Hawker rider
(gold)Member
- Joined
- Nov 26, 2001
- Posts
- 249
Well here we go KSUPILOT, Seems you solved your own problem.
I am offically signing off from this website
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I am offically signing off from this website
Don't go away mad...I was thinking about the comfortable comment, then this gem came to mind...KSUPILOT said:Well I am sorry I ever even posted anything on here. I am offically signing off from this website. You can not post anything on here without getting someone to blast on your question.
NTSB said:NTSB Identification: CHI97MA017 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Public Inquiries
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, October 30, 1996 in WHEELING, IL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/31/1998
Aircraft: Gulfstream G-IV, registration: N23AC
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
The flightcrew of a Gulfstream G-IV began taking off on Runway 34 with a crosswind from 280 deg at 24 kts. About 1,340 feet after the takeoff roll began, the airplane veered left 5.14 deg to a heading of 335 deg. It departed the runway, and tire marks indicated no braking action was applied. One of the pilots said, "Reverse," then one said, "No, no, no, go, go, go, go, go." The airplane traversed a shallow ditch that paralleled the runway, which resulted in separation of both main landing gear, the left and right flaps, and a piece of left aileron control cable from the airplane. The airplane became airborne after it encountered a small berm at the departure end of the runway. Reportedly, the left wing fuel tank exploded. The main wreckage was located about 6,650 ft from the start of the takeoff roll. Examination of the airplane indicated no preexisting anomalies of the engines, flight controls, or aircraft systems. The Nose Wheel Steering Select Control Switch was found in the "Handwheel Only" position, and not in the "Normal" position. The pilot-in-command (PIC) routinely flew with the switch in the "Normal" position. The PIC and copilot (pilot-not-flying) comprised a mix crew in accordance with an Interchange Agreement between two companies which operated G-IV's. The companies' operation manuals and the Interchange Agreement did not address mixed crews, procedural differences, or aircraft difference training.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
failure of the pilot-in-command (PIC) to maintain directional control of the airplane during the takeoff roll in a gusty crosswind, his failure to abort the takeoff, and failure of the copilot to adequately monitor and/or take sufficient remedial action to help avoid the occurrence. Factors relating to the accident included the gusty crosswind condition, the drainage ditch, the flight crew's inadequate preflight, the Nose Wheel Steering Control Select Switch in the "Handwheel Only" position, and the lack of standardization of the two companies' operations manuals and Interchage Agreement.
Hugh Jorgan said:Good grief, 15,000 hours and the after-takeoff checklist above 1000 agl is scary? How the heck do you manage to do the before landing checklist when it's busy and you are at 1500' agl? Next thing you know, he'll call for the after-landing checklist while you are still taxiing in!!! The nerve! (BTW...two T's in butthole, since Tonyc doesn't seem to be paying attention today).
http://members.fortunecity.com/wavjunky/swl-d/dontlet.wavKSUPILOT said:Well I am sorry I ever even posted anything on here. I am offically signing off from this website. You can not post anything on here without getting someone to blast on your question.
KSUPILOT said:So Iam flying with this buthole captain this week. He has a serious case of Captainitis. I do not feel comfortable being in the cockpit with him. I could sit here and right a four page letter on why I do not feel comfortable but the biggest thing I am trying to get over is his excessive overkill of command and response. The times he wants to do it scares the piss out of me. Give me your thoughts. He has called for the after takeoff check list between 1,00o and 2ooo feet of the ground coming out of busy airports. Today he wanted to talk about comnad and response at 6,000 feet in the climb coming out of a High dentsity Airport and I refused and called out "Sterile Cockpit". What are your thoughts on the commmand and response overkill?
THanks,
KSUPILOT
atrdriver said:Last time I flew with a Captain that felt it necessary to nit pick at everything I did I said "your controls". After he took them he asked me why, and I told him I didn't need flight instruction and he could fly the rest of the trip and I would take care of the radios. He said he didn't want to fly all the legs for 4 days, so I told him to keep his opinions to himself unless it involved safety.