Colgan 3407 NTSB Animation

[Singlecoil]

It seems to me the maneuver he performed when the autopilot kicked off at stick shaker was a ground prox escape maneuver. I can almost hear his sim instructor telling him to, "Pull back until you get stick shaker and add full power." Why he did the wrong thing at that time we will never know? Micro sleep woken up by stick shaker? Who knows.

 

[DiverDriver]

Well, then fine. But I disagree, in fact, I've asked about a pusher and any training in the event it happens, but no one does it. Why? The FAA doesn't require it. Hell, yes, we should not stall. And YES, we should recover at just the onset of a stick shaker. But once the pusher goes off, I don't recall any training ever in the sim, in terms of what to do next. It's pretty much up to you, let the pusher do its thing, lower the nose, and let the airspeed rise. Not a big deal when you're 10,000' or higher. A HUGE deal when you're only 1,000 to 1,500 AGL. At that point, who knows, human instinct might to be pull up to avoid the pusher taking you into the ground. I wouldn't know.

But I think we should all get ready and be prepared for stall profile changes, and training right up to and in the pusher. Our airline already did away with stall profiles. I'm sure others will be changing soon, more to follow.

They weren't at 1,000 AGL!! They actually CLIMBED ABOVE glideslope intercept altitude! There were not standard calls by the FO for vertical speed. Just "uhhh". Are there no calls by the pilot not flying at Colgan during windshear training? Do you not experience a pusher in windshear or unusual attitude training. It's NOT just about stall recovery training. We don't do stall recovery training we recover from slow flight in the sims. But that's not all the required training we get. There are other skills that could have carried the day here.

And we can whine and cry about the company's fatiguing schedules. IF YOU ARE F'N FATIGUED CALL IN FATIGUED! BE THE PROFESSIONAL AND MAKE THE CALL! You want the company having someone walk around giving you alertness quizes all the time? How about we just make the call when necessary? How about pilots call in sick when they're sick instead of expecting someone else to do it for them? How about we all act like adults and take responsibility for our own actions?

 

[PBRstreetgang]

Thank you.

If any of us were there, we would be dead too. I for one welcome the finding of the crew being at fault. Would you rather the airframe be suspect and have to go strap on a Q400 for work?
PBR

 

[big shacks]

Every PC or RFT I've taken there were stalls demonstrated on approach or just after takeoff in a turn. Don't other companies do the same?

 

[say again]

The crew stalled the plane, its pilot error. Fatigue may have played a roll, poor training, etc, etc, but they put themselves in the situation that never should've happened in the first place. Ultimately, their actions (or the lack thereof) were the main reason for the loss of many lives. Extremely sad, but very true.

 

[ultrarunner]

...For example a Captain with 5 check ride failures and 100 hours in type paired with a very inexperienced FO should never happen.

What is so ironic is that the PRIA report would show these failures. So in the Colgan case, everyone knew about his substandard performance. The irony is that it was repeated PC failures on the part of the Eagle captain that killed everyone, including himself in RDU that night, that led to PRIA, as that information was never disiminated to AE. AE likey may have never hired him.

In the Colgan case, they knowling had a cheeseball, and still sent him into battle.

Pretty predictable on what the outcome will be....

 

[ASA_Aviator]

If any of us were there, we would be dead too. I for one welcome the finding of the crew being at fault. Would you rather the airframe be suspect and have to go strap on a Q400 for work?
PBR

Depends on what you mean by "if any of us were there." If you mean, "If any of us were there after the stall had begun, and the captain well and truly stalled the plane," then I suppose you are correct. Once the plane was fully stalled and rolled to 100 degrees, it would have been difficult, if not impossible to recover.

I disagree, however, that none of us reading this would have been able to prevent the stall in the first place. That is where the breakdown truly happened, and most of us here who are professional pilots wouldn't have allowed it to get that far, despite what the media tries to say about our lack of professionalism and experience.

I'm not saying that it couldn't happen to me, quite the contrary. Anyone could have made this mistake, but on average, most of us would have caught this before it got that bad. That is why there aren't many more accidents like this.

 

[ultrarunner]

...For example a Captain with 5 check ride failures and 100 hours in type paired with a very inexperienced FO should never happen.

What is so ironic is that the PRIA report would show these failures. So in the Colgan case, everyone knew about his substandard performance. The irony is that it was repeated PC failures on the part of the Eagle captain that killed everyone, including himself in RDU that night, that led to PRIA, as that information was never disiminated to AE. AE likey may have never hired him.

In the Colgan case, they knowling had a cheeseball, and still sent him into battle.

Pretty predictable on what the outcome will be....

 

[CKJET]

If any of us were there, we would be dead too. I for one welcome the finding of the crew being at fault. Would you rather the airframe be suspect and have to go strap on a Q400 for work?
PBR

It seems to me the shaker/pusher went off around 130kts and 2300, the plane then climbed to 2500 before going down,

Keep flaps where they are, full power, and just five degrees nose down saves them..... I just cant relate to the yoke in his lap?

 

[mesaba13]

What is amazing to me is how long the thing flew at around 90kts while large rudder/aileron control inputs were applied. One would think it would have dropped off much sooner and entered a spin.