SWA lands at wrong Branson Airport

[waveflyer]

That's not what I said, clearly. But you've had no fatalities on your airplanes over the same time period that most other airlines have had at least some. My point is that that is luck, because your safety practices are certainly not superior to theirs. The overall radical improvement in safety industry-wide has definitely not been luck, which can be attributed to a lot of things.

I do assert that our practices are better, online, even if our programs are not. Our flying culture is better - the same one that you lament as 'unsafe' is exactly why I think we are safer. The "slow is safe, paid by the minute, over reliant on automation" crowd is far less safe than our group. While I support us embracing technology we have by far the best example of a "flying" culture- we DO NOT subscribe to button pusher airline culture and we've been better off for it. We do work hard and play hard and after viewing cultures at 6 airlines- I think we focus better and are less complacent because of it. Our "get the job done, taxi as fast as we can safely, be efficient" culture has precisely the opposite effect that you and the other critiques fear it will.
That and SWA doesn't reverse our sleep schedule, so while every other airline is operating at fatigue levels well beyond safe while they fly til midnight on day 1 and lobby at 5am on day 4- we either fly AM or PM which means we're much better rested overall.

My opinion only of course-

(But way more valid than your inexperienced ass pcl)
(How's that for a sissy response?! )

 

[SWA Bubba]

Well, lets see. Just since 2000, two disastrous runway overruns that could have been prevented by go-arounds, an airplane driven into the runway and wrecked at LGA because the CA wouldn't go-around, and now a crew rushes into landing at the wrong airport and narrowly averts a deadly overrun. Do you really not see how this keeps happening?

Maybe it happens at other airlines too, but that's their concern. We need to step back and see what it is that we need to change here at SWA before our luck runs out and we hurt someone.

Did you not read what I wrote (or what you wrote, for that matter)?

These are not the "same type of incident." Even the two that were similar had completely different causes. And nobody has denied them, or excused them, and Southwest has indeed studied them, learned from them, and changed because of them:

BUR- the worst example of a pilot error. The captain completely dicked it away, and the FO didn't stop him. Resultant Southwest changes: complete overhaul of procedures and checklists to mitigate risks (SNORT), reworked stabilized approach criteria, and enhanced CRM procedures and training to ensure both pilots are proactive, especially in the area of calling a go-around.

MDW- a confluence of a lot of internal and external factors. They touched down on speed, exactly where they should have, so your claim that "they should have gone around" is complete BS on your part. After a normal touchdown, they didn't get the reversers out soon enough because one thrust lever was unknowingly slightly out of idle; the airport-advertised braking action of "fair," was actually "poor-to-nil" for the second half of the runway; and nobody knew at the time, but the OPC had different performance parameters then the data we got from Boeing. Resultant Southwest changes: training and procedural changes on autobrake usage; investigation that led to new Boeing data on stopping margin with/without reverser credit; and finally, Southwest got the MDW airport authority to spend more money and change their procedures to ensure more accurate determination of braking action throughout the entire runway.

LGA and BRG- investigations not complete, so I don't know what the result will be yet.

So anyway, like I said before, tell me how these are all the "same type of incidents," and how "no one's trying to figure what we're doing wrong." It's like you don't really know the first thing about any of these incidents. And you're claiming that you work for Southwest?

Tell you what, Nindiri: why don't you step back, use your superior intellect, and explain to us why these incidents are "exactly the same," and how we can address them, since, obviously, nobody else at Southwest seems to care about safety. Please save us, Nindiri.

Or, keep on randomly bitching anonymously like you seem to to do best. And keep ignoring any facts; they only get in your way.

Bubba

 

[Dan Roman]

.
That and SWA doesn't reverse our sleep schedule, so while every other airline is operating at fatigue levels well beyond safe while they fly til midnight on day 1 and lobby at 5am on day 4- we either fly AM or PM which means we're much better rested overall.

Not gonna jump in on this debate ( SWA is not "better") but under the new regs, as I understand it, our (Hawaiian) inter-island pilots can no longer string together all AM's or all PM's. As you said, it makes sense to stay on either a PM or AM schedule. Under pt 117, on day 3, AM's have to switch to PM's to be legal. Major failing of PT 117, it created a more fatiguing schedule.

 

[waveflyer]

Why do you say that Dan?

And ndiri-
What bubba said- your post seemed like obvious flame to me it's that far out in left field

 

[Nindiri]

Did you not read what I wrote (or what you wrote, for that matter)?

These are not the "same type of incident." Even the two that were similar had completely different causes. And nobody has denied them, or excused them, and Southwest has indeed studied them, learned from them, and changed because of them:

BUR- the worst example of a pilot error. The captain completely dicked it away, and the FO didn't stop him. Resultant Southwest changes: complete overhaul of procedures and checklists to mitigate risks (SNORT), reworked stabilized approach criteria, and enhanced CRM procedures and training to ensure both pilots are proactive, especially in the area of calling a go-around.

MDW- a confluence of a lot of internal and external factors. They touched down on speed, exactly where they should have, so your claim that "they should have gone around" is complete BS on your part. After a normal touchdown, they didn't get the reversers out soon enough because one thrust lever was unknowingly slightly out of idle; the airport-advertised braking action of "fair," was actually "poor-to-nil" for the second half of the runway; and nobody knew at the time, but the OPC had different performance parameters then the data we got from Boeing. Resultant Southwest changes: training and procedural changes on autobrake usage; investigation that led to new Boeing data on stopping margin with/without reverser credit; and finally, Southwest got the MDW airport authority to spend more money and change their procedures to ensure more accurate determination of braking action throughout the entire runway.

LGA and BRG- investigations not complete, so I don't know what the result will be yet.

So anyway, like I said before, tell me how these are all the "same type of incidents," and how "no one's trying to figure what we're doing wrong." It's like you don't really know the first thing about any of these incidents. And you're claiming that you work for Southwest?

Tell you what, Nindiri: why don't you step back, use your superior intellect, and explain to us why these incidents are "exactly the same," and how we can address them, since, obviously, nobody else at Southwest seems to care about safety. Please save us, Nindiri.

Or, keep on randomly bitching anonymously like you seem to to do best. And keep ignoring any facts; they only get in your way.

Bubba

You asked for examples of pilots trying to rationalize and explain these incidents away. Your post here is a perfect example. You go on and on about people "bitching", but you fail to explain why these incidents keep happening. It's not about placing blame here, Bubba, it's about identifying what we're doing wrong and fixing it before someone gets hurt again.

 

[SWA Bubba]

You asked for examples of pilots trying to rationalize and explain these incidents away. Your post here is a perfect example. You go on and on about people "bitching", but you fail to explain why these incidents keep happening. It's not about placing blame here, Bubba, it's about identifying what we're doing wrong and fixing it before someone gets hurt again.

Whatever you say, Nindiri.

Yes, I asked for examples of "rationalizing" or "explaining away" incidents. However, you didn't actually give any such examples. The only thing that my post is only a perfect example of, is pointing out that you're characterization was completely off-base. In the examples you cited, I gave specifics on how Southwest was doing exactly what you said they didn't do: they studied and identified the pertinent issues in these incidents (i.e. "what we're doing wrong") and made procedural and operational changes as a result (i.e. "fixing it before someone gets hurt again"). I'm sorry that you have such a serious reading comprehension problem, but I'm not sure how I can put it any simpler: you were wrong.

Why don't you actually educate yourself on the actual history of these incidents, and the changes Southwest has made over the last 15 years, before you spout off random crap? Just a suggestion.

Bubba

 

[Ty Webb]

Bubba and Wave-

I don't think Nindiri is flaming; I think he is being sincere. Many of the pilots who have transitioned over have expressed surprise and dismay at the lack of use of some of the technology that makes operating in todays' ATC environment safer and easier. I'm betting you will see these becoming SOP at SWA, but they don't seem to be yet.

A couple of examples-

IAN approaches- much more stabilized approach for nonprecision approaches

Deselecting Speed Mode- instead of disconnecting autothrottles entirely, it retains Alpha floor protection

Level Change- Maintain ATC assigned speed while descending in the terminal area (unlike Vert Speed)

If you haven't sat on the jumpseat of another 737 operator to see how they are doing things, I would highly recommend it. You may be quite surprised.

PS, Wave spare me the stories about your hairy-chested manly flying skills. :laugh:

 

[madjack]

We just fly the plane like the company says to...

 

[Dan Roman]

Why do you say that Dan?

And ndiri-
What bubba said- your post seemed like obvious flame to me it's that far out in left field

Because SWA is not "better" than the rest of the industry. Note I didn't say worse either. Airlines go through good periods or bad. Look at Delta in the 90's. Anyone thumping their chest about being better than anyone else is wrong. Right now SWA is making the news for all the wrong reasons, LGA and Branson. It could happen to any of us. We have a superior safety record than you. So what. It doesn't mean we are better. Hawaiian is doing a lot right right now, but I would hardly be smug about it.

Back to the AM's in row. Have you found that you can't do 3 days in a row of AM departures under the new regs? I don't do inter-island but that's what I heard.

 

[humveedriver]

Bubba and Wave-

I don't think Nindiri is flaming; I think he is being sincere. Many of the pilots who have transitioned over have expressed surprise and dismay at the lack of use of some of the technology that makes operating in todays' ATC environment safer and easier. I'm betting you will see these becoming SOP at SWA, but they don't seem to be yet.

A couple of examples-

IAN approaches- much more stabilized approach for nonprecision approaches

Deselecting Speed Mode- instead of disconnecting autothrottles entirely, it retains Alpha floor protection

Level Change- Maintain ATC assigned speed while descending in the terminal area (unlike Vert Speed)

If you haven't sat on the jumpseat of another 737 operator to see how they are doing things, I would highly recommend it. You may be quite surprised.

PS, Wave spare me the stories about your hairy-chested manly flying skills. :laugh:

Something I have come to appreciate having transition is that your procedures can be a lot more standardized when you have standardized aircraft fleets. Having two glass airplanes (717 and 737 ) is better than a fleet of steam and glass 737s. When the last -300 leaves the Max will be on property and we will still have some antiquated procedure because it's the -700s fault. Speaking of level change. The -300's chase airspeed in the descent like the 717 does in the climb. Two great examples of when v/s delivers smoother performance.