Guitar Guy said:
Do you mean "disturbed subsonic flow" or maybe "wake" instead of "shock wave"? I don't think you'd have a shock wave during a deceleration to a stall even at high altitude. But I don't fly the CRJ, so I thought I'd ask.
Good call!I do mean "disturbed subsonic flow" -- not the shock wave associated with high mach or "near sonic" flight. According to the manufacturer of the CRJ airframe, when the boundary layer separates in an aerodynamic stall of the wing, the disrupted airflow is directed towards the engine inlet and can reduce the inlet airflow to a level lower than required to sustain combustion (when at or near the limits of the envelope). [This is not due to the wing design itself; it is due to the placement of the engines with relation to the wing]. As a result, airflow distruption on the wing at high Alpha, is sufficient to potentially cause flameout. [I tried to state that as carefully as possible -- I hope it's intelligible]. Again, according to the manufacturer (and they have the test data), the settings of the SPS are designed to activate the shaker/pusher at a point that will avoid this phenomenon; thus preventing flameout.
The CF-34 engine that powers the CRJ is, by comparison, a small engine and doesn't have a big inlet to begin with. The by-pass ratio is relatively high for engines of that size. Additionally, the internal protection against external damage from a catastrophic failure also serves to restrict airflow to the engine core. I wouldn't go as far as to say that the engine is "prone" to airflow interruption, but I would say that it is somewhat "touchy" compared to other engines, due to all of these factors. As a consequence, pilots need to be careful about operations that contribute to airflow interference. We don't have to be "worried" about it but it is necessary to be prudent and avoid doing "unusual" things, especially at the extremes of the performance envelope. In heavier air an well within the envelope, operation is quite "normal".
Personally, I don't find this unique to the CRJ design. Every engine/airframe combination has its own "quirks" if you will. In my own experience all airplanes require careful attention when operated at the extremes of their performance envelopes; not just CRJ's.
If you choose to operate
outside of the envelope, it is safe to say that you can expect the unexpected.
In my humble opinion, all of the critical knowledge we have should be provided to flight crews in the course of their training. I don't think manufacturers should be keeping little "secrets" from operators and I don't think operators should be limiting flight crews to the "bare minimums". Obviously there are limits; we're not engineers and we don't need to know how to build the airplane, but we do need enough information to not become unknowing test pilots.
Please don't take that as a veiled bashing of PCL for it is not so intended. In my opinion, none of the operators (including my own airline) are providing enough information. In some cases that is because the operator's training cadre does not have the information itself. For that I blame both the manufacturer and the FAA, not the airline.
As an example, during the Public Hearing associated with the PCL accident, I listed to the manufacturer's chief traing captain insist, over and over again, that it is OK to train stall recovery at 10,000 ft because the techniquie is "identical" regardless of altitude (his words). At the risk of being called an idiot myself, that is unadulterated bu11sh_it! The recovery from an approach to stall at 10,000 feet is NOT the same as the technique required at FL410. In fact it's not even close.
That few operators teach pilots the differences is no secret; they don't. That's because we spend hours tooling around in simulators "practicing" canned approaches to stalls that apply to Cessnas, not high performance swept-wing aircraft and virtually no time even demonstrating what happens at very high altitudes. Pilots
need to know what to expect at lower altitudes AND at extreme altitudes, particularly the latter.
Stall recovery is NOT the same when you have no excess power as it is when you have lots of excess power.
At low altitudes the objective is to protect against altitude loss. At high altitude it is the exact opposite; give up altitude and get the wing flying again.
The idea of "practicing stalls" with a certain pitch attitude, a particular bank angle and the concept that losing 100 ft of altitude is a check ride "bust" is pure nonsense and a waste of time. Any "stall" that occurs in an airliner is going to be inadvertent and a surprise to the flight crew. Pilots don't stall airliners intentionally no matter how "cowboy" they might be. Training needs to be realistic; not an excercise in checking off squares to please some FAA inspector who often has minimum knowledge, if any, about the particular airplane.
I could rant forever about that but I've already said too much. So, I'll end this by saying: the training is inadequate. That's not a PCL problem, it's an industry wide problem, and by that I do NOT mean "regional" airlines only.
Adequacy of training is an exception; it ought to be the rule.