NTSB To Determine The Probable Cause Of Pinnacle 3701

[PCL_128]

CRJ drivers and those really "in the know" about this accident correct me if I am wrong, but:

The engines would not have relit during a properly executed APU start because the cores were already cooked. This was potentially due to the crew trying to windmill start the motors without enough airspeed (and thus N2 rotation) earlier in the accident chain.

Again, that is not correct. The cores were not "cooked." Only one engine suffered heat damage, and it was not enough damage to prevent a start. The engine sustained no heat damage whatsoever. This is all available in the NTSB docket.

 

[PCL_128]

Ya the guys performed like true pro pilots, at some point you are going to step off of the union platform and admit they made huge mistakes. I've read the report too, the QRH was NOT followed correctly. Quit blaming the engines and place resposibility where it is do.

There's plenty of blame to go around, and the crew isn't exempt from it at all. Lots of mistakes were made. That doesn't change the fact that this accident should have ended in an emergency landing and ruined careers rather than lost lives. The engines should have restarted, and they did not.

Your assertion about the QRH is incorrect. The QRH procedure for APU-assisted relight was followed flawlessly. All FDR data and recovered panels confirm that.

 

[405]

Do we really need to debate this again?

I concur with this question.

We don't have to do this all over again, do we? We all know what happened in this situation. Let's learn from it and move on.

 

[CFIT]

APU LCV will not open if either or both 10th stage bleed valves are enabled, it's kind of a trap but it is still there. Stop blaming the aircraft.

 

[Lear70]

I've read the report too, the QRH was NOT followed correctly. Quit blaming the engines and place resposibility where it is do.

You, sir, are 100% INCORRECT about the APU-assisted start.

They did NOT follow procedures in the initial first minutes of the accident sequence. They did NOT keep their airspeed up per the memory items on the aircraft. They did NOT achieve the proper speed during the windmilling air start procedure.

They DID, however, do the APU assisted start 100% correctly.

But you're not going to take the time to go read the transcript, are you? You're not going to take the time to go back and read the engine testing results after the engines were recovered, are you? That would require you to do the honorable thing and admit your mistakes.

Just stay tuned to the NTSB final report. GE will share some of the blame, albeit a very minor portion.

Unfortunately, PCL management, their training department, and their safety culture (or lack thereof) will also escape with a minor chastising.

True, the Captain made some incredibly stupid moves.

True, the F/O was too green to know any better and had flown with the Captain at previous companies and trusted him; he paid for it with his life.

But to assert that NO ONE ELSE shares a portion of the blame is EXACTLY the kind of blind indifference that leads to NOTHING BEING CHANGED at the training level.

As much as you guys like to bash PCL pilots, wouldn't you like to actually SEE the training department change? Wouldn't you, in the interest of safety, professionalism, and aviation in general, like to see SOMETHING positive brought out of all this?

Or would you rather just sling mud and walk away on your high horse?

Jesus... just disgusting behavior from "so-called" professionals. uke:

 

[CFIT]

Switch interlock, the APU LCV will not open, no air from the APU and the engine will not turn. What is a design flaw is in that configuration the valves will be illuminated to show that they are closed but the interlock will still prevent the LCV from opening.

 

[Lear70]

Switch interlock, the APU LCV will not open, no air from the APU and the engine will not turn. What is a design flaw is in that configuration the valves will be illuminated to show that they are closed but the interlock will still prevent the LCV from opening.

They weren't in that position.

When the F/O started reading the QRH after getting the APU started and back online, he switched the bleeds back over to the APU for pressurization, as verified by the CVR and the FDR.

Again, read the transcript, then come back and post.

 

[Rottweiller]

You, sir, are 100% INCORRECT about the APU-assisted start.

They did NOT follow procedures in the initial first minutes of the accident sequence. They did NOT keep their airspeed up per the memory items on the aircraft. They did NOT achieve the proper speed during the windmilling air start procedure.

They DID, however, do the APU assisted start 100% correctly.

But you're not going to take the time to go read the transcript, are you? You're not going to take the time to go back and read the engine testing results after the engines were recovered, are you? That would require you to do the honorable thing and admit your mistakes.

Just stay tuned to the NTSB final report. GE will share some of the blame, albeit a very minor portion.

Unfortunately, PCL management, their training department, and their safety culture (or lack thereof) will also escape with a minor chastising.

True, the Captain made some incredibly stupid moves.

True, the F/O was too green to know any better and had flown with the Captain at previous companies and trusted him; he paid for it with his life.

But to assert that NO ONE ELSE shares a portion of the blame is EXACTLY the kind of blind indifference that leads to NOTHING BEING CHANGED at the training level.

As much as you guys like to bash PCL pilots, wouldn't you like to actually SEE the training department change? Wouldn't you, in the interest of safety, professionalism, and aviation in general, like to see SOMETHING positive brought out of all this?

Or would you rather just sling mud and walk away on your high horse?

Jesus... just disgusting behavior from "so-called" professionals. uke:

Good post Lear. Someone who didn't do selective reading of the preliminary reports.

 

[TurboAWD]

Lear 70 is correct.

Aviation safety would not be where it is today if the professional pilots/engineers/etc of the past were as narrow minded as some of you.

ALPA isn't really saying the pilots weren't nuts, but rather the fact they were operating as airline pilots with that lack of knowledge indicates a systematic problem that needs to be addressed.

PS- if you don't think core lock is an issue, well the NTSB clearly disagrees with you.

Turbo

 

[nimtz]

then they really were idiots. even the controller thought it was weird. those red flags coming up from the bottom isn't a good thing to see in a climb or cruise.

pride got the best of these two. their deaths are not in vain as (hopefully) a lot more attention is paid to high altitude aerodynamics at both the majors (who have had their faire share of stalls in cruise/climb) and the regionals.

Ahem! I hope this NTSB report scathes the regionals for little to no training in high altitude aerodynamics. There needs to be something taught in systems be it even an hour long course. It bothers me that many guys can say coffin corner, but not recall any of the concepts that go with it.

Let's face it most places acted like the RJ's were just bigger 1900's when they first arrived. This accident is proof positive of that fact. These guys went to 410 because they saw a number in the book. That was the extent of their planning.

Many times I saw guys think it was okay to climb the ERJ under .60 Mach up to FL370 at heavy weights in turbulence. Oh don't forget they were usually distracted since they were reading 'company approved' material. Most of the time I'd get a confused look when I pulled out the buffet charts to show them the stupidity of this planning.

Handling the Big Jets should be mandatory reading for everyone who has visions of being an airline pilot.