Sure...
JP pilots got no scope. They are becoming feeders for widebodies.
OK this makes no sense at all.
Just to recap, JB has not scope hence they are feeders for widebodies.
I always thought it was the other way around, meaning you needed scope to keep the narrowbody feed in house which is very different from growing your network as small domestic airline by partnering with widerbody international airlines.
But as always ALPA knows best. MIT Researcher W. Swelbar had this to say about scope and labor.
Does Scope Produce the Intended Outcome?
In the most simplistic terms, scope is the definition of work for the class and craft of employees governed by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Its purpose is to provide job security for those employees. But it is safe to say that most scope clauses produced unintended consequences. Between 2000 – 2008, legacy carriers reduced the number of narrowbody aircraft they fly by 800, and more than 14,000 pilot jobs have disappeared.
So, one could argue that scope is just another example of protectionism that failed. As economist Henry George, a sharp critic of protectionist policies, once said: “Protectionism teaches us is to do to ourselves in times of peace what enemies seek to do to us in times of war.”
Scope negotiations have been divisive not only between labor and managements but just as much between the unions representing mainline pilots and those representing regional pilots. Ultimately airlines must determine whether the 90-125 seat flying of tomorrow should go to the mainline or be flown by their regional partners. To arrive at the right economic solution, it is time for organized pilot labor and management to stop putting a Band-aid on problems.
Perhaps a better way than scope for pilot unions to think about job protection is to find the economics that will employ the most pilots at the mainline. That challenge must acknowledge the fact that today’s industry is not the industry of yesteryear. If the regional industry has been used as currency to cross-subsidize pilots at the mainline; and assuming that the trading currency is not what is was as we engage in this round of bargaining, then something has to give.
There are two solutions as I see it: 1) relax scope in order to win bigger increases in wages, benefits and working conditions for pilots that remain at the mainline; or 2) embrace the absolute fact that contractual rates, work rules and benefits need to be lower for US domestic mainline flying. That type of carve out can be negotiated. Domestic market flying differentials can be the new trading currency used to adapt any pilot contract to the market realities of today. There is no way to “perfume the pig” here; the mainline did something similar in 1984 in order to average down labor costs to facilitate growth. When it was decided that the concept was not internally healthy, mainline pilot labor made the regional industry the new vehicle for cross-subsidization of mainline pilot terms of employment.
One trend is clear: the industry’s pricing structure cannot now support labor rates that keep pace with inflation. An unpopular message -- yes. But there needs to be a structure in place that recognizes the different conditions in the US domestic market versus international markets. This structure must recognize that not all flying is created equal, just as the airlines are coming to appreciate that a one size fits all operation is not financially sustainable. There is a tremendous opportunity to put in place something better – if only the players at the table can let go of the past and come to terms with a new era in the airline industry.
