Travis Barker - 4 killed, 2 hurt as rock star's jet crashes

[Quimby]

Wonderful, what aircraft had Carbon Fiber Brakes, Delta Fins, and Eicas back then?

he got ya there!

 

[steve937]

CAUTION someone mentined how important tire pressure checking is. I agree! He also mentioned 180 PSI for a Lear 55 or 60... 180 PSI is too low (around 20% low)for a 60 main! and maybe reason to change both tires due to side wall over stress. Please check your AFM or AMM for the correct values before servicing! Also check you tires cold, not after moving the airplane from the fuel farm. Hot tires read high, don't adjust. The Goodyear 14 ply tires have weep holes in them for mfg or seating reasons. They do lose presure over time and new tires lose pressure for a week or so due to strecting. Ask you mec for a copy of the tire section in chpt 32-40-xx
Yea, I too have seen a few pilots kick a 14 ply tire to check it, I just shake my head.....

 

[GREAT LAKES]

USC PILOT,

Well said man. I love the 60, what great airplane!

My condolences go out to the families involved for their losses.........

RIP for a great crew.

Notapilots post was from the NTSB report for the Jerry Jones Lear 60 crash.
I believe that there was a mod put on later aircraft (there is a list of S-B's available, ask at recurrent) that allows both TR's to deploy with only one squat switch in ground mode. Ill see if I can find it. Nevertheless if they stowed uncommanded the FADEC should roll them back to idle and making the piggybacks useless.
Also keep in mind ground idle is 52% N2 which is not bad but air idle is 65% which gives you quite a push.
The standard brakes steel two rotor assemblies(later models including the one in question should have had the three rotor brakes).
It would have been possible to have brakes on only one wheel if a tire blew and caused a sq sw to fail to air. If the left inboard tire blew and failed the left squat switch to air then both out board brakes would be useless and the crew would only have normal brakes on the right inboard. The only way (other than emer handle) to regain toe brakes would be to turn the antiskid off. This would close the solonoid shutoff valves and allow brake pressure to the remaining three wheels, with out antiskid protection mind you. You have to be pretty on the ball to think of it though.
Concerning the earlier discussion of high/low speed aborts (this is only what I have seen and I am in no way being critical of these crew members) everyone always gives the "standard" brief. Nevertheless the vast majority will abort for AHS,ADC,PFD failures and so forth. Secondly you dont always know its a tire failure (no annunciator for it). What if it was a flight control issue. They had only seconds to decide. While most people would be ok taking off after 80/90 kts with a blown tire they would not with a flight controll malf. Going back to what I said earlier most people abort for anything and the whole "band,swerve,or bell" goes out the window as soon as something abnormal happens. Ultimatly the PIC's decision if the safety of the flight is in queston.
I am not second guessing the crew nor am a suggesting that anyone here is. We will never have all the facts. The best we can do is learn from this tragedy.
Some of the earlier posts were extreamly critical of the 60. To me its like an excentric uncle. I can make fun of him but if anyone else says anything they better watch their a$$. The 60 (as a lot of other planes I would assume) is a mix recent and ancient technology. Lets not forget that the basis for the lear came from that old fighter (what was it swiss or spanish I think) that Bill Lear got a hold of. Among other things the 60 had the old brakes (including antiskid), a modified verison of the wing, and a plug stuck in a 55 fuselage to make it longer. But up front it had fairly recent (in the case of the XR very recent) avionics, and in the back it of course had those wonderful PW305A'a with FADEC. No it would pass cert if it was put up for it today but that does not mean that it is unsafe. On the contrary it has been a very safe airplane. Like most aircraft it has its own idiosyncrasies that you have to nake yourself aware. While there have been accidents this was the first to include fatalities.
Fly Safe and RIP to the fallen crew.

 

[AviateYou]

CAUTION someone mentined how important tire pressure checking is. I agree! He also mentioned 180 PSI for a Lear 55 or 60... 180 PSI is too low (around 20% low)for a 60 main! and maybe reason to change both tires due to side wall over stress. Please check your AFM or AMM for the correct values before servicing! Also check you tires cold, not after moving the airplane from the fuel farm. Hot tires read high, don't adjust. The Goodyear 14 ply tires have weep holes in them for mfg or seating reasons. They do lose presure over time and new tires lose pressure for a week or so due to strecting. Ask you mec for a copy of the tire section in chpt 32-40-xx
Yea, I too have seen a few pilots kick a 14 ply tire to check it, I just shake my head.....

That's correct. Thank you. I did not say the tire pressures were the same - they varie with both aircraft as the 60 has a higher MTOW. Checked cold. The tires are the same application under Goodyears Aircraft Tire Website. So please make sure you get the Nitrogen pressures from the Learjet Service Manual from your Director of Maintenance or Maintenance Facility. The stretch check is to be completed at 24 hours per our 55 Learjet service manual for new tires. Nitrogen's positive attributes are that it's a larger gas molecule and that allows for a decrease over time in loss of pressure versus compressed air. Because no oxygen is present, Nitrogen is not conducive to corrosion. It has better thermodynamic characteristics and is less resistant to heat and cold expansion and deflation.

 

[Club ORD FO]

Any recent news come out? There should be a prelim soon, if not already

 

[ultrarunner]

Yes, the prelim is out. You can read it at ntsb.gov. Gives no new information.

 

[FlyingPieceOfSt]

Last time I checked drag chutes were very ineffective at low speeds. Deploying the drag chute immediatley after landing with a hydraulic or similar emergency is one thing that a drag chute works very effectively in reducing initial speed. Having a blowout of a tire and no brakes below a hundred knots and the aerodynamic drag that takes place before a pilot's cranium kicks into gear to deploy the chute is not going to save the day once deployed at those speeds.

My two cents.

 

[ableone]

Any high drag devise is more effective at high speeds.

I believe that drag effect decreases with speed at a four to one ratio.

I was taught that the lear and falcon drag chutes were not really worth deploying at speeds less than 80 or even 100 KIAS.

 

[AviateYou]

Any high drag devise is more effective at high speeds.

I believe that drag effect decreases with speed at a four to one ratio.

I was taught that the lear and falcon drag chutes were not really worth deploying at speeds less than 80 or even 100 KIAS.

The drag chute is effective from 150 KIAS to even below 60 KIAS per the Learjet 35/55 as per the Flight Safety Technical Manual Chapter Page 17-9.

 

[Papa Woody]

Drag shoot?

Shotgun!

 

[stknrdr]

God Speed Jim

I appreciate the technical analysis of the crash; pilots learn from the disasters that claim others and we all hope our turn in the barrel doesn't come anywhere near V1. Thanks for those that were brief, professional, and informative.

Now, a small tribute to Jim (I'm sorry I didn't know the CoCapt).

Jim was a smiling face around Carlsbad Palomar airport. He was upbeat and, like most pilots, loved all kinds of aircraft. He flew props, jets and even turbine helos for CBP in the fight to keep our borders safe and drugs away from our citizens. He even worked selling airplanes on the side through his small business in California.

I once saw Jim fly a state away to ride in a plane he sold with the new owner so the guy would feel more comfortable getting to know the aircraft, and operating all the glass features in his new piston Cessna. That's just the kind of guy Jim was.

I used to receive calls out of the blue from Jim, like I'm sure those of you who were his friends got, where he would just be checking in with you and wondering how you were. He would give you the shirt off his back if you needed it and never ask why.

Aviation had a great loss in a genuine Aviator the day Jim B. went on to bluer skies. A quiet professional and true to the brotherhood of men/women that take to the air to reach their goals.

God Speed Jim B. You will be missed my many.

 

[400A]

I appreciate the technical analysis of the crash; pilots learn from the disasters that claim others and we all hope our turn in the barrel doesn't come anywhere near V1. Thanks for those that were brief, professional, and informative.

Now, a small tribute to Jim (I'm sorry I didn't know the CoCapt).

Jim was a smiling face around Carlsbad Palomar airport. He was upbeat and, like most pilots, loved all kinds of aircraft. He flew props, jets and even turbine helos for CBP in the fight to keep our borders safe and drugs away from our citizens. He even worked selling airplanes on the side through his small business in California.

I once saw Jim fly a state away to ride in a plane he sold with the new owner so the guy would feel more comfortable getting to know the aircraft, and operating all the glass features in his new piston Cessna. That's just the kind of guy Jim was.

I used to receive calls out of the blue from Jim, like I'm sure those of you who were his friends got, where he would just be checking in with you and wondering how you were. He would give you the shirt off his back if you needed it and never ask why.

Aviation had a great loss in a genuine Aviator the day Jim B. went on to bluer skies. A quiet professional and true to the brotherhood of men/women that take to the air to reach their goals.

God Speed Jim B. You will be missed my many.

sounds like a great guy. Nice Tribute

 

[Gear Up!]

Fly91, A drunk friend?? Come on, is that the best you can come up with???

 

[Basil]

Anybody see Bombardier's Advisory Wire 32-045 issued on 10/13/2008? It highlights the importance of correct tire servicing. Interesting timing.

 

[Basil]

latest from the NTSB...

NTSB Identification: DCA08MA098Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & CommuterAccident occurred Friday, September 19, 2008 in Columbia, SCAircraft: Learjet LR60, registration: N999LJInjuries: 4 Fatal, 2 Serious.This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.On September 19, 2008, at about 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) overran runway 11 while departing Columbia Metropolitan Airport (CAE), Columbia, South Carolina. The airplane had arrived about 40 minutes earlier to pick up the passengers, two popular musicians and their support staff, and proceed to Van Nuys, California. The flight was operated by Global Exec Aviation as a non-scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 135. Tire debris and portions of airplane. components were found along the 8,600 foot runway. According to witnesses and initial information, the beginning of the takeoff roll appeared normal, then sparks were observed as the airplane traveled along the runway. At about 136 knots, the crew attempted to reject the takeoff, however they were unable to stop the airplane before exiting the runway. The airplane continued beyond the runway blast pad and through the approximately 1,000 foot runway safety area while striking airport lighting, navigation facilities, a perimeter fence and concrete marker posts. The airplane then crossed a roadway and came to rest where it struck an embankment on the far side of the road.The 2 crewmembers and 2 of the 4 passengers were fatally injured, the other 2 passengers suffered serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by extensive post-crash fire. There was also damage to the airport lighting, a navigation antenna array; and perimeter fencing.The accident captain held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a Lear 60 type rating and had logged approximately 3,140 hours total flight time and approximately 35 hours in Lear 60 airplanes. The accident First Officer held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a Lear 60 type rating and had logged approximately 8,200 hours total flight time and approximately 300 hours in Lear 60 airplanes.The Learjet model 60 is a twin engine business jet with a nominal 8 passenger capacity. Records shows the date of manufacture for N999LJ was January 30, 2007. The airplane was purchased by the current owner on October 25, 2007 and the operator began to use the airplane for charter flights about six weeks before the accident. The airplane had logged less than 120 flight hours total. The airplane was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW305A engines, rated at a maximum 4679 pounds of thrust.A Special weather observation taken by the control tower at the time of the accident indicated the winds were from 060 degrees at 7 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles under clear skies, temperature 19 degrees Celsius, dewpoint 13 degrees Celsius, and the sea level barometric pressure was 30.23 inches of mercury.Columbia Metropolitan Airport Runway 11/29 was 8601 feet in length and 150 feet in width with a grooved asphalt surface. The runway safety area was 1,000 feet in length and 500 feet in width. At the time of the accident, the intersecting runway (05/23) was 8,001 feet in length and 150 feet in width, and was closed due to construction.The airplane came to rest along a southeasterly orientation, nose-up on the side of a hill of approximately 25-30 degree slope. With the exception of all three landing gear, right delta fin, and right wing flap, all major airplane assemblies were found in the expected orientations. The top and right side of the fuselage had burned away to about the level of the cabin floor. The aft fuselage was mostly consumed by fire as far aft as the localizer antenna on the vertical stabilizer. The first piece of tire debris was observed about 2300 feet from the departure end of runway 11. Numerous other piece of tire debris were located along the runway. Prior to the first piece of tire, five small pieces of broken taxiway reflector adhesive were found. Tire and skid marks could be followed on the runway and were spaced 100 inches apart (8’ 4”) consistent with the spacing between the centers of the inboard left and outboard right wheels. Before reaching about 3400 foot of remaining runway, the left and right main gear tire rims scarred the runway surface.The marks led past the runway and through four rows of gravel at the bases of the instrument landing system antenna components. Approximately 150 feet past the end of the pavement, near the first set of lights, the main landing gear pistons and wheel sets with the brake assemblies were found. The right main landing gear (squat) micro-switch was found on the grass near the main landing gear with short pieces of wire remaining. The left squat switch was also found on the grass, but with no wires.The wheel sets were found with very little rubber other than tire beads attached. Grinding and friction damage was evident on all wheel and brake assemblies, with the most severe damage on the right outboard, and diminishing somewhat across to the left outboard. The right outboard wheel halves had the edges of both bead flanges ground completely away. The tire beads were missing. The general bottom features of the brake assembly were ground flat and the bottom of the ground area of the assembly exhibited heat-bluing. The hydraulic lines had extensive damage.Preliminary examination of the right PW305A engine revealed that the accident exposed inlet guide vanes (IGV) and reference to a manufacturer’s chart showed the orientations were consistent with high power. The thrust reversers were in the retracted/stowed orientations.The main cabin door was found closed and latched. The aft exit and fuselage area was destroyed by fire, however, the exit handle and one pin-type latch were found in debris. Both were in the open or unlatched position. One of the surviving passengers reported no difficulty opening the exit.The operator, Global Exec Aviation, was established in 2002, in Long Beach, CA. GEA provides jet management and on-demand charter services. The company has approximately 20 employees including 11 pilots, and operated 9 airplanes including Gulfstreams, and a Falcon 50, Citation 650 and the Lear. GEA had no prior accidents recorded in the NTSB database.Parties to the investigation include the FAA, Learjet, Global Exec Aviation, Pratt and Whitney Canada, TSB-Canada, and Goodyear