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buthole captain

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KSUPILOT said:
Well I am sorry I ever even posted anything on here. I am offically signing off from this website. You can not post anything on here without getting someone to blast on your question.
Don't go away mad...I was thinking about the comfortable comment, then this gem came to mind...

NTSB said:
NTSB Identification: CHI97MA017 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, October 30, 1996 in WHEELING, IL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/31/1998
Aircraft: Gulfstream G-IV, registration: N23AC
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
The flightcrew of a Gulfstream G-IV began taking off on Runway 34 with a crosswind from 280 deg at 24 kts. About 1,340 feet after the takeoff roll began, the airplane veered left 5.14 deg to a heading of 335 deg. It departed the runway, and tire marks indicated no braking action was applied. One of the pilots said, "Reverse," then one said, "No, no, no, go, go, go, go, go." The airplane traversed a shallow ditch that paralleled the runway, which resulted in separation of both main landing gear, the left and right flaps, and a piece of left aileron control cable from the airplane. The airplane became airborne after it encountered a small berm at the departure end of the runway. Reportedly, the left wing fuel tank exploded. The main wreckage was located about 6,650 ft from the start of the takeoff roll. Examination of the airplane indicated no preexisting anomalies of the engines, flight controls, or aircraft systems. The Nose Wheel Steering Select Control Switch was found in the "Handwheel Only" position, and not in the "Normal" position. The pilot-in-command (PIC) routinely flew with the switch in the "Normal" position. The PIC and copilot (pilot-not-flying) comprised a mix crew in accordance with an Interchange Agreement between two companies which operated G-IV's. The companies' operation manuals and the Interchange Agreement did not address mixed crews, procedural differences, or aircraft difference training.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

failure of the pilot-in-command (PIC) to maintain directional control of the airplane during the takeoff roll in a gusty crosswind, his failure to abort the takeoff, and failure of the copilot to adequately monitor and/or take sufficient remedial action to help avoid the occurrence. Factors relating to the accident included the gusty crosswind condition, the drainage ditch, the flight crew's inadequate preflight, the Nose Wheel Steering Control Select Switch in the "Handwheel Only" position, and the lack of standardization of the two companies' operations manuals and Interchage Agreement.
 
I know I'll regret this, but here goes ...

I'm willing to bet I'm the lowest-time wannabe sitting right seat in a multi-turbine aircraft here, and my boss does the full boat on every single leg. I've learned all the challenges, responses, and actions for every normal procedure in the B200 (even though I'm still stumbling :D), and he uses them religiously. So here I am, trying to learn how to hand-fly this huge/fast (to me, being a Skyhawk weenie) aircraft, manage my own power, and still run the checklists at less than 300 hours. And for the life of me ...

I can't figure out what the big deal is?

And as anyone who's flown with me will attest ... I don't exactly fly like Chuck Yeager, and I ain't the sharpest knife in the drawer to start with. :D

I'm glad my boss does the full, two-crew checks per the Simuflite manual, even though he has thousands of hours doing by his lonesome.

I be learn'n ... and I be comfortable that way. :)


Minhommad the Muslim Pig Farmer
 
pile on

Hugh Jorgan said:
Good grief, 15,000 hours and the after-takeoff checklist above 1000 agl is scary? How the heck do you manage to do the before landing checklist when it's busy and you are at 1500' agl? Next thing you know, he'll call for the after-landing checklist while you are still taxiing in!!! The nerve! (BTW...two T's in butthole, since Tonyc doesn't seem to be paying attention today).

I think it should be hyphenated "butt-hole"
 
Weird

I think I'm going to start blurting out "sterile cockpit" anytime I don't want to trade in-flight meals.
 
You've got to have thick skin when you fly with a jerk. It's tough to do that when you're on a multiple day pairing, but it's just part of being a good pilot. A lot of people can fly airplanes. Getting along with crewmembers you don't like is the real test.

If there's something beyond that, such as a safety issue...remove yourself from the trip or better yet, discuss it with the captain.

Once you become the PIC, remember those things that you didn't like when the shoe was on the other foot.
 
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A "Butthole" Captain is no different from any other cockpit anomaly that has to be managed. Engines fail, hydraulics leak, generators drop off line and captains have brain farts. Just another situation in the life of a professional pilot.

Why not take the original post and substitute an aircraft system for the "butthole captain" and I think you will see the weakness is not the frailty of the offensive captain, but the inability of the first officer to cope appropriately.

After serving 16 years as a first officer and another 18 as the ______ (you fill in the blank) captain, I can tell you that personalities and personal foibles are a fact of life in the cockpit. It is just as important to be able to manage a malfunctioning crewmember as it is to manage an engine failure...maybe more important.

Copilots fall into two major categories: co-operators and competitors. Co-operators work with the captain to complete the assigned mission. They are respectful of the captain's position and understanding of the captain's limitations. Competitors are copilots who are continually vying to prove their superiority to themsleves. They understand NOTHING of the correography of the two man cockpit. They try to do the captain's job better than the captain while neglecting the tasks that the captain counts on the co-pilot to do. For the co-operators, CRM is a guide to a peaceful, safe operation. For the competitors, CRM is a manifesto of "you're not the boss of me". A four day trip with a co-operator is a pleasure. A four day trip with a competitor is a nighmare.

Being a copilot is much harder than being a captain. To play a good second fiddle, you gotta listen to the tune of the first fiddle. Harmony, or cacaphony...what's it going to be?
 

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