FDJ2,
Here is the document that I was asking for your reaction about. It is an exact quote from the RJDC update and may be found on their website. What I really want to know is how you would react if ALPA negotiated for Comair or ASA a scope clause that imposed on Delta pilots, the same restrictions that Delta pilots want to impose on ASA and Comair.
If you decide it is OK for Delta pilots to do it to CMR and ASA pilots, then please tell my why it would not be OK for CMR or ASA pilots to do the same thing to Delta pilots.
If you don’t know already you should know that everything contained in the following hypothetical scenario has already been done by a “large jet” ALPA carrier to a “small jet ALPA carrier.
Here is the document that I was asking for your reaction about. It is an exact quote from the RJDC update and may be found on their website. What I really want to know is how you would react if ALPA negotiated for Comair or ASA a scope clause that imposed on Delta pilots, the same restrictions that Delta pilots want to impose on ASA and Comair.
If you decide it is OK for Delta pilots to do it to CMR and ASA pilots, then please tell my why it would not be OK for CMR or ASA pilots to do the same thing to Delta pilots.
If you don’t know already you should know that everything contained in the following hypothetical scenario has already been done by a “large jet” ALPA carrier to a “small jet ALPA carrier.
Commentary: Take a Walk in Our Shoes
ALPA’s mainline scope clauses often define “control” as when one company directs the operation of another company or retains the right to direct its operation. Looking at the details of the Air Wisconsin and Republic investment in USAirways, it’s obvious that the two “small jet” carriers my soon be exercising a great deal of control over USAirways, including the right to reject its business plans.
This raises some interesting questions. What would happen to the USAirways pilots if the Air Wisconsin or Republic pilots adopted ALPA’s “might makes right” attitude? To illustrate the magnitude of ALPA’s bad faith conduct on behalf of its mainline interests, let’s see how the “new” Air Wisconsin scope would look if it were to be renegotiated and implemented along the lines of ALPA’s current mainline scope clauses.
• The operation, number, and routes flown by USAirways' "large” aircraft are to be unilaterally restricted by the Air Wisconsin pilot agreement.
o USAirways flying is now termed “permitted large jet flying.”
o The “permissible” size of USAirways “large jet” fleet is arbitrarily linked to the size of the Air Wisconsin “small jet” fleet.
o In the event of a reduction in Air Wisconsin’s small jet flying, USAirways “large jet” flying must be reduced in proportion.
o Rather than “allowing” USAirways to operate the new Boeing 787, the Air Wisconsin pilots create the “Boeing” division of Air Wisconsin, a “preferred” large jet alter ego subsidiary.
• ALPA negotiates on behalf of its Air Wisconsin pilots terms that conflict with numerous sections of its preexisting USAirways working agreement.
o Before USAirways can acquire additional wide-body aircraft, the USAirways pilots must first agree to allow them to be flown by Air Wisconsin pilots.
o Every other monthly schedule at USAirways would have to be awarded to an Air Wisconsin pilot regardless of seniority (i.e. slotted bidding.)
o Air Wisconsin’s pilots are granted special furlough protections not available to the USAirways pilots.
• When the USAirways pilots object to the bargaining of the Air Wisconsin pilots, ALPA’s officials refuse to take action.
o ALPA’s officials state that they are “unaware” of Air Wisconsin’s bargaining plans.
o ALPA refers the objections of the USAirways pilots to an advisory committee.
o ALPA’s leadership dismisses the objections of the USAirways pilots as mere “feelings” and “perceptions.”
o The USAirways pilots are “advised” by ALPA that if they don’t accept the terms of the Air Wisconsin pilots, all new aircraft will be diverted to other carriers.
o Over the objections of the USAirways pilots, ALPA’s President authorizes the Air Wisconsin bargaining and continues to sign every agreement and modification.
• The Air Wisconsin pilots justify their actions by claiming that it’s their “right” to bargain as they please since “they” purchased USAirways and it is “their” money that is now funding USAirways.
Does the “new” Air Wisconsin scope clause appear to be unfair, absurd, and economically untenable? It should: Every item in this hypothetical example is drawn from ALPA’s “mainline scope clauses or ALPA’s defense of its arbitrary actions.
One way to test the fairness and efficacy of ALPA’s small jet restrictions is to switch the identities of the participating carriers or change the size of the affected aircraft. If the transposed scope clause claims that restricting the number of 7678’s will promote the use of small jets which is obviously false, then the economic rationale for “fleet ratios” has rightly been exposed as fundamentally flawed.
Likewise, if the transposed scope illustrates that it would be unfair for ALPA’s small jet pilots to unilaterally impose any restrictions they please upon ALPA’s large jet pilots, then what’s going on today is no only equally unfair, but in conflict with ALPA’s duty of fair representation.