Chicago runway too slick at Crash

[Skyboy722]

I hope that Southwest looks at how they can prevent a future occurrence akin to Midway.

C'mon, do you honestly believe that they wouldn't?

 

[SWA tech]

I have worked at TWA and NWA and too many cargo outfits to list. All the pilots I have worked with are professional but SWA pilots are the best I have ever worked with. They are far from cowboys that's my 2 cents

 

[Hvy]

Hvy,

I've landed at MDW with the ATIS calling the winds calm only to find a full windsock on short final.

They are probably better thesedays with changing the ATIS quicker. Everything should get better, people learn from their mistakes, we should hope. Everyone can agree on this.

"Windcheck for Rwy__ __ please."

 

[SWA/FO]

COWBOY?

Unless we are talking 'bout Kid Rock... then maybe.

Whats this crap on the Oscars? This song thats on "its hard out here for a pimp". The chick is kinda hot singing but please what movie was this in "HBO's Pimps & John's"? They just won, wow.

Its hard out here being the pimp LCC...

 

[SWA/FO]

Hvy, didn't think of that...thanks. Next time I'll have to ask.

 

[Slug]

It is my understanding that a 13C approach was asked for by certain other aircraft and were denied. I have not read the PRELIMINARY report (just too busy right now), but I will read and study it after the initial few iterations do come out. Oh well...........

Slug

 

[SWA/FO]

I know for a FACT 13 C was requested. ATC said "unable"

 

[regionaltard]

"Windcheck for Rwy__ __ please."

No $hit. Unless of course your motto is "don't ask, don't tell."

 

[T1bubba]

Vis was below mins for all approaches except the ILS-Z 31C so other runways weren't an option.

 

[SWA/FO]

because.............Its hard out here for a PIMP LCC! - everybody!!!

 

[1BigRodeo]

This is not about hating Southwest. It is about leaving zero margin for error. Yes, the approach was legal. Barely. But I don't consider it to have been a safe decision. That is quite clear in the NTSB initial report.

As far as where everyone stands on this, what I see is a bunch of Southwest pilots attacking me for voicing that there was excessive risk involved with the mishap flight. If there were a lot of non-Southwest pilots attacking me for my comments, I'd take stock of it, but the vocal attacks on me have come from Southwest pilots. I might add that it appears that you (collectively) appear to have not read the NTSB initial report; if you had, there wouldn't be some of the comments made like how hard it is to switch runways from 31 to 13.
It's funny that you mentioned the cowboy thing in post #2. I was at an airport the day after the accident, and I overheard two people talking about the accident; one of them mentioned that Southwest has a reputation for being a bunch of cowboys. They were both in suit & tie, so I can't tell who they worked for, except that one of them said he was a VP for some small chain of health food stores. I did not talk to them.

I wish everyone at Southwest the best. It's a well run company. Hopefully Southwest will take stock of how they do business and reevaluate the minimum margin of safety for daily operations.
SWADude pointed out the San Mateo incident; as a result of that flight, there has been an increased emphasis on takeoff and landing currencies for widebody crews. UAL increased the number of domestic flights on the 777 & 400 so that crews would have more opportunities for takeoffs and landings. I think that was a very proactive step to fix a problem; I hope that Southwest looks at how they can prevent a future occurrence akin to Midway.

1. I wouldnt put much stock in anything that is stated as wisdom on this board, so what you consider safe and what I consider safe may be two different things based on experience, ability, and perspective. All you have is what is in that report, and as I said, I was there that night, and it isnt at all in the report. You needed to hear the tower reports, what other pilots were saying on the radio, and what was or wasnt being relayed from dispatch. Inflection, intent, and cockpit discussion isnt public yet, so keep your pants on in judging these guys.

2. Most of us could give a rats behind what some guy in a terminal in a suit and tie said about us. Is it a general reflection on how we operate? Hardly. That would be as assinine as anyone who says United only hires 1000 hour females and minorities. Is it true? In some cases, but not many. Ive heard my share about every airline out there in the terminal, so lets keep scope on what civilians are saying. As you know most rumor is generated by those who dont have a clue about what they speak of. I hear alot of great things about SWA in the terminal also. Had an ATC guy tap me on the shoulder the other night on a deadhead to say how much he liked working with our guys. Had a TSA guy thank me for treating him like a human being in PIT the other day too, how much he appreciated how SWA folks treated him. Hear kudos in the jet as we say thank you to the folks all the time, some chides, but mostly "thanks for a nice ride". Do you care what Ive heard about United in the terminal Andy? Didnt think so, so save it, the 1%Cowboys that do exist at SWA wont hear it any more than the 1% of clowns you have on your almighty list.

3. Do you honestly think that SWA mgmt or Union goons just sit around after something like this happens and pray that it doesnt happen again? Do you think that BUR didnt get anyones attention? There is not one thing in our operation that tells me to press the field, land on a marginal runway, taxi at mach 2. There is one common thread, and that is to be safe, efficient, and effective. In that order. Individual interpretations of that point are policed by we, the crew members, in conjunction with our Professional Standards, and Chief pilots. There may be and old school element left here, but the vast majority of us got here in the past 7 years, and have a bit of a different mindset. There is no "culture issue" here, just because we dont do things the way you do doesnt make us wrong or unsafe. We all have a vested interest in our bottom line, and we are very much in touch with the operation of our jets. It has served us well financially and safety-related for a long time. A few blips on the screen that we have had pale in comparison to some(most) other airlines safety records.

The fact at hand Andy is that yes a few of us have taken personally your inference that two of our pilots made an unsafe decision, and that somehow reflects on SWA operations as a whole. Thats flamebait. I say you dont have all the facts, you may never have all the facts, all you have is what the NTSB releases. Should we pass judgement on all the reports that they have regarding fatalities at UAL? Who the heck are we to judge anyway? We should know better. Take what you think you need from this to be a better pilot, and remember, to opine in here is opening yourself up to the anti's and the pro somebody elses.

 

[HighSpeedClimb]

Not to hash up old news, or play Monday Quarterback, but this is very interesting info. Notice that the brakes were applied pretty forcefully, but the reversers were deployed and ony 25% or so of N1 was used until almost off the runway, when 80% N1 was finally applied. We know reversers aren't nearly as effective as brakes, but I wonder what 80% N1 from the get go would have done.
I can't get the sound to work, if anyone does, let me know how.

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2006/ChicagoIL_SW_Animation/sw_animation.html

 

[SWA/FO]

Landed in the zone. On speed.

 

[HighSpeedClimb]

Landed in the zone. On speed.

Yes he did, at the touchdown aiming zone and 131 kts, very nice. Did you notice though that the reversers didn't go to transient until 86 kts, 45 kts after touchdown. Full reversers weren't added until 70 kts. It was pretty eerie watching the airspeed decline so slowly on that contaminated runway.

 

[SWA/FO]

guess they are still looking into that. I was just pointing out to all those folks that claim "we are cowboys".

 

[HighSpeedClimb]

guess they are still looking into that. I was just pointing out to all those folks that claim "we are cowboys".

This was definaltely not a "Cowboy" thing. From some Boeing classes I went to, braking action reports are never correct to the exact condition. If its reported Fair its bad. One thing I did learn about reversers and Autobrakes is that if you let the autobrake system slow the a/c without overriding the brakes manually, and then add reversers, the brakes are adjusted to keep the same deceleration you had prior to deployment. In other words, landing with Autobrakes at 1,2,3 without overriding, reversers do nothing. These guys definately used full brakes though, as I'm sure any of us would have done.
We can learn a lot about these incidents to help each and everyone of us while out on the line.

 

[TurboS7]

The end of the runway alway has less traction and is "slicker" then the touchdown zone. AS for Southwest pilots being cowboys, I very much disagree with that, I consider them the 737 experts and they all know how to fly an airplane.

 

[pipejockey]

AS for Southwest pilots, I consider them the 737 experts

:laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh::laugh:

 

[erichartmann]

One thing I did learn about reversers and Autobrakes is that if you let the autobrake system slow the a/c without overriding the brakes manually, and then add reversers, the brakes are adjusted to keep the same deceleration you had prior to deployment. In other words, landing with Autobrakes at 1,2,3 without overriding, reversers do nothing.

The system, at least in the A/C I fly, is not perfect. If you rapidly reduce RT to idle at 80kts you can feel the A/C rate of deceleration reduce, then feel the brakes come back in and increase the rate of deceleration once again.

 

[Fearless Tower]

Interesting info on the autobrakes/thrust reverser deployment can be found in the human factors info released by the NTSB.

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2006/chicagoil%20sw/Exhibits/347680.pdf

If I am reading it correctly it would appear that the information was obtained from SWA's own testing prior to implementing autobrake use for line ops.

For what its worth, a common theme, apparently, among pilots making autobrake assisted landings for the first time was either forgetting to deploy thrust reversers or late deployement of reversers (see post evaluation comments on pages 14-15).

For the accident captain, it was his first landing using autobrakes.