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NTSB Blames Kentucky Crash on Pilot Error

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erikgigem

Well-known member
Joined
Mar 4, 2006
Posts
101
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Comair pilots' failure to notice clues that they were heading to the wrong runway was the primary cause of last summer's deadly Kentucky plane crash that killed 49 people, safety investigators concluded Thursday.

Pilot error caused the August 2006 crash of a Comair commuter plane in Kentucky, investigators have ruled.

The National Transportation Safety Board deliberated all day on possible causes of the August 27, 2006, crash of Comair Flight 5191, which tried to depart from the wrong runway -- a general aviation strip too short for a proper takeoff.

Board members originally had considered listing errors by the air traffic controller as a contributing cause but ultimately pinned most of the blame on the pilots and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to enforce earlier recommendations on runway checks.

NTSB board member Deborah Hersman suggested during the meeting that there were numerous causes -- nearly all of them human. "That's the frustration of this accident -- no single cause, no single solution and no 'aha' moment," Hersman said. "Rather than pointing to a mechanical or design flaw in the aircraft that could be fixed or a maintenance problem that could be corrected, this accident has led us into the briar patch of human behavior."

Staff members also concluded the flight crew's lack of updated maps and notices alerting them to construction that had changed the taxiway route a week earlier was not a factor in the navigation error.

NTSB staff member Joe Sedor identified one possible overriding factor -- unnecessary chatter between pilot Jeffrey Clay and first officer James Polehinke as they prepared to taxi and take off. Comair has acknowledged some culpability as a result of the talk, which violated FAA rules calling for a "sterile cockpit."

Sedor said the talk "greatly affected the crew's performance." Hersman agreed but suggested the disaster couldn't be pinned on that alone. "It's clear this crew made a mistake," Hersman said. "Their heads just weren't in the game here. The issue is, what enabled them to make this mistake?" Hersman pointed to the paperwork the crew never got detailing the taxiway change. Not only was it not in their packet from Comair, but the air traffic controller didn't broadcast the announcement that morning, even though it had been doing so the rest of the week.

NTSB Chairman Mark Rosenker said many things could have prevented the crash. "We deal in redundancies in this business," Rosenker said. "That's what enables us to look after each other in the cockpit, and if one of the crewmen fails to do something, the other is there to help fill in the gap."

No witnesses were called at the board meeting. Investigators said the lone air traffic controller on duty used poor judgment by turning his back before takeoff, but they debated whether a required second controller could have prevented the accident.

NTSB staff concluded controller Christopher Damron should never have turned away to do an administrative task "not critical to flight safety" as the jet was preparing to depart.

However, the staff dismissed as a nonfactor the violation of an FAA directive calling for two controllers to work overnight shifts in airports like Lexington -- one to keep an eye on the ground, the other to monitor radar.

About 25 relatives of crash victims gathered at a hotel in downtown Lexington on Thursday to watch a video link to the hearing.
"You just think that if one precaution had been observed, then this tragedy wouldn't have happened, and we would still have our loved ones," said Lois Turner, whose husband was a passenger. "And that, I think, is the sad part and the hard part, to know that there were so many missed opportunities."
 
What did you think they would blame it on? Fatigue? Oh no... thats a dirty dirty word.
 
ALPA sited fatigue as a major contributor. I'm not sure how ALPA can site fatigue since the crew was just beginning their day after a long layover? Anyway, ALPA's reported pointed fingers at many different causes and not a single one was pilot error. I'm not judging one way or the other but it was strange how ALPA's report overlooked the obvious and placed blame everwhere else.
 
ALPA sited fatigue as a major contributor. I'm not sure how ALPA can site fatigue since the crew was just beginning their day after a long layover? Anyway, ALPA's reported pointed fingers at many different causes and not a single one was pilot error. I'm not judging one way or the other but it was strange how ALPA's report overlooked the obvious and placed blame everwhere else.
Here we go again....

Circadian rhythms were clearly a factor in this case. Just because a pilot had enough "rest" on the books doesn't mean he or she rested during that time. If the circadian rhythm has changed or the light/dark cycle has shifted by even an hour, the ability to rest has changed substantially. 99% of regional airline schedules are not built with respect to this medically and scientifically proven factor involving rest. Most major airlines under ALPA have built schedules to reflect these factors due to influence from their safety board.

How many times have you woken up at 4 am with plenty of rest and still felt dog tired? If you haven't, then remember the last time you had jet lag. This is similar.
 
What did you think they would blame it on? Fatigue? Oh no... thats a dirty dirty word.
Fatigue, is not a dirty word, if you are too fatigued to fly, you call off. However if you are supposed to be legally rested and are not, it may be a different problem. Fatigue may have been a subtle factor in the crew's performance, but the break down of cockpit discipline was the major factor.

.
 
I watched/listened to a lot of the hearing and the only real fatigue issue that was discussed was the controller. They were able to verify his sleep schedule for the previous couple of days. He was fatigued for sure according to the NTSB. As for the pilots, they were not able to detirmine much of anything in the area of fatigue because they did not have adequate information to do so.

I'm not saying that fatigue was or wasn't a factor, but as pilotyip stated, if you are to fatigued to fly, call off. The only problem is when you are too fatigued to know you are fatigued. You get up the next morning after a long night flying and say to yourself, "I was really tired last night, probably should not have taken that flight."
 
Airline not always cause of fatique

Pilots do many things that add to fatique, such as commuting during rest time, or like the FAA does not recognize military flight time as time during crew rest. Back in the 80's we would fly back a P-3 back from Spain after a drill weekend, get into Detroit at 0100L, extra days pay that way, and the airline guy would go to work for his airline at 0700L and be 100% legal.
 
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1st of all, the Comair accident is a tragedy and we should all learn from it (as with all accidents/incidents). But, you guys need to grow up. Sure I've legitimately called in fatigued before but go and listen to the CVR transcript in which you will learn that they obviously weren't too fatigued to talk about everything going on in their personal lives.
Don't take this post the wrong way...all I'm sayingis that I think there was a lot of inappropriate conversation for 2 guys that are supposedly fatigued.
 
NTSB Does Not Issue Blame

This is not Brazil. As a safety science student one of the first things you learn is that the NTSB does not issue blame. They only issue Probable Cause.
 
. The only problem is when you are too fatigued to know you are fatigued. You get up the next morning after a long night flying and say to yourself, "I was really tired last night, probably should not have taken that flight."

Exactly. Fatigue is like hypoxia or hypothermia . . . if you're lucky, you MIGHT recognize it before it's actually about to happen. But once you're in the plane, it's a bit late to do anything about it.

As for the Comair crash though . . . cockpit discipline is a function of habit. The sterile cockpit rule is there for a reason. They should've been concentrating on the mission, not yuk-yuking it up.

We're all guilty of this to a greater or lesser degree. Best to learn from their mistake, thank fate that it wasn't us this time and move on.
 
Fatigue is not something that is "cured" by a rest period or even perhaps 2-3 days off..fatigue may be a result of ongoing interruptions to a pilot rest patterns over a long period of time..."tired and not well rested" are a very different animal than fatigue..while the pilots may feel "rested" in fact fatigue may very well affect their judgement...
 
OK, it's obvious that the pilots made the major mistake here. However, by placing probable cause entirely on the pilots, the NTSB blew a chance to address other problems in the system and fix them.

The fact that the controller was worthless, due to significant problems in the ATC system, should have been noted, so the problems there could be addressed. Now the scum at the top of the ATC mgt chain can just say "there is nothing wrong with our bare bones staffing models, and the NTSB agrees."

Way to go NTSB.

In the overly legalistic wasteland we are in these days, nothing will change for the better without legal force. The NTSB just excused the ATC system.
 
I am a huge proponent of revamping the flight/duty rules (having survived a few years at mesa) but in this case it's pretty hard to blame pilot fatigue....

The had a long layover.

The CVR not did record evidence of exhaustion, on the contrary they seemed quite chipper.

Ultimately, the fault was the pilots for lining up on the wrong runway. Period. Pretending otherwise doesn't really help the situation or help our professional credibility.

There were numerous links in the chain, but ultimately it was the crews responsibility to break one of the links:

Jepp plates out of date
Construction
Tower controller not watching (I don't think he was actually required to stare at the aircraft during the entire taxi and takeoff roll.)
Lack of strong company procedures to verify runway alignment...I think we ALL have this procedure now.
 
Rickair7777, the Jepp plates were not out of date. They were simply incorrect.
 
lets face it. 1. Most crews break sterile cockpit. 2. Waking up at o dark thirty will make you a zombie no matter how much sleep you had. 3. the taxi ways in LEX are confusing at that end of the airport, and i can see how that mistake could be made. 4. Most regionals will keep you in a perma-fatigue condition unless you a very high energy person.

I guess what im saying is that they messed up, but its a mistake that all of us could make.
 
However, by placing probable cause entirely on the pilots, the NTSB blew a chance to address other problems in the system and fix them.

The fact that the controller was worthless, due to significant problems in the ATC system, should have been noted, so the problems there could be addressed. Now the scum at the top of the ATC mgt chain can just say "there is nothing wrong with our bare bones staffing models, and the NTSB agrees."

Way to go NTSB.

In the overly legalistic wasteland we are in these days, nothing will change for the better without legal force. The NTSB just excused the ATC system.


Have you read the full report? Do you even know what is in an NTSB report?

The probable cause does not "address other problems in the system". There is 1 probable cause issued, there are other contributing factors issued. The probable cause section of the report is not to "address problems". The section of the report that does that is the Recommendation Section. I believe that is what you are thinking about. Those are direct recommendations to the FAA and/or congress.

Bottom line is the report is not out yet and we don't know what the recommendations will be until it is.
 
I would like to know how it can be known that an incorrect airport chart was not a contributing factor...

AND that the crew didn't receive a written copy of the Notam

AND that the Notam was not recorded on the ATIS that morning.

The NTSB has a rubber stamp that says "Pilot Error"
 
In spite of all else, the crew could have prevented the accident.
 
In spite of all else, the crew could have prevented the accident.

No doubt. And in a situation like this, primary and final responsibility for the safety of the flight rests with the crew.

But most accidents have not a single cause, but a chain of events where you start to lose options and the end result is a tragic accident.

I'm just saying many factors besides the crew's actions CONTRIBUTED to the accident. The NTSB report shows that only 1 of the panel members pushed to have those factors and others listed as contributing factors.

By the same token, having more than one overworked controller in the tower, a violation of FAA regs, COULD have prevented the accident also. (no guarantee, but it might have)

The NTSB has historically shown an alarming tendency to slap "pilot error" as the final and only last word on their reports.
 
Fatigue, is not a dirty word, if you are too fatigued to fly, you call off. However if you are supposed to be legally rested and are not, it may be a different problem. Fatigue may have been a subtle factor in the crew's performance, but the break down of cockpit discipline was the major factor.

.

I'd be calling in fatigue for every show before 6 am if I followed your advice. Trying to force yourself to bed abnormally early and then waking up abnormally early as well results in very poor quality sleep.
 
Don't take this post the wrong way...all I'm sayingis that I think there was a lot of inappropriate conversation for 2 guys that are supposedly fatigued.

Or maybe the fatigue caused a lack of decision making ability. If you have never had this happen you will. Just hope while your in this state of fatigue your mistake is'nt as big as theirs.

I look at Comair and their constant threats of closing down, pay reductions, poor scheduling, understaffing the airline, and most of all their general lack of respect for the 6500 people they employ.
 
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I look at Comair and their constant threats of closing down, pay reductions, poor scheduling, understaffing the airline, and most of all their general lack of respect for the 6500 people they employ.

Comair???? Sounds like you're describing just about any regional!
 
Around 2 weeks after the accident the tower cleared us for takeoff right after I called for the taxi check. We told him we'd call him back when we were ready for takeoff. We hadn't even set flaps and we were cleared for takeoff. Then they cleared another aircraft right after they called for taxi as well. This aircraft told the tower the same thing, "we will call you back when were ready to depart"

Does anyone know when they were given their takeoff clearance? Yes I do think it matters.
 
Papps-

You are absolutely right! Anyone who has taxied in KLEX would know that it is confusing down at that end. It can easily be confused especially in poor lighting and charts that fail to id the changes.

When management tells us that we pilots are not very important and our pay should reflect that stand, we should remind them how important we are...the only people that could have stopped that tragedy were the two up front. Evidently, noone else shares any responsibility.
 
In spite of all else, the crew could have prevented the accident.

Yip, I agree with this statement. My point is when will the NTSB wake up and quit blaming accidents on "pilot error". Most accidents are caused by some type of pilot error. My concern is what caused them to make the error. Current airport diagrams would have helped in this case. Not breaking sterile cockpit rules would have helped. Procedures confirming the correct runway with the heading would have helped (private pilot stuff here). What caused the pilot error? That's what is important.

Calling it pilot error is just too generic to satisfy my need to learn something from this accident. There is a quote that gos something like this, "learn from others mistakes, you will not live long enough to make them all yourself." Thats how I think about NTSB reports, and that is how I do my best to keep myself out of them.
 
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All this talk of "sterile cockpit", and if you actually read the transcript, they uttered about 2 sentences that were not flight related from the time they started moving under their own power and brake release. Those two sentences didn't cause this accident. Maybe an updated 10-9 page would have helped, but the new one wasn't issued until 2 weeks after the accident. Maybe their heads weren't in the game, but it certainly wasn't their chatter the distracted them, at least now when "sterile cockpit" was in effect.
 
Sterile cockpit is supposed to be in effect from the start of the start checklist to crusie or 10K whichever occurs first.
 
Sterile cockpit is supposed to be in effect from the start of the start checklist to crusie or 10K whichever occurs first.

What's your source for this? I'm just curious, because my copy of the FAR's never mentions anything about a "start checklist" under 121.542.

The only operations on the surface defined as sterile cockpit by 121.542 is movement of the aircraft under it's own power. I'm confused about how the aircraft can be moving under it's own power if a "start checklist" is being performed.

As someone wrote earlier, if you read the transcript, there was about a sentence each after the taxi began that violated sterile cockpit as defined by 121.542. To give this amount of conversation the amount of attention it has gotten does great disservice to those affected most by the accident...the passengers, crewmembers, and families, because it does distracts attention from more important factors in the accident.
 

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