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HS125 said:
d. When ATC assigns speed adjustments, it will be in accordance with the following recommended minimums:
1. To aircraft operating between FL 280 and 10,000 feet, a speed not less than 250 knots or the equivalent Mach number.
NOTE-
1. On a standard day the Mach numbers equivalent to 250 knots CAS (subject to minor variations) are:
FL 240-0.6
FL 250-0.61
FL 260-0.62
FL 270-0.64
FL 280-0.65
FL 290-0.66.

2. When an operational advantage will be realized, speeds lower than the recommended minima may be applied.

2. To arriving turbojet aircraft operating below 10,000 feet:







(a) A speed not less than 210 knots, except;
(b) Within 20 flying miles of the airport of intended landing, a speed not less than 170 knots.








3. To arriving reciprocating engine or turboprop aircraft within 20 flying miles of the runway threshold of the airport of intended landing, a speed not less than 150 knots.
4. To departing aircraft:








(a) Turbojet aircraft, a speed not less than 230 knots.
(b) Reciprocating engine aircraft, a speed not less than
150 knots.








e. When ATC combines a speed adjustment with a descent clearance, the sequence of delivery, with the word "then" between, indicates the expected order of execution.​






...........this is a DP ...they have thier own restrictions if you choose to accept the DP/STAR. This is far different than the Part 91 speed restrictions.
 
Right. Now, you're missing one step there. Find where the adminstrator's authority is designated to an individual Air Traffic controller. I can show you exactly where it is written that the adminstrator's authority is designated to an individual inspector. Show me where its the same delegation is made for a controller. Bet you can't

How about ....delegated... (as it is written)

By that logic, Air Traffic Controller's instructions are not obligatory.

The Administrator has delegated Control of Air Traffic to those Certified by the Administrator (and those who are certified by the Administrator) to act in the Adminstrators capacity to Control Air Traffic. I doubt THE HEAD HONCHO Administrator in DC is not likely to be manning ARTCC or any other facility in the near future, so THE HEAD HONCHO Administrator has DELEGATED his authority of actual ATC to those Certified by THE ADMINISTRATOR.

This makes Clearances OBLIGATORY as they are taken to mean direct from THE ADMINISTRATOR.

If ARTCC or Tower Cab or TRACON personnel are not considered "administrator in the matter concerned" (i.e control of air traffic) then where is the obligation of the pilot to follow the instructions and clearance?

Any ATC specialist can tell you that they will lose their certificate if found that they violate their FARs and The Controller Manual which cover their positions. Continously issuing illegal or unsafe clearances (leading to LOS or terrain violations) will lead to certificate action by the FSDO on the ATC Specialist. However, when OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS require clearances in this discussion (>250KIAS <10,000') the ATC Specialist has been granted "administrator status" for the matter concerned... ATC. Otherwise we have NO "controlling legal authority" (thanks, Al) to follow ATC instructions if those instructions are not taken and understood to be the word of THE ADMINISTRATOR.

As far as 91.117...

(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.).

ATC does not necessarily "control" by means of obligatory communications between ATC and all aircraft in all airspace below (for the purpose of this discussion) 10K. So if your OPS SPECS or LOA direct from THE ADMINISTRATOR or FSDO allows you to fly over 250 below 10K (how about throwing military authorization in there for MTR's as an example of what the ADMINISTRATOR has authorized) then by all means, ATC did not authorize that speed, but the ADMINISTRATOR did through the FSDO.

So ATC does not have to be specifically referenced here as it does in (b) and (c) which cover class D, C and B airspace.

And that is why the language changes from "ADMINISTRATOR" to "ATC" although they are considered one in the same.

The regulation just specifies when ATC can act as ADMINISTRATOR and where ATC acts as ADMINISTRATOR, namely within "ATC Communications Required" airspace. (D,C, and B)

If ATC needs me to get outta da way, better believe I'll be movin' and filin' the NASA report later!

And yes, I'm aware that I should question the need for the deviation.
But most of the time, I'm listening up and can figure out what is behind me, but more than likely, the controller will tell you why they need a certain speed.
 
taters said:
...........this is a DP ...they have thier own restrictions if you choose to accept the DP/STAR. This is far different than the Part 91 speed restrictions.

Go back and re-read my original post! It was in response to a question regarding how slow ATC can ask you to fly on arrival and approach and had nothing to do with the question about exceeding 250 below 10,000.

However, since you asked; on departure, ATC can not ask a turbojet to fly slower than 230kts, nor can ATC authorize or request you to fly faster than 250kts below 10,000. You as a pilot may only exceed 250 below 10,000 (inside the 12 mile limit) if it is operationally necessary (I.e. minimum clean maneuvering speed is greater than 250kts).
 
Crank-stomping 101 by Hugh Johnson

Hugh Johnson said:
"There is no speed restriction in Class B, anywhere."

WRONG. Nice try. Back to ground school for you. Reference para (b) below. Para (d) applies to all the big guys that have to go fast.


Sec. 91.117 - Aircraft speed.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.).
(b) Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, no person may operate an aircraft at or below 2,500 feet above the surface within 4 nautical miles of the primary airport of a Class C or Class D airspace area at an indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph.). This paragraph (b) does not apply to any operations within a Class B airspace area. Such operations shall comply with paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) No person may operate an aircraft in the airspace underlying a Class B airspace area designated for an airport or in a VFR corridor designated through such a Class B airspace area, at an indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph). (d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed.

Johnson - I believe it is you who needs to learn to read. Yes, paragraph b states that operations withing Class B shall comply with paragraph a, however, you are conveniently only reading a part of paragraph a - it clearly states "Below 10,000 feet MSL at an airspeed...."... back to groundschool for you. What an ignorant and cocky thing to say! And yes - you severely stepped on your crank.
 
[quote=A Squared]If he thinks he is "the adminstrator" then he is not more informed that me. he is misinformed. He not the first controller to be laboring under this misunderstanding.

Your buddy is most likely confused by 91.117(d) which allows the restriction to be lifted for *safety* not operational conveninece. This is in accoradance with the regulations and does not make ATC "the administrator"

He is not my buddy, just my college professor who teaches advanced Air Traffic Control courses. I am sure he hasn't read the Far's, or your version of the ATC Handbook, or flown a DC-6, so what does he know.
 
HS125 said:
Go back and re-read my original post! It was in response to a question regarding how slow ATC can ask you to fly on arrival and approach and had nothing to do with the question about exceeding 250 below 10,000.

However, since you asked; on departure, ATC can not ask a turbojet to fly slower than 230kts, nor can ATC authorize or request you to fly faster than 250kts below 10,000. You as a pilot may only exceed 250 below 10,000 (inside the 12 mile limit) if it is operationally necessary (I.e. minimum clean maneuvering speed is greater than 250kts).

My fault,,thanks for the clarification
 
rballty said:
I just spoke to a controller about this issue who is obviously much more informed than you people are. You need to get some firsthand knowledge on the subject versus your limited ability to quote the regs and the ATC handbook. ATC is a designee of the administrator wether you like the idea or not, they waive this restriction daily for operational needs.

I used to work for that organization that all pilots fear in that sterile glass building on Maryland Avenue, SW, Washington, DC, and if you're friend is "waiving" the issue, then he is doing it contrary to the the FAA orders. The process is explained here: FAA Order 8300.10, Chapter 8, "Exemptions, Deviations, Waivers, and Authorizations." Paragraphs 1-19.
 
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rballty said:
He is not my buddy, just my college professor who teaches advanced Air Traffic Control courses. I am sure he hasn't read the Far's, or your version of the ATC Handbook, or flown a DC-6, so what does he know.

Well, not much apparently.

So far you and your buddy haven’t offered on iota of documentation that ATC is authorized to waive the 250Knot limit for reasons other than safety. So far all you’ve said is in effect is "My buddy is really really smart and he knows lots and lots of things, so he’s right and I’m right" Pardon me for being skeptical, but it takes something a little more substantial to convince me, and you haven’t posted a single thing of substance.


Have your buddy show you where in FAA Order 7110.65R (the ATC handbook) or in any other official FAA document controllers are authorized to waive the 250 knot rule for operational reasons. An authorization like that is not passed by word of mouth, if it exists, it’s documented, ask him where.

Have your buddy explain why, if ATC has the authority to waive the 250knot restriction, did they have a special test program where one ATC facility was given, for a limited time, the authority to waive the 250knot restriction? Did they forget ATC already had that authority? Or was it because they *didn’t* have the authority. Ask your buddy which explanation makes more sense.

Ask your buddy why Part 91 contains no less than 14 regulations which state "unless authorized by ATC....." yet 91.117(a) says "unless authorized by the Adminstrator....." not ATC Perhaps they really meant to say ATC, but they forgot how to spell it?


OK, now, take your AIM over to your buddy’s house and show it to him. Have him read 4-4-11(h)


h. Pilots are reminded that they are responsible for rejecting the application of speed adjustment by ATC if, in their opinion, it will cause them to exceed the maximum indicated airspeed prescribed by 14 CFR Section 91.117(a), (c) and (d). IN SUCH CASES, THE PILOT IS EXPECTED TO SO INFORM ATC. Pilots operating at or above 10,000 feet MSL who are issued speed adjustments which exceed 250 knots IAS and are subsequently cleared below 10,000 feet MSL are expected to comply with 14 CFR Section 91.117(a).

Now, ask your buddy why, If ATC is authorized to waive the 250 knot speed restriction, why does the AIM specifically instruct pilots to reject any clearance which would result in them exceeding that speed? Why is that?

Now, notice also that the AIM excerpt says to reject clearances which will cause them to exceed the speed limitations in 91.117 (a) and (c), yet it doesn’t mention 91.117 (b) Do you think it is because ATC may authorize exceeding 91.117 (b) but not 91.117 (a) and (c) ? Ya think? Ask your buddy what he thinks about that.

OK, now, hand the AIM back to your buddy and have him read 4-4-11(j)

j. For operations in a Class C and Class D surface area, ATC is authorized to request or approve a speed greater than the maximum indicated airspeeds prescribed for operation within that airspace (14 CFR Section 91.117(b)).

Now ask your buddy why the AIM would tell pilots that ATC can waive 91.117(b), but it doesn’t say anything about ATC waiving 91.117(a). Why is that? It was just discussing 91.117(a) 2 paragraphs ago, does your buddy think that the AIM authors just forgot to mention that ATC has the authority to waive 91.117(a)? Ask your buddy if he can find anywhere in the AIM where it mentions ATC having the authority to waive 91.117(a), anywhere at all.

Ok, now tell your buddy to dig out his ATC handbook and talk a look at the note at the end of 5-7-2

NOTE-
1. A pilot operating at or above 10,000 feet MSL on an assigned speed adjustment greater than 250 knots is expected to comply with 14 CFR Section 91.117(a) when cleared below 10,000 feet MSL, within domestic airspace, without notifying ATC. Pilots are expected to comply with the other provisions of 14 CFR Section 91.117 without notification.
Now have your buddy explain, why, if ATC is authorized to waive 91.117(a), does the ATC handbook tell the controller to expect a pilot to comply with 91.117(a) even though the controller has assigned a higher speed? Does your buddy have an explanation for that?

While your buddy is sitting there thinking about that, give him a copy of Order 8700.1, General Aviation Operations Handbook. If he’s an Aviation professor he probably has a copy of it somewhere. Have him flip to Chapter 49 section 1-1-3(g)(2)


.
(2) ATC may authorize the pilot to exceed 200 knots in addition to a clearance for a low approach. In no case may a pilot construe such an authorization or permission to exceed the § 91.117(a) 250-knot speed limitation below 10,000 feet mean sealevel (MSL).
Now, have your buddy explain that one.


I think I could pretty much rest my case now, as your buddy has a lot of explaining to do, stuff that he won’t ever be able to explain. But I figure that as long as I’m burying you, I might as well really bury you. Here’s the deal. If you want to know what the original intent of a regulation was, you go to the federal register where that regulation, or an amendment of that regulation was published. The Federal Register will contain a discussion of the regulation or amendment of the regulation, explaining what and why. I have posted below the entry in the federal register for the last amendment of 91.117. In the discussion, it makes it very clear, in very explicit language that the administrator does *NOT* give ATC the authority to waive 91.117(a), and in fact the purpose of the amendment was to clarify that ATC does not have that authority, only the administrator has that authority.

SO, ask your buddy, if ATC has the authority to waive 91.117(a), why is it published in the Federal Register that ATC does not? Hmmmmmm??????

I’d really love to hear your Controller/Professor/expert Buddy explain that. Tell us again how "informed" your buddy is. Imagine that, some DC-6 driver with grease under his fingernails is more informed that your professor buddy. He must be the pride of your community college.



Volume 58, No. 157; Tuesday, August 17, 1993; Page 43553
14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No. 24456; Amendment No. 91-233]

Airspace Reclassification

AGENCY:
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION:
Final rule; correcting amendment.

SUMMARY:
This action corrects the Airspace Reclassification Final Rule effective September 16, 1993. The Airspace Reclassification Rule inadvertently assigned the authority to air traffic controllers to allow aircraft operators to deviate from the maximum airspeed restriction below 10,000 feet. The authority to approve deviation from the speed limits contained in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) rests with the Administrator, and the FAA did not intend to amend the approving authority. This action reestablishes the Administrator as the proper authority to permit waivers of aircraft speed. This action also corrects the inadvertent inclusion of Class B airspace in the maximum airspeed restriction effected by the Airspace Reclassification Final Rule.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This correcting amendment is effective as of September 16, 1993.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Messieurs Aaron I. Boxer or Joseph C. White, Air Traffic Rules Branch (ATP-230), Airspace - Rules and Aeronautical Information Division, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202) 267-8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background
On October 18, 1989, the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Airspace Reclassification (54 FR 42916) which proposed, among other things, that the nomenclature of various airspace areas be renamed to conform with agreements with the International Civil Aviation Organization. On December 17, 1991, the FAA published a final rule on Airspace Reclassification (56 FR 65638) which becomes effective on September 16, 1993. Section 91.117 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) (14 CFR 91.117) was amended as part of this process.
Section 91.117(a) requires that any aircraft operated below 10,000 feet be flown no faster than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.) unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator of the FAA. Section 91.117(b) provides that, unless authorized or required by ATC, no person may operate an aircraft within an airport traffic area faster than 200 knots (230 m.p.h.), except for operations within a terminal control area. The preamble to the proposed airspace reclassification rule included a discussion of several recommendations received from the National Airspace Review (NAR) task group. NAR 1-2.1.3 recommended several changes to operating requirements in Terminal Control Areas (Class B airspace). Included in NAR 1-2.1.3 was a recommendation to delegate the authority to approve deviation from the 250 knot speed restriction in Class B airspace to air traffic control. The FAA had adopted other portions of NAR 1-2.2.3 through separate actions, but had not intended to incorporate the recommended delegation of authority or include Class B airspace in the 200 knot rule. However, the rule language amending Sec. 91.117(a) inadvertently included such redelegation, and that amending Sec. 91.117(b) inadvertently included the Class B airspace area. This action establishes the Administrator as the sole approving authority for deviations from the aircraft speed restrictions contained in Sec. 91.117(a) and excludes the Class B airspace area from the speed restrictions contained in Sec. 91.117(b).

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91
Air traffic control, Air transportation, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety.

The Amendment
Accordingly, 14 CFR part 91 in effect as of September 16, 1993, is amended by making the following correcting amendments:
 
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spngbobsqrpilot said:
By that logic, Air Traffic Controller's instructions are not obligatory.

Well, logic never was your strong suit, bob. No, we aren't free to ignore ATC instructions because ATC is not "the Administrator". We are required to comply with ATC instructions because the administrator, by issuing 91.123, has directed us to comply with them. That doesn't make ATC "the adminstrator". 91.17 requires a pilot to comply with a local law officer's request for a blood alcohol test, but that doesn't make that officer "the adminstrator" any more than 91.123 makes ATC "the adminstrator".

As for the rest of the question, the excerpt from the Federal Register which I posted in my previous post makes it abundantly and explicitly clear that ATC is not "the adminstrator" nor does ATC have the Authority to waive 91.117(a)
 
A Squared said:
Well, logic never was your strong suit, bob. No, we aren't free to ignore ATC instructions because ATC is not "the Administrator". We are required to comply with ATC instructions because the administrator, by issuing 91.123, has directed us to comply with them. That doesn't make ATC "the adminstrator". 91.17 requires a pilot to comply with a local law officer's request for a blood alcohol test, but that doesn't make that officer "the adminstrator" any more than 91.123 makes ATC "the adminstrator".

As for the rest of the question, the excerpt from the Federal Register which I posted in my previous post makes it abundantly and explicitly clear that ATC is not "the adminstrator" nor does ATC have the Authority to waive 91.117(a)

(My emphasis)

Well, there you go again.

91.123
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may operate an aircraft contrary to an ATC instruction in an area in which air traffic control is exercised.


Scenario:
ATC instruction is given to a person operating an aircraft in an area in which air traffic control is exercised.

Question:

Is it considered an "emergency" in itself to follow the FARs regarding speeds and is the refusal of acceptance of that clearance / instruction based on pilot following 91.117(a) in itself constitute an "emergency"?

Back to 1.1:

Administrator means the Federal Aviation Administrator or any person to whom he has delegated his authority in the matter concerned.

..."to any person to whom he has delegated his authority in the matter concerned."

The matter here is the Control of aircraft via clearances issued by the Air Traffic Control Specialist (person, "person", now defined to mean "administrator" via delegation of authority). And as anyone who really understands what controllers job ACTUALLY entails will tell you it is the separation of KNOWN aircraft.

"Air traffic clearance means an authorization by air traffic control, for the purpose of preventing collision between known aircraft, for an aircraft to proceed under specified traffic conditions within controlled airspace. "

So if the ATC Specialist (controller) needs you to exceed 91.117(a) based on his KNOWN traffic, and you refuse, based on 91.117(a), do you have to declare an emergency to not follow the instruction while the 747 behind you produces a CA on his scope?

Or does the Controller, with the authority granted to him in the matter concerned, (the Control of Air Traffic) have the authority to grant you a clearance to prevent a collision between known aircraft, and for you to proceed under the SPECIFIED conditions in that clearance?

Sounds like that professor is right to me based on 1.1.

If that's not enough then 91.117(d) covers the pilot of the aircraft as well:

"(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed."

How about the "ANY" particular operation being defined as of including NOT BEING INVOLVED IN A LOS OR MID-AIR?

"Any" is quite a broad term and defined to include all particular operation(s).

So it appears that 91.117(d) allows the Pilot to ACCEPT the CLEARANCE issued by AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL for the OPERATION of preventing a LOS or MID-AIR, and to proceed under those SPECIFIED traffic conditions.

I never said that a controller can just issue illegal and unsafe clearances for the sake of convenience, by the way. In fact, just the opposite. The original post queried as to whether or not the crew could accept the clearance. They could, but as it was correctly pointed out, should have queried ATC as to what speed ATC was looking for, and was ATC aware of the actual IAS at the time the crew was told to maintain present speed. (At which point the controller should have amended the clearance, or explained the need for the deviation... i.e. traffic behind you a 747, etc.)

My point is that if the controller has an operation (preventing LOS or MIDAIR) that REQUIRES a pilot to exceed 91.117(a), both the controller AND pilot are authorized to do so (i.e. issue instruction / follow instruction) for that operation. So the Controller CAN authorize you to deviate from 91.117(a) while complying with 91.117(d).

Got it?
 
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Bob, give it a rest. it is obvious that all you're doing is attempting to cover your embarrassment at being shown conclusively to be wrong by spouting a bunch of meaningless babble that doesn't even make sense. Stop, you're just embarrassing yourself even more, but I suspect you don't realize it. Trust me, you are.

If you think that ATC has been delegated the administrator’s authority to waive 91.117(a) then why does the Federal register very carefully make the distinction between "ATC" and "the Administrator" and make it very clear that ATC does *not* have the authority to waive the regulation? Hmmmmm? You’re arguing against the FAA’s own very clear words in this case, and that is a fools game.


spngbobsqrpilot said:
So if the ATC Specialist (controller) needs you to exceed 91.117(a) based on his KNOWN traffic, and you refuse, based on 91.117(a), do you have to declare an emergency to not follow the instruction while the 747 behind you produces a CA on his scope?

No, this has already been covered, you don’t declare an emergency, you ask for an amended clearance AIM 4-4-1(b). You’re asking questions which have already been answered. Do you actually read the references posted?

spngbobsqrpilot said:
Or does the Controller, with the authority granted to him in the matter concerned, (the Control of Air Traffic) have the authority to grant you a clearance to prevent a collision between known aircraft, and for you to proceed under the SPECIFIED conditions in that clearance?

Again, that has already been answered by with an AIM reference 4-4-1(a) Which part of "IT IS NOT AUTHORIZATION FOR A PILOT TO DEVIATE FROM ANY RULE, REGULATION, OR MINIMUM ALTITUDE..." didn’t you understand?


As for the rest, you are apparently attempting to conjure up some far fetched scenario in which a controller asks you to increase speed in order to prevent an impending loss of separation. The absurdity of this only underscores how desperate you apparently are to deflect attention away from the fact that you are completely wrong. If two planes are getting ready to hit each other, a speed adjustment is the *last* thing ATC will use to prevent the loss of separation. You think that if 2 757s are about to collide that a Controller will tell one to increase speed 30 knots and sit there while the jet engines spool up and a half million pound airplane slowly accelerates? Hoping a 15% change in speed will keep them from getting too close? No, if loss of separation is imminent, the controller will either turn, climb or descend one or both of the planes. That is the quickest way to get space between 2 airplanes that are about to be too close, not asking one to speed up.

Regardless, if there was an imminent collision, I assume that the controller would be able to exercise emergency authority to meet the needs of the emergency, as a pilot is. That’s an emergency, you do what you need and you sort out the legalities later. That is all irrelevant. The original question was not "can ATC waive 91.117(a) in an emergency" the question was "may ATC waive 91.117(a) for their convenience". The answer is clearly no.
 
AA, he's never going to admit how wrong, and apparently uninformed, he and his college professor are.

Chances are he's never going to be in this position, but if he ever gets busted for it, he'll remember this exchange.
 
If you have a problem with the way the FARs are written and what is there in black and white (or red) then take it up with someone else.

As used in Subchapters A through K of this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

Administrator means the Federal Aviation Administrator or any person to whom he has delegated his authority in the matter concerned.

(link as defined: To commit or entrust to another)

Now The FARs Define a "Person".

Person means an individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or governmental entity. It includes a trustee, receiver, assignee, or similar representative of any of them.

So a "Person" is an individual entrusted by the Administrator to control Air Traffic on behalf of the Administrator. The item delegated (entrusted) to the individual (Person) is the Control of Air Traffic.

Air traffic control means a service operated by appropriate authority to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.

Appropriate authority IS the Administrator.


So, The Administrator is any person who is an individual entrusted by the Administrator for the matter concerned, such as the Control of Air Traffic, or a representative of a government entity, (this section does INCLUDE a LEO if that LEO asks for a alcohol test) or The FAA itself.

A person is an individual, or government entity (The FAA) or a representative thereof. It does not exclude an Air Traffic Control Specialist, who has been specifically entrusted with the responsibility of issuing clearances on behalf of The Administrator for the Administrator’s service of Air Traffic Control.

Air traffic control is a service operated by The Administrator (appropriate authority) and that authority is any person or individual to whom he has delegated this responsibility by his authority. The authority delegated is the Control of Air Traffic or Air Traffic Control. It is operated by Appropriate Authority which is the Administrator. The Administrator, who is appropriate authority, is any person entrusted in this matter. This includes an individual who is a representative of that appropriate authority. The Administrator, by certifying or employing the Air Traffic Control Specialist, has delegated his authority on his behalf to the ATC Specialist to issue Air traffic Clearances by that ATC Specialist for the matter of Air traffic control for the service operated by the Administrator (or appropriate authority) to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.


Now. Again. Where did I EVER say that a Controller can issue clearances which are in violation of the FARs SOLELY for convenience?

I referenced 91.117(d) which says:

(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed.

We don’t and won’t know what the circumstances were behind the original question. Was the operation to prevent a LOS? Was there another aircraft involved? Was the minimum speed of the other aircraft required to be 250+? Was that other a/c behind the original poster’s plane? The original post said that the plane was to “maintain” speed. NOT ACCELERATE. So your condition and assumption that a controller will just sit there while he waits for tons of flesh, metal and fuel to accelerate is a poor deflection of the conditions that were initially stated and why a Controller may require speeds for “any particular operation”. And as I did point out, the crew shoulda’ asked for clarification.

The Controllers have a good union… wording like this in *(d) is here as a result of union lawyers leaving an “out” during the rare times that the Controller exercises his authority granted by Part 1’s definitions so that the Controller does not have to declare an emergency every time he has a fast 747 coming up behind a 250K 737 on a departure during SWAP or anytime only one or two departure corridors are open, and traffic must be moving, due to ATC flow times, or other considerations needed for the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.
 
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Spngbobsqrpilot,

You have got to be the dumbest SOB on the planet. You got one of the worst cyberspace b!tch slappings that I have ever seen, and yet you still wont give it up.

A squared has quite clearly shown you that YOU ARE WRONG. Give it a rest already.
 
spngbobsqrpilot said:
I referenced 91.117(d) which says:

(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed.

We don’t and won’t know what the circumstances were behind the original question. Was the operation to prevent a LOS? Was there another aircraft involved? Was the minimum speed of the other aircraft required to be 250+? Was that other a/c behind the original poster’s plane? The original post said that the plane was to “maintain” speed. NOT ACCELERATE. So your condition and assumption that a controller will just sit there while he waits for tons of flesh, metal and fuel to accelerate is a poor deflection of the conditions that were initially stated and why a Controller may require speeds for “any particular operation”. And as I did point out, the crew shoulda’ asked for clarification.

The Controllers have a good union… wording like this in *(d) is here as a result of union lawyers leaving an “out” during the rare times that the Controller exercises his authority granted by Part 1’s definitions so that the Controller does not have to declare an emergency every time he has a fast 747 coming up behind a 250K 737 on a departure during SWAP or anytime only one or two departure corridors are open, and traffic must be moving, due to ATC flow times, or other considerations needed for the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.

NO, NO, NO

91.117(d) Is there solely for you as the pilot to allow you to exceed 250kts below 10,000'. This is what allows the pilot of a wide body to clean up his/her aircraft and fly at the minimum maneuvering airspeed for his/her current weight.

A pilot of a wide body aircraft is not expected to keep the hight lift devices out to maintain a speed at or below 250 kts. Infact on most aircraft, if the high lift devices were left out, the pilot would have to restrict speed well below 250kts. It is much more efficient for the aircraft and flow control, for the pilot to clean up the aircraft and fly at the higher minimum maneuvering airspeed. ATC knows and expects this from wide body A/C.

If a 747 is climbing out and catching a 737, ATC is not going to ask or tell the pilot of the 737 to increase speed abvoe 250 while below 10,000'. ATC will give one of the aircraft a turn or hold one of the aircraft at a lower altitude or both.
 
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Spnongebob,

You are truly an idiot, and I don't say that frivolously.

If you can read thes two sentences from the Federal Register:

The Airspace Reclassification Rule inadvertently assigned the authority to air traffic controllers to allow aircraft operators to deviate from the maximum airspeed restriction below 10,000 feet.

and

This action reestablishes the Administrator as the proper authority to permit waivers of aircraft speed.

yet still insist that for the purpose of 91.117(a) ATC *is* "the administrator" I can only conclude that you have a profound developmental disability.

I don't think there's much point wasting anymore bandwidth on you. I'm fairly confident that everyone else who has an interest in this thread can see what the correct answer is.
 
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A Squared said:
Spnongebob,

You are truly an idiot, and I don't say that frivolously.

If you can read thes two sentences from the Federal Register:



and



yet still insist that for the purpose of 91.117(a) ATC *is* "the administrator" I can only conclude that you have a profound developmental disability.

I don't think there's much point wasting anymore bandwidth on you. I'm fairly confident that everyone else who has an interest in this thread can see what the correct answer is.

AA

Where does the hostility come from. I realize what you said is 100% correct, but why the beat down? You are right, I know it, you know it, most people on here know it, so why stoop to a level of name calling and insults? If you were having this conversation with this person face to face, would you use the same language? Maybe you would, I don't know, but I just don't get why you and others, get so wound up if someone disagrees with you, even if you are correct. Why waste the energy and drag yourself down trying to change their mind? The information has been given, if they choose to ignore it, so be it. If they come back with another point of view, so be it, answer the point without the insults.....

maybe I'm just lonely, CANT WE ALL GET ALONG!
 
group hug!!!

I would like to give my THANKS to all involved in this thread...
Very informative - and might I say entertaining also...

A2 Thanks for your diligent "research." That my friend was outstanding.

We need more threads like this!


ps The one thing I did learn is:
"There is NO SPEED restriction (legally speaking) IN class B airspace - period."
 
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Submitted to the Jury with all the facts in evidence -1

http://www.ardemgaz.com/prev/crash060299/A1xcrash1015.html

Government pins blame for '99 crash on pilot error
ANDREA HARTER

The U.S. Department of Justice says it knows for sure that the crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 was caused by pilot error.
The government's lawyers, including U.S. Attorney Paula Casey, filed a motion for summary judgment Wednesday in more than a dozen cases in which passengers have sued American for damages.
American, in turn, has sued the government, contending the air-traffic controller on duty when the plane crashed was negligent
.
The Justice Department represents the Federal Aviation Administration, which employs the controller, Kenneth Kaylor, a veteran manning the tower and radio at Little RockNationalAirport, Adams Field, when Flight 1420 crashed June 1, 1999
, during a severe thunderstorm.
From the moment of touchdown, the pilots had lost control, and the jetliner never found a steady path on the wet runway. The MD-82, carrying 139 passengers and a crew of six, slid off the runway and struck a instrument pole before crashing over a 25-foot embankment, ripping through a steel walkway and landing, broken in half and burning, about 100 yards from the Arkansas River. Eleven died, including the pilot.
"The sole cause of the accident was pilot error, including the decision of the pilots to land the airplane in known dangerous weather and their mishandling of the airplane during the landing," the Justice Department motion argues.
"In landing the airplane that night, the pilots of Flight 1420 violated American Airlines' internal rules and the Federal Aviation Regulations," the motion states. It asks U.S. District Court Judge Henry Woods to dismiss the government from the case, as testimony derived in depositions from the surviving co-pilot, Michael Origel, said the controller did a good job directing the flight that night.
The motion was signed by David W. Ogden, assistant attorney general, Casey and Kathlynn G. Fadely, assistant director of aviation in the government's trial division.
Casey's name is a matter of course, as she is
Arkansas
' highest-ranking Justice Department official. But on Friday, she said she had not seen the complaint and referred all questions to Fadely, who was out of the office.
Woods has not ruled on the motion or set a hearing date.
American spokesman John Hotard said Friday he was surprised to see the government make bold statements that had not been authenticated by the safety board.
"
We still feel that the FAA did play a part in this accident and should remain a party in the litigation," he said.
A safety board spokesman, Ted Lopatkiewicz, said the agency has made no statement about what probably caused the crash, and won't until a hearing to discuss its final report in the spring.
"Wherever they are getting their information from, they are not quoting us," he said.
A Justice Department spokesman, Charles Miller, offered only a prepared statement:
"Based on the documents produced by American Airlines in connection with litigation, the testimony taken in depositions in connection with the litigation and the National Transportation Safety Board materials that are publicly available, this leads to our assertion that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the cause of the crash -- that being pilot error."
One area of difference between the Justice Department and the safety board involves the spoilers, the moveable panels on the wings that retard a plane's aerodynamic ability to fly. They are employed during landings to slow the plane, and sometimes are referred to as air or speed brakes, as they use the natural resistance of the wind to bring the plane down.
From the beginning, there have been questions about whether Flight 1420/s pilots deployed the spoilers.
In January, the safety board released flight data-recorder information that shows at least one of the four spoilers was working for a short period of time as the plane was touching down. The right inboard spoiler had extended to 58.9 degrees for a second or two, then closed. (A spoiler's range of extension is limited to 60 degrees.)
That information caused investigators to consider that the spoilers might have been activated; otherwise, there should be no movement. They have not released a conclusion, which will help determine the degree to which the crash can be blamed on pilot error.
Attorneys for passengers have contended that the spoilers were not activated, since the cockpit controls were in the wrong position after the crash. It is not known if the controls were in the proper position before the landing; the cockpit's voice recorder disclosed that Origel did not do a verbal checklist that night.
Still, the Justice Department has formed its own conclusion. Its motion states, unequivocally, "the spoilers on Flight 1420 were never deployed."
It cites as evidence statements made in a deposition by Capt. Cecil Ewell, who was American's second-in-command for pilots before his retirement in December. Ewell was not on the plane.
In March, Ewell was asked by
Chicago
attorney David Rapopport to look at the flight-data readings the safety board had gathered from Flight 1420. Rapopport then asked Ewell, "You are aware, however, that the spoilers did not deploy and stay deployed as they should have, correct?"
Ewell: "I don't know what the [safety board] has ultimately said about that. I have heard that statement, that they didn't deploy."
Ewell did say that American's policy book, which he wrote, called for them to be deployed, and that if they had failed to work automatically, the pilot should have turned them on manually. But he did not indicate any knowledge that 1420/s spoilers didn't work.
Co-pilot Origel has testified inconsistently on the subject, telling investigators he was fairly certain Capt. Richard Buschmann had armed the spoilers, and even asking the safety board to amend the cockpit voice recording to show that a clicking sound heard on the tape is the noise of the spoilers being activated. The safety board declined to alter the transcript, but did make a note of Origel's objections and concerns.
In a March deposition, Origel backpedaled, telling attorneys he felt bad about the spoiler issue and conceding that they may not have been set. It was Origel's job to set them, but the controls were closer to Buschmann.
The safety board's Lopatkiewicz said the airplane's wreckage will be released to American this week, but he did not have specific information about the spoilers or know if they were included.
While the spoiler issue may become paramount in the final understanding of what happened in the cockpit that night, it is a separate issue from the lawsuit before Judge Woods. American contends that Kaylor, the air-traffic controller, failed to tell the pilots every piece of information they needed to land safely.
Kaylor did give the pilots many wind warnings and weather updates. But when one of the final readings was misread back to him, he failed to catch the error.
American contends he should have warned the pilots that the runway was very wet -- the company has specific landing policies when a braking advisory is issued in wet conditions -- but the Justice Department countered that Kaylor told the pilots it was raining, and that alone should have led them to believe the runway was wet.
While this dispute gears up for a court challenge, another motion before Woods could shed additional light on American's safety practices.
Six weeks after the crash, the Federal Aviation Administration undertook a safety investigation of the airline. It deemed its investigation closed in November, but refused an Arkansas Democrat-Gazette request in June to release the findings. The agency said its report included too much financial information about the company to be released.
Jim Jackson, a Bryant attorney who represents a mother and two children involved in the crash, has filed a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs' steering committee asking Woods to make the report public, even if some material is redacted. No hearing date has been set.





http://www.ardemgaz.com/prev/crash060299/A1_1420_23.html
 
-2

Inquiry ongoing to find answers for 1420 crash
ANDREA HARTER
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE


Behind closed doors, the search for the cause of a jetliner crash last year in
Little Rock is continuing, despite little public discussion.
The National Transportation Safety Board is more than a year into its investigation of the
June 1, 1999
, crash landing of American Airlines Flight 1420. Its report is expected this fall. In the meantime, neither the board nor its investigators will discuss their findings.
The crash killed 11 people, including the pilot, and more than 40 lawsuits have been filed. The passengers' lawyers have deposed more than 20 people as they try to pin down blame for the accident, but only a few of those depositions have been made public.
Those few are like a bread-crumb trail.
Take, for example, the deposition of Kenneth Kaylor, the air-traffic controller on duty the stormy night of the crash. His testimony may shed light on what went on when the plane failed to stop at the end of Runway 4R.
Kaylor has not spoken publicly about the crash.
In fact, the Federal Aviation Administration said last week that it would encourage him not to talk about it
, outside of mandatory interviews with attorneys, until the crash inquiry is complete.
His testimony was expected in January, when the safety board held a public hearing in
Little Rock
. But Greg Feith, the safety board's chief investigator, announced he'd received a letter from the FAA saying that Kaylor was too sick to testify.
However, Kaylor told the lawyers deposing him that, although he had taken a leave of absence due to post-traumatic stress disorder about the time of the hearing, he had never been asked to testify.
Asked if that was so, safety board spokesman Paul Schlamm said last week that Kaylor's statement had been taken after the crash, and was released in the safety board's preliminary findings.
It was two pages long.
"If the parties to the investigation feel that there is something more that needs to be said or learned about, they will seek him out," Schlamm said. "We were told Mr. Kaylor was ill. That was enough for us."
In May, lawyers questioned Kaylor for five hours. The transcript of his deposition runs 244 pages.
Last month, U.S. District Judge Henry Woods ruled that Kaylor's comments were of interest to the public and should be released, along with the depositions of Kaylor's boss, Michael Holland, and an American Airlines meteorologist, William Orvis.

'CLEAR TO LAND'
Kaylor has been an air traffic controller since 1986, getting his start at busy
Midway Airport in Chicago. Since 1992, he's worked at Little Rock National Airport, Adams Field. He testified that he had the experience needed to work several positions at once if the traffic was light, as it was that night.
Kaylor worked an early shift that day,
6 a.m. to 2 p.m., then went home to nap. The FAA requires only eight hours off between shifts, and Kaylor returned to work at 11 p.m.

A storm was edging its way into
Pulaski County at that hour. Kaylor soon was spending most of his time calling out wind speeds and changes, including wind-shear alerts, as Flight 1420 made its final approach.
But when he gave 1420's pilots clearance to land, Kaylor wasn't talking about the weather or how bad it was or might get, a point on which attorney Mike Slack questioned him.
"
And what does that mean to you when you say 'clear to land'?" asked Slack, an Austin, Texas, attorney who represents the family of two crash victims, Gordon and Joyce McLerran.
"That I'm ensuring to that crew that
there is not another airplane, not a vehicle or anything known to me
on that runway which would inhibit their landing," Kaylor responded. (1)
He said he could not deny a landing because of the weather, no matter how bad it was. He has a handbook that spells out what he can and can't say to a pilot.
Slack pressed him. "And the handbook does not permit you, nor do standard operating procedures permit you or -- I mean, to allow you to qualify permission to land based on weather conditions, do they?"
"No, sir. That decision is put upon the pilot," Kaylor said.
Slack asked for details. Kaylor replied, " ... From an air traffic controller's perspective, that decision to land is the pilot's."
"Okay. Well, in other words, you're not -- you're not telling American, Weather's bad; don't come in. That's not your responsibility, is it?"
" ... No sir," Kaylor said.
In fact, he confirmed
, it would have been breaking the rules to do so.

WINDS 'NEAR THE LIMIT'
Kaylor's testimony adds perspective to what was said between tower and plane and between pilot and co-pilot. The safety board has released transcripts of those conversations, although passengers' lawyers are now seeking release of the actual cockpit voice recording; a hearing is scheduled Aug. 1.


 
-3

According to the transcripts, 17 minutes before the crash, at 11:34, Kaylor tells Capt. Richard Buschmann, "ah we have a thunderstorm just northwest of the area moving uh, through the area now." He tells Buschmann the wind is blowing at 28 knots, gusting to 44 knots, at almost a right angle to the runway.
In the cockpit, Buschmann repeats the numbers Kaylor has given him, but gets them wrong. Co-pilot Michael Origel corrects him. Buschmann notes to Origel that they are "right near the limit" of what the plane can land in.
At
11:42
, Kaylor tells the cockpit that a second part of the storm is moving through. The wind is blowing across the runway at a different angle, 30 degrees from being a 90-degree crosswind.
Although pilots land in them all the time, crosswinds steal control. Imagine crossing the Interstate 430 Arkansas River bridge with a stiff wind slamming against the side of the car.
At
11:45
, Origel tells Kaylor the plane is getting "pretty close to the storm."
At
11:47
, Kaylor tells the cockpit that the wind has shifted again. It is at a 50-degree angle to the runway and gusting to 45 knots.
Origel repeats the numbers but gets them wrong. According to his numbers, 1420 is on a headwind course, which is what the plane needs to stop in heavy rain.
It is part of Kaylor's job to correct him, but Kaylor does not.

'WE'RE DOWN. WE'RE SLIDING'
At
11:48:27, Kaylor gives 1420 clearance to land. Runway visibility has dropped to less than a quarter-mile. The wind is still volatile.
At
11:49:11
, Kaylor tells the cockpit the wind is at 330 degrees, blowing at 28 knots. If it were at 310 degrees, it would be a crosswind to a plane landing on Runway 4R.
At
11:49:54
, he tells them the wind is at 320 degrees, just 10 degrees from being a crosswind, and blowing at 23 knots.
Buschmann and Origel do not acknowledge Kaylor, but, in the cockpit, one of them tells the other, "Aw [expletive], we're off course." Investigators do not know which was speaking.
Thirty seconds later, Origel says to Buschmann, "We're down."
Quickly, he adds, "We're sliding."
Kaylor can hear none of this. From his crow's nest, he waits, watching his instruments and the rain.
At
11:50:54
, he says, "American 1420, report clear of the runway, please."
At 11:51:16, "Amer -- American 1420, tower."
Kaylor repeats that call four more times, but no one answers.
At
11:54:06
, he calls the airport's emergency crew.

WHO'S AT FAULT?
While the safety board will determine what likely caused the crash, the legal system will determine American's degree of liability.
Many -- attorneys, passengers and aviation officials -- have suggested privately that the air traffic controller bears some responsibility. But he works for the federal government, which generally cannot be sued, (2) so the passengers' attorneys are focusing on American, leaving only the airline to make a case against the FAA.
At January's public hearing, Robert Baker, American's vice chairman, noted that Kaylor was "conspicuous by his absence." He contended Kaylor's recollection was key to getting to the bottom of the story.
At Kaylor's May 18 deposition, American lawyer William C. Brown questioned the controller extensively, grilling him on how he did his job.
For more than 30 minutes, Brown quizzed Kaylor on what he could see that night, the exact readouts of the indicators that measure sight distance on the runway, where those records are kept, why Kaylor couldn't recall every detail.
Kaylor testified that he saw the plane land. "I could make out the type aircraft and the 'American' on the -- "
"On the tail?" Brown broke in.
"Well, whereever it's written. Right offhand I don't recall, but -- "
American's airplanes carry the company's name along the side, in billboard-sized letters -- the name stretches 15 rows. There are two giant initials on the tail, one red, one blue -- the company's logo, AA.

CREW'S DECISION
In his deposition, Kaylor argued that Buschmann and Origel were better-equipped to monitor the weather than he was from his 75-foot control tower. He had made the same point to Buschmann about 15 minutes before the crash.
"Their weather radar, you know -- from my experience, the airlines -- not just American, but all of them -- have weather radar on board, and they're -- they're good at telling you what it looks like. They have -- they get the colors and all of that," Kaylor testified.
"My equipment, all I get is an outline of a big blob and, you know, no intensity or you don't see anything else; it's just an area with precipitation ... "
American's sophisticated onboard equipment can give pilots a color display not unlike what television viewers get when storm watching. But Origel has testified he saw no change in the weather colors that night, although he allowed that he may not have had his weather radar pointed at the heart of the storm. As it was dark, he had it pointed where he thought was best, straight down at the ground.
If meteorologists' estimates are right, the storm was heaviest right in front or even above the plane when it touched down.
Proving that is the crux of the case against American. Although it does not dispute that there was a storm nearby, the airline maintains it did not fly into a thunderstorm.
Kaylor remembers the touchdown. "I saw them for just a little ways. I lost them somewhere right in this area right here," he testified, pointing to a spot about one-third of the way down the runway on an aerial photo.
"Because of poor visibility?" Slack asked him.
"Yeah, some obscuration out there. I don't know what it was."
Asked again later if there was something he could have said to prevent 1420 from landing, to deny it clearance, Kaylor stood his ground.
"From an air traffic standpoint, weather has no bearing on it. That decision's up to the crew."

Slack asked, "Am I correct, sir, too, that you do not, as an air traffic controller, close runways; is that right?"
"No, sir. I have no authority to close a runway."


FAR FROM OVER
Kaylor is still an air traffic controller. Most days, he trains other controllers, although he still spends some time in the tower.
He may have to tell his story again soon. The first trial -- the McLerrans' case -- is set for Aug. 14. Gordon and Joyce McLerran were part of a Russellville travel group returning from a tour of the
British Isles.
Fifteen lawsuits have been settled out of court, and at least four passengers have settled without filing suit.
The most recent court-mediated settlement, on May 31, involved the family of Sgt. Jeffery Stewart, an airman who died from his injuries 10 days after the crash. The mediator, U.S. Magistrate Judge David Young, has scheduled seven more conferences next month.

http://www.ardemgaz.com/prev/crash060299/A4xcrash14.html

Court strategy keeps air-traffic controller from getting apology
ANDREA HARTER
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE


American Airlines isn't offering an apology for naming an air-traffic controller in a federal lawsuit relating to the doomed landing of American's Flight 1420, despite a union challenge to do so.
Kenneth Kaylor, the air-traffic controller on duty the night Flight 1420 crashed in
Little Rock, has been made an "extra victim" of the crash by news media and the airline, his union said this week.
 
-4

To that end, American Airlines owes Kaylor an apology, John Carr, president of the 15,000-member National Air Traffic Controllers Association, said in a telephone interview from Washington on Tuesday.
The company responded in a statement late Wednesday.
"American Airlines has stated that it was never its intent to hold Mr. Kaylor personally liable at trial in any of the Flight 1420 cases.

"However, there are still several [air-traffic control] issues stemming from the accident that need to be addressed in court, and this will now be possible because the U.S. government has been made a party in these cases," the company said.

An apology would complicate American's position that the Federal Aviation Administration, through Kaylor, (4) did not give out enough weather information about runway conditions on the night the plane crashed.


"We're talking about a wrecked career here. This man's name has been smeared for no good reason. This controller did the best that he could under trying conditions," Carr said. "It is unfortunate that an innocent person had to be made an extra victim."
Kaylor had worked eight hours on
June 1, 1999, before taking a four-hour break and returning to work the night shift at the control tower at Little RockNationalAirport
, Adams Field.
He had been on duty about an hour when the weather turned violent. Flight 1420, two hours behind schedule, was approaching from
Dallas-FortWorthInternationalAirport
.
Kaylor called out the erratic winds to the pilots but did not offer an opinion on whether the plane should land.
He is prohibited from doing so; that decision is the pilot's.
Heavy rain was beating on the runway as Flight 1420 touched down. The pilots struggled to maintain control. The plane fishtailed, struck a set of instrument poles and careened over a 25-foot embankment, crashing through a steel walkway and breaking apart just yards from the Arkansas River
.
The captain and 10 passengers died. Most of the 134 survivors were hurt.
At an Aug. 1 hearing before U.S. District Judge Henry Woods, American's attorneys notified the court that the airline would seek to have the government, specifically Kaylor and the FAA, included as defendants in passengers' lawsuits.

Woods told American's lawyers that he would not permit a suit to be brought against Kaylor, as he is guaranteed immunity from lawsuits as a federal employee. Kaylor was named in four lawsuits, but his name has since been removed, and the government has been substituted as a defendant. (3)
Woods later issued an order explaining his position and noted that American could seek to recover damages from the government only after it had paid the passengers' claims. Then American would have to prove to a judge that the government was at fault
and should be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In an Aug. 29 letter to Kathlynn G. Fadely, the Justice Department's assistant director for aviation litigation, American's lead counsel, Bob Craft, wrote that American did not want to name Kaylor in its original suits.
The federal government must agree to be sued, and Craft wrote that it would not do so without Kaylor's name being included.

On Sept. 1, Gerald J. Arpey, American's executive vice president of operations, wrote FAA Administrator Jane Garvey with a further explanation, saying, "It was never American's intent to hold Mr. Kaylor personally liable at trial in any of the Flight 1420 cases. In state courts, however,
we were required to name the individual controller as a party so that the United States government would substitute itself for Mr. Kaylor."
 
-5 (last page)

Arpey said the company would not include Kaylor's name on future 1420 cases.
The government's actions are not a factor in the suits set for trial this fall. First up is Allison Hunt, a choir member from
OuachitaBaptistUniversity, whose suit against American is scheduled for trial Sept. 25.
Hunt is one of about 40 passengers who were returning from international trips. Because an international treaty prevents those passengers from seeking punitive damages, American has admitted liability in their cases; the government is not a party.
But larger action looms, as attorneys for the passengers traveling within the
United States
prepare punitive-damage cases against American.
Four cases -- three domestic and one international -- were scheduled for mediation this week before U.S. Magistrate Judge David Young, but they will be rescheduled.
The delay comes because of a reshuffling of attorneys at Hill Gilstrap, an
Arlington, Texas
, firm that represented 15 of the passengers.
Bob Bodoin, who represented another Ouachita Baptist student, Kristin Maddox, in her successful suit against American, has left the firm. A jury awarded Maddox $11,015,000 last month.
Hill Gilstrap co-founder Frank Hill said that the split was amicable, and Bodoin and a
Little Rock
lawyer, Matt Warner, wanted to specialize in aviation law.
The firm will still have input on how Bodoin and Warner play out the 15 cases, but Bodoin and Warner are in control. Warner is the lead lawyer representing the family of Debra Sattari, the only domestic passenger killed in the crash.
As a footnote to the litigation, Woods ordered Monday that a portion of passengers' settlements go into an escrow account to pay the expenses of a committee of lawyers gathering evidence and taking depositions for the passengers' cases.
He ordered domestic passengers who filed suit before July 15 to pay in 3 percent of their settlements. Domestic cases filed after that date will have to contribute 5 percent. International passengers must pay 1 percent, up to a maximum of $25,000; that includes Maddox.







Articles reprinted from here:

http://www.ardemgaz.com/prev/crash060299/



(1) ATC= Control of KNOWN Traffic

(2), (3) reference a legal term of “Sovereign Immunity”
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s103.htm


SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - A doctrine precluding the institution of a suit against the sovereign [government] without its consent. Though commonly believed to be rooted in English law, it is actually rooted in the inherent nature of power and the ability of those who hold power to shield themselves.

In England it was predicated on the concept that "the sovereign can do no wrong", a concept developed and enforced by - guess who? However, since the American revolution explictedly rejected this interesting idea, the American rulers had to come up with another rationale to protect their power. One they came up with is that the "sovereign is exempt from suit [on the] practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 205 U.S. 349, 353.






(4) discussed as to who the “Sovereign” is, and who represents “The Sovereign”

http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s165.htm


SOVEREIGN - A chief ruler with supreme power; one possessing sovereignty. It is also applied to a king or other magistrate with limited powers.

In the United States
the sovereignty resides in the body of the people.

SOVEREIGNTY - The union and exercise of all human power possessed in a state; it is a combination of all power; it is the power to do everything in a state without accountability; to make laws, to execute and to apply them: to impose and collect taxes, and, levy, contributions; to make war or peace; to form treaties of alliance or of commerce with foreign nations, and the like.

Abstractedly, sovereignty resides in the body of the nation and belongs to the people. But these powers are generally exercised by delegation.

When analysed, sovereignty is naturally divided into three great powers; namely, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary; the first is the power to make new laws, and to correct and repeal the old; the second is the power to execute the laws both at home and abroad; and the last is the power to apply the laws to particular facts; to judge the disputes which arise among the citizens, and to punish crimes.


Isn't the intepretation of law fun???

Hope you all have enjoyed it!
 
spngbobsqrpilot said:
Inquiry ongoing to find answers for 1420 crash
ANDREA HARTER
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE





Spngbob, I'm trying to understand your angle...Are you trying to use newspaper articles to support your contentions? Despite all of the regulatory language and FAA documentation posted here?
 
Shoot the messenger. What a witty rejoinder.

I had more to say, but I'll leave it at that.

Civics lessons are in the website next door.
 
spngbobsqrpilot said:
Shoot the messenger. What a witty rejoinder.

I had more to say, but I'll leave it at that.

Civics lessons are in the website next door.

Uhhh, spongebob, if you believe that you've done anything other than make yourself appear even more foolish (if that is even possible) you are tragically mistaken.
 
SpongeBob,

WTF, over?!? What exactly does American 1420 have to do with exceeding 250KIAS below 10000'? I don't get it... but since you think it has something to do with this arguement, I'll connect the two...


spngbobsqrpilot said:

Slack asked, "Am I correct, sir, too, that you do not, as an air traffic controller, close runways; is that right?"
"No, sir. I have no authority to close a runway."


Funny. According to you, a controller is the administrators "designee" and therefore he/she has the AUTHORITY to waive the speed limitation. One would think that if they had the AUTHORITY to waive published regulations, they would have the AUTHORITY to close a runway, no?

It's too bad that they don't have an icon that shows a smiley face inserting its foot into its mouth...
 
Flyerjosh said:
SpongeBob,

WTF, over?!? What exactly does American 1420 have to do with exceeding 250KIAS below 10000'? I don't get it... but since you think it has something to do with this arguement, I'll connect the two...





Funny. According to you, a controller is the administrators "designee" and therefore he/she has the AUTHORITY to waive the speed limitation. One would think that if they had the AUTHORITY to waive published regulations, they would have the AUTHORITY to close a runway, no?

It's too bad that they don't have an icon that shows a smiley face inserting its foot into its mouth...


If you are going to attempt to repeat what I said, at least get it right.

I never said "designee".

I quoted FAR 1.1:

Administrator means the Federal Aviation Administrator or any person to whom he has delegated his authority in the matter concerned.

I even highlighted "delegated" I then provided a link that defines delegated.

Should you choose to ignore that definition, here it is, yet again:
  1. A person authorized to act as representative for another; a deputy or an agent.
tr.v. del·e·gat·ed,


1. To authorize and send (another person) as one's representative.
2. To commit or entrust to another: delegate a task to a subordinate.

Now, an ATC Specialist (Controller) is tasked (by the Administrator) with the matter of the control of known traffic, and issuing clearances which provide for the safe, orderly and expiditious control of that known traffic. Again, you conveniently leave out the definition found in FAR 1.1 which defines what Air Traffic Control is which states:

Air Traffic Control means a service operated by appropriate authority to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.

That defintion does NOT say anything about closing a runway, so the Controller cannot close a runway.

The FAA, administrator or otherwise does not decide when a runway is too contaminated for traffic operations. Both a pilot and the airport authority decide if the runway is too contaminated. A pilot has the option to divert, (or not attempt to depart) whereas the airport authority has the obligation and authority to close the airport for snow removal, for example. When the local port authority or airport commisioner closes the airport for snow removal, the airport / runway / individual taxiways as needed are closed by the local airport authority.

I dunno. Maybe it's been said before, but if not I'll say it:

"Where common sense ends, the law begins."

It's been said that most of the FARs are written in blood because someone at one point ****** up, and couldn't use common sense. But, likewise they were written in such a fashion which practically guarantees that the Administrator, or his DELEGATE (which are both severally and jointly the same as the United States government) could be protected under any interpretation of the laws (FARs), and the individual (pilot --not the government) would be in violation of the law or regulation which was written to provide immunity for the government. See the reference to the legal concept of "Sovereign Immunity".

That leads us to FAR 1.1 again:

Air traffic clearance means an authorization by air traffic control, for the purpose of preventing collision between known aircraft, for an aircraft to proceed under specified traffic conditions within controlled airspace.

Which brings us to 91.123:
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in command may deviate from that clearance unless an amended clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in response to a traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory. However, except in Class A airspace, a pilot may cancel an IFR flight plan if the operation is being conducted in VFR weather conditions. When a pilot is uncertain of an ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately request clarification from ATC.
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may operate an aircraft contrary to an ATC instruction in an area in which air traffic control is exercised.

91.123(a)....When a pilot is uncertain of an ATC clearance, that pilot shall immediately request clarification from ATC. requires us to question a clearance we are unsure of, but 91.117(d), which states "If the minimum safe airspeed for any* particular operation is greater than the maximum speed prescribed in this section (this section includes 91.117(a) which is what your sole argument is based on), the aircraft may be operated at that minimum speed." allows the pilot to operate at that minumum safe airspeed. Safety, in my opinion, includes not being involved in a mid air because a controller needs a certain speed greater than maximum speed prescribed in this section, which includes 91.117(a).

*any

  1. One, some, every, or all without specification: Take any book you want. Are there any messages for me? Any child would love that. Give me any food you don't want.
  2. Exceeding normal limits, as in size or duration: The patient cannot endure chemotherapy for any length of time.
I guess the Judge doesn't know what he is talking about either.

At an Aug. 1 hearing before U.S. District Judge Henry Woods, American's attorneys notified the court that the airline would seek to have the government, specifically Kaylor and the FAA, included as defendants in passengers' lawsuits.

Woods told American's lawyers that he would not permit a suit to be brought against Kaylor, as he is guaranteed immunity from lawsuits as a federal employee.

And that is what this case has to do with this.

(Controller) is delegated (committed or entrusted) by the Administrator to carry out the task of the Control of Air Traffic on behalf of the Administrator and the United States Government.

So I guess the Judge and the earlier referenced professor both don't know what they are talking about.

rrrrrrrrriiiiight.
 
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well, spongebob,

I gotta hand it to you, not too many guys would continue arguing that ATC has the authority to waive 91.117(a) after they have been shown a docket from the Federal Register which states in plain english that ATC does *not* have that authority, but you don't let that slow you down, you keep on arguing. I've got to admire your tenacity, if not your intelligence, or powers of reasoning, or sanity.

You do know, though, don't you, that anyone still reading this thread is just laughing thier @sses off at what a fool you're making of yourself?
 

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