More fallout from SWA crash - pax and rw length

[Skyboy722]

LJDRVR,
Amen, and thank you my brother.

 

[Mach 80]

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Ok, so what info would a SWA crew consult when faced with a landing on a short cluttered rwy? I don't know SWA procedures.
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Oakum boy,

As was stated earlier, they consult an Onboard Performance Computer.

It is distrubing to see so many incorrect statements on various pilot internet sites.

Such as...."probably no strut compression so that's why he didn't get reverser action" - (All you need is less than 10' radar altitude)

"He landed below minimums". Not sure if the the wx was below the usual minimums, but at many airports, SWA gets lower than standard minimums unique to them due to use of the Heads Up Display. SWA pilot friend of mine says he's actually heard pilots who were holding for an approach due to below mins weather (for them) claim his flight was "busting minimums" but they aren't aware of the lower mins SWA sometimes gets with the Heads Up Guidance System.

"He landed with a tailwind!!!!" If you've been around the block enough, you would know that often the runway with the tailwind is the only none with minimums low enough to make an approach. Happens all the time and I think it was the case at MDW that night. Would one rather have a headwind? Of course...but it again, it occurs quite often.

 

[FatesPawn]

Ok, so what info would a SWA crew consult when faced with a landing on a short cluttered rwy? I don't know SWA procedures. Every plane I've flown or typed in inculding the 737 has ALD published for levels of braking action or equivalent contaminate charts in others. Haven't been in those charts, I think ever. It isn't something one considers often.

I know you don't know SWA procedures. This is what is irritating to those of us who do. People start espousing the "truth" and it turns out the "truth" is something totally different. My angst isn't directly squarely at you oakum. It's aimed at every pilot who thinks they can come up with probable-cause in the hours after an accident.

What SWA pilots use is a touch screen laptop to do all their performance calculations. You enter the airport, runway, atis, flap setting, Braking action, NOTAMS and various other performance items like bleeds, engine/wing anti-ice, and MEL's. It chews on the data for a second and spits back your stopping margin with Min Med and Max braking.

You don't have to know the rules and regs to operate it. It just spits data back at you. For example if you enter an MEL like TR's inop and enter poor braking action, the 'OK' button gets grayed out and you can't continue.

If everyone is going to make assumptions lets make these assumptions:

The pilots did everything right
They entered the data on the computer exactly as it was presented
They landed the aircraft in accordance with the FOM
They followed all the regulations and policies

They subsequently ran into an unforseeable condition that invalidated the above data.

Measure with a micrometer, mark with chalk and cut with an ax.

Speculation complete.

Fate

 

[SWA/FO]

They entered the data on the computer exactly as it was presented

Highlighted by ME (The SWA/FO) for effect.

 

[Bookingsareup]

" "He landed with a tailwind!!!!" If you've been around the block enough, you would know that often the runway with the tailwind is the only none with minimums low enough to make an approach. Happens all the time and I think it was the case at MDW that night. Would one rather have a headwind? Of course...but it again, it occurs quite often."


If they landed with a tailwind it will show to be a contributing factor. It doesn't matter if it happens all of the time. Cpt. has ultimate authority. If that was the only runway available, there is still the choice to divert.

 

[SWA/FO]

Guys, I've landed at MDW (a few times) when the ATIS states clam winds, tower is claiming calm winds, only to find a full wind sock (x-wind) on short, short final (22L).

 

[Mugs]

I know you don't know SWA procedures. This is what is irritating to those of us who do. People start espousing the "truth" and it turns out the "truth" is something totally different. My angst isn't directly squarely at you oakum. It's aimed at every pilot who thinks they can come up with probable-cause in the hours after an accident.

What SWA pilots use is a touch screen laptop to do all their performance calculations. You enter the airport, runway, atis, flap setting, Braking action, NOTAMS and various other performance items like bleeds, engine/wing anti-ice, and MEL's. It chews on the data for a second and spits back your stopping margin with Min Med and Max braking.

You don't have to know the rules and regs to operate it. It just spits data back at you. For example if you enter an MEL like TR's inop and enter poor braking action, the 'OK' button gets grayed out and you can't continue.

If everyone is going to make assumptions lets make these assumptions:

The pilots did everything right
They entered the data on the computer exactly as it was presented
They landed the aircraft in accordance with the FOM
They followed all the regulations and policies

They subsequently ran into an unforseeable condition that invalidated the above data.

Measure with a micrometer, mark with chalk and cut with an ax.

Speculation complete.

Fate

Are you done lecturing now? I think some expressed surprise that the approach and landing in question did allow for everything to go right. Spoilers, brakes, and thrust reverse. All of this on a very low vis approach to a short runway with questionable breaking, a taliwind, and rapidly changing conditions that should be expected in a snow event. If in fact it comes out that the T/R problem was the ultimate reason for the over run, I think the Feds will be modifying your performance data. I'm not trying to point fingers at the crew at all. We have all been in situations where our back was against the wall in a marginal situation. It is unfortunate that they were placed in a situation where it may have been "legal" to do even though the deck was stacked so heavily against them. I flew out of Midway a bunch years ago, so I am quite familiar with what you guys are up against. Quite frankly, I think that SWA's safety record there given all the flights over the years speaks very well for the SWA pilot group. In any case, as always, there will be good lessons for all that come out of this unfortunate event.

 

[Speed]

Tailwind and Braking Conditions

Armchair QBs, I agree with the above statements that we should give the crew the benefit of the doubt and assume they did everything right based on the information that they had. The Capt was very experienced and would not have "rolled the dice" if the data didn't support it was safe and legal.

We won't know IF and how much of a player delayed thrust reversers contributed to the accident until the all parties conclude their investigation. Here are some other factors to consider as we speculate and try to learn some lessons to make us all better, and safer pilots.

ATIS was calling the winds 110 at 11 with BA Fair. RVR was 4000 V 6000 and they were only landing 31C (which does have mins down to 3000 RVR for SWA also). I don't know why some of the papers were calling the visibility 1/4 mile...no one would have been legal to attempt a landing.

Approximately 15 minutes before the time of the accident Tower was calling the winds 110 at 9 which gave a 7 Knot tailwind component.

It is considered safe and legal (if the OPC says it is for the given landing weight) to land with up to a 10 knot tailwind component if the BA was Fair--either of the wind reports above yeilded less than a 10 knot tailwind...again, some of the papers have stated that it was a stronger tailwind than this (11 knots)...hard to know where they're getting their information.

If however, the braking action was Poor...then it drops to a 5 knot tailwind and would not have been considered safe and legal to land.

Fates is exactly right on how the stopping distances are calculated in the
-700 vs the -300/500.

I think the biggest problem is the somewhat subjective call of what is Good, Fair, and Poor. It depends on the equipment (757, 737, RJ), where on the rwy you are breaking, and ultimately the crew's subjective call. Without current MU readings on each third of the rwy you don't really know what the BA is. If a plane lands, is slowed and exits at the high speed then gives a PIREP that the BA was Fair, do we really know what the BA was on the last part of the RWY--NIL maybe?

One paper said the aircraft hit the wall at 40 knots--I doubt the difference between a 7 and 5 knot tailwind would make that much difference. If however, the BA was really Poor and maybe Nil near the end of the runway...that may have been a major contributing factor. If that's the case, then it could have happened to any one of us on this forum...so let's not be hasty to cast the first stone.

With young ones of my own, it broke my heart to hear of the loss. My prayers are with his family and loved ones whose lives are forever changed...and I hope that resulting safety measures (whether it be more scientific BA reports, more conservative Tailwind constraints, breakable concrete slowing walls, whatever) make it so others will be safer and his life was not totally lost in vein.

Speed

 

[Crossky]

So 2 ATA guys diverted? What are THEIR procedures under these circumstances. Unless you know individual carriers ops it's impossible to determine what is "safe" in their eyes. IF the data says it's safe and legal to land then it's safe and legal. Let's wait until the NTSB completes their investigation and releases data before we start crusifying the crew.

How many people died in Little Rock when an AA chief pilot tried to land in a thunderstorm and ran off the end of the runway?

This isn't about the Wright Ammendment or bad press.
Gup

I believe 19 human beings perished at Little Rock.

I suppose I could have left the WA and things not pertaining to this SWA MDW Accident out of my post. I was NOT comparing SWA's safety record to AA's, we all know who would lose that one. You brought up the subject of AA and their unfortunate most recent accidents, not I.

 

[AAflyer]

You SWA types are something else, why don't you stick to the topic. SWA ran off the runway in MDW, not AA. AA doesn't need to even be in this thread topic.

AA

 

[FatesPawn]

You SWA types are something else, why don't you stick to the topic. SWA ran off the runway in MDW, not AA. AA doesn't need to even be in this thread topic.

AA

Check his type ratings. He doesn't fly for SWA.

And, I have no idea why he brought up AA.

Fate.

 

[FatesPawn]

Are you done lecturing now?

It depends. When the class gets it, I'll be done. I think people are starting to understand. People need to understand - and understand clearly - that carriers do things differently and because they have a type rating in a 1900, 757, or A380 doesn't qualify them to make assumptions about a horrible accident.

If in fact it comes out that the T/R problem was the ultimate reason for the over run, I think the Feds will be modifying your performance data.

Perhaps, but I don't think so. Brakes and Spoilers can fail too and they still allow us to credit them for stopping distance. I'm not trying to argue what's going to happen or not going to happen. I'm poking my finger in the chest of people who think they can outguess the NTSB 6 days after the accident.


Fate

 

[regionaltard]

I think the biggest problem is the somewhat subjective call of what is Good, Fair, and Poor.

That's what keeps jumping out at me. If anything good is to come of this maybe airport authorities will be required to provide more timely, measurable information on runway surfaces in the future. If I'm going to be conducting an op. where pretty much everything has to go right I want to know, not hope.

 

[1BigRodeo]

We landed there 2 hours prior to the incident, and we didnt get the advertised BA either. It was worse than said.

 

[LegacyDriver]

Hey, FWIW, I *AM* giving them the benefit of the doubt.

My thinking is that something happened that delayed reverser deployment. Mechanical-induced, weather-induced, fatigue-induced...whatever. Hell I have had problems getting TRs to deploy before and it wasn't the airplane's fault, just happened to pull back a bit before I got the gate locks up and they jammed... Had to "recycle" the the deployment to get them out. No biggie. Dry runway. Plane stops great in far less than 3000' with brakes only at max weight....

I do not think the crew was careless or reckless in any form or fashion. Just unlucky.

 

[FatesPawn]

Hey, FWIW, I *AM* giving them the benefit of the doubt.

Thanks Legacy. I know you are are on the pilot's side.

I hope lurkers that may have been reading this thread thinking "what a bunch of knuckleheads" will take a step back and wait for the NTSB findings.

Fate

 

[100-1/2]

Why are we all getting wrapped around the axle about what the weather and conditions 'were' as reported by the media. Most of the "MMQB's" here never experienced for themselves and firsthand, the rapid and continually changing manner in which these conditions occur. The best braking condition reports and conditions occur after a pass of the broom truck. As heavy as the snow was following and the primetime tempo of the operations one would be led to conclude "MMQB" that the runway was likely deteriorating in braking action and probably due for another sweep by the broomtruck(s) when this misfortune occurred. When the weather is up and down the only weather report that matters is the last one before the FAF. Those don't always make it into the METAR archives. When runways are opened and closed for snow removal, the most important BA report is the one issued with your landing clearance. That one is on tape. This one needs to go through the wash. even then, it looks like "wouldof couldof shouldof" are going to prevail. Fresh crew, first leg, newer airplane, very recent maintenance check, I too, would want to succeed at what everyone else had been doing all day/night long. As for the other [ATA] crew that went on to an alternate, who knows, fatiqued crew, end of the day, older plane and MEL'd equipment. Probably Chicago based crew uninterested in shovelling snow from their walk or digging their cars out of the employee lot. Hello Alternate/Hilton with shuttle service. Anyone else been there, done that, and got the pax grief?

As for mechanical and judgement, Only two people in the world right now know or have a firm grasp of the events in the cockpit throughout the incident. FD/CVR's are ony record channels from a portion of range of parameters possible. Initially it appears a mechanical reliability may have posed a significant contribution to the accident. We will rely on the NTSB to draw those conclusions. Contributing factors will likely include a pot pouri of crew judgement, weather, airport conditions, etc. It is sad, but the NTSB/FAA always find a way to include the crew in a mishap and would likely go along something like "failure to abort the attempted landing when a malfuntion or other adverse condition was experienced during a critical phase of flight". One where very small tolerances existed with little margin for error possible. For me, If at a split moment I believe an issue to exist surface with something like the TR's deployment at a critical moment such as rollout with soupie and crappie conditions above, I can't imagine NOTconsiderring for a moment in taking my chances with available runway over the horror of an airborn deployment of a TR while trying to go missed over West Chicago. We saw how a TR deployment turned out with a Canadian Troop transport in the 1980's.

This is a tough one and anybody that would say "they got a good handle on it and how it went wrong" is simply an idiot.

As for the media and your passengers, Have compassion. The media is sick and afflicted and the only fault of the flying public is how much weight they give the information oozing from the media's sores.

I have always succeeded with the rubberband theory and discription of winding up for takeoff and landing. AND I always remind my passengers to use the lav while in cruise for reduction of aircraft weight in preparation for landing. The FA's appreciate not having to chase the pax from the lavs just before landing. If that doesn't work, I tell'em "Its' okay, I am a limo driver" or "but I did stay at a holiday inn express."

Details about a funtion of physics already misunderstood simply confuses the matter and leads to more irrelevan details or questions. I told a lady just this morning: "Yeah, that Wolf Blitzer, what a great guy. I remember when he used to bag my groceries." "Bob, who?" "Oh, Arnott? You say." "He had a tough time learning to fly. I once helped him study for his third try at a Private Pilot License. I heard he finally got his license recently?" "Good for him. Always liked the chap. Bit of a boozer though as I recollect."

100-1/2

 

[knowlimits]

My understanding of the 737, though, is that the reversers can unlock at weight on the main wheels, but the engine will not go into reverse until nose wheel touchdown. The RA 10 thing is another safety thing built in for reverser unlock, kind of a back up. But the WOW is still required to get them unlocked.

They will unlock and deploy at RA<10 ft. Been there, done that, got the t-shirt. LAS, 1997, 25L, about 7pm. AWA737-300

Probably won't do it again, though. Makes for a firm touchdown.