I have a question that no one else has raised
So I have this question nagging at me – I’ll get to that in a minute.
Not being a CRJ pilot I’m only going to base my comments on my experience. Now, in my experience getting an airplane with turbofan engines up to its maximum altitude at ISA+10 – even at lighter weights - is no simple job. Anyone who’s been up there in an airplane that was barely doing it knows this, and anyone flying for a regional airline doesn’t get to FL 410 often enough to have a natural feel for how their plane’s gonna behave on the way up to a level cruise. So whatever happened, it happened because of a combination of too little air and not enough thought put into the problem.
Now I’ll take aim at my question. The NTSB reports that:
NTSB said:
The FDR data show that the computed airspeed did not get above 300 knots and that there was no measured rotation of the engine core.
I’d like to know why not. You see, something no one’s brought up is the loss of pressurization that would have occurred with a double engine failure – particularly at FL 410. At that altitude with no inflow air the cabin would climb rapidly to dangerous altitudes. In short, this is a good occasion to consider some or all of an emergency descent. I’ve never flown a jet that wouldn’t hit 300 knots through about 28,000’ in an emergency descent.
So it seems as though an emergency descent wasn’t underway and it seems as though what might not have been recognized was the link between an emergency descent and getting the engines running again.
That comes from inexperience or complacency, or both.
Surely there is a dual engine flameout procedure for this aircraft. For those who fly this plane, what does it say you need to do? Just as surely, there must also be a loss of pressurization procedure. What does it say?
What I’d also be willing to bet is that there is no procedure to address the occurrence of a loss of pressurization due to a double flameout. So what does one do when this occurs? Answer: in the absence of an AFM procedure specifically addressing the problem, the pilot has to stitch the applicable pieces of multiple procedures together in a way that makes sense.
In this case getting to thicker air was the key to getting the pilots breathing better
and getting the engines running again, but it seems no one ever figured that out. Someone was focused trying to buy time by optimizing glide instead of focusing on getting back to fairly normal operational conditions (O2 masks off and both the engines running again).
This one’s gonna be pilot error. I don’t believe that anyone here really doubts that for a minute. It will illustrate, in the final analysis, that as pilots, we need to think a few situations through
before they happen to us rather than when the pressure is on. It will also illustrate that better knowledge of jet aircraft performance is a direct enhancement to operational safety.
TIS