In a 121 training program the way you recover from a stall, and the required performance, is dictated by the FAR's. Appendix F of FAR 121 specifically states the three stalls you will be tested on (clean configuration, take off configuration and landing configuration) and the performance requirement - no loss or gain of altitude and clean up on a specific schedule. It is a constant altitude maneuver. The FARs require you to hold a lot of back pressure on the yoke and power out of it. That is the only FAA acceptable way to complete a Proficiency Check that a Captain must pass every six months. Since that is the requirement to pass a checkride that is the way hours and hours are spent training the maneuver.
I’m not going to say you’re wrong sinkrate – because knowing a little about the FAA you’re probably dead on right. But, that does NOT equal the right thing to do in stall recovery training. Please don't take this personal - it has nothing to do with you on that basis.
I’ll confess I don’t remember when the last time I looked at 121 Appendix F was, or more importantly – cared much about what it said. Yes, I’ve been a Sim instructor & a training captain but never by choice wanted to be a Check Airman. Turned it down whenever offered, which was more than once. That was precisely because of conflicts with the FAA.
The reason for that isn’t arrogance – I’m about as far as you can get from being a pilot with an ego or a know-it-all attitude.
In fact every airliner I’ve ever flown as captain was especially modified for me. Right next to that hook where you hang your hat – there was a special two-position switch (ON/OFF) installed. It was labeled - Ego Switch.
After hanging the hat, the 1st thing on the before-start checklist was to select that switch to the OFF position. It stayed there for the duration of the flight. The last thing on the shut-down checklist was: Don Hat – Ego switch – ON.
Now back to the FAA. The FAA is made up of people – and they’re just like you and me. Some of them are very bright. Many of them work there because they couldn’t get hired anywhere else. Some of those turn out to be POI’s.
In the good ol’ days we didn’t have FSDOS. We had GADO’s and ACDO’s.
GADO’s (General Aviation District Office) were for light aircraft – they took care of the small planes, gave check rides to new pilots, appointed examiners, and told us all how to fly. New pilots and CFI’s thought of them as demigods and hung on their every word. Most of the inspectors had precious little more experience and sometimes a lot less than the pilots they supervised. 135 POI’s came from the GADO.
ACDO’s (Air Carrier District Office) were for the airlines. They did most of the same things that the other folks did, but there were some major differences. 1) All of the pilots in the ACDO were experienced airmen. 2) They were regarded as equals (if that) and not gods. 3) They didn’t try to tell us how to fly – they usually asked us. 4) They were typed in the aircraft in/for which they gave check rides. 5) Most (though not all) had flown the line before they got the job. The POI’s always came from the ACDO.
Once in a while you’d get the proverbial AH. Usually that was an X-military jock of field-grade rank that was accustomed to “giving orders” and thought he could do the same in the civ, world. Usually it didn’t take long for us to run them off – usually to some 3rd world country. [No, I have nothing against the military – that’s where I learned the trade – or thought I did; I was wrong.]
Then one day somebody had the bright idea of consolidation, and the result was the FSDO, which made one out of two. In short order just about everything went to h-ll in a breadbasket. We had people telling us how to fly airplanes that they couldn’t fly themselves. People giving check rides and line checks that were not rated in the type. People with backgrounds in light airplanes serving as POI’s with airlines. Training regimes and modules that had everything to do with “rules” and little to do with the real world in which we worked every day. The one-size-fits-all concept may have pleased FAA managers but airlines that got the GADO types were not pleased at all.
I recall one instance where a former GADO dude giving a check ride in a 72 in which he wasn’t rated nearly resulted in the temporary shutdown of EAL. I also remember a PAA crew walking off the airplane and leaving the FAA to figure out what to do next. The ‘white hats’ just weren’t going to put up with the nonsense.
The regional carriers usually got stuck with the newbies and the GADO types. Well, the regional carriers have evolved. They are not flying Bandeirantes and Metros any more. The equipment is every bit as sophisticated as that of the legacy carriers, even if not as heavy.
Over the years a lot of that has gone away, particularly in the large airlines. However, a whole lot of the BS is still present in the regionals – or at least the one that I worked for. When I first started there I had to unlearn a whole lot of things to keep up with the FAA circus and fill in the squares. At the time the company didn’t have the cojones to tell the FAA when to bug off. Eventually most of that was overcome but only after the company started changing the equipment. From what I hear, some of the residue is still left.
All of that war story relates to why I think that training for recovery from an approach to a stall or a stall - that requires it to be “a constant altitude maneuver” [your words] is bad training – whether or not it says that in Appendix F of FAR 121. If it says that (I believe you) then it needs to be changed, and now.
While training does have to comply with the rules, that is not and should not be its primary purpose.
I believe that making stall recovery’s primary focus ‘a constant altitude maneuver’ is not only a bad training procedure but a dangerous procedure.
The FAR’s are not written in granite; they can be changed and have been many times over the years. Training manuals are written by operators and approved by POI’s. They can be changed too and often are.
If you know or sincerely believe that something in the FARs is wrong you don’t just acquiesce and go with it. You fight to get it changed. The FAR’s are not intended to assist in killing us. They are intended to keep us safe. As long as you can show that you know what you’re talking about, you can find people that will listen and make things happen.
I sincerely hope that method of training did not contribute to the upset of 3407. Unfortunately it looks like that possibility is lurking in this tragic accident.
PS. Kudos to Horizon for what appears to be a prudent and sensible training policy.
