When will "they" learn

[flyr4hire]

As a fairly new 135 charter guy, I wonder... With the recent bad publicity around 135 accidents (and another batch of fatalities on a charter flight into Pueblo)... when are the charter operators/managers/dispatchers gonna learn and start doing business smarter?!? There is legal and there is smart, and as long as the managers keep scheduling and flying according to how to best get around the regs (example: tacking on 91 legs after a day of 135 flights) in search of the almighty dollar, we are going to find 135 charter even more regulated. In addition, if a manger/dispatcher is worried about generating revenue... won't be generating much after an accident with multiple fatalities due, in part, because you run your crews into the ground day after day. Know this isn't a new topic, just a thought.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

As a fairly new 135 charter guy, I wonder... With the recent bad publicity around 135 accidents (and another batch of fatalities on a charter flight into Pueblo)... when are the charter operators/managers/dispatchers gonna learn and start doing business smarter?!? There is legal and there is smart, and as long as the managers keep scheduling and flying according to how to best get around the regs (example: tacking on 91 legs after a day of 135 flights) in search of the almighty dollar, we are going to find 135 charter even more regulated. In addition, if a manger/dispatcher is worried about generating revenue... won't be generating much after an accident with multiple fatalities due, in part, because you run your crews into the ground day after day. Know this isn't a new topic, just a thought.

If you are a charter pilot, then you are the problem. Don't keep saying 'they' and 'them'. It should be we and us. Look at the accidents, all may ultimately be deemed to be preventable by the PILOTS and may have nothing to do with the operator or dispatch. I really hate when people in an industry blame problems on everyone else. This is sad stuff, it shouldn't be used to wave a fliag of your own personal gripes. Question: Has there been an accident on a 91 leg after a day of 135 flights? Or are you just talkin outa your a$$.

Ace

 

[TransMach]

When will they ...

Ace,

Well said mate! It is much more "US" than "THEM". However, some of "THEM" are gonna put an end to the "Tail End FAR 91" flying as a result of revenue producing operations. The new rewrite of FAR135 will see to that, I'm told.

TransMach

 

[650 driver]

fly4hire

The PUB accident was Part 91 flight dept, not 135.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

fly4hire

The PUB accident was Part 91 flight dept, not 135.

Many pilots have their own personal agendas and use any subject, even a tragedy, to give themselves an opportunity to get on their soapbox and tell the world of their woes. Perhaps fly4hire thinks we’re not smart enough to see thru the fact that he’s talking about something he obviously knows nothing about and hasn’t taken the time to study up on.

It’s pretty embarrassing for them when they realize they’re using completely unrelated situations in a pathetic attempt to get attention to their personal cause. I suggest he look up the word segue in the dictionary. He probably won’t respond to this thread again.

Ace

 

[hawkerjet]

i agree with ace of base, the final resposibility lies with the PIC. i've worked for a couple of shady 135 operator's in the past and said no many times. they were pissed at the moment and forgot about it the next day. do what i did, inform the charter sales people of the various regulations such as duty times, rest requirements and flight time in a day. then give them some accident reports to bolster these rules. sometimes this won't matter but they respect you a little more and realize that maybe the GII can't go from aspen to hawaii non stop in the summer........( for those of you who don't know, the forementioned trip is impossible)

 

[LJDRVR]

Good lord, Ace, the guy is bringing up a subject that actually hasn't been talked about much here on the board. You accuse him of poor research and attepting to further some private agenda. Who died and made you moderator?

Well, I have no agenda (other than the prevention of death, injury and a loss of good will on the part of the public) and I do know a little bit about the subject. So, I'll climb up on my soapbox and begin.

"Look at the accidents, all may ultimately be deemed to be preventable by the PILOTS and may have nothing to do with the operator or dispatch."

Are you for real!?

If you guys think that the flight crews are the only problem, and that more personal responsibility and courage will prevent all the accidents and solve all our problems, then it's time you checked your over-developed EGO's, and maybe do a little bit of that research you suggested flyr4hire do.

Contrasted with 121, part 135 regulations are poorly and ambiguously written, as is much of the case law available. POI oversight is almost laughable. This coupled with poorly trained pilots, (Don't take this personally, I'm not talking about flying skills) and the very nature of 135 business, creates a culture rife with latent pathogens that all contribute to the accident chain.

The average 135 pilot gets little support from his organization in the way of information. There is usually no real dispatch. This leaves the pilot responsible for their weather, alternate, NOTAMS, runway analysis, fuel planning, ATC coordination, customs, overflight, etc.. The pilot must become an expert on the regulations, (To hold on to their certificate) and an expert on TERPS. (To hold on to their life) Unfortunately, we pilots are a lazy bunch, and instead of reading our operations manuals and regulations carefully and consulting the case law when applicable, we rely on what our peers or superiors tell us. An example would be the commonly held fallacy that "All you need is visibility to shoot the approach." True for 121 carriers, but a carefull reading of the case law will reveal a different story for 135. (I'll let you folks look it up, suffice to say the fuzz has taken enforcement action in the past over cieling when the jet got bent.)

Now being responsible for this stuff as PIC is doable. Unfortunately, the culture in many 135 companies is centered towards getting things done quickly, with no patience for a pilot who needs to delay a departure for a few minutes so he or she can assemble and review ALL the information they need to get the job done.

Then there's the matter of telling the folks who sold the charter that the flight cannot be legally or safely flown as qouted. Some operators have and excellent attitude towards this kind of change. Everyone views themselves as a professional, with nothing more important that the customer getting to their destination with all the t's crossed and i's dotted. Again, unfortunately many operators are more concerned with political "turf", and not saying "no" to the customer. In this case, the pilot better have a backbone, and they better know what they're talking about. Unfortunately, many 135 operators are so bent on that thin profit margin, that often the bearer of bad news one too many times, finds themselves looking for a new job. Compounding this problem is the experience level of many of the Captains involved, and the fact that there company doesn't have an iron-clad Ops Manual that they stand behind.

Rogue pilots that routinely operate outside the confines of regulatory procedural and guidance to get the job done, are either ignored by management, or even worse, given a pat on the back for being "company guys". This creates a breeding ground for a myriad of unsafe actions, sets a bad example for pilots trying to do it right, and provides no support for the aviator who has to say no. ("Bill did it last time, come on dude...")

Then there's poor maintenance. If we believe ACE's theory, it's all the pilots fault.

"If the airplane wasn't fixed, they shouldn't be flying it."

That's like saying the prisoner abuse in Iraq was all the junior enlisted folk's fault.

"If they hadn't obeyed illegal orders, none of this would've happened."*

The sad truth is that many 135 operators have not yet realized this simple truth: In order to remain in business and make a profit, you have to actually spend the money to fix your airplanes. I've seen more than one 135 operator who would ops checks good a jet instead of fixing it, simply because they were so myopic that getting the jet back out on line for that $5000 charter was much more acceptable to them than the hundreds of thousands of dollars (I'm not exagerating here) they eventually spent on that problem over the next several months.

I could type all night, but here's the crux of this: personal responsibility, flight discipline and airmanship is the key to a safer operation. But none of these things will happen in an environment where excellence is not demanded by leadership. Without that key commitment, very few individual aviators will apply themselves at a level they could. MANAGEMENT has to set the tone, provide the tools, resources and training required to prevent alot of these human factors accidents. The pilots can't change the culture one brick at a time by themselves, nor can a single individual in managent. It must come from the very top.

Here's a fun question. It's 2005. How many 135 folks go to a recurrent CRM event every year. (5th generation at least, one day, not those non-specific elective "thingy's" at SF or FSI.) What does the answer say about this subject?

PS-Hey Ace, type Professor James Reason into google and let me know what you find out, dude. Seriously. Sorry if I came off self-righteous, just throwin it back at you. (Not to mention you're way off-base here.) I agree with you that pilot's ought to be more responsible. I'll even go so far as to say individual discipline is the key to safety, but to suggest that all of these accidents are simply the pilot's fault? Get real. You go do some research.

*-sadly enough, that's how our government handled it.

 

[Rick1128]

There is no real incentive for a poor operator to do right when a person who owns an aircraft can do a charter without a charter certificate and the FAA does nothing about it, when told about it. Or how about the inexperienced inspectors that create their own rules. And don't say that dosn't happen, because it happens all the time.

Yes, there are bad and poor operators out there. A majority do attempt to do things right. And yes, the regs tend to be ambigous. but they are written to cover a very large variances in areas and aircraft. One size does not fit all.

And tail end 91 is not necessarily unsafe. Sometimes that is the safer course. Try getting any rest in a hotel during the day. Even with a "Do NoT Disturb" sign on the door. Each trip must decided on a case by case basis. And even under Part 121, the PIC is still in charge and responsible.

 

[FlyFlyFly]

Regardless of pressure from charter sales and the boss and whoever else, the regs are extraordinarily clear on who is responsible for a go/no go decision. I think mitigating factors and pressure can be cited as contributing factors, only when the PIC makes the decision to have those items impact their decisions.

I do not think rewriting the regs for clarity will solve the problem, because there will always be people that will pressure pilots to make bad decisions and there will always be pilots that will oblige them. Can't legislate judgement.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

LJDRVR, I'll be honest, I only skimmed your post. Way too long and rambling. Let me ask you a question (and try to post a short, succinct answer). Have ANY of the factors you point to been the cause of an accident? Again, lots of blame, few facts. Long posts with lots of statements of 'facts' are not impressive. Try using some NTSB reports or other factual sources. There have been accidents that were ultimately blamed on fatigue, but they were 121.

Ace

 

[350DRIVER]

Contrasted with 121, part 135 regulations are poorly and ambiguously written, as is much of the case law available. POI oversight is almost laughable. This coupled with poorly trained pilots, (Don't take this personally, I'm not talking about flying skills) and the very nature of 135 business, creates a culture rife with latent pathogens that all contribute to the accident chain.

Poorly written?. They seem pretty clear to most who fly or have flown 135. Not sure where you come up with that from. Poorly trained pilots?. Yeah, I suppose the FAA folks just give all a pass no matter how good or bad the pilots may or may not be. Get real, if you are into accident investigation(s) and you are a safety consultant then you should realize very little fact was in the above. You have shady operators and you have good operators, don't group the two together nor attempt to state the regulations, pilot training, and POI's are the cause of the problem. As the above poster mentioned the reply was too long, seemed more personal opinion than anything else so lost interest after the first paragraph and did not continue.

 

[HMR]

POI oversight is almost laughable. This coupled with poorly trained pilots, (Don't take this personally, I'm not talking about flying skills) and the very nature of 135 business, creates a culture rife with latent pathogens that all contribute to the accident chain.

Good post LJDRVR.

 

[100-1/2]

food for thought...

The bulk of the fars in 135 clearly state most boundaries with an introductory statement such as:

"...No air carrier may __________________ and No Pilot may _______________..."

When these boundaries are encroached and/or breached by an air carrier, they may have the FAA crawling up their arse. When a pilot or flight crew does the same, they may have an airplane crawl up theirs.

It is tough to say "NO" to your employer while an ocean of pimple heads stand by at the ready, and willing to do your job for less money. As a matter of self-preservation, it has to be done. AND, our bretheren need to get each other's back, not stab it. When one makes a "no-go" decision, others need to approach the situation with caution and consideration for consequences (BIG PICTURE-SITUATIONAL/INDUSTRY AWARENESS) and impact of accepting a trip that another has turned-down. Yes, EVEN with the FRUIT LOOPS that annoy the pilot corps when they use petty squaks to ground an a/c or Cx a trip for personal gain. Support them corporately before management and then take them 'quietly' and corporately IN PRIVATE and counsel those individuals on the impact of their actions.

The pressure these days is immense and unjust as margins are tighter and companies are fewer. A house divided against itself will SURELY fall. So too, will this industry as Loss claims mount and coverages skyrocket. I have said this before in post mortum, we have to band together and prevent this kind of loss as it impacts EVERYONE in this industry. The ripple is felt in every maintenance, manufacturing, service and support provider. And this is just the financial impact. The human aspect of the families' loss that was preventable is too, immeasurable.

Anyone can be a "yes" man. The 'real' money is made with an occassional "NO". That is what these companies are paying for. They expect after 5,000 hours you have seen alot and gleaned alot. Certaintly, that total would expect to be greater hold a few cancelled trips, due to duty/flight limits, maintenance limits, weather limits and a rare 'personal' limit.

Nowhere in here have I admonished the crew in this mishap. Read twice then react, then read twice more before responding. Anyone can sit at their CRT and see the chain of events, the failure therein and point as to a cause. That is easy, for the outcome is known. Put yourself in the shoes of the flight crew 90 minutes prior to departure of the illfated leg. Consider the circumstances and acknowledge the chain of events. Avoid any similar chains in your own career as it progresses. Break the chain before it breaks you and once again we visit this board to talk about another preventable mishap if someone would have just said, "No".

100-1/2

 

[LJDRVR]

Have ANY of the factors you point to been the cause of an accident? Again, lots of blame, few facts. Ace

Sure, Downeast Airlines NTSB-AAR-80-5. (Part 135 to boot.) If you'd like more I'll post dozens. Your assertion is that only pilots are to blame for accidents. You're wrong, and it takes reading a little bit more than the probable cause paragraph of an NTSB summary to begin to understand what I'm talking about.

There is no short and succinct answer here. I think it's interesting that you jump all over the original poster for not knowing what he's talking about, suggesting he do some research, but you don't even bother to read my post because you deem it too long and poorly written. Whatever.

Here's one you're familiar with:

• Aircaft company builds single-aisle twin that has a tendency to pitch up/roll-off in the neighborhood of V1 when the leading edge devices are contaminated. Operators complain vociferously to the manufacturer, who, in order to avoid liability and not adversly effect sales, largely ignores the issue with an obscure AOM bulletin.
• Post deregulation start-up carrier grows rapidly from a warm weather DC-3 operator, to an airline flying this company's product into the northeast during winter. The airline's training department is a pencil-whipped joke, but the feds allow the expansion anyway.
• Flight crew doesn't de-ice, fails to perform a visual inspection, and attempts takeoff with the engine anti-ice selected OFF.

Who's fault is it? The pilots were only the final link in the chain.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

LJDRVR, shorter, thank you.

Now, I still think your focusing on 121 (or scheduled 135). I don't need a dozen examples, just one for the causes you set forth in your first post. The original poster said that 91 legs after long 135 days were contributing to this rash of accidents. I still ask for examples. That is all. My whole point was that safety is not "them", it is "us". Pilots just love to say they work in an unsafe industry. Whose fault is that? Who can change it? Us!!

Ace

 

[flyr4hire]

Yeoooow-ouch

Well, the discussion in flowing that's for sure!!! Lots of good points but far too much emotion in some to carry much water. I am not going to take anyone's personal attacks and attempts to define my motives based on THEIR reading and interpretation of my post personally... I stand by what I posted, it is based on my experience. I agree that is always easier to point the finger at someone else, but I also learned long ago that when I point one finger at someone, four remain pointed back at me--note my use of brackets in the title of the post around the word they-- it implies a certain degree of accomplice thus THEY really becomes US. The easy answer is that EVERYTHING rests on the PIC as the final authority to conduct flight. However, stubbornly holding to this allows other folks to escape responsibility and accountability for, well, lets just call 'em less than smart decisions, especially if the PIC just happens to miss something, and being human this is always a possibility. Many PICs obviously feel that they are super human by attaining PIC designation and therefore do not make mistakes. Some so take this final authority to heart that they become complete assses to all around them and become a destabilizing force in the cockpit and in their department. We (dispatch, managers, line service, maintenance, pilots) all have our parts to play, 'nuff said for now.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

Well, the discussion in flowing that's for sure!!! Lots of good points but far too much emotion in some to carry much water. I am not going to take anyone's personal attacks and attempts to define my motives based on THEIR reading and interpretation of my post personally... I stand by what I posted, it is based on my experience. I agree that is always easier to point the finger at someone else, but I also learned long ago that when I point one finger at someone, four remain pointed back at me--note my use of brackets in the title of the post around the word they-- it implies a certain degree of accomplice thus THEY really becomes US. The easy answer is that EVERYTHING rests on the PIC as the final authority to conduct flight. However, stubbornly holding to this allows other folks to escape responsibility and accountability for, well, lets just call 'em less than smart decisions, especially if the PIC just happens to miss something, and being human this is always a possibility. Many PICs obviously feel that they are super human by attaining PIC designation and therefore do not make mistakes. Some so take this final authority to heart that they become complete assses to all around them and become a destabilizing force in the cockpit and in their department. We (dispatch, managers, line service, maintenance, pilots) all have our parts to play, 'nuff said for now.

Flyr, nice sum-up. When put that way, I agree whole-heartedly with what you are trying to say. Safety is obtained by all parts of the flying company working together towards a common goal. The pilots ARE the last line of defense, and sometimes ARE the sole cause of the problem. But more common then that, an accident is something that could have been prevented by any number of people stepping in and changing the chain of events.

Keep your eye on safety and you will live a long, happy life in aviation as I have.

Ace

 

[El Chupacabra]

was there not a recent article in ProPilot that showed 135 accidents vs 91 accidents... Confusing the issue were some accidents put in the 135 camp were actually tail end 91 flights.