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Asiana 777 crashed on landing at SFO

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Pear- Threshold was moved west 300' for construction - so an lnav/vnav would give them an invalid glideslope- but you're right- in hindsight better than nothing-

So far I've seen nothing to take the focus off of our collective ability to fly a ballpark 3 deg GS off sight picture alone- still waiting final conclusions however.
 
There are no anonymous disclosure programs like FOQA in Asian airlines. Hand flying and non-precision approaches are highly discouraged. Couple this highly automation dependency, a punishment culture and a non-precision approach in an Asian carrier and you have an accident which was years in the making.
Right-seat captain has said that he thought the auto throttles were maintaining the airspeed and that his first realization that something was wrong was when they were low.

Use of automation often makes us think it is doing something when really "it" does nothing--the pilot maintains airspeed, not the automation, regardless of how much automation is used. It appears that he dropped the airspeed out of his cross check because "it" (the automation) was doing it for him. Failure to verify what the pilot is asking the automation to do is a very common problem, but usually not this bad.

http://pilots.calforums.com/showthread.php?93987-777-Crash-in-SFO
 
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I fly more segments per day than some pilots fly per month, without autothrottles, and I am perfectly happy without them. Managing the thrust of the aircraft allows me to be more connected to the aircraft as I fly it. I've jumpsat on enough heavy equipment and notice that pilots hardly even fly the panel, they just fly the box with VNAV coupled to the A/T.

The intentions with A/T were good, but with an autopilot manipulating the flight controls AND the box managing the thrust, who the #### is flying the airplane? Worse in an airbus, the thrust levers don't even move.

I say replace the A/T with an alerting system when airspeed decays beyond recommended parameters. Time to get back to being real pilots. Letting the box control your flight plan AND your thrust is pathetic and breeds over-reliance like the plague.

Managing your own power keeps you connected. And that's key. That way, you'll never be the guy that "thought" his autothrottles were managing thrust and then crashes because you just "set it and forget it"..

The intention of automation was to reduce workload so other flying tasks could be accomplished. Now we've got people who are overloaded with managing the automation which in some cases, has gotten way too complex..doesn't that defeat the original purpose?
 
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The more information that comes out, the more I'm convinced this was a "FLCH Trap" event.

Ironically enough, the awareness focus of our last recurrent cycle was the FLCH Trap and how inappropriate use of certain verticle modes can lead to airspeed decay and even stall. The scenario was developed after a corporate Gulfstream nearly crashed.

The weather was perfect VFR, the flying pilot was performing a visual approach and his eyes were looking out the window, the other "helpful" pilot selected FLCH and 0 in the altitude alerter, and then started looking out the window too. The autothrottle did EXACTLY what it was supposed to do and went to idle. Problem is, nobody was looking at the airspeed or the command bars. At the last second, right when the shaker started, somebody cobbed the power and the airplane flew out of the stall and successfully went around.

Sound kind of familiar?

Except for the successful go around part.

Add in the other training and cultural issues we've been talking about, and stir gently.
 
As seen on the internet

For what it's worth...
Subject: Re: [retup] Low-down on Korean pilots

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the ?400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it?s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce ?normal? standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt? compute that you needed to be a 1000? AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn?t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested ?Radar Vectors? to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then ?Cleared for the approach? and he could have selected ?Exit Hold? and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to ?Extend the FAF? and he couldn?t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was ?Hold at XYZ.? Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141?s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can?t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It?s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don?t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don?t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I?ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250? after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800? after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real ?flight



 
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Its starting to sound like the crew was unaware of what the automation was actually doing!

The AFDS panel is fantasy land, the FMA is reality!! Sounds like for some reason, they lost the alpha floor protection in the ARM mode and nobody seemed to notice!

I'm very curious to understand what other modes of the AFDS were being utilized for this visual approach besides the ATS??? Was the A/P engaged? In what mode was it? The assumption is that if the A/T are engaged, then the A/P is also.(I know the MD-82/83 A/T are certified for use all the way to touchdown while hand flying)

In V/S mode, with the alt set to 0 the A/T should provide alpha floor protection?
 
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I've taught enough crews from all over the world to corroborate this.

There is a certain lack of awareness of technology in general, and complex concepts that seems to totally evade the minds of people raised in rigid cultures.

They simply do not develop critical thinking skills, because they are not taught to or allowed to.
 
Pear- Threshold was moved west 300' for construction - so an lnav/vnav would give them an invalid glideslope- but you're right- in hindsight better than nothing-

So far I've seen nothing to take the focus off of our collective ability to fly a ballpark 3 deg GS off sight picture alone- still waiting final conclusions however.



As I'm sure that you're aware - the FAA has published two new GPS approaches to 28L and 28R. They were published for the construction. LNAN/VNAV works just fine for them. I'd mention IAN, but don't want to confuse you ;)
 
Unaware- haven't been in there for a while-
Did they get runway changed ?

I'm always thoroughly amused, I mean confused by you dicko. Your knowledge is just one more area ;) haha
 

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