Asiana 777 crashed on landing at SFO

[IBNAV8R]

Hey wizard, STFU!!!! Jokes not funny

Get off it, man. That was funny.

I was just wondering how they got from 7 miles out to the accident site in 24 seconds.

 

[AeroDMB]

Stupid question about the 777 then. If you aren't on an autoland then do you have to turn the auto throttles off before touchdown or do they still have an auto retard before touchdown based on radar altimeter? In other words if they are doing vertical speed, level change, or a GPS would you leave the auto throttles on the entire time or do you have to disconnect them before touchdown. We don't use autoland...we only use the HUD for CAT III....and we have to disconnect auto throttles before landing (I know that's specific to our airline)

They auto-retard upon flare and landing (25' RA Idle). We don't shut them off. They disconnect automatically when either thrust reverser goes to reverse idle.

As far as the inhibit function of the A/T when using FLCH, yes I did just discover that the autothrottle wake-up is inhibited during use of FLCH when on approach and below 100' RA. The autothrottle wakeup protection basically advances the thrust levers to min maneuver speed when outside the inhibit realm. Although I'm still not sure why the speed was at 107kt unless they shut off the A/T system sometime during the manuever. It should have been keeping up with the ref +5. Using FLCH that low to the ground sounds way odd as well. It's usually VS to get back on glide...or...wait for it...hand fly!

 

[ackattacker]

Saw today where it was an IOE Captain flying with a check-airman in the right seat.

There's something I'm not getting. At the beginning of the audio, the crew calls final 7 miles south(?) and is cleared to land. The mystery go-around call is at about 16 seconds. The call for equipment is at about 24 seconds. At 137 knots, this equates to about .6 miles and .9 miles, respectively. Either I misheard or misunderstand, the crew WAY overestimated the distance to touchdown, or there is missing audio.

That audio file everybody is listening to is condensed (edited)

 

[Capn Butthead]

Thanks aero for the info! I didn't know the 777 was like that. It kind of makes at least a little more sense....whatever it was im sure we will learn a lot from it.

 

[Capn Butthead]

I listened to the live atc archive at real time. When they checked on they were level at I believe 8000 for a few minutes. On tower they checked in outside of the bridge with Skywest right behind them. The last minute of the atc tape was very intense. Great job by atc imo

 

[Wesb737fo]

Hmm. The 777 AT's low speed protection is inhibited below '100 in FLCH? I'm on the 737NG. If we don't capture an approach mode for some reason ( which has happened once or twice) the AT's will still advance in the flare as the speed slows, and can be a surprise. I guess we will have to wait for the gritty details. I thought I heard someone say they were originally on 28R and got the last minute switch to the left.

 

[Dan Roman]

I'm surprised no one has made the observation that perhaps fatigue was a major issue? A 10 hour flight is pretty grueling, 10 hours of IOE? These guys could have just flat worn themselves out. Even worse, from what I hear about Asian carriers, the training can be anal overkill with not enough focus on common sense and tremendous focus on very strict procedures that are not to be deviated from. Which in turn, makes non standard situations, like no G/S, sidestep approach, and starting the approach high and fast as is common place at SFO, more difficult when you try and replace good airmanship with an overly strict focus on procedures.

Bottom line is though, if (and I emphasize IF) the instructor quizzed and hammered on this guy all the way across the Pacific, he could have set themselves up to try and land when they were at a level of fatigue that was very dangerous.

I'm wondering if the environment in the cockpit may be a big factor. Were they working as team to land the airplane or was the check airman more concerned about judging the IOE candidate and withholding his support?
It may be politically incorrect, but I've heard too many stories of Asian Carrier instructors that are incredible tyrants and have an unhealthy focus on hierarchy in the cockpit. 10 hours of that could wear anyone down to an unsafe level.

 

[dicko]

An excellent point. The flight began in Shanghai, stopped in Seoul and ended in San Francisco. It was a four man crew, nevertheless that's a very long time to spend with a check airmen giving you the beady eye.

 

[ALGFLYR]

The finger pointing. The blame. The "I can't believe what an idiot..." It all needs to stop. One of the greatest things Jesus ever said was "Let he among you without sin cast the first stone". I can't believe how many go ahead and throw them. I'm sure I speak for many of you besides myself when I say the only reason we have not had an accident ourselves is because we knew what not to do because someone ahead of us learned the hard way.
I notice that accidents tend to come in 3's. So before anyone starts acting like Superpilot, look out or YOU may be number 2 or 3.

Is this number 2?

http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/08/us/alaska-air-taxi-crash/?hpt=hp_t2

 

[lionflyer]

I'm surprised no one has made the observation that perhaps fatigue was a major issue? A 10 hour flight is pretty grueling, 10 hours of IOE? These guys could have just flat worn themselves out. Even worse, from what I hear about Asian carriers, the training can be anal overkill with not enough focus on common sense and tremendous focus on very strict procedures that are not to be deviated from. Which in turn, makes non standard situations, like no G/S, sidestep approach, and starting the approach high and fast as is common place at SFO, more difficult when you try and replace good airmanship with an overly strict focus on procedures.

Bottom line is though, if (and I emphasize IF) the instructor quizzed and hammered on this guy all the way across the Pacific, he could have set themselves up to try and land when they were at a level of fatigue that was very dangerous.

I'm wondering if the environment in the cockpit may be a big factor. Were they working as team to land the airplane or was the check airman more concerned about judging the IOE candidate and withholding his support?
It may be politically incorrect, but I've heard too many stories of Asian Carrier instructors that are incredible tyrants and have an unhealthy focus on hierarchy in the cockpit. 10 hours of that could wear anyone down to an unsafe level.

My initial reaction to this is that these guys were very reliant on automation because it's mandated by their company and it was how they were trained. When they were thrown a curveball, they were pushing buttons all the way down instead of just hand flying it. But you make a very good point. A 10hr oral over the Pacific would wear anyone down. Add in the heirarcy culture of Asian carriers where there's usually no CRM, you start getting a chain of factors.

 

[DCAA320]

"Old School" would have been adding 5 knots for the wife and kids. I guess they don't do that anymore.

From the DC-9 it would be 5 for wife1, + 5 for wife2, + 5 more for the kids.

250 to the marker was never a problem.

 

[Whine Lover]

"...speed decreasing below Vref and not being noticed.'

An excellent observation.

Forget the aircraft type and it's levels of automation...Where are YOUR eyeballs (and generally speaking, as is common procedure, the Other Guy's) ALL THE WAY DOWN THE APPROACH?

Pretty much, aren't they focused on Airspeed, Altitude, and ILS parameters with accompanying Call-Outs to be made for deviations....?

I believe this will come down to a "Cultural Differences in Operations" and/or a "Training Philosophy" type of thing, as many have speculated thus far. (along with the usual additional aspects of The Accident Chain. )

Just glad the carnage was minimal....So sorry for those two young kids and their families.



Whine

 

[LJ45]

NTSB highlights

-At 1600 feet, the autopilot was switched off.
-At 1400 feet, air speed was 170 knots.
- At 1000ft, airspeed was 149 knots,
- At 500ft airspeed was 134k.
- At 200 feet, airspeed was 118 knots, about 16 seconds prior to impact.
-At 125ft, the throttles were being moved forward & airspeed was 112kts.
-The target airspeed for touchdown was 137 knots.
-At about 3 seconds before impact, the FDR recorded its lowest speed of 103 knots. At this time, engines were at 50% power and increasing.
-At impact, air speed was 106 knots, a full 31 knots slower than the target speed

 

[Guam360]

Atlantic Coast Airlines 6291:

http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/look.php?report_key=1347

Some similarities?

http://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/look.php?report_key=10

 

[whymeworry?]

Who wants to bet the industry will learn nothing from this, save for maybe the actual professional pilots who understand this stuff?

I know it's still too early to speculate but the NTSB is putting out information about this accident faster than I've ever seen via twitter and other means so I think it's fair to at least start considering what may have occurred. My observations thus far:

- not surprising, Asian cockpit techniques... over-reliance on automation. Inability to actually fly an airplane. Volumes have been written about this issue. Yet the Asians quite regularly tell us Westerners to mind our business when we try to suggest they change their ways. I have personally seen this in India, Japan and Korea. Lots of trivial "make-work" cockpit stuff they do which takes attention away from flying the aircraft. If I had a nickel for every time I heard "You Americans think you know everything... " when working for various carriers in these countries.

- IOE. I've always thought IOE was a pretty risky event as it is. I recall years ago when a check-airman literally talked to me all the way across the Atlantic... all night long. Unreal. How much aviation crap do you have to cover? I was worn out before we even got to TOD. The approach was a blur. In fact I recall my neck being kinked from turning towards him as if to show I'm interested. If I knew then what I know now I would've told him enough is enough. It's impossible to cover it all in 25-40 hrs of IOE. Just show the student how to land and shoot approaches. It will take him or her another 300-1000 hrs to get comfortable with the airplane. That's just the way it is. Someone needs to start telling checkairman that it doesn't make them a bad instructor if they don't talk the whole flight. Cover a few items, yes. Maybe give some pointers on the arrival, approach and landing. But enough with the "let me show you how much I know" technique. Then again, maybe it's 180 degrees different in this case. Maybe the checkairman wasn't giving enough input, clearly not at the critical moments, if this Captain was elder and senior to him.

50% power when you're 35 kts below target speed? Are you kidding me?

- The dumbing down of aviation. Both Boeing and Airbus have strived to make today's aircraft dummy-proof. Which is why you see certain people hired into this profession because of who they know, rather than on their skills and competence. The conventional wisdom has become, "anyone can be trained to fly these things". Well, apparently not when things step outside of one's comfort zone. Even at my airline I see a few of pilots who lack basic airmanship skills. Look at all the posts on all the web-boards talking about what to do if the A/T does this or that. Who cares? Turn the auto-throttles off and fly the airplane. IMO, this should be a requirement. But I know that will never happen.

-Fatigue. These guys were landing a jet after a grueling 11 hr flight at their WOCL. No doubt they were probably awake for 16-18 hrs save for maybe a short nap on the airplane. They were sleep deprived and fatigued. No doubt about it. The fatigue issue was probably amplified if excessive instruction was being conducted across the Pacific. All of the contributing factors to fatigue will be probably be brushed under the rug.

At the end of the day, the so-called "experts" like that talking parrot Schiavo, or the annoying "aviation buff" Richard Quest, and the whole host of non-pilots who have zero idea about how we do our jobs will push for recommendations of further automation, more IOE, whatever.

The reality seems pretty simple, barring any MAJOR engine anomalies, these guys forgot how to fly an airplane likely due to a career defined by automation in the cockpit. Pretty stupid if you ask me. This and the Asian hierarchy variables has always been pretty well known and those of us who have witnessed it have always warned of it's dire consequences.

 

[Whine Lover]

Well said SIR.

Overall, you bring the discussion to it's Essence:

" fly the airplane "

When the simplest tasks become obfuscated with Technology, Automation, Culture, Procedures, and Ego.....The simplest tasks can not be accomplished.

Airplanes stay aloft with one simple factor....."Airspeed".

Remove It....And the rest is for naught.


YKW

 

[densoo]

I know it's still too early to speculate but the NTSB is putting out information about this accident faster than I've ever seen via twitter and other means so I think it's fair to at least start considering what may have occurred.

No kidding. Instead of obfuscatiing information and dodging questions for months until no one cares anymore (and the corporate is glad for that), the NTSB practically gave the cause of accident out the day after-- "they.were.well.below.137.knots." Maybe so other pilots could take heed now, vice years later when new procedures and equipment is in place.

over-reliance on automation. Inability to actually fly an airplane

Saves money on training costs.

IOE. I've always thought IOE was a pretty risky event as it is. I recall years ago when a check-airman literally talked to me all the way across the Atlantic... all night long. Unreal. How much aviation crap do you have to cover? I was worn out before we even got to TOD

Big changes here I think. We don't do IOE much different from Asiana appears to. Again, to save money, cram as many check off items as possible into as few hours as possible. I see IOE getting much longer with possible segments with fed checks at different points in IOE rather than just one at the end.

The dumbing down of aviation. Both Boeing and Airbus have strived to make today's aircraft dummy-proof. Which is why you see certain people hired into this profession because of who they know, rather than on their skills and competence

This has been the very reason for outsourcing. Why be responsible for the skills and training of 10,000 pilots when you can unload 6,000 of them to a system that continual goes through "free-market creative destruction" into lower and lower costs until you have the very cheapest pilot money can buy--that is, one who is a whiz at automation of planes that fly themselves. Until they don't.

These guys were landing a jet after a grueling 11 hr flight at their WOCL.

New fatigue reg will help U.S. carriers in this area starting 4 January. But, predictably, many carriers are still building trips that ignore the science of fatigue right up to January 3rd. A late afternoon flight, then a 2-hour sit, and then a west coast to east coast redeye, all in one duty period with two pilots. Not legal under new FAR, clearly counter to the science of the new FAR, but legal and cheaper, so do it.

 

[ultrarunner]

-At 1600 feet, the autopilot was switched off.
-At 1400 feet, air speed was 170 knots.
- At 1000ft, airspeed was 149 knots,
- At 500ft airspeed was 134k.
- At 200 feet, airspeed was 118 knots, about 16 seconds prior to impact.
-At 125ft, the throttles were being moved forward & airspeed was 112kts.
-The target airspeed for touchdown was 137 knots.
-At about 3 seconds before impact, the FDR recorded its lowest speed of 103 knots. At this time, engines were at 50% power and increasing.
-At impact, air speed was 106 knots, a full 31 knots slower than the target speed

These numb-nuts must have been enjoying the view out the window. They sure as heck weren't flying the plane. I wonder if they knew what the stick-shaker was when it fired....

...'heads up A$$'...comes to mind here...

 

[DCAA320]

These numb-nuts must have been enjoying the view out the window. They sure as heck weren't flying the plane. I wonder if they knew what the stick-shaker was when it fired....

...'heads up A$$'...comes to mind here...

They probably screwed up, but you're a DICK!

 

[Flyer1015]

"...speed decreasing below Vref and not being noticed.'

An excellent observation.

Forget the aircraft type and it's levels of automation...Where are YOUR eyeballs (and generally speaking, as is common procedure, the Other Guy's) ALL THE WAY DOWN THE APPROACH?

Pretty much, aren't they focused on Airspeed, Altitude, and ILS parameters with accompanying Call-Outs to be made for deviations....?

I believe this will come down to a "Cultural Differences in Operations" and/or a "Training Philosophy" type of thing, as many have speculated thus far. (along with the usual additional aspects of The Accident Chain. )

Just glad the carnage was minimal....So sorry for those two young kids and their families.



Whine

Where their eyeballs usually feel the body clock telling them they are: 3:30 am in REM sleep. That's the local Seoul time when this accident happened. I'm not saying they were in deep sleep, but landing after a long flight at 3-4am body clock time can lead to fatigue/tiredness and performance issues related to that. There were two crews, each takes a break on the Seoul-SFO flight. How long did each crewmember actually sleep in their rest break? Previous 72 hr lookback rest? There are so many human performance issues that are not known yet. This needes to come out, and over time it will.

No accident is ever just one simple reason. It's a chain of events, and one of those chains likely will be a tired crew landing at 4am their body clock time.