Why so many charter crashes?

[Bandit60]

Sounds like the problem in this scenario lies not in dispatch, but in a lazy pilot.

What did you say?

Who made it less safe?


Dispatchers have more tools at their fingertips and fewer distractions in their faces. They do a lot more than just check the weather at each stop. They can be a tremendous asset. Whether a pilot avails himself of that asset is another story entirely.

Sorry, should have been more clear...the pilot made it less safe

 

[shamrock]

I heard a rumor that the Hendricks Captain was ex Usair, But the dates that he was with hendrick as listed in the media do not match with a furloughed U pilot(He started with Hendrick 2 years prior to the layoffs.), and I could not find his name on any senority list. I guess he could have been from one of U's regionals, and the media screwed up the report. (Or ignored it for sensationalism)

He was a Captain at Commutair, which was a USAirways Express carrier. He left a few months after they switched over to Continental Connection in December 2000.

 

[TonyC]

Sorry, should have been more clear...the pilot made it less safe

I wasn't trying to be dense - - I was trying to emphasize the point that the pilot jeapordized the safety of his flight, not the dispatcher. Your point was that dispatchers do not contribute to the safety of the operation, but your example failed to support that point.

If you've never been in an operation that uses licensed dispatchers that share in the responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight, you may not be able to appreciate their contributions. By the same token, if you've only flown single seat, single ship fighters, you may have a hard time appreciating the value of a wingman or a first officer. Once you get there, perspectives change. (I'm using the third person "you" here, so don't take any of this personally - - I don't know your background, and it doesn't matter.) We're on the same team.

 

[rvsm410]

I agree...

I've met a few ATCers who think that every plane in the sky would fall to earth if it was not for their services.

Personally, I think that dispatchers contribute greatly to efficiency, serve as a good backup for catching nitpicky little things on releases, and do contribute somewhat to safety.

Lots of dispatchers are not really that familiar with what flying in real weather is like, though. Familiarization flights should only occur on the worst weather days of the year.

I am a passionate sick puppy of a dispatcher, I look for opportunities to J/S on company on those kind of days...I once was prevledged to be aboard an AA flight a few years back that did a Cat IIIc apch, the auto land was awesome....

The regs say a min of 5 FAM hours a year...as of this year I have over 155 hours in many different J/S's...yea I keep track of ever flight and aircraft I have flown the cockpit in...stupid I know....

As the helping...well everyone is different at there work, you can usually tell when someone Loves what they do....

 

[Lead Sled]

Please don't equate corporate and charter flying. If you research the FAR Part 135 (charter) accident rate and compare it to the FAR Part 91 (Corporate) accident rates there is little comparison. These accidents involved 135 operators. I've flown both. The first thing that I noticed when flying 135 was that our training went down the tubes - under part 91 we got a full 3 days in the sim. Under 135, it was 2 days in the sim practicing for the checkride. The 3rd sim session was the sim check. Under Part 135, the minimum training requirements and standards became the goals and once they were met you were out on the line; after all, the airplane is the profit center. Under Part 91, the airplane typically isn't a profit source. As a Part 91 pilot, the company has paid for many "extra-curriculiar" courses such as weather radar training, aerobatics, altitude chamber training, etc. that most charter guys will seldom, if ever, see.

'Sled

 

[Vik]

I agree with you 100%. News ratings are based on how scared you can make the people watching it.

"5 million people left a stain on the seat! I'm gonna get an Emmy! wheeee!"

Forget airline regulation. The news needs to be regulated.

Here in SoCal, one of the news channels actually has a segment called .. "Whats GOOD about California in 60 seconds." 1hr newscast, of which 60 seconds is good news.

Yes, with the election overwith and not much to talk about in the news, I would imagine a corporate plane crash is good enough for these ambulance chasers. Funny, a tire blew out on a car yesterday killing 6...you don't hear much speculation going on about that one? Tire blowouts was THE big story not to long ago...but the media grew tired of that subject. (get it...tired?)

I think the media is more into sensationalizing these stories...especially when the plane carries the rich and famous.

 

[TimsKeeper]

Even PROFESSIONAL pilots need to have a sense of fear. I feel as a pro you need to be aware of complacency and fight against temptation to "go below", not to deice, etc. There is enough other problem that can occur that the pilot has no control over then to add to the odds of an accident.

 

[Bandit60]

I wasn't trying to be dense - - I was trying to emphasize the point that the pilot jeapordized the safety of his flight, not the dispatcher. Your point was that dispatchers do not contribute to the safety of the operation, but your example failed to support that point.

If you've never been in an operation that uses licensed dispatchers that share in the responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight, you may not be able to appreciate their contributions. By the same token, if you've only flown single seat, single ship fighters, you may have a hard time appreciating the value of a wingman or a first officer. Once you get there, perspectives change. (I'm using the third person "you" here, so don't take any of this personally - - I don't know your background, and it doesn't matter.) We're on the same team.

Since when is the safety of the flight anyone elses responibility other than the PIC. I have never read an accident report that gives any type of blame or responibility to the dispatcher.

 

[Bandit60]

Please don't equate corporate and charter flying. If you research the FAR Part 135 (charter) accident rate and compare it to the FAR Part 91 (Corporate) accident rates there is little comparison. These accidents involved 135 operators. I've flown both. The first thing that I noticed when flying 135 was that our training went down the tubes - under part 91 we got a full 3 days in the sim. Under 135, it was 2 days in the sim practicing for the checkride. The 3rd sim session was the sim check. Under Part 135, the minimum training requirements and standards became the goals and once they were met you were out on the line; after all, the airplane is the profit center. Under Part 91, the airplane typically isn't a profit source. As a Part 91 pilot, the company has paid for many "extra-curriculiar" courses such as weather radar training, aerobatics, altitude chamber training, etc. that most charter guys will seldom, if ever, see.

'Sled

Could not have said it better myself!!!

 

[AA717driver]

Uh, excuse me, but how long do I have to be out of the airlines and in corporate flying for my airline past to not be a contributing factor if I auger in? Thanks in advance.TC

 

[T-Gates]

How many of the crashes lately have had an ex airline guy flying? So far I have not seen what any of the pilots did prior to the accident job. I heard a rumor that the Hendricks Captain was ex Usair, But the dates that he was with hendrick as listed in the media do not match with a furloughed U pilot(He started with Hendrick 2 years prior to the layoffs.), and I could not find his name on any senority list. I guess he could have been from one of U's regionals, and the media screwed up the report. (Or ignored it for sensationalism)

What pilot or crash is the basis for your theory?

The Captain on the Hendricks B-200 was an ex-CommutAir guy...... Not U Mainline...

 

[TonyC]

Since when? Part 1 of 2

Since when is the safety of the flight anyone elses responibility other than the PIC. I have never read an accident report that gives any type of blame or responibility to the dispatcher.

Since you persist in criticizing something of which you obviously have no knowledge, I will attempt to educate you.

Since when? Since it's in the FARs.

For Domestic 121:

Sec. 121.533 - Responsibility for operational control: Domestic operations.

(a) Each certificate holder conducting domestic operations is responsible for operational control.

(b) The pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning, delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications.

(c) The aircraft dispatcher is responsible for --

(1) Monitoring the progress of each flight;

(2) Issuing necessary information for the safety of the flight; and (3) Cancelling or redispatching a flight if, in his opinion or the opinion of the pilot in command, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released.

For Flag 121:

Sec. 121.535 - Responsibility for operational control: Flag operations.

(a) Each certificate holder conducting flag operations is responsible for operational control.

(b) The pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning, delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications.

(c) The aircraft dispatcher is responsible for --

(1) Monitoring the progress of each flight;

(2) Issuing necessary instructions and information for the safety of the flight; and (3) Cancelling or redispatching a flight if, in his opinion or the opinion of the pilot in command, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released.

For Supplemental 121:
(For supplemental operations, you'll read "director of operations" and "persons authorized by the certificate holder to exercise operational control." Although these persons are not technically dispatchers, those individuals are frequently trained as dispatchers, usually called dispatchers, and frequently even licensed as dispatchers. That's the world I live in.)

Sec. 121.537 - Responsibility for operational control: Supplemental operations.

(a) Each certificate holder conducting supplemental operations --

(1) Is responsible for operational control; and

(2) Shall list each person authorized by it to exercise operational control in its operator's manual.

(b) The pilot in command and the director of operations are jointly responsible for the initiation, continuation, diversion, and termination of a flight in compliance with this chapter and the operations specifications. The director of operations may delegate the functions for the initiation, continuation, diversion, and termination of a flight but he may not delegate the responsibility for those functions.

(c) The director of operations is responsible for cancelling, diverting, or delaying a flight if in his opinion or the opinion of the pilot in command the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released. The director of operations is responsible for assuring that each flight is monitored with respect to at least the following:

(1) Departure of the flight from the place of origin and arrival at the place of destination, including intermediate stops and any diversions therefrom.

(2) Maintenance and mechanical delays encountered at places of origin and destination and intermediate stops. (3) Any known conditions that may adversely affect the safety of flight.

Since I doubt you'll have the patience to follow a link to some FARs, I'll throw in a few more for good measure.

Sec. 121.593 - Dispatching authority: Domestic operations. Except when an airplane lands at an intermediate airport specified in the original dispatch release and remains there for not more than one hour, no person may start a flight unless an aircraft dispatcher specifically authorizes that flight.

Sec. 121.593 - Dispatching authority: Domestic operations. Except when an airplane lands at an intermediate airport specified in the original dispatch release and remains there for not more than one hour, no person may start a flight unless an aircraft dispatcher specifically authorizes that flight.

Sec. 121.597 - Flight release authority: Supplemental operations.

(a) No person may start a flight under a flight following system without specific authority from the person authorized by the operator to exercise operational control over the flight. (b) No person may start a flight unless the pilot in command or the person authorized by the operator to exercise operational control over the flight has executed a flight release setting forth the conditions under which the flights will be conducted. The pilot in command may sign the flight release only when he and the person authorized by the operator to exercise operational control believe that the flight can be made with safety.

Sec. 121.599 - Familiarity with weather conditions.

(a) Domestic and flag operations. No aircraft dispatcher may release a flight unless he is thoroughly familiar with reported and forecast weather conditions on the route to be flown. (b) Supplemental operations. No pilot in command may begin a flight unless he is thoroughly familiar with reported and forecast weather conditions on the route to be flown.

Sec. 121.601 - Aircraft dispatcher information to pilot in command: Domestic and flag operations.

(a) The aircraft dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command all available current reports or information on airport conditions and irregularities of navigation facilities that may affect the safety of the flight.

(b) Before beginning a flight, the aircraft dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command with all available weather reports and forecasts of weather phenomena that may affect the safety of flight, including adverse weather phenomena, such as clear air turbulence, thunderstorms, and low altitude wind shear, for each route to be flown and each airport to be used. (c) During a flight, the aircraft dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command any additional available information of meteorological conditions (including adverse weather phenomena, such as clear air turbulence, thunderstorms, and low altitude wind shear), and irregularities of facilities and services that may affect the safety of the flight.

Sec. 121.605 - Airplane equipment. No person may dispatch or release an airplane unless it is airworthy and is equipped as prescribed in §121.303.

Sec. 121.607 - Communication and navigation facilities: Domestic and flag operations.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section for a certificate holder conducting flag operations, no person may dispatch an airplane over an approved route or route segment unless the communication and navigation facilities required by §§121.99 and 121.103 for the approval of that route or segment are in satisfactory operating condition. (b) If, because of technical reasons or other reasons beyond the control of a certificate holder conducting flag operations, the facilities required by §§121.99 and 121.103 are not available over a route or route segment outside the United States, the certificate holder may dispatch an airplane over that route or route segment if the pilot in command and dispatcher find that communication and navigation facilities equal to those required are available and are in satisfactory operating condition.

Sec. 121.609 - Communication and navigation facilities: Supplemental operations. No person may release an aircraft over any route or route segment unless communication and navigation facilities equal to those required by §121.121 are in satisfactory operating condition.

- TO BE CONTINUED -

 

[TonyC]

Since when? Part 2 of 2

So, the dispatcher must be familiar with the weather, the airworthiness of the airplane and the airplane equipment, the airport conditions, the communication and navigational facilities enroute... Oh, and there are many, many more paragraphs of FARs that a dispatcher must observe when he's about to sign his name to a release. Take, for instance, this one:

Sec. 121.629 - Operation in icing conditions.

(a) No person may dispatch or release an aircraft, continue to operate an aircraft en route, or land an aircraft when in the opinion of the pilot in command or aircraft dispatcher (domestic and flag operations only), icing conditions are expected or met that might adversely affect the safety of the flight.

(b) No person may take off an aircraft when frost, ice, or snow is adhering to the wings, control surfaces, propellers, engine inlets, or other critical surfaces of the aircraft or when the takeoff would not be in compliance with paragraph (c) of this section. Takeoffs with frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks may be authorized by the Administrator.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no person may dispatch, release, or take off an aircraft any time conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to adhere to the aircraft, unless the certificate holder has an approved ground deicing/anti-icing program in its operations specifications and unless the dispatch, release, and takeoff comply with that program. The approved ground deicing/anti-icing program must include at least the following items:

(1) A detailed description of --

[I'll spare the details]

Shall I go on?

 

[Bandit60]

Gee that was nice ,but after all that you said, you still havent showed me a 121 accident that the dispatcher was held responsible for the accident.

The ultimate responsiblity of the flight remains with the PIC.

Dont get me wrong, I'm sure they can be a big help and do alot of good, but my point is that the PIC is the one that is responsible.

 

[TonyC]

Gee that was nice ,but after all that you said, you still havent showed me a 121 accident that the dispatcher was held responsible for the accident.

The ultimate responsiblity of the flight remains with the PIC.

Dont get me wrong, I'm sure they can be a big help and do alot of good, but my point is that the PIC is the one that is responsible.

Let's see, did I deny that the PIC has responsibility for the flight? No, I did not. In fact, in most cases the FAR excerpts I shared with you demonstrate that the PIC and the dispatcher have the exact same responsibility.

Since when is an accident report the source of authority on an issue? If I can't find an accident report to support the premise that gravity was responsible for a crash, does that make gravity any less valid, any less real, any less pervasive a force?

Let's you review. You said:

Since when is the safety of the flight anyone elses responibility other than the PIC.

I provided plenty of evidence that the safety of the flight (at least in the 121 world where a dispatcher is a part of the team) is a shared responsibility. Do you have a FAR that says differently?


Again:

Dont get me wrong, I'm sure they can be a big help and do alot of good, but my point is that the PIC is the one that is responsible.

You ARE wrong - - the PIC is not the one that is repsonsible, he is one of the responsible ones.

 

[TonyC]

Gee that was nice ,but after all that you said, you still havent showed me a 121 accident that the dispatcher was held responsible for the accident.

Not that it's necessary, but to amuse you:

NTSB Identification: NYC03FA035

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The captain's failure to attain a proper touchdown on runway, and his subsequent failure to perform a go-around, both of which resulted in a runway overrun. Factors were the company's inadequate dispatch procedures with their failure to provide all NOTAMS for the airport to the flight crew, and the snow covered runway.

Another: NTSB Identification: ATL01LA049

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The flight dispatcher failure to provide the flight crew with current in-flight turbulence information that resulted in the in-flight encounter with turbulence during climb. A factor was the pilots failure to obtain adequate weather information.

Another: NTSB Identification: MIA98FA089

Factors in the accident were . . . 2) inadequate weather information disseminated to the flight crew during the preflight briefing by the company dispatcher for failing to provide current up-to-date information of the intensity, and location of adverse weather 3) the failure of the company dispatcher to relay pertinent weather information to the flight crew while en route which included convective sigmets, and the current extent and intensity of the squall line . . .

 

[rvsm410]

You're the man Tony! I could not have done a better job than you did here.....

thanks for setting this person on the right track....obviously he/she has never used a professional dispatcher before and is used to flying part 91...

 

[irapilot]

Clearly we are all witnesses to a race for the bottom in what was a noble profession.

 

[TonyC]

Clearly we are all witnesses to a race for the bottom in what was a noble profession.

Huh?





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