Looks like Gulfstream got the WSJ's attention

[glasspilot]

No flight level midairs come to mind.

2006, Brazil, B-737-800 and a Legacy. Boeing crashed and the Legacy landed. Both pilots had passports seized and were held in their hotel for a few months. This happened at FL370.

 

[GogglesPisano]

MEL is a MEL. .

Actually an MEL is an MEL.

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

2006, Brazil, B-737-800 and a Legacy. Boeing crashed and the Legacy landed. Both pilots had passports seized and were held in their hotel for a few months. This happened at FL370.

One of the airplanes had their xponder off. So how is that helping your point?

Combo MELs are something you have to look at and use your judgement on...Just because it's legal doesn't make it smart. MELs are developed as stand alone procedures. When you start compounding them you have to look at the implications of the intermixed items.

 

[glasspilot]

My point was never that TCAS isn't great. It's just that it can be deferred or not installed. I'd feel better if it couldn't, but it can.

You're right about multiple MEL's. But a TCAS and a 10,000 foot are not by themselves compatible. The pilot screwed up or the article left out major facts.

 

[machophil]

2006, Brazil, B-737-800 and a Legacy. Boeing crashed and the Legacy landed. Both pilots had passports seized and were held in their hotel for a few months. This happened at FL370.

I was referring to Florida, not a 3rd world country with atc rules and services that pale in comparison to ours. Midairs below 10 in florida are common, in the flight levels i can't think of any.

In the lower 48, atc is able to provide separation services for at least two reasons; transponders and two-way radios. Between 10 and FL180 transponders are required but not two-way radios (meaning that atc can see those a/c and their altitudes even if your tcas isn't working). Above FL180 a/c are to be in communication too, providing the best atc separation possible. So, I'd much rather be at 370 with no tcas than below 10, perhaps even below FL180.

True, a no transponder a/c below 10 renders your tcas useless, but it also leaves atc with only maybe a primary target. On a nice weekend day in Florida there are tons of aircraft operating below 10, some with transponders, some without. Given this scenario and the combination of an inop tcas and a below 10 restriction, this captain did not feel it was safe because he could easily imagine the worst case scenario...and midair in which there was no warning.

 

[JustaNumber]

"In this Captain's opinion" you have already flown around low level in central Florida without TCAS, or did you bring a hand held TCAS with you in your PA-44?

The pax deserve the safety of TCAS? No they don't. They deserve the safety of each and every FAR their government sets forth. Those FARs allow for an MEL and that MEL allows for the damn TCAS to be deferred. I should be charging a ground instruction fee here.

As to my "total abdication of Captain's authority"... Where did I do that? I supported the half the panel lights out at night guy. I even supported the RMI is only heading info if the Gens quit guy. I do not support the TCAS is broke so I ain't goin guy...plus he's a GIA weenie so right away I'm sure he's screwing something up.

I know it's tough to make it three whole days without your paper in flight, but put it down and look out the window and do your job.

Yes, I personally flew without TCAS while instructing low level in Florida, it was some of the most dangerous flying I've done, and I wouldn't put paying pax in that situation.

The pax only deserve the minimum level of safety guarranteed by the government? I'll bet you any amount of money that you go above and beyond that on every single flight. You do make decisions for yourself, right?

See and Avoid has been scientifically proven to be an inadequate means of collision avoidance. Let's say you're cruising at 250kts, and have a 270 degree field of vision. In 3 miles vis, you've got 22 seconds to see head-on traffic. But if you start looking over your left shoulder and scan each 10 degree segment for three seconds (which you would have to do since collision-course traffic has no relative motion), you would still be looking way left while you just got nailed. The Big Sky Theory is really what's keeping most GA aircraft apart, but that's relying on too much luck for me, particularly in high-density training areas.

My point about captain's authority is, you either give him complete authority to make the best choices as he sees them (be those choices right, wrong, or somewhere in the middle), or you give him no discretion. It's either or. The moment you start second guessing him, firing him for this safety decision but not that, then captain's authority doesn't really exist. You might as well just make him call the chief pilot any time there's a question about safety. And I would guess that a bottom-feeding operation's chief pilot is NEVER going to err on the side of safety. Allowing for complete captain's authority is not a perfect system, but I'll take it over your system.

 

[DrunkIrishman]

Yeah, ummmm. A transponder is not TCAS.

In RVSM, you need an operable TCAS system. FL370 is in RVSM airspace.

I would assume many on this board are arguing with you because you said a colleague should be fired for exercising "PIC authority." You won't find many friends with that kind of attitude...Captain.

 

[glasspilot]

Any pilot can imagine a "worst case scenario" on any flight. A pilot who never flies isn't really a pilot is he? If you can't fly a plane without TCAS then it is because A. you're too lazy to be bothered to look out the window for traffic, or B. you're incompetent.

I would not have fired the pilot. I would have brought him in for additional training. That said, if I was a GIA Chief Pilot in this situation then I would fire every single pilot on the list and then quit.

As for mid air collisions...

29 September 2006; Gol Linhas Aereas 737-800; near Peixoto de Azevedo, Brazil
The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from Manaus to Brasilia when it had a midair collision in the area of São Félix do Xingu with an Embraer ERJ135 Legacy 600 executive jet operated by ExcelAire. The ExcelAire Legacy 600 jet had been on a flight from São José dos Campos to Manaus. After the collision, which damaged the left wing, left stabilizer, and left elevator of the executive jet, the crew of the damaged ExcelAire aircraft was able to land at a nearby military airfield at Cachimbo, Brazil. The 737 subsequently crashed 30 kilometers (19 miles) north of the Peixoto de Azevedo municipality. The Legacy 600 was on the first leg of a delivery flight to the U.S. The 737 aircraft was also relatively new, having come into service with the airline less than three weeks before the crash.

All six crew members and 148 passengers on the 737 were killed. The two crew members and five passengers on the Legacy 600 were not injured.

1 July 2002; Bashkirian Airlines Tupolev 154; near Ueberlingen, Germany
The aircraft was involved in a midair collision involving a DHL 757 while both aircraft were flying at about 36,000 feet (about 11,000 meters). Debris from both aircraft fell in an area near Lake Constance on the German-Swiss border. Both crew members on the DHL 757 and the 57 passengers and 12 crew members on the Tupolev 154 were killed. The 57 passengers on the Tupolev 154 included 44 children. The 757 departed Bahrain and was continuing on to Brussels after a stop in Bergamo in northern Italy. The Tupolev 154 was on a trip from Moscow to Barcelona and had made a stopover in Munich shortly before the accident.
12 November 1996; Saudia 747-100; near New Delhi, India

22 December 1992; Libyan Arab Airlines 727-200; Near Tripoli, Libya

31 August 1986; Aeromexico DC9-32; Cerritos, CA
The DC9 collided with a single engine Piper Archer which had made an unauthorized penetration of controlled airspace. All 6 crew members and 58 passengers were killed. The three occupants of the Piper and 18 people on the ground were also killed.
25 September 1978; Pacific Southwest 727-200; San Diego, CA
The aircraft had a midair collision with a single engine Cessna and crashed. All seven crew members, all 128 passengers, both occupants of the second aircraft, and 13 others on the ground were killed.
1 March 1978; Nigeria Airways F28-1000; Lagos, Nigeria

10 September 1976; Inex Adria DC9-32; Near Zagreb, Yugoslavia

5 March 1973; Iberia DC9-32; Nantes, France

30 July 1971; All Nippon Airways 727-200; northern Honshu, Japan, CA

6 June 1971; Hughes Airwest DC9-31; Near Duarte, CA

9 September 1969; Allegheny DC9-31; Near Fairland, IN

19 July 1967; Piedmont 727; Hendersonville, NC
The 727 was climbing away from the Asheville airport when it hit a Cessna 310 about eight miles (13 km) from the airport. All five crew members and 74 passengers were killed. The three occupants of the Cessna were also killed.
9 March 1967; TWA DC9-14; Near Urbana, OH
The aircraft crashed after an in flight collision with a Beech Baron. All four crew members and 21 passengers on the DC9 were killed. The sole occupant of the Baron was also killed.
16 December 1960, United Air Lines DC8 and Lockheed Constellation, New York, NY
The two aircraft collided over New York with the Constellation crashing in Staten Island and the DC8 crashing in Brooklyn. All seven crew members and 76 passengers on the DC8 were killed. All 50 occupants of the Constellation were also killed.

 

[glasspilot]

In RVSM, you need an operable TCAS system. FL370 is in RVSM airspace.

No you don't. Find me a reg and I'll buy you a beer.

oh, and notice the quotes around my calling myself "This Captain". I was making a point to the guy I was responding to. He referred to himself as "this Captain" in his post and I thought it a tad over the top.

 

[glasspilot]

Allowing for complete captain's authority is not a perfect system, but I'll take it over your system.

First: I'm am all for Captains discretion. We're talking about on the ground acceptance of an aircraft. The pilot chose to not fly an airworthy airplane. TCAS inop does not ground a plane at his company, your company, or my company. GIA terminates instead of retrains. Guess that place sux. Who knew.

Second: It's not my system. It's the way the whole industry IS. If you guys need a little time catching up that's fine. But at the end of the day when you show up to work tomorrow or next year and the TCAS is broke you're gonna strap in and go fly. You're macho chest thumping isn't going to help you then.