Travis Barker - 4 killed, 2 hurt as rock star's jet crashes

[WTF]

briefs

Concerning the earlier discussion of high/low speed aborts (this is only what I have seen and I am in no way being critical of these crew members) everyone always gives the "standard" brief. Nevertheless the vast majority will abort for AHS,ADC,PFD failures and so forth. Secondly you dont always know its a tire failure (no annunciator for it). What if it was a flight control issue. They had only seconds to decide. While most people would be ok taking off after 80/90 kts with a blown tire they would not with a flight controll malf. Going back to what I said earlier most people abort for anything and the whole "band,swerve,or bell" goes out the window as soon as something abnormal happens. Ultimatly the PIC's decision if the safety of the flight is in queston.

Good post USC. In my post about briefing and doind what you briefed I should have made the disclaimer as you did, that ultimatley it is the PIC making a decision. I too do not know what they saw out that front window as they heard the "pop" off a tire blow. I was just describing what I saw and felt the 2 times it happened to me. I hate speculation , and I hate when people think every situatuion is the same or similar. I know that I felt the tire blow and we slid left as we were going down the runway, in looking back, I knew we were going no matter what, even if we traversed throuch the grass slighly while still moving forward. Stopping was not an option, we were about 1.5 seconds from being able to fly, with 2 powerful engines still propelling us forward. Get up, get clean and discuss options later. That was our mindset.

I think briefing for an engine failure, fire, tr deployment, loss of dir control or a major airframe issue and then doing an abort for an AHS or PFD failure, tire pop, bird stike.....the list goes on, only puts the gray back into a black and white mentality that we should have in these critical seconds. Thats what they are seconds. 2 good engines, a good wing and forward momentum and it should be a go all the time unless one of the briefed items comes into play. We truely are seconds from getting in the air. A red blink and a master caution annunciating a door light or similar should not trigger a roll back in power.

I like what you said, We will NEVER know the whole situation. Accidents and incidents are only beneficial in one way way, and that is to spark conversation, reflection and the chance to hear others somment on what theyhave done, would do, or should do in a similar situation. But not at the expense of questioning a crews decision.

Again good post and my prayers for the families involved.

 

[Club ORD FO]

more info here: http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S=9043949

It says the 2 pax who did not survived died from blunt force trauma, and the pilots from smoke inhalation.

I wonder who was sitting where, and which exit they used. They say that most people in an emergency automatically go for the door they entered through...

Edit: a picture shows the outer main cabin door handle in the closed/locked position... so I guess they did not go out that way

 

[ultrarunner]

actually your numbers there come to a ramp weight of 21000. Pretty heavy...

Opps...yep...too quick to add...

So yes, about 6000 min fuel for that trip depending up on wx.

So yes, it is likely the RTB to TEB was done at a pretty heavy landing weight, and our figures do not take into account pax and cargo.

Hmmmmm

 

[Club ORD FO]

A 20 minute clip of the NTSB news briefing can be found here: http://www.wltx.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=66348&catid=2

sundays briefing I think, not sure

 

[notapilot]

Notapilots post was from the NTSB report for the Jerry Jones Lear 60 crash.
I believe that there was a mod put on later aircraft (there is a list of S-B's available, ask at recurrent) that allows both TR's to deploy with only one squat switch in ground mode. Ill see if I can find it. Nevertheless if they stowed uncommanded the FADEC should roll them back to idle and making the piggybacks useless.

I am not picking on you, but the accident investigation found otherwise.

Normal operating procedures include deploying the thrust reversers within 4 to 6 seconds after landing. Pilots deploy thrust reversers (T/R) by raising piggyback levers located in the cockpit with the throttles. With the loss of the squat switch on the left main landing gear, the T/R relay box deenergized the deploy solenoid and the T/R's go to the stow position. The electronic engine control (EEC) commands the engine speed to go to idle. As the T/R's complete the stow cycle, the unlock switches open, signaling the T/R relay box to remove the discrete signals. The EEC's switch to the forward thrust schedule and within 2.6 seconds estimated, and if the piggybacks remain at the max reverse position the engines rpm begins to increase to near takeoff power.

I am in no way saying the 60 is a bad airplane or this was the cause. It is a strange similiarity. We all understand that we will know more in time, but accidents like this cause us all to think about systems and what ifs. That may be the only positive outcome of this tragedy.

If they blew a tire 2800 feet down the runway they would either abort or continue the takeoff. If they continued the take off and had some issue that prevented the airplane from rotating, it is likely that they may have realized this and eventually decided to abort. Similiarly in the TEB Strawberry crash after the aircraft would not rotate they did attempt to abort. I think it would be instinct to do so. So in either situation if an abort was made it seems strange that the TRs were not deployed. I would have a hard time believing that they would not have deployed the reversers at some point on the ground as they watched the end of the runway, fence and hill through the windshield fastly approaching. Especially since all 60 pilots know the brakes are the weak link. This would seem to support the same abnormality that happened in the J.J. crash. It would be deplorable if this problem was not fixed after the first accident and even more so if this likelyhood is not being discussed or trained in school.

Do any 60 crews know if there was a mod for this problem? It would have probably been in the last 5 years.

 

[notapilot]

I guess they were trying to abort. This info from The Star news.


National Transportation Safety Board member Debbie Hersman said Sunday that crew members told air traffic controllers they heard a tire burst and tried to abort the takeoff Friday night.
The cockpit voice recorder that was recovered Saturday is bringing new insight into what may have caused the crash. Officials weren't certain the data on the recorder would yield any big clues into what may have happened.
"As you know, there was a serious post-crash fire that occurred after the accident," Hersman said. "So, we are not certain whether or not there is any usable information on the cockpit voice recorder. We will have to wait until we get it into our lab in Washington to audition it and find out."
However, NSTB officials say the recordings are helping them piece together the moments before the crash.
"The crew attempted to reject the takeoff, but was unable to stop the aircraft before it departed the runway," Hersman said.

 

[LJPilot]

I was mistaken earlier. Both squat switches must be in ground mode to get any thrust reverse deployment. I shouldn't post when I'm tired.

 

[WTF]

Do any 60 crews know if there was a mod for this problem? It would have probably been in the last 5 years.

I have not heard of a mod, addressing or fixing this "problem" Last year in fact it was again brought up in recurrent and the instructor was emphasizing the importance of alertness as to what the aircraft is doing in this situation. He says 'You need to recognize quickly that the aircraft is in flight mode because the squats are shot and do what you can to either lay the piggy backs down and push the levers up and go, or pull everything back and get stopped.

IMO, if there is a mod, relocate the squats and the wiring harness that bends out in front of the mains, maybe behind. That would have taken the deer out of the equation.

 

[CFI4LIFE]

The anti-skid/brakes should work on either the inboards or outboards as long as one squat switch is in ground mode. Of course your sim scenario just sucks... I hope it didn't happen to these guys.

The autospoilers would only work with one squat switch out if it had a spin-up kit... however with just ONE switch in ground mode you can manually deploy the spoilers.

And if they were aborting they SHOULD have deployed the spoilers manually which SHOULD work regardless of squat switch position. A hydraulic failure would, however, cause all sorts of problems. Bad deal no matter what happened.

 

[starcheckdriver]

It is a very real possibility that the T/Rs were in a MEL status and strapped for this flight. The lack of T/R use may have nothing to do with a squat switch problem.