Safety of regionals

[LowlyPropCapt]

Wait a month and see how much people are chatting about the news helos. My guess is it will all blow over.

We do one of two things in this country in response to shocking accidents/incidents. We either forget about them quickly or kneejerk into stupid ineffective responses (ala TSA).

 

[KeroseneSnorter]

Issues I have seen lately.

1. Young Captains afraid to say no to bad fuel loads.
2. F/O's with little to no high speed aerodynamic or high altitude training.
3. Captains with above problem.
4. Regional airplanes running routes well outside of their "optimal" range. Meaning that if an alternate is needed a divert due to fuel is almost a given.
5. Younger Captains ignoring the planned speeds and running the A/C at near redline. Then landing and wondering why they are almost out of gas. Adds to problem #4
6. Several instances of Mach buffet (overspeed for the condition) while commuting or deadheading. When queried about it, in a nice conversational way, the crew was oblivious to the fact that it was airframe vibration instead of turbulence. See problem #2 Very obvious to most pilots with any amount of jet time. Remember metal fatigue is cumulitive.
7. Relying on automation too much, have seen several letting the airplane get further and further out of shape while farting around with the auto pilot trying to make it do what they want instead of just flying the freaking thing.
8. As a jumpseater I witnessed a Captain giving his F/O a hard time about this and that on the release, gave him a 5 minute dissertation on tail numbers, W/B issues, scolded him because he did not do the W/B fast enough etc. Then proceeded to launch into an area of thunderstorms without ever looking at wx or fuel load other than it matched what the release said. Passing through 15k he finally looked at his F/O and said "Hey did you happen to look at the wx at XXX?" (destination) He was so caught up in schooling his F/O that the guy forgot all about what his job as Captain was supposed to be. He couldn't even tell you if he needed an ALT since he didn't bother to look. (He needed it, but didn't have one) I have since marked that airline off my list for family travel or commuting.

There are issues that we need to address in the industry, however pay and QOL has got so bad that nobody seems to have time to look at safety. I am kind of surprised that we have been as accident free as we have. My guess is the glass cockpits have a lot to do with it.

Just an opinion.

 

[great cornholio]

There are issues that we need to address in the industry, however pay and QOL has got so bad that nobody seems to have time to look at safety. I am kind of surprised that we have been as accident free as we have. My guess is the glass cockpits have a lot to do with it.

Just an opinion.

I was in the sim a few months ago and was talking to the sim instructor about that. He was saying that the way the new hires are that he had been getting lately that its a good thing we don't fly turboprops anymore because these new guys would probably make a lot of turboprops fall out of the sky. But since we have so much automation on the EMB 145 that it has more than likely kept at least one accident from happening.

 

[DiverDriver]

The NTSB will never cite "lack of experience" as a probable cause or even a casual factor. If the crew meets the minimums set by the FAA and the airline, it would be treated as any 20,000-hour crew having a wreck. Yes, folks, the regionals are in the armpit of aviation.

This has already happened. Low time CA in type. Low time FO. At night at ROA. No, the NTSB did not out n out say low time caused this accident but it seems steeped in the body of the report.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20011030X02159&key=1

NTSB Identification: NYC02LA013.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of Mesa Airlines (D.B.A. US Airways Express)
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 16, 2001 in Roanoke, VA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/25/2003
Aircraft: Embraer 145LR, registration: N825MJ
Injuries: 33 Uninjured.

The captain briefed a "no go-around" for a night visual approach to a "Special Airport." The approach was not stabilized, and the airspeed decreased to the point of a stall. The airplane struck the runway in a nose high pitch attitude, on the aft fuselage, and settled on the landing gear. The first officer made initial callouts of slow airspeed and then stopped when the captain failed to respond to her callouts. After landing, the airplane was taxied to the gate where a post flight inspection limited to the main landing gear did not find the damage. When interviewed, the captain reported that she briefed "no go-around" because no takeoffs were authorized on the runway at night or in IMC conditions; however, the first officer knew this was incorrect, but did not challenge the captain. Both pilots had received CRM training, which included crewmember assertiveness, methods of fostering crew input, and situational awareness, and training on special use airports; however it was not followed by either pilot. The captain's handling of the airplane was outside the parameters specified in the company manuals. Both pilots were described to having good flying skills. The captain said the first officer was passive and quiet. The first officer reported the captain was defensive and did not take criticism very well. A definition of stabilized approach criteria was not found in the company manuals. An FAA Advisory Circular dated August 10, 2000 defined stabilized approach criteria, and actions to be taken if the approach was not stabilized.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
the captain's failure to maintain airspeed which resulted in an inadvertent stall/mush, and hard landing. Factors were the failure of both pilots to follow company CRM and flight manual procedures, and the captains improper approach briefing.

 

[CoAlpha]

classic story!! what happened to those two mesa girls?

 

[DiverDriver]

classic story!! what happened to those two mesa girls?

Someone correct me if I have this wrong but what happened after the hard landing was that the CA DID NOT write up a hard landing. Another crew showed to the plane in the morning and didn't see the 10 foot by 3 foot scrape on the belly of the tail. It flew to CLT where another crew did a preflight and said "WTF is this!"

 

[flyingfool]

Regional airlines are statistically much safer then major’s just because when they crash less people are killed. Simple mental math for pilots.

 

[Papps]

That would be an awsome company slogan for any regional

 

[flyburg]

Well,

IMVHO US trianing is some of the best in the world. An opinion that is often repeated by some of the very same posters here when it comes to foreign pilots and their inadequate training whenever there is an accident abroad. Then, all of the sudden the US system is the best ( and to stop all discussion right here, I think it is the CPL/IR isn't much but the 121 training is very good indeed)

I can't help but think that a lot of the expressions given here are a frustration about one's own difficulties about getting the job when jobs were not that easy to get.

To give a personal story, I got hired by a major regional in '95 right after a big hiring boom. I was at the tail end. Guys that hired 3 months before me made captain within a year, I had to wait 3 years. I got hired with 2500 hours including 500 ME flying for an on demand freight company. This one day(at band camp) I flew with this guy that got hired straight out of university just 3 months prior to me with 1200 hrs and he started giving me ******************** about how everybody had to pay their dues before making CPT!!!

There's are reason these topics only come up in the regional section.....frustration!!

Lighten up already

 

[wscrj]

And so it goes...

classic story!! what happened to those two mesa girls?

Ahhh...."Youngblood" at its finest, eh?