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Public release on Dover C-5 crash

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Beertini said:
C'mon kev--who has the 800+ posts? :) Besides, what else am I supposed to do on a layover in Mumbai?

(Also, I firmly believe in doing your homework before making a personal accusation. I know that flies in the face of the FI "way," but have you ever been to Mumbai?:eek:).

Beertini

I hope you have high-speed over there, lol.
 
dojetdriver said:
True. But a few (notice I said a few) mil type guys walk around with their chests stuck out, bragging about how great the military training is compared to the civilian training and that only the top gun-best of the best-super pilots can cut it in the military. And how good they are compared to civ pilots, how with a mil pilot you getting a "known quantity" blah blah blah.

I have no idea what kind of training you received, how long it took, or what else you had going on while learning to fly. For all I know, you had a college buddy give you flying lessones in exchange for low cost dime bags and acceptance into the Friday night Dungeons and Dragons club!!! Though Im pretty sure you busted your butt getting to where you are today, and mad respect for the civies who truly earn their way!!!

But guess what, you know exactly what my military training consisted of! One thing is for sure, I never had to worry about how to pay for my next flying lesson, never once had to pimp myself out to pass a checkride (thought about it), and realized by the age of 22 that I had achieved my primary career objective...to fly planes. So yes, I am a known quantity!!!
 
dojetdriver said:
True. But a few (notice I said a few) mil type guys walk around with their chests stuck out, bragging about how great the military training is compared to the civilian training and that only the top gun-best of the best-super pilots can cut it in the military. And how good they are compared to civ pilots, how with a mil pilot you getting a "known quantity" blah blah blah.

Were those mil guys you are referring to naval aviators by any chance? The Navy guys tend to have a bit higher PSI on the ego, and I have on a few occasions had to listen while a naval aviator regaled me with tales of how his training was so superior to anything in the civilian world. The USAF pilots I have worked with tend to be much more down to earth.
 
HarryShadow said:
I have no idea what kind of training you received, how long it took, or what else you had going on while learning to fly. For all I know, you had a college buddy give you flying lessones in exchange for low cost dime bags and acceptance into the Friday night Dungeons and Dragons club!!! Though Im pretty sure you busted your butt getting to where you are today, and mad respect for the civies who truly earn their way!!!

But guess what, you know exactly what my military training consisted of! One thing is for sure, I never had to worry about how to pay for my next flying lesson, never once had to pimp myself out to pass a checkride (thought about it), and realized by the age of 22 that I had achieved my primary career objective...to fly planes. So yes, I am a known quantity!!!

Dude, you quoted my post so I ASSume you read it. I said a few, then emphasized by repeating it again in parenthes. By doing so I meant just that, a few.
 
dojetdriver said:
Dude, you quoted my post so I ASSume you read it. I said a few, then emphasized by repeating it again in parenthes. By doing so I meant just that, a few.

A few...got it!
 
Fearless Tower said:
The USAF pilots I have worked with tend to be much more down to earth.

That's because they don't land on a pitching carrier deck or fly at two hundred feet off the water with an engine shutdown!
 
dojetdriver said:
Good, I'm glad that somebody was able to read/comprehend the original post.

Read and comprehended...but Im still a known quantity, and now know this...this thread is getting old!!!
 
Air Force Times Story of Crash

I know that several stories have been posted, but this one has some CVR statements.....gives some indication as to what was going on between the crewmembers.

Cockpit crew blamed for C-5 crash

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]By Randall Chase[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Associated Press[/FONT]

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][/FONT]
[FONT=Times New Roman, Times, serif]DOVER, Del. — Human error is to blame for the crash of a giant C-5 cargo plane at Dover Air Force Base, military officials said Tuesday.
Investigators said the cockpit crew made three critical errors after declaring an emergency shortly after takeoff on April 3.



http://ads5.mconetwork.com/RealMedi...airforce.gif/34336234313431653434613465633330


Investigators found “clear and convincing evidence” that the crew tried to throttle-up an engine they had shut down while not utilizing a fully operational engine, used flap settings that resulted in too much drag, and selected the wrong type of approach for the conditions they faced.

After receiving a false indication that the thrust reverser on one of the engines was unlocked, the crew of the C-5B Galaxy shut down the engine and tried to return to base. The aircraft stalled about a mile from the runway, clipped a telephone pole and plowed into an open field, breaking into three sections.

All 17 people aboard the aircraft, which was laden with jet fuel and carrying supplies for U.S. troops in the Middle East, survived.

The two pilots at the controls of the plane were Capt. Brian LaFreda and Lt. Col. Harland Nelson. A third pilot, Lt. Col. Robert Moorman, was sitting in a jump seat behind them. The veteran cockpit crew also included two flight engineers. The three pilots collectively had more than 10,000 hours flying time in the C-5, as did the two flight engineers in the cockpit.

The plane belonged to the 436th Airlift Wing, the active duty unit at Dover, but was being flown by a crew from the 512th Airlift Wing, a reserve unit.
“This crew developed a lack of situational awareness and complacency, “ said Col. Ray Torres, head of the accident investigation board.

Torres said the fate of the cockpit crew, none of whom has flown since the crash, is outside the scope of the investigation board. The board’s report will be referred to their commanders, he said.

“We are premature on making any statement on the crew, whether the crew will ever fly again or not,” said Col. David Wuest, vice commander of the 512th Airlift Wing.

Wuest said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Mosely had signed off on the accident report, but that it remains to be determined who will make the decisions regarding the fate of the crew members.

“It will be in the chain of command,” Wuest said.

Dover Air Force Base spokeswoman Lt. Col. Cheryl Law said all of the crew members had been offered the opportunity to speak to the media, and that all declined.

Delaware’s congressional delegation, Democratic Sens. Joseph Biden and Thomas Carper and Republican Rep. Mike Castle, released a statement expressing confidence in the safety of the C-5 fleet. They noted, as did Torres, that there was no evidence that new cockpit avionics equipment with which the aging fleet is being outfitted played any role in the crash.
“We found no linkage between the update to the cockpit and the causes of this accident,” Torres said.

The crash occurred after a cockpit signal indicated, falsely, that a thrust reverser on the No. 2 engine was unlocked. Following procedure, the crew shut down the engine and turned back for the base, idling the other three engines to “reconfigure” the aircraft and prepare for descent.
When re-throttling the engines, however, LaFreda mistakenly throttled up No. 2, which was shut down, instead of No. 3, which remained fully operational, yet idling. The other two pilots and the two flight engineers failed to notice the mistake.

Compounding the error, the crew used a full flap approach. Using flap settings of 62.5 percent or 40 percent, instead of 100 percent, would have lessened drag on the 730,000-pound aircraft, which was about 100,000 pounds heavier than the normal landing weight. Investigators said a 40 percent flap setting would have boosted airspeed by about 20 knots on final approach to 166 knots.

According to the cockpit voice recorder, Nelson told LaFreda about 45 seconds before the crash that the aircraft was a “little slow,” and that a “lot of power” was needed. After confirming that the airspeed was too slow, LaFreda called for “flaps 40,” but followed up immediately with “Aw, disregard, don’t do that yet.”

Meanwhile, the two flight engineers were talking to themselves about why a 40 percent flap setting was not being flown.

“Guys, I’m concerned,” LaFreda said as an alarm signaled an altitude of 300 feet.

At about one mile out, with the plane traveling at about 127 knots and an altitude of about 150 feet, the crew finally reduced flaps to 40 percent, which resulted in the aircraft stalling.

In addition to not using the No. 3 engine and setting the flaps incorrectly, the crew also mistakenly tried a visual approach to the runway, bringing the C-5 well below the normal glide path for an instrument approach or the normal visual flight rules pattern altitude.

Finally, investigators found “substantial evidence” that LaFreda did not provide a complete approach briefing to the crew, which may have resulted in crew members raising questions that might have averted the crash.
Torres said numerous simulator tests indicated that, with the same flap settings and approach used by the crew, the crash could have been avoided had the No. 3 engine been throttled up as late as 300 feet above the ground. Similarly, even with only two engines working, a reduced flap setting would have resulted in a safe landing. A safe landing also could have been achieved, with only two engines and at full flaps, had the crew used an instrument landing approach to a different runaway or even a “non-precision” instrument approach to the runway they selected, investigators determined.

“Clearly there was complacency, and clearly a lack of situational awareness,” Torres said. “Our crews are highly trained. This is not normal behavior for our crew members.”
[/FONT]
 
It may have been mentioned in the thread already (I don't think I saw it), but there's a video floating around that has the accident FDR and CVR data produced by the MAAF, similar to what the NTSB puts out for accident animations.

Interesting to say the least. Monday morning it, it's painful to see the thrust lever swap...
 

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