Dornier 335
Well-known member
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2005
- Posts
- 1,089
You are correct, but I couldn't find a more up-to-date video on this subject. Thanks for the "disclaimer".
Welcome to Flightinfo.com
- Register now and join the discussion
- Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
- Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
- Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
- Share the passion for aviation
- Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun
Asiana 777 crashed on landing at SFO
- Thread starter Andy
- Start date
- Watchers 94
Welcome to Flightinfo.com
- Register now and join the discussion
- Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
- Invite your friends
- Share the passion of aviation
- Friendliest aviation community on the web
You are correct, but I couldn't find a more up-to-date video on this subject. Thanks for the "disclaimer".
Dornier 335
Well-known member
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2005
- Posts
- 1,089
Asiana crash to reopen sensitive questions on etiquette, automation
link
Asiana crash to reopen sensitive questions on etiquette, automation
On a seemingly routine visual approach on clear late morning over San Francisco, a Boeing 777-200ER flown by Asiana Airlines started an approach that began too high, descended too low, swerved off the centreline and, in the final, crucial moments, slowed to nearly a stall.
The resulting crash on runway 28L that killed two passengers and sent more than 180 to the hospital triggered a US safety investigation that promises to reopen sensitive questions over crew resources management, automation, air traffic management and culture.
The experience and working dynamic between the pilot flying, captain Lee Gang-guk, and the pilot monitoring (but still in command), Lee Jeong-min, is already a major focus for investigators. Lee Gang-guk had recently transitioned to the 777 from the Airbus A320, while Lee Jeong-min was flying as an instructor in the 777 for the first time.
Perhaps reviving distant memories of South Korean pilots and a culture of deference to authority, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also wants to know whether Lee Jeong-min and the relief first officer present on the flightdeck suppressed voicing any concerns to Lee Gang-guk.
"We are certainly interested to see if there are any issues where are any challenges to crew communication," says Deborah Hersman, NTSB chairman. "We will be looking at those relationships as we move forward."
Investigators will also look at a series of complications with the automated systems designed to make the pilots' job easier, but appeared, in this case, to flummox and confuse the crew.
First, a deactivated glideslope indicator - due to construction at the airport - forced the crew to fly a non-instrumented approach, which appeared to make them uncomfortable. According to Hersman, the pilot monitoring - and not the pilot flying - realised they were coming in too high on the glideslope as the aircraft passed through 4,000ft (1,220m).
In an attempt to correct the mistake, the crew - working in vertical speed mode - set a descent rate of 1,500ft in the flight director, which corresponds to an unusually steep descent rate.
The next automation problem appeared after the steep descent from 4,000ft put the aircraft too low on the glidepath. Neither the pilot flying nor the pilot monitoring noticed that they were too low until passing through 500ft and approximately 35s away from a normal landing. The pilot flying said in interviews with the NTSB that he was temporarily blinded by a flash of light from the ground, which Hersman says is being investigated.
"We really don't know what it could have been," she adds.
The pilots however were already flirting with disaster. Many airlines require pilots to be in final landing configuration and on the glideslope as the aircraft passes through 1,000ft. The Asiana 777 had already passed through 500ft and was low on the glideslope, but the crew did not break off the approach.
As the crew attempted to pull the nose up and regain altitude, the aircraft also yawed off the centerline of the runway, forcing the pilot flying to make quick lateral corrections at the same time as he was trying to ascend.
At this point, another automated tool caught the crew off-guard. As Lee Gang-guk, the pilot flying, raised the nose up, the pilot monitoring later told the NTSB that he assumed the auto-throttles were still engaged.
The auto-throttles were either inhibited as a result of the selected operating mode, turned off unknowingly by one of the crew members or had somehow failed. Neither pilot advanced the throttles to compensate for the vertical corrections, which appeared to cause the aircraft to bleed off speed from 137kt (254km/h) down to a low of 103kt within 3s from impact with the seawall.
The NTSB is still trying to understand the complexities involving how the autothrottle operates in the different operating modes of the 777.
"In the last 2.5 minutes in the flight, we see multiple autopilot modes, and we see multiple autothrottle modes," Hersman says. "We need to understand what those modes were - if they were commanded by the pilots, if they were activated inadvertently, if the pilots understood what the mode was doing."
The status of the autothrottle system, however, may not relieve the pilots of blame for losing track of the airspeed as it departed from the reference of 137kt. Moreover, some 777 pilots are trained in simulators to catch inoperative auto-throttles on approach and successfully execute the approach or go-around.
The lack of a glideslope indicator to enable a stabilised approach is also not likely to be a probable cause, as airline pilots are expected to be able to hand-fly a routine visual approach to an 11,000ft runway.
Like the automation issue with the auto-throttles, however, the NTSB wants to understand what role - if any - the air traffic management tools played in the crew's decisions that morning. The NTSB has asked the US Federal Aviation Administration to provide data on all of the missed approaches to runway 28L since 1 June, when the glidescope indicator was deactivated to begin the three-month construction project.
It is still early in the investigation, but so far, neither the Asiana crew nor the NTSB has found any reason to blame the Pratt & Whitney PW4090 engines on the seven-year-old aircraft for failing to maintain the aircraft at the reference airspeed. The crew had plenty of power available, but it was not summoned until it was already too late.
Unless a fault is detected upon further analysis, that likely means that the incident is not a repeat of the British Airways Flight 38, which crashed landed short of the runway at London Heathrow airport in 2008. In that non-fatal incident, an unusually large number of ice crystals that formed in the fuel clogged a heat-exchanger on a Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engine.
As the Asiana crew faces questions about actions before the crash, they are also under scrutiny for the decisions made immediately afterwards. Despite a crash that ripped off the tail of the aircraft and spun it in a violent 360 degree circle that cracked a rib of the reserve first officer in the jump seat, the flightdeck initially told the lead flight attendant to keep passengers seated rather than immediately evacuate, Hersman says.
The order from the flightdeck was rescinded only after a flight attendant came forward from the middle section of the cabin to report that the No. 2 engine was on fire. But the passengers and crew lost 90s of evacuation time before video reviewed by the NTSB showed the cabin doors finally opening and the slides deploying.
"The pilots indicated [to the lead cabin attendant] that they were working with air traffic control," Hersman says, adding that the flightcrew was not fully aware of the fuselage damage when they gave the order to keep the passengers seated.
Another key subject of the investigation will be the crashworthiness of the seats and the integrity of the escape slides. Although the fuselage sustained two massive impacts and stayed mostly intact, two of the escape slides somehow deployed inside the cabin. One of the slides pinned down a flight attendant, who was the last person on the aircraft to be rescued as flames began to consume the interior of the fuselage sidewall, Hersman says.
link
Asiana crash to reopen sensitive questions on etiquette, automation
On a seemingly routine visual approach on clear late morning over San Francisco, a Boeing 777-200ER flown by Asiana Airlines started an approach that began too high, descended too low, swerved off the centreline and, in the final, crucial moments, slowed to nearly a stall.
The resulting crash on runway 28L that killed two passengers and sent more than 180 to the hospital triggered a US safety investigation that promises to reopen sensitive questions over crew resources management, automation, air traffic management and culture.
The experience and working dynamic between the pilot flying, captain Lee Gang-guk, and the pilot monitoring (but still in command), Lee Jeong-min, is already a major focus for investigators. Lee Gang-guk had recently transitioned to the 777 from the Airbus A320, while Lee Jeong-min was flying as an instructor in the 777 for the first time.
Perhaps reviving distant memories of South Korean pilots and a culture of deference to authority, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also wants to know whether Lee Jeong-min and the relief first officer present on the flightdeck suppressed voicing any concerns to Lee Gang-guk.
"We are certainly interested to see if there are any issues where are any challenges to crew communication," says Deborah Hersman, NTSB chairman. "We will be looking at those relationships as we move forward."
Investigators will also look at a series of complications with the automated systems designed to make the pilots' job easier, but appeared, in this case, to flummox and confuse the crew.
First, a deactivated glideslope indicator - due to construction at the airport - forced the crew to fly a non-instrumented approach, which appeared to make them uncomfortable. According to Hersman, the pilot monitoring - and not the pilot flying - realised they were coming in too high on the glideslope as the aircraft passed through 4,000ft (1,220m).
In an attempt to correct the mistake, the crew - working in vertical speed mode - set a descent rate of 1,500ft in the flight director, which corresponds to an unusually steep descent rate.
The next automation problem appeared after the steep descent from 4,000ft put the aircraft too low on the glidepath. Neither the pilot flying nor the pilot monitoring noticed that they were too low until passing through 500ft and approximately 35s away from a normal landing. The pilot flying said in interviews with the NTSB that he was temporarily blinded by a flash of light from the ground, which Hersman says is being investigated.
"We really don't know what it could have been," she adds.
The pilots however were already flirting with disaster. Many airlines require pilots to be in final landing configuration and on the glideslope as the aircraft passes through 1,000ft. The Asiana 777 had already passed through 500ft and was low on the glideslope, but the crew did not break off the approach.
As the crew attempted to pull the nose up and regain altitude, the aircraft also yawed off the centerline of the runway, forcing the pilot flying to make quick lateral corrections at the same time as he was trying to ascend.
At this point, another automated tool caught the crew off-guard. As Lee Gang-guk, the pilot flying, raised the nose up, the pilot monitoring later told the NTSB that he assumed the auto-throttles were still engaged.
The auto-throttles were either inhibited as a result of the selected operating mode, turned off unknowingly by one of the crew members or had somehow failed. Neither pilot advanced the throttles to compensate for the vertical corrections, which appeared to cause the aircraft to bleed off speed from 137kt (254km/h) down to a low of 103kt within 3s from impact with the seawall.
The NTSB is still trying to understand the complexities involving how the autothrottle operates in the different operating modes of the 777.
"In the last 2.5 minutes in the flight, we see multiple autopilot modes, and we see multiple autothrottle modes," Hersman says. "We need to understand what those modes were - if they were commanded by the pilots, if they were activated inadvertently, if the pilots understood what the mode was doing."
The status of the autothrottle system, however, may not relieve the pilots of blame for losing track of the airspeed as it departed from the reference of 137kt. Moreover, some 777 pilots are trained in simulators to catch inoperative auto-throttles on approach and successfully execute the approach or go-around.
The lack of a glideslope indicator to enable a stabilised approach is also not likely to be a probable cause, as airline pilots are expected to be able to hand-fly a routine visual approach to an 11,000ft runway.
Like the automation issue with the auto-throttles, however, the NTSB wants to understand what role - if any - the air traffic management tools played in the crew's decisions that morning. The NTSB has asked the US Federal Aviation Administration to provide data on all of the missed approaches to runway 28L since 1 June, when the glidescope indicator was deactivated to begin the three-month construction project.
It is still early in the investigation, but so far, neither the Asiana crew nor the NTSB has found any reason to blame the Pratt & Whitney PW4090 engines on the seven-year-old aircraft for failing to maintain the aircraft at the reference airspeed. The crew had plenty of power available, but it was not summoned until it was already too late.
Unless a fault is detected upon further analysis, that likely means that the incident is not a repeat of the British Airways Flight 38, which crashed landed short of the runway at London Heathrow airport in 2008. In that non-fatal incident, an unusually large number of ice crystals that formed in the fuel clogged a heat-exchanger on a Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engine.
As the Asiana crew faces questions about actions before the crash, they are also under scrutiny for the decisions made immediately afterwards. Despite a crash that ripped off the tail of the aircraft and spun it in a violent 360 degree circle that cracked a rib of the reserve first officer in the jump seat, the flightdeck initially told the lead flight attendant to keep passengers seated rather than immediately evacuate, Hersman says.
The order from the flightdeck was rescinded only after a flight attendant came forward from the middle section of the cabin to report that the No. 2 engine was on fire. But the passengers and crew lost 90s of evacuation time before video reviewed by the NTSB showed the cabin doors finally opening and the slides deploying.
"The pilots indicated [to the lead cabin attendant] that they were working with air traffic control," Hersman says, adding that the flightcrew was not fully aware of the fuselage damage when they gave the order to keep the passengers seated.
Another key subject of the investigation will be the crashworthiness of the seats and the integrity of the escape slides. Although the fuselage sustained two massive impacts and stayed mostly intact, two of the escape slides somehow deployed inside the cabin. One of the slides pinned down a flight attendant, who was the last person on the aircraft to be rescued as flames began to consume the interior of the fuselage sidewall, Hersman says.
HowardBorden
Well-known member
- Joined
- Jan 13, 2013
- Posts
- 889
http://www.airsafenews.com/2013/07/faa-suggests-non-us-airline-crews-lack.html
On Sunday 28 July 2013, the FAA issued a recommendation that non-US airlines landing San Francisco International airport (SFO) use their GPS systems to help guide them during landings operated under visual flight conditions at the airport's longest runways, including runway 28L, which was the one being used by the Asiana 777 that crashed at SFO on 6 July 2013 . This implies that non-US pilots may not have the basic piloting skills needed to consistently land aircraft at SFO under visual flight rules.
An FAA representative stated that the recommendation was a response to concerns that some non-US airline pilots may not have sufficient experience or expertise to land an airliner using visual approach procedures, which don't rely primarily on electronic landing aids.
Neither the FAA or the NTSB has stated that the visual approach procedures were a factor in the crash of Asiana flight 214 on July 6th. However, since that crash, the FAA has revealed that an unspecified number of flights involving Asiana, EVA Air, and other non-US carriers have had more aborted landing attempts than usual at SFO.
Since last week, the FAA has instituted a different landing protocol for visual approaches on runway 28L, the intended landing runway for Asiana flight 214, and the parallel runway 28R. That protocol will have air traffic controllers at SFO requesting that non-US airliners use a GPS-based navigation system to assist those flight crews in landing on either of those runways.
In a visual approach, pilots typically don't rely on a variety of electronic aids like an instrument landing system to align the aircraft with the runway and to keep to the aircraft on the proper glide slope. On runway 28L, the glide slope system was not operable on the day of the accident, and is scheduled to be out of commission until 22 August 2013. During a visual approach, pilots may use the glide slope system, as well as other systems like the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system, which was used by the crew on Asiana fight 214.
While the FAA did not state when the recommendation for non-US airlines would be lifted, it would likely not be necessary once the glide slope system is back in operation.
On Sunday 28 July 2013, the FAA issued a recommendation that non-US airlines landing San Francisco International airport (SFO) use their GPS systems to help guide them during landings operated under visual flight conditions at the airport's longest runways, including runway 28L, which was the one being used by the Asiana 777 that crashed at SFO on 6 July 2013 . This implies that non-US pilots may not have the basic piloting skills needed to consistently land aircraft at SFO under visual flight rules.
An FAA representative stated that the recommendation was a response to concerns that some non-US airline pilots may not have sufficient experience or expertise to land an airliner using visual approach procedures, which don't rely primarily on electronic landing aids.
Neither the FAA or the NTSB has stated that the visual approach procedures were a factor in the crash of Asiana flight 214 on July 6th. However, since that crash, the FAA has revealed that an unspecified number of flights involving Asiana, EVA Air, and other non-US carriers have had more aborted landing attempts than usual at SFO.
Since last week, the FAA has instituted a different landing protocol for visual approaches on runway 28L, the intended landing runway for Asiana flight 214, and the parallel runway 28R. That protocol will have air traffic controllers at SFO requesting that non-US airliners use a GPS-based navigation system to assist those flight crews in landing on either of those runways.
In a visual approach, pilots typically don't rely on a variety of electronic aids like an instrument landing system to align the aircraft with the runway and to keep to the aircraft on the proper glide slope. On runway 28L, the glide slope system was not operable on the day of the accident, and is scheduled to be out of commission until 22 August 2013. During a visual approach, pilots may use the glide slope system, as well as other systems like the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system, which was used by the crew on Asiana fight 214.
While the FAA did not state when the recommendation for non-US airlines would be lifted, it would likely not be necessary once the glide slope system is back in operation.
lowtimedriver
Marmott Stalker
- Joined
- Jan 24, 2006
- Posts
- 4,224
Asiana Ho Lee Fuk/NTSB update
NTSB says Asiana captain worried about visual landing; :nuts:
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/12/11/ntsb-to-review-asiana-crash-at-hearing/?intcmp=latestnews
The Asiana Airlines captain who crashed a Boeing 777 at San Francisco International Airport in July told investigators he was "very concerned" about attempting a visual approach because the runway's automatic landing aids were out of service due to construction, according to an investigative report released Wednesday.
Lee Kang Kuk, a 46-year-old pilot who was landing the big jet for his first time at San Francisco, "stated it was very difficult to perform a visual approach with a heavy airplane." The jet crash landed after approaching low and slow in an accident that left three dead and more than 200 injured, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.
A visual approach involves lining the jet up for landing by looking through the windshield, as well as using numerous automated cues.
The investigative report was released at the start of a daylong NTSB hearing into the accident.
Though Lee was an experienced pilot with the Korea-based airline, he was a trainee in the Boeing 777.
NTSB investigator Bill English said Lee had less than 45 hours experience in the Boeing 777 and he last piloted a jet into San Francisco in 2004.
Lee told investigators that he realized others had been safely landing at San Francisco without the glide slope indicator, an array of antennas that transmits a signal into the cockpit, helping ensure the plane is landing correctly.
That system was out of service while the runway was expanded, and has since been restarted.
Lee was nervous about attempting to land using "stick and rudder" flying skills. Pilots spend more time managing computer systems than manually flying planes, systems that are more precise and use less fuel than a human pilot.
When asked if he was concerned about his ability to perform the visual approach, Lee said "very concerned, yeah."
"This pilot should never have taken off," said attorney Ilyas Akbari, whose firm represents 14 of the passengers. "The fact that the pilot was stressed and nervous is a testament to the inadequate training he received, and those responsible for his training and for certifying his competency bear some of the culpability for the tragedy of this crash."
Lee said he told his instructors about his concerns in the flight's planning stages. He told investigators that as he realized his approach was off, he was worried he might "fail his flight and would be embarrassed."
Another Asiana pilot who recently flew with Lee told investigators that he was not sure if the trainee captain was making normal progress and that he did not perform well during a trip two days before the accident. That captain described Lee as "not well organized or prepared," according to the investigative report.
Recordings from the cockpit show Lee took over the controls as the autopilot disconnected when the plane was about 1,500 feet above San Francisco's bay and closing in fast on the airport.
Lee insisted in interviews that he had been blinded during a critical instant before the botched landing by a piercing light from outside the aircraft. NTSB investigators repeatedly probed him about the light but the trainee pilot was unable to pinpoint its origin or how it precisely affected him.
An instructor pilot said he never saw a bright light outside the aircraft.
According to a transcript of the Asiana plane's cockpit voice recorder, the crew did not comment on the jet's low approach until it reached 200 feet above ground.
"It's low," an unnamed crewman said at 11:27 am.
In an instant, the plane began to shake.
At 20 feet, another crewman broke in: "Go around," he said.
It was too late. At impact, someone yelled: "Oh!"
Multiple alarms chimed in the cockpit as the crewmen sat stunned.
Lee acknowledged to investigators that it took him 20 to 30 seconds to order an evacuation from the shattered jet while he called the control tower to check on what was happening outside the plane.
NTSB investigators also raised concerns about a safety certification issue involving the Boeing 777's controls design, warning that the plane's automatic protection against stalling does not always automatically engage. When the plane's autothrottle is placed in a "hold" mode, as it was during the Asiana flight, it is supposed to re-engage or "wake up" when it reached minimum airspeed.
But a primary project pilot who oversaw the Boeing 787 flight tests for the Federal Aviation Administration told the NTSB that the both the 787 and the B777 had the same anti-stall protection systems -- and that the wake-up system did not always work when tested at minimum speeds.
Boeing's retired 777 chief pilot John Cashman said the system and flight manuals had been evaluated and approved.
Cashman underscored that auto controls are not designed to replace pilots.
"The pilot is the final authority for the operation of the airplane," he said.
San Francisco Fire Department Assistant Deputy Chief Dale Carnes is also scheduled to talk at Wednesday's hearing about how a fire truck racing toward the burning plane ran over a survivor on the tarmac.
Footage taken after the crash showed a fire truck running over 16-year-old Ye Meng Yuan while she was lying on the tarmac covered with fire-retardant foam. The San Mateo County coroner later ruled that she was killed by the truck.
NTSB says Asiana captain worried about visual landing; :nuts:
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/12/11/ntsb-to-review-asiana-crash-at-hearing/?intcmp=latestnews
The Asiana Airlines captain who crashed a Boeing 777 at San Francisco International Airport in July told investigators he was "very concerned" about attempting a visual approach because the runway's automatic landing aids were out of service due to construction, according to an investigative report released Wednesday.
Lee Kang Kuk, a 46-year-old pilot who was landing the big jet for his first time at San Francisco, "stated it was very difficult to perform a visual approach with a heavy airplane." The jet crash landed after approaching low and slow in an accident that left three dead and more than 200 injured, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.
A visual approach involves lining the jet up for landing by looking through the windshield, as well as using numerous automated cues.
The investigative report was released at the start of a daylong NTSB hearing into the accident.
Though Lee was an experienced pilot with the Korea-based airline, he was a trainee in the Boeing 777.
NTSB investigator Bill English said Lee had less than 45 hours experience in the Boeing 777 and he last piloted a jet into San Francisco in 2004.
Lee told investigators that he realized others had been safely landing at San Francisco without the glide slope indicator, an array of antennas that transmits a signal into the cockpit, helping ensure the plane is landing correctly.
That system was out of service while the runway was expanded, and has since been restarted.
Lee was nervous about attempting to land using "stick and rudder" flying skills. Pilots spend more time managing computer systems than manually flying planes, systems that are more precise and use less fuel than a human pilot.
When asked if he was concerned about his ability to perform the visual approach, Lee said "very concerned, yeah."
"This pilot should never have taken off," said attorney Ilyas Akbari, whose firm represents 14 of the passengers. "The fact that the pilot was stressed and nervous is a testament to the inadequate training he received, and those responsible for his training and for certifying his competency bear some of the culpability for the tragedy of this crash."
Lee said he told his instructors about his concerns in the flight's planning stages. He told investigators that as he realized his approach was off, he was worried he might "fail his flight and would be embarrassed."
Another Asiana pilot who recently flew with Lee told investigators that he was not sure if the trainee captain was making normal progress and that he did not perform well during a trip two days before the accident. That captain described Lee as "not well organized or prepared," according to the investigative report.
Recordings from the cockpit show Lee took over the controls as the autopilot disconnected when the plane was about 1,500 feet above San Francisco's bay and closing in fast on the airport.
Lee insisted in interviews that he had been blinded during a critical instant before the botched landing by a piercing light from outside the aircraft. NTSB investigators repeatedly probed him about the light but the trainee pilot was unable to pinpoint its origin or how it precisely affected him.
An instructor pilot said he never saw a bright light outside the aircraft.
According to a transcript of the Asiana plane's cockpit voice recorder, the crew did not comment on the jet's low approach until it reached 200 feet above ground.
"It's low," an unnamed crewman said at 11:27 am.
In an instant, the plane began to shake.
At 20 feet, another crewman broke in: "Go around," he said.
It was too late. At impact, someone yelled: "Oh!"
Multiple alarms chimed in the cockpit as the crewmen sat stunned.
Lee acknowledged to investigators that it took him 20 to 30 seconds to order an evacuation from the shattered jet while he called the control tower to check on what was happening outside the plane.
NTSB investigators also raised concerns about a safety certification issue involving the Boeing 777's controls design, warning that the plane's automatic protection against stalling does not always automatically engage. When the plane's autothrottle is placed in a "hold" mode, as it was during the Asiana flight, it is supposed to re-engage or "wake up" when it reached minimum airspeed.
But a primary project pilot who oversaw the Boeing 787 flight tests for the Federal Aviation Administration told the NTSB that the both the 787 and the B777 had the same anti-stall protection systems -- and that the wake-up system did not always work when tested at minimum speeds.
Boeing's retired 777 chief pilot John Cashman said the system and flight manuals had been evaluated and approved.
Cashman underscored that auto controls are not designed to replace pilots.
"The pilot is the final authority for the operation of the airplane," he said.
San Francisco Fire Department Assistant Deputy Chief Dale Carnes is also scheduled to talk at Wednesday's hearing about how a fire truck racing toward the burning plane ran over a survivor on the tarmac.
Footage taken after the crash showed a fire truck running over 16-year-old Ye Meng Yuan while she was lying on the tarmac covered with fire-retardant foam. The San Mateo County coroner later ruled that she was killed by the truck.
waveflyer
Well-known member
- Joined
- Jan 9, 2005
- Posts
- 10,005
HowardBorden
Well-known member
- Joined
- Jan 13, 2013
- Posts
- 889
Weren't the PAPI's operational?
Couldn't they have pulled up any number of RNP or GPS approaches that would generate vertical guidance?
I agree with your general statement, take away ALL vertical guidance of any kind and all of a sudden your just "eyeballing" it, which could make me a little uncomfortable but it is certainly doable.
lowtimedriver
Marmott Stalker
- Joined
- Jan 24, 2006
- Posts
- 4,224
redflyer65
Well-known member
- Joined
- Jan 1, 2004
- Posts
- 4,456
HowardBorden
Well-known member
- Joined
- Jan 13, 2013
- Posts
- 889
Morningwood...
It's never too early.
It's never too hard.
Take matters into your own hand.
Morningwood Academy is located in beautiful Morningwood Hills, Ohio. Our early morning classes are designed to make it easy to get up. We know competition is stiff. We are a high achievement school that was recently recognized by Governor Michael Hunt for academic excellence. Mike recognizes that Morningwood is out-in-front of the others when it comes to knowledge. All of our classrooms are equipped with computers and the latest software to ensure that our students receive lots of knowledge.
http://www.morningwoodacademy.com/Home_Page.html
Share this page
Latest resources
-
-
-
-
-
AC 90-89C - Amateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing HandbookAmateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing Handbook
- Neal
- Updated:
