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Bloomberg on AF447

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I'm not too up to speed on Airbus FBW control laws, but will the airplane still have some sort of AOA protection with loss of speed indication? Was the airplane just hanging on the edge of a stall or in a true aerodynamic stall? I would think a full stall from altitude would have been a much different mode of descent.
 
Im not a bus guy either, but the article from the above link states that at speeds below 60kts the AOA inputs are rejected. Also states that the A/S came back (along with the stall warning). The V/S was 10k fpm and the pilot continued to pull back on the stick. Pilot states he had no valid flight instrumentation. I don't know. Something seems screwy here. Not going to pass judgement here until more info comes out, then I still won't judge, I'll just learn.
 
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2011/05/air_france_447_the_facts_and_w.html


3. A few minutes later the PF makes a sidestick control input which raises the nose and causes the aircraft to climb rapidly to 38,000ft. There was no reason to climb, the PF did not announce an intention to do it,and the aircraft was not cleared by ATC to do so. The natural result of climbing without an increase in power is a loss of speed. But we'll deal with that shortly.


Am I misreading (3)? What was the reason for the PF pitch up?
 
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The report says nothing about entering a thunderstorm. After the loss of airspeed indication, they did not maintain proper pitch and power setting, and the aircraft stalled. They applied 'pitch up' control in response to the stall and maintained 'pitch up' control throughout most of the descent.

This investigation is pissing me off. They have completely overlooked or at least publicly ignored the fact they drove their aircraft directly into a thunderstorm. How about the investigating committee stop critiquing thier piloting techniques on stall recovery once they entered the thunder storms and determine why the hell they did in the first place. Any aircraft would ice over and stall in thunderstorms of that magnitude. It's time we start investigating basic piloting and thunderstorm avoidance.
 
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So we shouldn't learn and educate our self and have discussions about this so it doesn't happen again?
Didn't say nothing of the sort. How about you wait until all the facts and analysis have been released before you draw your own conclusions?
I also find it very interesting how you know for sure you would have just acted perfectly in the scenario even though you weren't there. Who knows exactly what was going on? You, so far at least, have very little known facts about this crash, yet have no qualms about assuring us that this accident was simply about some FO not having basic aerodynamic knowledge and skills.
While you might have made a good point given your view of what happened, it's people like you, who think they are God's gift to aviation, that scare me the most.
 
This investigation is pissing me off. They have completely overlooked or at least publicly ignored the fact they drove their aircraft directly into a thunderstorm. How about the investigating committee stop critiquing thier piloting techniques on stall recovery once they entered the thunder storms and determine why the hell they did in the first place. Any aircraft would ice over and stall in thunderstorms of that magnitude. It's time we start investigating basic piloting and thunderstorm avoidance.

Watch the AF447 Nova episode. It gives an idea as to why they may have not seen the Tstorm.
 
Didn't say nothing of the sort. How about you wait until all the facts and analysis have been released before you draw your own conclusions?
I also find it very interesting how you know for sure you would have just acted perfectly in the scenario even though you weren't there. Who knows exactly what was going on? You, so far at least, have very little known facts about this crash, yet have no qualms about assuring us that this accident was simply about some FO not having basic aerodynamic knowledge and skills.
While you might have made a good point given your view of what happened, it's people like you, who think they are God's gift to aviation, that scare me the most.

+1 -
But I'll moderate it out- and say that some actions of pilots are worthy of our contempt or critique- but let's wait a bit longer on this one until we can get a real handle on it-
I have very little time in Airbii relatively- but know enough that their designs can very much change a pilot's assumptions on correct action. Never before has the manual been more important to understand
 
11,000 hours for CA? 3,000 hours for the "copilot" at the controls? Wow. The average FO at a major likely has more than 11,000 hours. Quality time is good, but quantity also has it's place.

It's not like it's a secret, but it's not uncommon for int'l pilots (US or foreign) to NOT fly that much.

Also, often the structure of the seniority vs. fleet type vs. pay at some European legacies can be different than the U.S. In other words, the "junior pilots" (in all seats) being on the int'l stuff because the schedules can flat out suck.

So even though the CA may have had "only" 11,000 hrs, who knows how much he may have had in the right seat that was probably heavy/int'l at some point before getting his first "command"?
 
LJ45 has not been pounding his chest as you suggest and has not said he could have handled it perfectly. I think when this is all over he will be proven right. I am sure the investigaters know exactly what happened, just haven't put it in their report yet.

Not being Airbus trained, by choice, I had the same questions LJ45 had and have no idea with a stall warning why you would pull back in any airplane. I have flown 74 different types of aircraft including Lear Jets and 4 different airliners and not once have I been encouraged to pull back with a stall warning. Windshear is the exception because of proximity to the ground. Never at altitude. I know Airbus preaches their airplanes can't stall so you can pull full back during stall recovery but how well did it work this time? Did it go into alternate law or direct law so the computer removed all protections? If so why would they teach to pull back on stall recovery? By the way I noticed Airbus just changed their stall recovery procedure to reduce pitch first. Too bad they didn't do that two years ago.
 
It's not like it's a secret, but it's not uncommon for int'l pilots (US or foreign) to NOT fly that much.

Also, often the structure of the seniority vs. fleet type vs. pay at some European legacies can be different than the U.S. In other words, the "junior pilots" (in all seats) being on the int'l stuff because the schedules can flat out suck.

So even though the CA may have had "only" 11,000 hrs, who knows how much he may have had in the right seat that was probably heavy/int'l at some point before getting his first "command"?
Did not know that. However, the why doesn't change the wow to me. Perhaps some of it is some envy that a pilot could make a living while flying so little. Age 57 and 11,000 hrs -- couldn't have been flying more than a couple of hundred hours a year.
 
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I know Airbus preaches their airplanes can't stall so you can pull full back during stall recovery but how well did it work this time? Did it go into alternate law or direct law so the computer removed all protections? If so why would they teach to pull back on stall recovery? By the way I noticed Airbus just changed their stall recovery procedure to reduce pitch first. Too bad they didn't do that two years ago.

Part 1 is factual information, part 2 was speculation put together shortly after the accident when they didn't really have any info on what happened, and assumed a full on loss of all three ADR's

Part 1;

02:10Z:
Autothrust off
Autopilot off
FBW alternate law
Rudder Travel Limiter Fault
TCAS fault
Flight Envelope Computation warning

02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)

02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree

02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault
02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)

Part 2;

The following is a list of affected systems from the loss of all ADR's checklist.

F/CTL PROT (Alternate Law)
ADR 1+2+3
L/G RETRACT
AP 1+2
A/THR
RUD TRV LIM
WINDSHEAR DET
CAB PR 1+2
GPWS

OTHER INOP SYS
FLAPS AUTO RETRACT
ALPHA LOCK
FLAPS LOAD RELIEF
ATC ALTI MODE TCAS
 
Did not know that. However, the why doesn't change the wow to me. Perhaps some of it is some envy that a pilot could make a living while flying so little. Age 57 and 11,000 hrs -- couldn't have been flying more than a couple of hundred hours a year.
Make that 500 hours a year.
 
Make that 500 hours a year.

Possibly. But take into account that many foreign airlines can get close to 2 months of "annual leave". Combined with training event's, ect. He could have possibly been a management pilot and/or TRE/TRI for AF and spent time instructing as well as flying the line at some point in his career, ect. Accounting for low total flight time vs. age, etc.
 
How much time makes you immune?
How little time makes you safe? Yes, you're never immune. I guess if they develped a test to determine that a 250-hour pilot will never have an accident then all would be well. I've heard stories of incidents/accidents on retirement flights or those very near retirement. But I don't think the Sioux City accident would have had the same outcome without the immense experience on that flight deck.

Dennis E. Fitch, an off-duty United Airlines DC-10 flight instructor, was seated in the first class section and, noticing the crew were having trouble controlling the airplane, offered his assistance to the flight attendants. Upon being informed that there was a DC-10 instructor on board, Haynes immediately invited him to the cockpit, hoping his instructional knowledge of the aircraft would help them regain control. Upon entering the cockpit and looking at the hydraulic gauges, Fitch determined that the situation was beyond anything he had ever faced. The flight crew, while using the engines to control the airplane, were also still trying to fly the airplane using their control columns. Haynes, trying to fly the airplane with his control column while simultaneously working the throttles, asked Fitch to work the throttles instead. With one throttle in each hand, Fitch was able to mitigate the phugoid cycle and make rough steering adjustments. Air traffic control (ATC) was contacted and an emergency landing at nearby Sioux Gateway Airport was organized. Haynes kept his sense of humor during the emergency, as recorded on the plane's cockpit voice recorder (CVR): Fitch: I'll tell you what, we'll have a beer when this is all done. Haynes: Well I don't drink, but I'll sure as hell have one.
This of course is the reason UAL still DHs their pilots in first class. Or is it because the pilots have enough self respect to insist on it in their contract. One major airline not only does not DH in first class, but it has the IRO/crew rest seat in coach. If Air France had that it would have taken another 60 seconds for the CA to reach the cockpit....but I digress.
 
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Didn't say nothing of the sort. How about you wait until all the facts and analysis have been released before you draw your own conclusions?
I also find it very interesting how you know for sure you would have just acted perfectly in the scenario even though you weren't there. Who knows exactly what was going on? You, so far at least, have very little known facts about this crash, yet have no qualms about assuring us that this accident was simply about some FO not having basic aerodynamic knowledge and skills.
While you might have made a good point given your view of what happened, it's people like you, who think they are God's gift to aviation, that scare me the most.

WOW! the only one drawing conclusions would be you sir and with tired old attack lines added...whatever makes you happy.
 
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Sometimes you just have to let them rant, LJ45. We know where we stand so who cares. I couldn't figure out his problem because you didn't show any better than thou attitude at all.
 
Giant line of embedded thundestorms. Heavy aircraft. Night. IMC. Over a dark ocean. Unreliable or inoperative flight instruments cause by severe/extreme icing and turbulence. I'm sorry what are we debating again?
 

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