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Pinnacle Flt 3701

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"GO AROUND"

Again?!?!?
Joined
Mar 15, 2005
Posts
949
I'm probably gonna get some hate mail for this but I think it needs to be said. If it already has then I guess I'm just not in the loop. Hopefully someone can glean something that might help them in the future to avoid a similar fate.

During my PC the other day I had a chance to read the full transcripts on flt 3701 and I was speechless at what actually happened and what the crew did and didn't do.

Being a CRJ Capt. I tried to read what I could to find out what happened to flt 3701 so that it might help me and I think I heard what most of us did. Too high, too slow, shaker, pusher, double engine flame out, unable to restart, crash. The biggest article that I have read to date is the one by ALPA blaming the crash on engine "CORE LOCK" and the fact that we as pilots are ignorant to this situation because the training department didn't give them this info. No mention of the numerous "PILOT ERROR" links in the error chain That got them to "CORE LOCK" were mentioned. Being a former TP FO and Capt I had to learn about Jet operations and High Alt. Ops just like everyone else and I was wondering if they were not taught, or just ignored what they were taught and if the other CRJ pilots out there are given instruction about these issues?

1. Climbing to FL410 at an airspeed as low as Vt?
I was taught 250 to 290 to .74, but never less than .70 in the climb.
If you can't maintain .70 and 300fpm you are done climbing and probably
need to descend back down.
2. Swapping Seats??????
Yes, by the transcripts the FO was in the left and the Capt was in the right
seat. FO flying cause he has the only operating screens and trying to talk
the FO through the procedure and run the checklist at the same time.
3. Encountering the shaker and pusher not once, twice, but Five times and
not recovering? So that by the fifth time the nose was 30 degrees up and
blanketed the engines airflow causing them to flame out?
First thing I learned about the RJ was NEVER GET IT SLOW. The pusher is
not the end of a slow speed condition. The pilot has to mash the little red
button, push the nose over and recover the stall or it will more than
likely do what it did to them.
4. Never Communicating their problem to ATC initially, only asking for lower and
declaring the emergency later? I only have questions about this.
5. Never maintaing the proper airspeed in preperation for or during the engine
relight procedure? (Is it true pinnacle did not train for a double engine
failure sometime during sim training? This is what I heard.)
Our procedures have us maintain a target airpseed until ready to restart.
.70 above FL340 and 240kias below 340. Then accellerate to 300 min up to
335 during the restart. They never achieved the minimun speeds in either
phase.

I don't know if the final findings have come out yet but it seems to me that the engines and the core lock situation and the airplane are getting all the blame and noone is learning from the pilot errors.

I am far from Chuck Yeager and am still learning every day. No disrespect to the pilots or their families, I'm just trying to learn from an unfortunate situation.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Everything you said is true.

Did you actually expect Pinnacle to take the blame for this?

Pinnacle/Express Airlines has a history of incidents/accidents resulting from poor CRM and poor company leadership. They live, and unfortunately die, by using the deflection and blame game.

Did you expect ALPA to take the blame for this?

These pilots were among the most unprofessional in history based on what they did during this flight. Yet ALPA shifts the blame to "core lock" and claims the pilots did everything they could.

What these two clowns did is an embarrassment to our entire industry. Yet the blame will be deflected to Bombardier, GE, etc. and the true cause of this will forever be dilluted.

If Pinnacle were a half-assed decent company, they would own up to this.

If ALPA really had safety as their main interest, they would own up to this.

I'm not holding my breath.
 
ALPA blame a pilot for anything? That will never happen. Deflection, that's a good word for it..
 
You forgot to mention the 3 Barrel Rolls that they did during the initial climb out. Sad but true.
 
DetoXJ said:
You forgot to mention the 3 Barrel Rolls that they did during the initial climb out. Sad but true.

Please say you're kidding. I've never heard of this regarding 3701 before.
 
DetoXJ said:
You forgot to mention the 3 Barrel Rolls that they did during the initial climb out. Sad but true.

Actually, no, that is not true. Bank angle never exceded 80 degrees during the flight. The 80 degrees bank angle happened during the stall recovery. These guys certainly did enough stupid stuff on this flight, but let's not spread rumor around as fact to make it sound even worse.
 
Memo from MEC Chairman Wake Gordon


Re: Pinnacle flight 3701 accident


Date: June 13, 2005

I will caution you right now that you will become aware of certain facts which will not reflect well on the accident pilots, on you and your fellow pilots, or on the Company itself. Your first reaction may very well be to jump to the defense of any or all of these entities.


The following has been written by the Pinnacle Air Line Pilots Association’s Air Safety committee to inform the general pilot group about Pinnacle Flight 3701. The information contained in this document has been taken from the NTSB public docket and consolidated from almost 1,200 pages of reports and interview transcripts. The information contained herein is factual and contains no analysis.


Captain Jesse Rhodes was hired by Pinnacle Airlines on 2/24/03 as a first officer. At the time of the accident he had 6900 hours total time, 5055 hours as pilot in command, 150 hours as pilot in command CRJ and 823 hours second in command CRJ.


FAA records show Jesse Rhodes received a notice of disapproval at several points during his flight training, during his BA-4100 first officer initial and during
his ATP / BE-1900 type rating. All certificates were completed after additional
training. One additional sim session was required during CRJ upgrade training due to checklist difficulties.


First Officer Peter Richard Cesarz was hired by Pinnacle Airlines on 4/26/04 as a first officer. At the time of the accident he had 761 hours total time with 222 as SIC in the CRJ.

Examination of the FDR data showed portions of the ascent where sharp pitch up maneuvers occurred. Pitch- up maneuvers were identified at three separate times between liftoff and the final level off altitude at 41,000 feet. The initial

rotation occurs at 02:21:45, up to a pitch angle of about 6 degrees. Four seconds later, a larger column deflection to 8 degrees raised the pitch of the
aircraft to 22 degrees, and generated close to 1.8 g’s of vertical acceleration. A single stick pusher discrete is recorded on the FDR, followed by a large column deflection towards nose down (-7„a, where V11„a is the limit) and reduction of pitch angle.

At approximately 02:27:17, while level at 15,000 feet, the autopilot is disconnected and a pull up is initiated with a column deflection. Over 2.3 g’s of vertical acceleration is generated as the airplane pitches up to 17 degrees over the next several seconds. At 02:27:26, a nose down push is initiated, requiring a calculated 20-pound force in the nose down direction. During this push, the vertical acceleration drops to close to 0.3 g’s. This is followed by another pull of about 26 pounds. Approximately 70 seconds later, a rudder doublet is performed, consisting of a large rudder input to the left, then to the right. This generates close to 0.16 g’s of lateral acceleration on the first deflection left, than 0.34 g’s lateral acceleration to the right, than 0.18 g’s back to the left. After these maneuvers, the autopilot is reconnected at 02:29:27 as the airplane ascends through 22,300 feet.


While at 25,000 feet, a climb is initiated with the autopilot engaged and vertical speed selected at 600 feet/min. With the autopilot engaged, the column is moved aft to 4 degrees airplane nose up by 02:32:40. This increases the pitch to over 10 degrees, and generates 1.87 g’s vertical acceleration, and increased to the climb rate to over 5000 fpm for several seconds. At 02:32:46, the autopilot is disconnected and the column is pulled with a calculated force of 34 pounds, increasing the pitch to close to 15 degrees. The column position remains between 3 and 4 degrees over the next 8 seconds. This column force is released, and another pulling force is gradually applied starting at 02:32:58, reaching a calculated peak of 44 pounds as the column moves to 5.3 degrees (the max column movement nose up is 13.8„a). The autopilot is then re-engaged at 02:33:10 with a target climb rate of 3000 ft/min, which is reduced to 1400 ft/ min, and then 1000 ft/min. Shortly after this the crew requests and is issued a climb clearance to 41,000.
 
GO AROUND said:
1. Climbing to FL410 at an airspeed as low as Vt?
I was taught 250 to 290 to .74, but never less than .70 in the climb.
If you can't maintain .70 and 300fpm you are done climbing and probably
need to descend back down.

Until this accident, Pinnacle never had a minimum climb speed limitation on the books. Normal climb was listed as 290/.74, but no minimum speed was specifically addressed. After the accident, 250/.70 was added as a minimum climb speed and 250/LRC was added as a minimum cruise speed.

5. Never maintaing the proper airspeed in preperation for or during the engine
relight procedure? (Is it true pinnacle did not train for a double engine
failure sometime during sim training? This is what I heard.)
Our procedures have us maintain a target airpseed until ready to restart.
.70 above FL340 and 240kias below 340. Then accellerate to 300 min up to
335 during the restart. They never achieved the minimun speeds in either
phase.

It is indeed true that Pinnacle didn't train for double engine failure in the sim before the accident. Double engine failure training consisted of nothing more than a quick briefing about the checklist itself. I've been here for over 3 years and have never done a double engine failure in the sim. Even on my last PT which was just a couple of months ago. I'm in upgrade now, so we'll see if they teach it during that sim training. I do know that they are teaching the new-hires however.

I don't know if the final findings have come out yet but it seems to me that the engines and the core lock situation and the airplane are getting all the blame and noone is learning from the pilot errors.

I am far from Chuck Yeager and am still learning every day. No disrespect to the pilots or their families, I'm just trying to learn from an unfortunate situation.

I seriously doubt that the pilots will skate by on this one. It seems very likely that the pilots (Captain specifically) will be listed as the probable cause for the accident. Core lock, Pinnacle's training program, and other issues will most likely only be listed as "contributing factors."
 

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