FAA Violated staffing policies

[CatYaaak]

So should no attempt be made to correct these deficiencies then? Mountains and the ground are common too, aren't they? Thousands of planes fly over mountains and ground everyday safely. If they said the same thing about it twenty years ago, then nobody would have bothered to develop and pay for installing GPWS then. Nothing excuses not realizing you are on the wrong runway, but the controllable factors that increase the probability that someone could unwittingly do something like this need to be reduced as well.

Thank you so much for basing your point on something I DIDN'T say, or even infer in the slightest.

Twenty years ago GPWS had already been invented, and I was among those arguing it should be in every jet or large aircraft. I wanted one. I hate crashing into mountains.

AA's Cali accident occurred many years after GPWS had been installed in all jet transport aircraft. Their's was functioning properly.

I love TCAS...it's saved my a$$ a few times.

A few years ago a TCAS-equipped Russian airliner blew a TCAS-equipped DHL cargo transport out of the sky in a mid-air collision in a lightly-congested, low-workload, enroute radar environment. Both TCASs were functioning properly.

Now you go ahead and take that career break until such time technology can spoon-feed you all the pilot-proof safety you need.

Or maybe it's better if we pilots quit giving the engineers tragic REASONS to develop new safety devices or the FAA to write new regs since they'll be doing those things anyway, by concentrating our energy on, and figuring out how to operate ("operation" is OUR area of expertise) more safely in this imperfect world until someone engineers and mandates it into perfection.

 

[AWACoff]

There were a lot of links in this accident chain. It doesn't really matter which link you want to blame... Just learn from this so you don't repeat it.

 

[Wasted]

Thank you so much for basing your point on something I DIDN'T say, or even infer in the slightest.

Twenty years ago GPWS had already been invented, and I was among those arguing it should be in every jet or large aircraft. I wanted one. I hate crashing into mountains.

Now you go ahead and take that career break until such time technology can spoon-feed you all the pilot-proof safety you need.

Or maybe it's better if we pilots quit giving the engineers tragic REASONS to develop new safety devices or the FAA to write new regs since they'll be doing those things anyway, by concentrating our energy on, and figuring out how to operate ("operation" is OUR area of expertise) more safely in this imperfect world until someone engineers and mandates it into perfection.

You're not seeing the forest for the trees. No, you didn't mention mountains, but your line of argument, 20-30 years ago, would have sounded very similar against GPWS. Just as an example.

Those guys crashed as a result of a chain of events. If any single one of those events did not transpire, those people would be alive. What is so wrong about learning from that chain of events and doing something about making sure that as many as those links don't ever happen again? This is not legislating away stupidity, since many of these links had been caused by ommission or carelessness. If the airport authority and Jeppeson had supplied them with a 10-8, maybe they'd be alive. If the NOTAMs were clearer, maybe they'd be alive. If the tower was properly staffed, maybe they'd be alive. If the tower didn't issue a takeoff clearance until after they had taxied past 26, maybe they'd be alive. If they had read the signs, maybe they'd be alive. If they had checked their heading before they rolled, maybe they'd be alive.

But all you see is, if they were more careful, maybe they'd be alive. Right? I've been in this career long enough to know that I make mistakes. I fly with people that make mistakes. I see others make mistakes. I'll bet even you make mistakes too. Right? So you can tell pilots to be more careful until you're blue in the face, but it will never prevent a mistake from happening again. People will make mistakes. You can't legislate people into not making mistakes or being more careful. But you can legislate rules and procedures that can prevent or catch a mistake.

Explain to me why you would not rather see an airport be required to publish information on construction changes. Explain to me why you would not rather see NOTAMs that are clearer, that state that the threshold and taxiways have been moved, not just that the distance for takeoff is different. Explain to me why you would rather not see a tower that is properly staffed so that the tower controller can pay attention to the planes taxiing, taking off and landing. Explain to me why you would rather not see ATC procedures in effect that would reduce the chances of somebody making the mistake of turning onto a runway that they were supposed to cross. But all you see is that those pilots should have read the signs and done a heading check. That is putting a lot of eggs in one basket.

When just say that we should just focus on what we pilots should do, you miss the forest for the trees. This is not about you as the pilot. This is about the passengers. This is about a system that is safer for the passengers. That the pilots missed the signs is just one link in that chain. It is neither the only link nor is it the biggest link. It is just the last link. The system needs to stack the cards in the pilots favor so that this kind of fate can be prevented, instead of stacking the cards in favor of this kind of fate.

 

[HoserASA]

So, should the taxpayers hire additional controllers to make sure airplanes take off on the assigned runway? Better yet, put a controller on every jumpseat to read the number painted on the pavement to the crew. Maybe a controller should review the performance numbers and wt & bal too. Can't have too many sets of eyes checking things! Maybe the airlines could fund this.

No, of course not. But, there is a reason a control tower has large windows that provide a 360 degree view. As a retired ATC I always kept my eyes on my traffic, something any good controller does. Check FAA 7110.65 if you want to check the responsibilities of a controller.

Hoser

 

[shelton]

We have been flying for just over 100 years now. We have made aviation extremely safe in the 121 environment. At some point I suspect that we will get rid of the God-like mentality that some have of pilots and reach a level of safety far beyond what one or two pilots could do alone. Was it the pilots fault? Sure it was, but many of the things Wasted suggested could be implemented. We have become so ingrained to the thought of blaming the pilot while stacking on more and more regulations, with an ever-complicating and congested airspace system, working with controllers who are overworked, underpaid, and understaffed. Further, we work with managements who, understandably, want an increase in the bottom line and are willing to sacrifice equipment while pushing pilots. Instead of listening to the pilots when they say they are coming up on 16 hours of duty(every human alive is fatigued anywhere near 16 hours) or are becoming fatigued we are asked, at least by some companies, to call the chief pilot. There is a lack of support there. Instead of the captain having to verify and correct everything on the release, companies and dispatchers should be held more accountable. Instead of telling me the thunderstorms are dissipating Mr. Dispatcher, tell me what they are really doing. I know thunderstorms have to build and mature before they dissipate yet all I seem to hear is how they are dissipating. There is absolutely no reason the IFR alternate airport system should be as complicated as it is with the 1 nav 2 nav rule and then the exemption that can be used if the weather is TEMP in nature--no wonder dispatchers dork that up all the time. There is no reason why pilots should be required to remember the various volts required to light various lights in the cockpit. There is no reason I should have to have immediate action items memorized word for word on the oral and yet know that when in the sim I do not do it exactly like that. There is no reason that exact oil temps in varying conditions should be memorized in the limitations section--put a red line on the gauge and be done with it. There is absolutely no reason the rest requirements and duty limits should be nearly as complicated as it is. Calls to the company freq have to be made during some of the busiest times resulting in brain power being used elsewhere when perhaps it could be used more effectively flying the airplane. Although I support it, the FFDO program gives even more responsibility to the pilot. Crews are being subject to undue hassle from the TSA as well. I could go on and so could you.

So my point? Maybe, just maybe, those men are just like you and me. Maybe, just maybe, they had other things on their mind. Now, I could be quick to the draw and say "that was a stupid mistake." Or is it possible that we and the feds should realise that pilots are not Gods(although many of us would like to be) and act accordingly.

 

[Moustache]

Hoser
ASA CRJ Capt
Retired ATC

Wow the titles keep on piling up hozer.

Bottom line, if pilots don't take care of their own safety, bad things happen, and controllers go home for dinner.

Moustache

B1900 CA
Husband
Uncle (3X)
Son
Mazda owner
Homeowner
Amatuer Beer brewer
Wearing Socks
Brown Eyes
Golfer
Can tell Time
Type 10 words / min
Hungover
Non-Smoker
Watch Deadwood
Pick nose in car
Packer Fan (I Know they suck)
Brewer fan (don't suck as much as they should)
The End

 

[Moustache]

We have been flying for just over 100 years now. We have made aviation extremely safe in the 121 environment. At some point I suspect that we will get rid of the God-like mentality that some have of pilots and reach a level of safety far beyond what one or two pilots could do alone. Was it the pilots fault? Sure it was, but many of the things Wasted suggested could be implemented. We have become so ingrained to the thought of blaming the pilot while stacking on more and more regulations, with an ever-complicating and congested airspace system, working with controllers who are overworked, underpaid, and understaffed. Further, we work with managements who, understandably, want an increase in the bottom line and are willing to sacrifice equipment while pushing pilots. Instead of listening to the pilots when they say they are coming up on 16 hours of duty(every human alive is fatigued anywhere near 16 hours) or are becoming fatigued we are asked, at least by some companies, to call the chief pilot. There is a lack of support there. Instead of the captain having to verify and correct everything on the release, companies and dispatchers should be held more accountable. Instead of telling me the thunderstorms are dissipating Mr. Dispatcher, tell me what they are really doing. I know thunderstorms have to build and mature before they dissipate yet all I seem to hear is how they are dissipating. There is absolutely no reason the IFR alternate airport system should be as complicated as it is with the 1 nav 2 nav rule and then the exemption that can be used if the weather is TEMP in nature--no wonder dispatchers dork that up all the time. There is no reason why pilots should be required to remember the various volts required to light various lights in the cockpit. There is no reason I should have to have immediate action items memorized word for word on the oral and yet know that when in the sim I do not do it exactly like that. There is no reason that exact oil temps in varying conditions should be memorized in the limitations section--put a red line on the gauge and be done with it. There is absolutely no reason the rest requirements and duty limits should be nearly as complicated as it is. Calls to the company freq have to be made during some of the busiest times resulting in brain power being used elsewhere when perhaps it could be used more effectively flying the airplane. Although I support it, the FFDO program gives even more responsibility to the pilot. Crews are being subject to undue hassle from the TSA as well. I could go on and so could you.

So my point? Maybe, just maybe, those men are just like you and me. Maybe, just maybe, they had other things on their mind. Now, I could be quick to the draw and say "that was a stupid mistake." Or is it possible that we and the feds should realise that pilots are not Gods(although many of us would like to be) and act accordingly.

are your finger raw?

 

[transpac]

No, of course not. But, there is a reason a control tower has large windows that provide a 360 degree view. As a retired ATC I always kept my eyes on my traffic, something any good controller does. Check FAA 7110.65 if you want to check the responsibilities of a controller.

Hoser

Thanks for the reference, but I seem to remember reading it before. In a previous life I actually had to refer to it occasionally. As I recall, ATC exists for the purpose of separating traffic, not for acting as a quality control for pilot actions. Granted, ATC will assist pilots beyond separating them and will mention any unsafe situation they happen to observe. But, that is all secondary to the reason they exist. To assign extra ATC staffing for the purpose of observing and correcting pilot negligence is ridiculous.

When I was training in the Navy there was a "wheels up watch" who sat at the end of the runway with a flare gun. His job was to fire a flare whenever it appeared trhat some nugget was about to land with the landing gear retracted. Maybe FAA needs to surround the runway with controllers who could check things out before aircraft land or depart. Or, maybe pilots could just do the job they're paid to do.

 

[LJ45]

This may have been brought up already, but how about ATC waiting until the aircraft has crossed the inactive runway and is near the active runway before issuing a take off clearance? That may have helped and would be a good policy change for LEX and other airports with a lay out like LEX.

 

[transpac]

This may have been brought up already, but how about ATC waiting until the aircraft has crossed the inactive runway and is near the active runway before issuing a take off clearance? That may have helped and would be a good policy change for LEX and other airports with a lay out like LEX.

Why would that be a good policy change? A takeoff clearance means the assigned runway is clear and is expected to remain so until you're airborne. What else do you want it to mean?