airlinepilot
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- Apr 19, 2002
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Second, is that your duty day starts when you show in the lobby for the van
Google Tort Law or Tort Reform.Are the FAA, and the Admistrator insulated from lawsuits? Can they be sued for negligence by failing to act on these recommedations?
Just curious.
Google Tort Law or Tort Reform.Are the FAA, and the Admistrator insulated from lawsuits? Can they be sued for negligence by failing to act on these recommedations?
Just curious.
Are the FAA, and the Admistrator insulated from lawsuits? Can they be sued for negligence by failing to act on these recommedations?
Just curious.
Reduce Accidents and Incidents Caused by Human Fatigue
ObjectiveImportance
- Set working hour limits for flight crews, aviation mechanics, and air traffic controllers based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms, and sleep and rest requirements.
The Safety Board has long been concerned about the effects of fatigue on persons performing critical functions in all transportation industries including flight crews, aviation mechanics, and air traffic controllers. In 1989, the Board issued three recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation calling for research, education, and revisions to existing regulations. These recommendations were added to the Board’s Most Wanted List in 1990, and the issue of fatigue has remained on the Most Wanted List since then. The Safety Board’s 1999 safety study of DOT efforts to address operator fatigue continued to show that this problem was widespread. Operating a vehicle without the operator’s having adequate rest, in any mode of transportation, presents an unnecessary risk to the traveling public.
Safety Board recommendations on the issue of human fatigue and hours-of-work policies have had a substantial effect on encouraging the modal agencies to conduct research and take actions towards understanding the complex problem of operator fatigue in transportation and how it can affect performance. However, the FAA has taken little if any action directly related to revising existing regulations and work scheduling practices.
Summary of Action
The FAA issued an NPRM in December 1995 to update the flight and duty regulations for airline pilots; however, in the intervening 12 years, the regulations have not been revised. The FAA has indicated to Congress that it is looking at alternatives without specifying an anticipated schedule. An ARAC reviewing Part 135 regulations has made some recommendations to simplify and improve the duty time regulations for flight crews covered by Part 135. The FAA has for some time indicated that it is developing an NPRM that incorporates the ARAC’s recommendations; the NPRM will include a fatigue risk management system that provides an alternative to the prescriptive limitations.
Action Remaining
Issue regulations that establish scientifically based duty time limitations for air carrier maintenance personnel and flightcrews. Revise controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide adequate rest periods modify controller shift rotations to minimize fatigue, and develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for controllers.Safety Recommendations
A-94-194 (FAA)
Issued November 30, 1994
Added to the Most Wanted List: 1995
Status: Open—Unacceptable Response
Revise the Federal Aviation Regulations contained in 14 CFR Part 135 to require that pilot flight time accumulated in all company flying conducted after revenue operations—such as training and check flights, ferry flights and repositioning flights—be included in the crewmember's total flight time accrued during revenue operations. (Source: A 1994 safety study on commuter airline safety [NTSB/SS-94-02])
A-95-113 (FAA)
Issued November 14, 1995
Added to the Most Wanted List: 1996
Status: Open—Unacceptable Response
Finalize the review of current flight and duty time regulations and revise the regulations, as necessary, within 1 year to ensure that flight and duty time limitations take into consideration research findings in fatigue and sleep issues. The new regulations should prohibit air carriers from assigning flight crews to flights conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 unless the flight crews meet the flight and duty time limitations of 14 CFR Part 121 or other appropriate regulations. (Source: The investigation of an uncontrolled collision with terrain accident, Air Transport International, DC-8-63, at Kansas City, Missouri, February 16, 1995 [NTSB/AAR-95-06])
A-97-71 (FAA)
Issued September 9, 1997
Added to the Most Wanted List: 1999
Status: Open—Unacceptable Response
Review the issue of personnel fatigue in aviation maintenance; then establish duty time limitations consistent with the current state of scientific knowledge for personnel who perform maintenance on air carrier aircraft. (Source: The Investigation of the ValuJet crash into the Everglades near Miami, Florida, on May 11, 1996 [NTSB/AAR-97-06])
A-06-10 (FAA)
Issued February 7, 2006
Added to the Most Wanted List: 2006
Status: Open—Unacceptable Response
Modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to affect crew alertness. (Source: Collision with Trees and Crash Short of Runway, Corporate Airlines Flight 5966, British Aerospace BAE-J3201, N875JX, Kirksville, Missouri, October 19, 2004 [NTSB/AAR-06/01])
Sorry for the above double post, sometimes FI doesn't reload for me and I can go up to 30 minutes or an hour at a time with no FI access, although all the other websites I go to work fine... Weird.Lear, did the accident captain get his job back?
The CA on that flight was in my initial new-hire class at PCL. He had become a Check Airman, had about 7,000 hours total time, and about 5,000 in the CRJ, 3,000+ of which was PIC time (estimated based on how much time I had in the airplane knowing he flew about 1,000 more hours than I did in my first 3 years before I got off reserve).
He was doing IOE with a new-hire pilot who was very low-time.
It was the last leg of the day, I "heard" 9:30 (approximate) hours rest the night before, and they were at 14 hours and change of duty at the time of the accident, pretty close to midnight.
I disagree with the board on finding that he disregarded information that the runway was slick. 15 minutes prior to landing, he spoke with the airport manager who was doing snow removal ops and received a verbal that braking action was "fair" as reported by a truck following the snow removal equipment. The worst of the storm hit just a few moments later after the CA returned to normal descent duties and approach planning, and he was too busy flying the descent and approach to check in one last time below 10,000.
What's most interesting about this is that the Captain initially REFUSED this leg based on weather and the forecast winds and heavy snow. Pinnacle dispatch called NWA ops and got them to CHANGE the forecast to include a wind just BARELY at the legal limit for tailwind to do the only approach available to meet the forecast ceiling and vis, AND amended the snow forecast to LIGHT snow instead of heavy.
Northwest has the ability to amend their own TAF's away from what the NWS publishes within certain parameters. I'VE HAD THEM DO THIS TO ME, it's NOT a rumor. Difference is the last time they did this, I diverted back to MSP when we got to the destination because the weather was below mins (it's one of my interview stories where I disagreed with a policy, did as instructed anyway, then chose the safe exit and came home, proving my point along the way). This CA didn't divert because it was within acceptable mins when he started the approach. This is the first time I know of that it has bit NWA directly.
Where he touched down is in debate. The airport manager insists it was "halfway down the runway" while the FD data (weight on wheels), G/S recording, and aircraft speed show it closer to 2,000 feet past the threshold - well within the TDZ.
Doubt very seriously they will change the rest rules over it. No fatalities, regional carrier, and, quite frankly, without those factors, they're simply going to pin it on the CA being fatigued and making a bad call which is partially true, but he was walked down the primrose path.
This guy is VERY sharp, one of the nicest guys in the biz that I know, and didn't deserve the crucifying he got over it (he lost his job). We all make mistakes; we just get lucky most of the time and either the person beside us catches it or we luck out and nothing happens.
Was hoping the board would emphasize the weather changing issues by NWA ops more in this hearing. Personally, I don't think ANY airline should have that ability...
Doesn't help if the aircraft in question is no longer monitoring the ops frequency and is, instead, monitoring CTAF... Too bad the ops guy didn't have a radio with CTAF dialed in.Airport ops reported "nil" braking from the truck twice over the radio...
I agree with the other poster. Anything over 12 hours of duty with a FNG, especially ops after midnight after an 8 hour flight day is just begging for trouble.Now days with OE are limited to 14 hours of duty. The flight time was limited to 8, but too many flights were being cancelled so that went away.
limit the duty day to 12 hours and make rest 12 hours--- fly as much as you can in the meantime... incentize the companies to be more efficient... it's not a mistake that the most productive pilots are also the happiest.... but then again i get jealous of their schedules- ave 10 hour duty day- 14 in a hotel- 7 hrs block- and 8-9credit- consistent schedules- am OR pm. You could fly a whole lot and not get tired w/ those parameters.
My airline schedules me all kinds of ways that make me exhausted, but yet doesn't make either one of us any money or produce anything.