulations require for pilots at passenger airlines, according to a transcript of the flight's cockpit voice recorder.

Fannin agreed. She said she had a "good sleep" the previous night, but woke up tired anyway.

Regulations governing pilot hours "should be across the board," Beal said, "to be honest, in my opinion whether you are flying passengers or cargo or, you know, box of chocolates at night."

Beal had recently expressed concern about the schedules at the cargo carrier, according to a summary of investigators' interviews with witnesses.

"About 7 weeks before the accident, he told a colleague that the schedules were becoming more demanding because they were flying up to three legs per night," according to summary of interviews compiled by investigators. Beal said "I can't do this until I retire because it's killing me," and had a similar conversation with another colleague the night before the accident, the summary said.
However, Beal's wife told investigators he hadn't expressed reservations about UPS scheduling to her, it said.


UPS officials cautioned against concluding the pilots were fatigued and therefore prone to error.

"Crew rest is a complex concept. And for some, it's easy to jump to the conclusion that a pilot who flies at night must be tired," the company said in a statement. "It's also easy to presume that if they are tired, it's induced by their assigned work schedule. Neither is necessarily accurate."

NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman warned UPS and union officials that they risk their status as parties in the board's investigation if they publicly interpret facts presents in the case.

The safety board has long expressed concern about operator fatigue, saying the problem shows up repeatedly in accidents across all modes of transportation ? planes, trains, cars, trucks and ships. Fatigue can erode judgment, slow response times and lead to errors much as alcohol can.

Two years ago, the Federal Aviation Administration issued new rules aimed at ensuring airline pilots have sufficient rest. FAA officials had proposed including cargo airlines in draft regulations, but exempted them when final regulations were released, citing cost. Cargo carriers, who do much of their flying at night, strongly opposed the regulations. FAA officials estimated the regulations would cost $550 million over 12 years if applied to cargo airlines; the Independent Pilots Association, which represents UPS pilots, estimated the cost at $320 million.

The work shift of the UPS pilots killed in the crash began about 9 p.m. the previous day in Rockford, Ill., and took them to Peoria and then to Louisville, Ky. They were finishing their third and last scheduled leg when the plane slammed into the hillside just before 5 a.m.

Night shift workers frequently suffer fatigue, especially between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. when the human body's circadian rhythms ? physical and behavioral changes that respond to light and darkness ? are telling the brain to sleep, according to sleep experts.

Studies show that 30 percent to 50 percent of night-shift workers report falling asleep at least once a week while on the job, according to Dr. Charles Czeisler, chief of sleep medicine at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston.
 
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Classic CFIT..PF looking outside for the airport...as he should...PNF doing???? Pretty obvious nobody was minding inside, as they went through minimums at VS-1500...
 
Classic CFIT..PF looking outside for the airport...as he should...PNF doing???? Pretty obvious nobody was minding inside, as they went through minimums at VS-1500...


PF looking outside as he should on a LOC APP!!
I though that happens after PNF says at least "APP LIGHTS inside" or one of does required calls, or did I mis when the PNF says it?
 
Hard to see how the cargo carriers are going to be able to resist implementation of 117 now.

I would hate to be one of those "UPS officials" who are trying to sell the idea that this crew wasn't tired, with the crew essentially telling people that their schedules were fatiguing them.
 
I hope the pilot group gives them hell and demand the same duty rest times as passenger ops The chair person of the NTSB Hersman is not qualified to talk or run the agency her only previous experience was child safety seat certifications at the highway transportation dept. she has put everything back fifty years WTF !!
 
PF looking outside as he should on a LOC APP!!
I though that happens after PNF says at least "APP LIGHTS inside" or one of does required calls, or did I mis when the PNF says it?

Unfamiliar with UPS SOP's...All I know was there was a comment by the Capt...who was PF, "runway in sight"...One would assume (hope) the other pilot would be "inside" monitoring minimums, sink rate speed etc....etc...doesn't appear to be the case...a study in CFIT accidents while on approach showed the majority were on track, but for some reason or the other, blew the vertical profile and crashed short....as is the case here..last callout regarding altitude on the transcript was at 1000'....if this was from the baro altimeter, that would be approximately 200' above minimums...don't see any reference to any specific call "minimums"...which they passed through at VS-1500...(unstable by any standard)...
 
It's within criteria if briefed at a lot of carriers. VS1000 is a default standard with a lot of operators, but no reason not to use 1500 if there is a legitimate reason, such as a steep gradient in the final segment.

Read Advisory Circular 120-71A and get back to us.

3.2 degree glidepath and 140kts approximate groundspeed for this approach results in 792 FPM.
 
Whatever happened to the basic 3 to 1? It's the most basic tool available to any approach! Just type in the runway into the fix page or prog or whatever it's called in your airplane and put it in the scan. I'm working 3 to 1 from top of descent all the way to touchdown. In 33 years of flying it hasn't failed me yet! I do see many of my fellow aviators not have a clue when they're cleared all the way from TOD down to the final approach altitude. The magic's great and we still have to fly and show up well rested. It's personal responsibility!
 
Whatever happened to the basic 3 to 1? It's the most basic tool available to any approach! Just type in the runway into the fix page or prog or whatever it's called in your airplane and put it in the scan. I'm working 3 to 1 from top of descent all the way to touchdown. In 33 years of flying it hasn't failed me yet! I do see many of my fellow aviators not have a clue when they're cleared all the way from TOD down to the final approach altitude. The magic's great and we still have to fly and show up well rested. It's personal responsibility!

If there are obstacles, you cannot use that.

99.99% of the time you are right, I use it too.
 
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Okay, all-knowing, all-seeing Lord of the Sky.

Perhaps you've just not been exposed to one of the (relatively) rare situations where greater than VS-1000 is required.

Obviously, Birmingham was not one of those situations.
 
Okay, all-knowing, all-seeing Lord of the Sky.

Perhaps you've just not been exposed to one of the (relatively) rare situations where greater than VS-1000 is required.

Obviously, Birmingham was not one of those situations.

OK, good luck to you guys, wish u well.

-1500 VS that close is just strange.
 
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Read Advisory Circular 120-71A and get back to us.

3.2 degree glidepath and 140kts approximate groundspeed for this approach results in 792 FPM.

First, as I stated earlier, this was not an approach requiring VS>1000.

But, how would you handle a steeper final segment, with a notably higher corrected ref than that with a tailwind that becomes a crosswind upon landing?

I've seen ref speeds in the high 140s, plus 5, plus 15 knots of tailwind aloft, changing to direct crosswind.

Call it 160 knots groundspeed. At the max published gradient per Terps (400 ft/nm) that yields a descent rate of 1100 fpm.

Now, the 400 ft/nm is measured from the FAF crossing altitude to threshold plus 50 ft. This means that on some approaches, to get an effective chance at visual contact, you may need to beat 400 ft/nm slightly, depending on whether the MDA and "approximate" VDP falls above or below the average descent gradient.

Also, the 1100 fpm I referenced earlier is the required average rate of descent, which means unless you are capable of instantaneously achieving that rate and leveling off instantaneously, some additional descent rate will be required in order to account for initiating and ending the descent.

In short, there is nothing magic about VS-1000, other than that for 99+% of flights, it serves as a useful limit for descent rate.

However, the right mix of ref additives, winds, and approach gradient/MDA geometry can push the required rate higher.

Brief it, be aware, and use sparingly.
 
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It's within criteria if briefed at a lot of carriers. VS1000 is a default standard with a lot of operators, but no reason not to use 1500 if there is a legitimate reason, such as a steep gradient in the final segment.


steep gradient in the final sector doesn't exist on THIS approach...I fly approaches into Kathmandu and other places where it does...but in this case doesn't seem to be a legitimate reason....especially when passing through minimums....these folks seem to have lost all awareness of their vertical situation, and were stuck in the mindset they were very high above profile...
 
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OK, good luck to you guys, wish u well.

-1500 VS that close is just strange.
Just because you haven't seen an approach that requires a descent like that, doesn't mean they don't exist. Several airports in SE Alaska, for example. There's nothing black magic about descending quicker than 1000fpm on an approach.
 
Just because you haven't seen an approach that requires a descent like that, doesn't mean they don't exist. Several airports in SE Alaska, for example. There's nothing black magic about descending quicker than 1000fpm on an approach.

YES THERE IS IDIOT If you are flying with me, u try this ********************, you better have a good reason and have briefed it, otherwise, u r going around.

Really, these guys are in Ala********************ingbama and u bring up Alaska.

Next time in SE Alaska I'll keep that in mind.

What's your point?
 
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My point is, your one-size-fits-all attitude isn't necessarily the end-all of SOPs. Descendind at greater than 1000fpm isn't going to put you in the dirt unless you're messing up other things. Nice job on your CRM skills, by the way.
 
My point is, your one-size-fits-all attitude isn't necessarily the end-all of SOPs. Descendind at greater than 1000fpm isn't going to put you in the dirt unless you're messing up other things. Nice job on your CRM skills, by the way.

The SOP is there so guys don't fly into the fuc{ing ground.
 
That's nice. Though it was the descent below minimums that did it in this case.
 
excessive rate of descent loss of SA=accident....one will discover that most airlines SOP's specify stable approach criterion which include rate of descent not greater than 1000fpm, unless required by the procedure...commencing at 1000AAL and thereafter...I don't understand why folks here are bring up Alaska etc....etc..this particular approach was an unstable approach full stop...why they became confused about their vertical situation is the real issue here...I suspect they were both half asleep....
 
Some people on this thread have severe reading comprehension challenges.

There is no one suggesting that greater than VS-1000 was required on the Birmingham approach. So stuff that notion, please.

The discussion, for those of you lucid enough to be paying attention, is on whether greater than VS-1000 is warranted in some cases.

Now, there is a commenter here who seems to be afflicted with a certain type of Tourette's syndrome regarding vertical speed, and is attempting to lend weight to his words through the use of some gratuitous profanity. Such attempts to adorn his argument have, in my oh-so-humble opinion, merely served as an indicator that he feels his words have insufficient weight of their own accord, and therefore require augmentation.

It's okay, I don't always expect the highest level of discourse from denizens of the flight deck, but in this case even my lowered expectations are being disappointed.

While there is a certain Rain-main style charm to his stubborn insistence on missing everyone else's points, like all character eccentricities, it eventually wears thin.

If VS > 1000 is outside of his comfort level, then I applaud him for recognizing his personal limitations, and for abiding them.

For the rest of us, an engaged conversation on the approach geometry in question is more interesting than a crusty rebuke from someone who, well, isn't really listening.
 
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