Informal poll for the IR's: do you fly single piston in IMC?

[pilotyip]

Does that mean if you have your crash you don't need to worry about it again?

 

[USMCmech]

Show me that math. This is no more certain than the trite, but overused expression respecting gear up landings that "there's thems that has, and thems that will." Hogwash.

It is called "Actuarial Science", the SCIENCE of measuring and quantifying risk. If you spend enough time out doors you WILL be struck by lightning. It is how the insurrance company decides to charge to offest their losses when there is a loss.

Risk is defined as "the proability of collapse (can never be zero) multiplied by the severity of the collapse (can never be zero)".

It is a law of mathamatics that every system will break down eventually back to a "stable" situation. This is called "the sand pile effect". The more complex the system the quicker it will collapse. Most of these "colapses" are small, some are medium, and some are huge.

The Space Shuttle was guaranteed to crash. There was no risk, it was a certianty.

At the begining of the program the risk of a catostropic failure was calculated to be 1/400. In fact the demonstrated risk is actually 1/50.



"Those that have, and those that will" is in fact completely accurate statement.

Don't get me wrong, we should never just give up and wait for the sky to fall. We take every possible step to catch our mistakes before the consequences become severe. The use of before landing checklists will catch our mistakes 99.99999% of the time. But one day if we keep doing this we will forget to lower the gear and will we will foreget to use the checklist.

Again, the focus gets put in the wrong spot. So many are quick to zero in on the concept of engine failure, when instrument failure and single-source instrument power failures are a much bigger hazard that differentiate single engine visual flight from single engine instrument flight.

So what if there are redundant power sources, redundant instrumentation? Does that "eliminate risk"?

Or could the pilot misinterpret all of those perfectly running instruments and fly into a mountian?

How do we "eliminate" that risk?

 

[mtrv]

Again, the focus gets put in the wrong spot. So many are quick to zero in on the concept of engine failure, when instrument failure and single-source instrument power failures are a much bigger hazard that differentiate single engine visual flight from single engine instrument flight. Vacum failures are very common in light airplanes, as are electrical failures...the power sources, and generally the only onbaord power sources, for the aircraft instrumentation, anti-ice, radar, etc. Just as bad as one engine to fail is one system source to fail.

With today's hand-held GPS's, in which some of the popular brands such as the Garmin 296/396/496 have batteries which will last for hours; you've still got the map page, the terrain/obstacle page, possibly the XM Satellite weather page, and your basic six-pac instrument page. At least enough information to stay out of instant disaster, as long as the magneto's do their job.

And, as brought up in previous threads, many of todays newer single engine airplanes will carry a 2nd lower amperage rated alternator that replaces the vacuum pump, as well as a second battery system with dual and switchable electrical busses. And then throw in a handheld GPS & NAV/COMM to the above for the third layer of backup.

 

[Lead Sled]

With today's hand-held GPS's, in which some of the popular brands such as the Garmin 296/396/496 have batteries which will last for hours; you've still got the map page, the terrain/obstacle page, possibly the XM Satellite weather page, and your basic six-pac instrument page. At least enough information to stay out of instant disaster, as long as the magneto's do their job.

And, as brought up in previous threads, many of todays newer single engine airplanes will carry a 2nd lower amperage rated alternator that replaces the vacuum pump, as well as a second battery system with dual and switchable electrical busses. And then throw in a handheld GPS & NAV/COMM to the above for the third layer of backup.

All that's well and good, but you're still exposed. Granted, you've got multiple layers of back up for things, that if they fail, are not inherently critical - at least if they're handled correctly. The problem with singles - piston or turbine - is that when all is said and done you're still betting everything on a single critical component that has no backup. Having a second alternator, dual this, and triple that won't do you one whit of good if your single engine decides to call it day. At that point, your survivability depends upon the decisions that you have made up to that point - if you've decided that it was OK to be flying at night, IFR, over mountainous terrain your odds of surviving will be much less than if it happens in day VFR over "suitable" terrain. You can ignore the dangers, and place your trust in the laws of probability. (After all, they say that nowadays, an engine failure is a “once in a career” occurrence – yeah, right!) But remember, if you choose this path, the danger doesn’t go away, it merely lies in wait.

LS

 

[USMCmech]

The problem with singles - piston or turbine - is that when all is said and done you're still betting everything on a single critical component that has no backup.

That is no different from any twin.

Every airplane has dozens of critical components that have no backup.

A single just has an extra one.

 

[avbug]

It only takes one.

Which is where judgement comes in. Unfortunately, the answer is usually that judgement is the passkey...I accept risk becasue I judge it to be okay...everything is magically blessed to be acceptable becasue of judgement.

Judgement is knowing when to say no, when to say yes, and how to tell the difference, whereas justification is better known as the narcotic of the soul. As I have stated many times before, I certainly see a lot of addicts out there.

 

[GVFlyer]

NO!

I do not.

I agree. I have a little over 100 hours of actual instrument in single-engine turbines, but I don't do that anymore.

It's all a risk management process and it's more risk than I am willing to accept.

I use sports psychology and positive imagery in much of what I do - forming a positive mental image of the desired outcome of the activity I'm engaged in. It just doesn't work in this case. I just keep seeing myself with no seat, in an engine-out glide in the clouds wondering what I'm going to see when I break out, if I break out, and all the while thinking what an incredible idiot I am.


GV

 

[G21Agoose]

I agree. I have a little over 100 hours of actual instrument in single-engine turbines, but I don't do that anymore.

It's all a risk management process and it's more risk than I am willing to accept.

I use sports psychology and positive imagery in much of what I do - forming a positive mental image of the desired outcome of the activity I'm engaged in. It just doesn't work in this case. I just keep seeing myself with no seat, in an engine-out glide in the clouds wondering what I'm going to see when I break out, if I break out, and all the while thinking what an incredible idiot I am.


GV

Chicken! A single engine turbine is much more reliable than a GMT Master II. Or should we start another thread?

 

[pilotyip]

We can eliminate all risk by not flying. Navy used to do that after a rash of accidents, they would have a safety standdown where the whole Navy would not fly for a couple days. It sure cut down on the accidents

 

[avbug]

It is called "Actuarial Science", the SCIENCE of measuring and quantifying risk. If you spend enough time out doors you WILL be struck by lightning. It is how the insurrance company decides to charge to offest their losses when there is a loss.

Again, show me the math. It cannot be done. You cannot do it. Such ridiculous stupidity. Cavemen braying at the moon here...we cannot eliminate risk! It cannot be done! It cannot be done!

The risk of a lightening strike is inevitable, is it? Hogwash. Show me the math, scientist. Show me the math.

You can certainly say one might get struck by lightening, and there are ways to prevent it, avoid it, eliminate that "risk."

The fear that wells up in you at the concept of risk elimination is a sad reflection on your own willingness to accept the risk, to take chance, to justify! Justification, the narcotic of the soul, and your soul loves it, drinks it in, cannot live without it. Must accept risk! Must! Cannot live without it! Cannot make it go away! No! Will not! Cannot! Love risk! Embrace risk!

The inevitability cry; it's inevitable. We'll all die somehow, might as well die doing something we love! We'll all get struck by lightening, we'll all crash eventually, we'll all have a gear failure at some point...yada, yada. It's science! We must embrace it! Every airplane in the world will eventually crash! It's inevitable! Because it's inevitable, then we might as well do it; there's no escaping it! We'll just hope it doesn't happen to us!

What a fatalistic, suicidal, asinine outlook on life.

I like to tell individuals to think of an engine failure in terms of inevitability. Does this mean that the individual will have an engine failure? Of course not. But I like to stress the mindset to prepare for it, which is part of risk elimination. But to take that into your fatalistic world, we ought not fly, because not only is the engine failure inevitable, but so is the crash. It is not. You may put away your slide rule or calculator and relax, math boy. Theory falls short in the face of reality, where our eventual death is certainly inevitable, but crashing an airplane or the need to take a risk (and the gauranteed outcome thereof) is not.

Insurance is based on gambling. Casinos run on gambling. Horse races are based on gambling. We do not base our flying on gambling. Risk should not be a part of our decision process, because we focus on what we should not. We fly considering potentials, and solving the problems as we go. Every moment, every breath brings a new soloution. Engine quits, I go here, now here, now here, now here, now here...We keep a full instrument scan in order to be prepared for the failure of an instrument by cross referencing other instruments. We carry fuel reserves and frequently check what we have with what we expect. We forecast the weather, then check it enroute, monitor it against what we see on radar, or XM-whatever, enroute, and continually revise our decision process. We are constantly on the lookout for risk, we find it, we eliminate it by doing something else, making decisions that take the risk out, opening an escape path such that the risk is no longer a hazard...we eliminate that risk by any infinite potential number of means, to ensure the safe outcome of the flight.

That's our job. Embracing risk is a failure at our job.

Yesterday I made a decision to abort my assignment and land at an interim location. Conditions changed. A dust storm brought visibility down, we experienced an onboard gear problem, Other aircraft going missed put us back down the line and threatened our fuel reserves if we remained, so I made a decision to terminate early and recovered at a different field. No different than any one else would have done.

We had a gear problem, considering the outcomes, it might have threatened a directional control problem. The destination, very close to the point where I terminated, had 44 knot crosswinds. Visibility was very low in sand and dust. We had explosives on board, and full fuel right to our landing weight. An inexperienced pilot was supposed to be making the landing for currency, and I nixed that, too. Various other factors, while not necessary to cause me to divert, also applied.

I elected not to take the risk. I went to a location with known support, much better winds, a full ILS, better surrounding terrain, better visibility. I elected to perform the landing. I looked at each risk factor, each potential, and eliminated it. You like to cry loudly that one can't eliminate risk. I'm not concerned about feeding the world; just myself and those around me. One belly at a time. One risk at a time. Eliminate all the risk in the world? Busy. Dealing with this...this hazard, don't want it to be a risk...one risk at a time. Risk elimination. It's a mindset, a practice, a way of life.

Failure to practice it delivers one to your god of science; failure to practice risk elimination may well put one into the realm of the inevitable; eventually you're going to succomb to those risks, so long as you accept and embrace them.

There is no natural order to risk elimination; it's an active process in which you constantly change the future by preventing things from happening by being proactive, careful, and alert. Walking through life with your eyes closed, moaning about the inevitable, is not risk elimiantion; it's being part of the food chain, and one might say, you become your own just deserts.