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Flight Options Accident?

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Say WHAT FL000?

quote:
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Originally posted by Safetycheck
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?...513X00667&key=1

We could all learn something from reading this.


Agreed!
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FL000 SAID..........

Do you have any idea how many 3,000 hour captains there are out there? Please let me know when I have "enough." My guess is that if this captain had had an additional 5,000 hours of successful flight time, this accident would have been MORE likely to happen, not less.
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So the more experience you have, the more likely you are to have an overrun accident? Back that up with some proof, FL000! That is one of the more ridiculous statements I have heard in quite a long time.

Clearly there were many contributing factors...and this is one accident that will be talked about and pondered for quite some time, I am sure.

While I agree that time alone does not make a good pilot, it seems this crew made some 3000 hour mistakes...without a doubt. This could no doubt happen to anyone, myself included... there but for the grace of God go I.
 
This accident has its roots in a captain who felt very comfortable in his aircraft. He felt as if he could get it stabilized before crossing the threshold, otherwise he would not have continued. If he had been new in the aircraft, my guess, GUESS, is that he would have gone around. Had he had another 5,000 uneventful hours in that seat, he undoubtedly would be even MORE comfortable in the aircraft. Coupled with the fact that he has proven himself prone to continue an unstable approach, I'd say he would be MORE likely to have done it with 8,000 TT than with 3,000 TT.

Aside from that mind-boggling, complicated theory, I have heard from more than one FAA investigator that the high-timers are just as, or even more, likely to make a judgement error of this type. If you want, I'll track them down and have them mail you an affidavit stating such. Would that be sufficient proof?

My original point was "what's wrong with a 3,000 hour captain?" There are tons of us out there. What would be sufficient time for safetycheck to approve of one's being a captain? Would he not board an aircraft with a 3,000 hour captain? I don't think the crew made 3,000 hour mistakes. The exact same scenario has been duplicated in the past by crews with triple, quadruple and quintuple that amount of flight time. The crew made human errors in judgement that can happen across the board. To state that the captain "only had 3,000 hours!" is truly ridiculous.
 
I think it's reasonable to surmise that a given pilot is safer and more competent at the 5000 hour point than he or she was a couple of thousand hours sooner. Everyone makes errors along the way, but most don't lead to accidents. This is called "experience". Most 5000 hour pilots learned a lot of lessons after passing 3000 hours. I learn something new about my equipment, my environment, or myself, on every flight. This pilot apparently had never had the bejesus scared out of him during a hurried approach to a short runway. If he'd salvaged this one, he likely would never have tried it again.
 
Trainerjet,

You are correct. I don't usually openly assume anything about accidents, but I was taken to task about my opinion and thought I'd attempt to support it. After all, we all HAVE opinions about these things, we just don't openly state them for fear of "foot-in-mouth" disease and lack of personal knowledge.

Also, this captain apparently has already given a lot of information to the NTSB that you don't normally see in a synopsis, which made assumptions more tempting. I am in agreement with the prior poster for giving kudos to the captain for stepping up to the plate.

As for the FAA inspectors, I was referring to gentlemen with whom I have an informal relationship and the comments were garnered in an informal atmosphere. They were simply generalities based on their years of investigating incidents and accidents. I can't go out and learn everything in life firsthand. Sometimes I just have to take more experienced people at their word.
 
tdvalve said:
This pilot apparently had never had the bejesus scared out of him during a hurried approach to a short runway. If he'd salvaged this one, he likely would never have tried it again.

This is exactly my point, which is why I qualified my assumption with "an additional 5,000 uneventful hours." With experience can also come complacency. I see it in myself from time to time. Therefore, I always try to keep events like this in mind so as to keep myself honest and not to have to learn the lessons in the first person.
 
CRM

The number of hours someone collects over a career means very little after you reach a certain level in this business. The argument about experience is an old one and does have some merit however, the fact is, experience is subjective and has too many variables to be an accurate measure of one's abilities.

A 3,000 or 5,000 or 10,000 or 20,000 hour pilot's skills, knowledge, and experience is totally dependent their training. Proper and constant training is the key to maintaining these abilities. A properly trainied 2000 hour pilot is by far more effective than a 20,000 hour pilot with bad or inconsistent training.

One fact is certain, if the report is accurate, this crew, regardless of their experience, made some bad decisions with plenty of warning signs slapping them in the face.
 
safety is always the journey....

Yes, training is key here, and it goes deeper than that. Each flight department has a certain corporate culture that shows though. This is emphasized by the amount of quality control excercised by an individual comany/flight department via SOP's, standardisation and support for these things that starts from the top. It's got to be above the lip service level.

I'm not saying anything specifically about Flight Options, I've never worked there. This event does replay some classic CRM scenarios of olde though.

Many flight departments, specifically larger airlines, will have stabilized approach criteria that would incorporate callouts or procedures that would make anything like this below 500 feet (VFR) turn into a huge red flag to prompt an immediate go around, as well as give a SIC the tools to be more assertive in communicating the need to the PIC or PF to fly like they train, so that training like you fly gets you somewhere in reality.

I have to give some credit to the crew for being honest, as it would have come out sooner than later, but at least they have some integrity. And again, given the right circumstances, we can all do worse I'm sure, and the monday morning QB's will still have their field day.
 
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This reflects on the whole Frax industry

NTSB will have a field day
There seem to have been many contributing factors, as I read this thing. The following is my opinion only, and is not to suggest that I would not have made some of the same mistakes....

First of all, never should both pilots have their heads down trying to program the FMS at the same time...it seems that from their statements these pilots pretty much admitted to doing this. Big NO NO...especially when you are that low and that close to the airport.

If you are not stabilized on your approach by 500 feet, you go around. Stabilized means many things....vref+20 MAX, 500 to 700 fpm descent or on vasi/glideslope, and set up for the TDZ. These guys werent stabilized if you listen to their statements.

CRM...and the two command rule. I dont know if the FO said go around more than once...but he SHOULD HAVE....the two command rule dictates this. Go around captain...nothing...GO AROUND CAPTAIN...nothing....I HAVE THE AIRCRAFT!!!...end of story.

Dont get me wrong...again...im not preachin here..just making some observations.

The Captain had 3000 hours...that in itself may or maynot raise concerns. Seems like that may have been a factor, though...they were in too much of a hurry to get this job done...should have gone around!

Anti Skid, working or not....they had enough runway theoretically to land anyway....if everything was done by the book. Come in too hot, and you might as well throw the book out the window cause now you ARE A TEST PILOT with regard to landing distances.

I feel bad for these guys.... unfortunately their mistakes are public knowledge for everyone in the world to read...including future customers of the Fractional Industry which is what worries me the most.
 
What's wrong with 3K?

I find it very disheartening to see that there has to be an "X" amount of hours to be ...I don't know..."qualified" to be a captain. I use the term qualified in to broadest sense. I know that this is merely someone's "opinion", but how many sub 3000 or even sub 2000 captains are there in the regionals? I feel it all boils down to the training. Granted no amount of training can replace experience, but if they are trainined right, they wouldn't or shouldn't be put in a position to to exercise their "superior airmanship". That is just my opinion. I am a little annoyed that someone is outraged by a 3000 hour captain. I have flown with some 4 and 5 thousand hour captains and I wonder how they ever got there.:eek: Anyway, I feel for those guys...I'm just glad they didn't get hurt. Hindsight is always 20/20.

Fly Safe.
 
CRM, quality training, SOP's

Yes, yes...

Quality CRM, quality flight training, SOP's that are stricktly adhered to, recent experience, etc... Breakdowns in these factors are evident in most accident scenarios and we all know how important it is to keep current in these areas.

There is another lesson here as well. Most companies I've worked for have it spelled out in their SOP's to keep your mouth closed and let the PR department handle things if you have an accident or incident. There are simply too many things that can go wrong with any statement made while you're in shock and under extreme stress. One mispoken statement made under the duress of a low-browed official could really do more damage than anything else. Certainly, there are many facts that you need to collect before making any statements. There may be factors related to your particular mishap that you are not aware of. Statements should only be made after you've had a chance to recover mentally and physically and had a chance to review the facts... and then only with accompanying representation.
 

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