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Engine Failure On Takeoff - 2 Cfi's At The Controls

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UndauntedFlyer said:
So does the gear position, up or down, really make a difference in the decision to continue or abort. Not to me. And it shouldn’t make a difference to anyone else if the gear can be moved up or down in seconds. Therefore, decisions to continue should be made on known AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY, not gear position.

Personally, I have found the PA-44 (Seminole) to be a weak but a satisfactory performer when I have done the engine failure on takeoff simulation from a 3000 foot AGL simulated hard deck. In other words it will climb out at 200 fpm following an engine failure from the after takeoff scenario.


Seen it, done it, not much to hit when you're at 3000. Gear position absolutely makes a difference in that plane regarding a go/no go- Those seconds in transit while your attempting to acheive a climb speed equals a downward trend to that huge hard thing where the wreckage will be found. So you pull the gear up, no performance from the machine, and you're hurtling towards the buildings, trees, anything else that you now have to clear with a handicap and a slow climb. Blueline into the trees or gear stays down, point down and land immediately? On top of all of that, you bring it around (more obstacular interference)- plenty of opportunity to make a hash of it.

Indecision abounds when you're talking about a plane specifically built for training. You have more time over the outer marker than most have total, and someone like you wouldn't have much of a problem at all in it- because you're not just a professional pilot but a HECK of a HIGH TIME professional pilot. But slap a real failure on the shoulders of a guy with 0 time in twins, the instructor might be put in a place he can't get out of. Look at who we're talking about here- myself included- as far as the basic demographic that's flying these.

The cowl flap penalty alone in a Seminole is pretty sick. It's anemic on the best of days!
 
Sig said:
Seen it, done it, not much to hit when you're at 3000. Gear position absolutely makes a difference in that plane regarding a go/no go- Those seconds in transit while your attempting to acheive a climb speed equals a downward trend to that huge hard thing where the wreckage will be found. So you pull the gear up, no performance from the machine, and you're hurtling towards the buildings, trees, anything else that you now have to clear with a handicap and a slow climb. Blueline into the trees or gear stays down, point down and land immediately? On top of all of that, you bring it around (more obstacular interference)- plenty of opportunity to make a hash of it.

Indecision abounds when you're talking about a plane specifically built for training. You have more time over the outer marker than most have total, and someone like you wouldn't have much of a problem at all in it- because you're not just a professional pilot but a HECK of a HIGH TIME professional pilot. But slap a real failure on the shoulders of a guy with 0 time in twins, the instructor might be put in a place he can't get out of. Look at who we're talking about here- myself included- as far as the basic demographic that's flying these.

The cowl flap penalty alone in a Seminole is pretty sick. It's anemic on the best of days!
I agree...there's a BIG difference between a demonstration at 3000 feet and the real thing. That nice 200 fpm climb rate is what, an 800fpm sink rate with prop windmilling and gear down? Add another couple hundred fpm sink rate in an airplane like a Baron for the gear in transit (extra doors open)?

The last engine I had quit at takeoff--probably about 15 feet agl--started running again before I could close the throttles and land again (I think it swallowed a slug of water...we never did find anything definitive), but it was DEFINITELY headed for the ground, and would have touched down before I could have retracted the gear and feathered the prop.

Fly safe!

David
 
Can you make a decision to "GO" with an engine failure at 75' with the gear still down and make it? Again, the answer is: I all depends. It depends on what kind of performance is available that day based on aircraft weight, density altitude and obstructions/terrain ahead. If the airplane is light and you have personally done the 3000 foot hard deck test in that airplane under similar or poorer conditions, and were satisfied with the performance result, it is a go if the runway is any less than about 6,000 to 7,000 feet which is an estimate of how much runway would be required to return to the takeoff runway. It may take more or less runway than the 6,000 to 7,000 feet but that all depends on pilot technique. If you choose to "GO," then take the gear up while applying directional control (rudder and aileron) and pitching to keep your airspeed. It is really not a very difficult maneuver in VFR conditions and can be practiced quite safely at 3000 AGL. When I test engine failure after takeoff on multiengine tests like this, even the newest of the new applicants have no problem; they just retract the gear and actually feather the engine (as I have briefed for them to do) while keeping the airplane climbing out. I have done this so many times I really can not tell you an accurate number but it’s in the many hundreds of times, maybe 1,000 times. Personally, I believe that the so call "chop and drop" maneuver is a more demanding maneuver and is the real subject of this thread. (You rembemer, the accident with 2-cfi’s at the controls.) Now that is a dangerous maneuver for someone that doesn't have much experience like those 2-CFI's.

It is interesting to note that the Beechcraft Duchess (BE-76) has an “accelerate-go” chart in its POH. This chart is used for determining runway distance required to lose an engine on the runway at 71K and continue the takeoff. The required distance is about 5,000 feet of runway. Remember that is in the POH for an engine failure on the runway and then continuing the takeoff, similar to a Part 25 certified airplane. I have no intentions of trying this out and I don't think anyone should either, but obviously if this little trainer with two 180HP engines (same as the Seminole) can make it from the ground, rotate, retract the gear and climb out; then from 75' that could only be much easier to perform successfully. Can anyone disagree with this?

A follow-up question for this thread is this: Why do we have so many engine-out upset (roll-over) types of crashes for twins after takeoff?
 
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UndauntedFlyer said:
A follow-up question for this thread is this: Why do we have so many engine-out upset (roll-over) types of crashes for twins after takeoff?
In my personal experience, people tend to either:
1. try to counteract the failed engine with aileron, or
2. forget about flying the airplane in a flurry of trying to feather a prop (right one or wrong one, one of those darn things is gonna get feathered QUICK)
Basically, poor potty training. Hence my resistance to telling people to suck up the gear, feather the prop, and go flying from 75 feet.

This will also be my last post on the topic...it's sounding way too much like a discussion I had with the guy who flew this airplane...
Then, the airplane made a steep left bank, rolled inverted, and nose dived into the back porch of a home.

Fly safe!

David
 
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Deer in the Headlights Syndrome - That is the Problem

“Deer in the headlights” syndrome, (freezing-up) that’s the problem.

I see this many times when I am testing a multiengine applicant who is only prepared for what he or she thinks is the usual simulated engine failure after takeoff. What I mean is that some applicants are only prepared for the instructor/examiner to simulate an engine failure by bringing a throttle back at about 600 - 800 feet AGL after takeoff when the landing gear would already have been retracted and the power reduced to climb power. After the examiner brings back a throttle, the applicant mumbles a few things such as, “Mixture, props, throttles, gear-up, flaps-up, verify and feather.” Then the examiner moves the throttle and prop and announces that “zero thrust” is set. In my opinion this whole scenario has very little realism to an actual engine failure just after takeoff at 50, 75 or 100 feet with no runway ahead and no where to land.

Instead of testing with the above scenario I prefer a more realistic simulation of a real engine failure after takeoff. As I have mentioned earlier in this thread, I prefer to climb to 3000 feet AGL for the safety of a simulated hard-deck takeoff with the gear down, full power and airspeed between Vxse and Vyse or, Vsse if such as speed is published. With a mixture cut at 50 feet above the simulated hard deck, all that’s required is to apply rudder to maintain directional control, level the wings while simultaneously pitching forward to hold airspeed, then retracting the landing gear and feathering (for real) the propeller. This simulation is realistic. Every instructor that knows me and how I test this task prepares their students for this simulation. Almost all applicants pass this task by clearly knowing the correct action following an engine failure after takeoff. They have a clear plan of action for this emergency. And as for performance, all modern training twins such as the Seminole and the Duchess climb out with no difficulty.

On the other hand, if I happen to have an applicant for testing that is recommend by a CFI outside my area who might be unfamiliar with the 3000 foot AGL hard deck method, those applicants perform similar to a “Deer in the Headlights” following the engine failure after takeoff. They are startled and do nothing for a short while and then they start mumbling something about mixtures, props, throttles, checklists, carb heat, boost pumps, flaps and so on (even though all of these were set for takeoff and don’t need change). This brings an element of confusion and second guessing until so much time is lost along with airspeed. Of course, the next thing we know the airspeed has deteriorated to very near Vmc causing examiner intervention for safety of flight. That check ride is over.

So you see, what is necessary to prevent the “Deer in the Headlights” roll over accident is a clear plan of action for an engine failure right after takeoff. If the runway is less than about 5000 feet it would be very difficult to abort a takeoff once airborne and above 50 feet. But if you know the airplane is light enough and the performance will be satisfactory, then be prepared to do exactly what is necessary and don’t perform actions that are unnecessary for that takeoff that day. For example don’t talk about or try to retract the flaps when they aren’t being used for takeoff. Have a clear plan of action and review that plan in your mind before takeoff:
  • Maintain directional control while pitching forward to maintain airspeed
  • Retract landing gear
  • Verify and feather prop
  • Maintain at least Vxse, or Vyse if that speed has been obtained
Having a clear plan of action will prevent the “Deer in the Headlights” syndrome which is the cause of Vmc roll-over (upset) accidents.

Comments/questions?
 
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I'm not a twin driver, but I can read. The statistics speak for themselves, that attempted continued take-off with only one engine is much more likely to result in a crash than resigning oneself to landing straight ahead. The average twin driver is just not that proficient in emergency single engine operation.

Incidentally, landing a single on the remaining runway after a complete loss of power at 75' AGL isn't easy, unless you're prepared for it. That's the trouble with most sudden engine failures--no one is truly "prepared for it". You think you are, until it happens to you.

Cary
 
Cary said:
I'm not a twin driver, but I can read. The statistics speak for themselves, that attempted continued take-off with only one engine is much more likely to result in a crash than resigning oneself to landing straight ahead. The average twin driver is just not that proficient in emergency single engine operation.
Cary

Engine failure after takeoff: Apply rudder, level the wings while pitching forward to maintain airspeed, retract the landing gear, feather the prop and climb out. This is really not a difficult task in terms of airmanship. What it does take is a predetermined plan of action (POA) in your mind just prior to takeoff. Without this POA the result may be the Vmc upset you mention. Therein lies the cause of the "statistics that speak for themselves" as you say. It's the "Deer in the Headlights" syndrome that kills people. Pilots with no plan are at risk on every takeoff. If a pilot has a "Plan of Action" for engine failure after takeoff and considers runway length, obstructions, terrain and performance, then there is no reason for any pilot to experience a Vmc upset.

If aborting the takeoff and crashing off the end of the runway was the only plan I would likely look for an alternative such as changing runways or maybe taking off at a lower weight. If performance is the problem because of high density altitude then there isn't much that can be done. If that's the case, only then is the plan of action following an engine failure just after takeoff to reduce power, abort the takeoff and make the best of this bad situation. If a pilot flies light twins from high density altitude airports there is always a performance risk that can not be overcome except with turbo-charging.
 
UndauntedFlyer said:
Engine failure after takeoff: Apply rudder, level the wings while pitching forward to maintain airspeed, retract the landing gear, feather the prop and climb out. This is really not a difficult task in terms of airmanship. What it does take is a predetermined plan of action (POA) in your mind just prior to takeoff. Without this POA the result may be the Vmc upset you mention. Therein lies the cause of the "statistics that speak for themselves" as you say. It's the "Deer in the Headlights" syndrome that kills people. Pilots with no plan are at risk on every takeoff. If a pilot has a "Plan of Action" for engine failure after takeoff and considers runway length, obstructions, terrain and performance, then there is no reason for any pilot to experience a Vmc upset.

If aborting the takeoff and crashing off the end of the runway was the only plan I would likely look for an alternative such as changing runways or maybe taking off at a lower weight. If performance is the problem because of high density altitude then there isn't much that can be done. If that's the case, only then is the plan of action following an engine failure just after takeoff to reduce power, abort the takeoff and make the best of this bad situation. If a pilot flies light twins from high density altitude airports there is always a performance risk that can not be overcome except with turbo-charging.

Yes, sir. I run the mental drill immediately prior to every takeoff in a light twin. And I personally don't fly GA recip twins if I can't climb out on one...the reliability is too low and Vso is too high.

A light single is twice as reliable and and lands much slower if you go engine out.
 
Let's talk about retracting the landing gear after a normal takeoff.

Many pilots are trained to retract the landing gear after takeoff when there is no longer sufficient runway remaining for a landing. These pilots are taught to use the landing gear up or down to make their decision to abort the takeoff or to continue based on gear position. Gear down, land; gear up, go. There are two problems with using the gear for determining a go, no-go point of decision.

1. It may be that a distraction such as a rough running engine followed by that engine's failure causes the pilot to not retract the gear right after takeoff. This could result in the gear still being down while climbing through 100 feet which is a sufficient altitude for the pilot to continue the takeoff on one engine (assuming the airplane is within the performance envelope), but yet the trained procedure is to abort the takeoff and crash since the gear is down. This shows a problem with using the gear as a deciding factor because in reality except for left engine failures on the older twins like the PA-23 series, the gear can be retracted or extended in a matter of seconds. It is performance as well as other factors such as obstructions ahead but not gear position that really should determine the go, no-go decision.

2. Another problem is that pilots trained in the above method of using the gear for determining the go, no-go decision point just don't retract the gear quickly enough following normal takeoffs. If a runway is 5,000 feet long the point at which the pilot could still abort the takeoff and stop on the runway is just about immediately after takeoff. Yet I many times see pilots brief that the gear will be their go, no-go decision maker and then delay gear retraction until way past the point in which a safe landing could have been made straight ahead on the takeoff runway. So this means that they have predetermined a plan for a crash landing even though the airplane could have continued a climb on one engine (assuming the airplane was within the performance envelope).

So in conclusion, if a pilot wants to use the landing gear as the go, no-go decision maker, the pilot should retract the landing gear almost immediately after takeoff when the runway is less than 5,000 feet. By delaying the gear retraction the pilot is only fooling himself or herself into believing that the airplane can safely land straight ahead on the runway. When a pilot briefs that the gear will be his decision maker regarding the go, no-go point, and then keeps the gear down way too long, this would be a failure item for "Normal Takeoff Procedures" on FAA multiengine tests.

Big long airline (8000') runway, delay gear retraction by a few seconds, any other runway, retract the landing gear promptly after takeoff.

Questions/Comments are welcome....
 
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dhc8fo said:
In my 340, if I had a 10,000 foot runway, my gear would still be down at 75 feet.

I too have flown the 340. This is why I am astounded that the gear is down at 75 feet. From my ops in the PHX area we took typically 2000-3000 to get off. Then by the time we were at 75 feet...no way in he11 we'd make it back to the runway. Even an 8000 foot runway would be unsafe to attempt for a 340. The speed to lose for touchdown would take you way, way off the end.
 

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