We sure can learn from this accident

[mtrv]

technology will never beat a sectional chart and knowing how high the terrain is

(but yes, it helps)

Yes it will, because I'm where the terrain is, and there are sure a lot of flight into terrain accidents around here, because the pilot has become confused for a few seconds in IMC conditions and can't get a mental bearing on the situation.

When you've got four or five seconds to figure what is what, a good moving map beats the crap of trying to figure out where you are on a sectional.

The accidents I refer too, are not a case of maintaining minimum altitudes over terrain. They are caused when descending to land, departure climbs, or missed approaches. All in IMC conditions.

These accidents have ranged from plain stupidity, to white outs, clouds in darkness, severe loss of altitude while trying to capture the ILS, or losing situational awarness while attempting a missed approach. The brain is scrambled, or just not thinking, and no time left to be looking at a sectional.

 

[avbug]

No, that's the time to be flying proceedures. Published proceedures. Terrain maps won't save you then, either. Reverting to basic skills, and falling backon the homework one must have done prior to making the flight, is essential.

I have seen failures in map technology insofar as the terrain before me was not entirely congruent with the terrain on the box. I have seen EFB failures in which all my chart data disappeared. I have seen dual EFB failures where all chart data disappeared on two boards within about fifteen seconds of each other. (That occured IMC aproaching Miami, before a proceedure had been assigned). I've never had a sectional chart fail but once...and it wasn't so much the chart failing as all my charts got sucked out the door of the airplane.

But find someone who has actually used these new systems, and learned how to use them, instead of just a flight or two with the glass setups; and then see how many prefer to go back to the six pac setups. I have found no one! Not one single soul.

You have now. Me.

When you've got four or five seconds to figure what is what, a good moving map beats the crap of trying to figure out where you are on a sectional.

Nonsensical, as when one is IMC, one isn't operating by pilotage. I do agree whole heartedly with those who elect to carry sectionals and WAC's when flying IFR in mountainous terrain, however. Strict adherence to IFR altitudes referencing current IFR publications is critical, as is adherence to proceedures. At times of disorientation, every resource available to a pilot should be used. I don't think anyone is advocating abandoning FMS and moving map in favor of a crumpled sectional, but I do think there are legitimately many who still understand the value that additional information may provide.

I don't like reading a lot on the computer, because I can only see what's on the screen. I like a book, where I can highlight, underline, dog ear, write in the margins, and quickly flip back and forth...I have a bigger picture in my hands. Trying to do something on a computer is a little like reading a newspaper with your nose pressed to the page. Likewise, having a big picture with a paper chart is an excellent way way for me to be oriented, and to get a lot of information quickly without having to go to multiple screens, pages references, or push lots of little buttons. One quick glance at the chart, I'm squared away.

I don't abandon the new, but I certainly don't abandon the "old," either. All that some might call "old" still forms the core basics of what we do today.

The terrain warning box will pop up, no matter what page your reviewing. Even my Garmin 296 hand-held forces me to acknowledge the fact that I'm possibly about to die, if I don't do something about it. If VFR, and low to terrain, such as putting out fires, then ignore it or don't use it, as Avbug has suggested.

In the example I cited above, I wasn't on a fire mission, but a nicely appointed airplane with all the bells and whistles. We happened to be at a lesser altitude on that occasion for demonstrative purposes regarding the function of the EGPWS and terrain displays, and like all other occasions it confirmed for me that my trust is best placed in what I see before me, rather than what the box tells me is there, particularly when I am not established on an instrument proceedure or high in the enroute structure.

 

[mtrv]

You have now. Me.

Sorry, but I don't believe you count. You don't own an aircraft with these high tech systems, nor have you flown with one enough to become highly aqauinted. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

Like I said, I'm an older guy. The majority of pilots/plane owners that I associate with are retired military,commercial, or just active GA pilots who own aircraft, and in many cases, their own hangars.

Many are into the experimental/kitbuilt/homebuilt market as well as certified factory bought. Some will spend hundreds of thousands on a kitbuilt, while others somewhat less.

And this is what I've noticed and suspected, and responces on this forum really seem to bear it out. Most of these pilots in which I'm referring too, are past the-- fly for someone-- stage. Many have the financial ability to equip their panels as they like. And more than not, many are very interested in the new glass concepts. These new ideas in technology are talked about daily within the experimental forums.

It appears that the majority who use this forum, are much less aquainted with these glass systems, and the forever evolving gains in technology. And that's for good reason; going out on a short limb, I'd say that the majority who use this forum are still flying as pilots for airlines, cargo operations, the military, fire fighting, etc. But what is common with all, is that most aircraft flown by those who use this forum, just are not yet equipped with the newest in technology. Who wants to argue this? If you're not using these new systems, with any regularity, then how would you really know? It's as simple as that.

For instance, it won't be the first time, that a well qualified commercial aircraft pilot has been impressed with a simple hand-held that uses XM Satillite weather. Afterall, most air carriers still don't equip their aircraft with this technology, although in many way's it's much more informative than radar.

 

[satpak77]

lets remember that AA flew a perfectly good 757 into a mountain in Colombia, largely due to dependence on high-tech gadgetry

 

[avbug]

You don't own an aircraft with these high tech systems, nor have you flown with one enough to become highly aqauinted. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

???????????????????????????????

Perhaps you can tell me what ownership of an aircraft has to do with it. Perhaps you can tell me what makes you think I don't have experience with all the systems under discussion.

Perhaps you didn't read the thread. Perhaps you didn't notice that I described experience with these systems. But I am curious what would prompt you to make such an ignorant statement.

 

[lava9611]

Ok. I'll admit I'm just a low time private pilot, and I will probably get flamed for this but here goes...

I am mistaken in reading on the NTSB report that once a pilot reports to ATC that they want IFR Clearance and the controller gives them instructions to remain VFR until X that they are then under ATC control? To further this theory, the controller also gave them heading instructions that turned them to 020, or into the mountains. This was after he had them ident and knew their altitude. He also said he was aware of the terain around the departing airport. In addition to all of that, he also lied to NTSB investigators and told them he was on the phone when the altitude alarms went off, when in fact he did not initiate the phonecall until after the plane had already left his screen.

Now, even I, the lowly low time private pilot, understand that I am the PIC and ultimately have the resposibility for the aircraft. But, it appears that the controller did make at least one (if not more) mistake according to the FAA regs.

Also, there is something that just doesn't sit right with me. He said he knew the terrain, then turned them toward the mountains, and didn't bother to warn them that they needed to avoid them. Ultimately, I understand it was not totally his responsibility, but still. He only had the one aircraft to worry about. Why didn't he warn them? I am not saying that he said to himself "It is not up to me to tell them, so let them crash." But, he could have prevented this accident. Why didn't he?

Let the flaming begin.

 

[avbug]

Lava,

I'm not sure if you're asking a question or making a statement, but yes, you are mistaken.

The crew never talked to ATC. They merely took off after being unable to obtain a clearance, and flew into a mountain. The controller never lied to anybody.

I am mistaken in reading on the NTSB report that once a pilot reports to ATC that they want IFR Clearance and the controller gives them instructions to remain VFR until X that they are then under ATC control? To further this theory, the controller also gave them heading instructions that turned them to 020, or into the mountains. This was after he had them ident and knew their altitude. He also said he was aware of the terain around the departing airport. In addition to all of that, he also lied to NTSB investigators and told them he was on the phone when the altitude alarms went off, when in fact he did not initiate the phonecall until after the plane had already left his screen.

The report states that "the crew tired to contact Brown Field Municipal Clearance...but received no response. The captain suggested the copilot contact Tijuana, but the copilot refused. The copilot tried FSS via RCO, with no contact. The copilot then tried Tijuana tower, without success. The report clearly states that "after a fourth failed attempt to obtain the IFR clearance using the radio, the captain said, "All right, let's just do it VFR."

See a trend there? The crew never talked to ATC...and elected to depart VFR.

The crew had a cellphone and satphone on board, and didn't use them. When I've been into brown at night, I've picked up my clearance by cell. I've done it many times. The crew elected instead to talk to no one, depart VFR, and pick up their clearance in flight. They never talked to anyone, and ATC never talked to them.

The crew failed to fly the obstacle departure which would have put them going the opposite direction from the mountains. Had they flown the published proceedure, they would have been headed out over the ocean

You are mistaken that once a pilot talks to ATC and receives a "remain VFR" statement, that the pilot is "under ATC control." ATC provided a Class B VFR clearance, and advised the pilot to expect an IFR clearance once he reached 5,000'. The crew assumed their own terrain separation by electing to depart VFR and to not make contact until airborne.

The controllers use of the 020 heading was fullfilling his own obligations as ATC...it kept the flight out of Mexican airspace. The controller did not assume, and had no way of knowing, w(h)eather the learjet crew could see the terrain, was aware of the terrain, or what they intended to do to stay clear of terrain. ATC's function is not to separate VFR traffic from terrain. ATC exists to separate IFR traffic from IFR traffic, and in some airspace, IFR traffic from VFR traffic. An aircraft operating under VFR takes most responsibility squarely upon it's own shoulders. The crew was where they shouldn't be, when they shouldn't be, and didn't seek help until it was too late. Additionally, the captain briefed the first officer that they would level at 2,100' and accelerate to 250 knots while "doing their best" to contact ATC. Separation from terrain shrinks very quickly at 250 knots, especially when flying toward mountains that one can't see at night. This was a pilot decision, not an ATC decision.

When the radar MSAW warning appeared, the crew was already five miles east of the field, at 2,400'. The minimum vectoring altitude for that area is 5,000, which is why the controller advised he'd provide a clearance once they reached 5,000. Again, this is correct. The flight travelled one mile before disappearing. The aircraft was almost upon the terrain when the warning appeared, and quickly the altitude display disappeared (the warning disappeared even faster, lasting only four seconds). What the report doesn't tell you is that it's not uncommon for ATC to not see the altitude report correctly on a Learjet, as the climb rate can exceed the computer's ability to keep up.

Had the Lear bumped up to 5,000 when they were told at a more lively climb rate, they might well have survived. Had they followed the obstacle departure, they might well have survived. Had they obtained a clearance on the ground and operated that way, they might well have survived. Had they not been doing 250 knots when they first produced the MSAW warning, they might have had a chance if the controller would have been able to give them vectors around terrain..which he could not as they were VFR and below MVA. Additionally, their display continued for 15 (the warning lasted four seconds) seconds, whereas a standard rate turn from an east heading to 020 alone would have taken longer.

Had the crew received a safety alert, chances are they couldn't have done anything about it, but that doesn't negate or change the fact that the safety of the flight, to include terrain avoidance, was not the controller's responsibility, but the PIC's responsibility.

The crew screwed up, pure and simple. It cost them their lives. Attempting to throw it back on the controller's shoulders is an idiotic reaction. Always gotta throw the blame on someone else. Take your responsibility seriously...just like your life depends upon it. It does, you know. These folks found out, but doing so cost them their life. What can we learn from this? Take your responsibility as PIC seriously, and don't worry for a minute about who else might share in that responsibility, because it's ALL YOURS!!!!!

AIM 5-5-6 (Pilot-Controller Responsibilities):

5-5-6. Radar Vectors
a. Pilot.
1. Promptly complies with headings and altitudes assigned to you by the controller.
2. Questions any assigned heading or altitude believed to be incorrect.
3. If operating VFR and compliance with any radar vector or altitude would cause a violation of any CFR, advises ATC and obtains a revised clearance or instructions.

b. Controller.
1. Vectors aircraft in Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E airspace:
(a) For separation.
(b) For noise abatement.
(c) To obtain an operational advantage for the pilot or controller.
2. Vectors aircraft in Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class G airspace when requested by the pilot.
3. Vectors IFR aircraft at or above minimum vectoring altitudes.
4. May vector VFR aircraft, not at an ATC assigned altitude, at any altitude. In these cases, terrain separation is the pilot's responsibility.

AIM 4-1-16 (Services available to pilots, radar assistance to VFR aircraft):

4-1-16. Radar Assistance to VFR Aircraft
b. Pilots should clearly understand that authorization to proceed in accordance with such radar navigational assistance does not constitute authorization for the pilot to violate CFRs. In effect, assistance provided is on the basis that navigational guidance information issued is advisory in nature and the job of flying the aircraft safely, remains with the pilot.

 

[A Squared]

Avbug,

I'm not disagreeing with you, I think we both have pretty similar views on this accident, but the crew did talk to ATC, it was, however after they were airborne. Maybe you know this, but it seems like you and LAVA are talking past each other. You're right there was no communication before they took off, but they did contact SOCAL approach, and they were assigned a transponder code.

In rereading this report more carefully, I see that it wasn't 17 seconds from the time the beacon code appeared on the radar, to the crash, as I stated in a previous post. it was more like 32 seconds. still, not a lot of time to recognize the problem and correct it.

ANyway, apparently, issuing an instruction to an aircraft, even if you haven't issued an IFR clearence, according to the FAA, transfers responsibility for terrain seperation to the Controller.

The controller said:

“lifeguard three zero delta kilo radar contact cleared
through class b airspace for now fly heading of zero two zero [degrees] maintain vfr and as soon as you get above five thousand [feet] I’ll uh have an ifr clearance for ya.”

WHich technically transfers responsibilityfor terrain control to the controller. Apparently, if he had said " Lifeguard XXX, maintain VFR, upon reaching 5000 ft fly heading 020" the responsibility would then have technically remained with the pilot.

The thing is, this line of thinking leads to analysis of semantics to determine who had responsibility, after the crew is already dead. Perhaps it might be better to assume that the responsibility for seperation from terrain is *always* on the crew, regardeless of who says what.

As far as the heading assigned by ATC causing hte crash, I don't think so. It appears to me from looking at the terrain around the airport that they would have hit a mountain if they had stayed on runway heading (080) or turned to 020, or any intermediate heading.

The controller probably did make some mistakes, according to his handbook, but it all comes down to this: If the crew had not been able to contact ATC, would the accident still have happened? I think the answer to that is almost certainly yes. In that case, the issue of the controllers actions is reduced to a marginally relevant side issue.

 

[avbug]

I'm not disagreeing with you, I think we both have pretty similar views on this accident, but the crew did talk to ATC, it was, however after they were airborne.

I addressed the controllers actions in providing the pilot a heading to avoid mexican airspace, and an altitude with a comment to expect an IFR clearance upon reaching that altitude.

In rereading this report more carefully, I see that it wasn't 17 seconds from the time the beacon code appeared on the radar, to the crash, as I stated in a previous post. it was more like 32 seconds. still, not a lot of time to recognize the problem and correct it.

The MSAW warning lasted four seconds. Radar returns of the aircraft after it was annunciated continued for fifteen seconds, but altitude readouts disappeared after two sweeps. It was there, and gone again. Altitute information frequently is in error in high performance aircraft such as the learjet, because the lear is changing altitude too quickly. I've had this happen many times when the controller frequently asks altitude, because his data isn't accurate.

WHich technically transfers responsibilityfor terrain control to the controller. Apparently, if he had said " Lifeguard XXX, maintain VFR, upon reaching 5000 ft fly heading 020" the responsibility would then have technically remained with the pilot.

If the flight had been IFR, provision of a vector would have meant that the controller was assuming terrain separation responsibility. However, the controller clearly told the pilot to remain VFR. As we have seen from the previous AIM pilot-controller responsibility statement, terrain avoidance under VFR remains a pilot responsibility, including during a vector. ATC didn't assign an altitude, and only provided an initial heading that would keep the flight clear of mexican airspace. Provided no clearance beyond a VFR Class B clearance. ATC did not assume responsibility for terrain separation, technically, or otherwise.

4. May vector VFR aircraft, not at an ATC assigned altitude, at any altitude. In these cases, terrain separation is the pilot's responsibility.

This thread is about attacking the controller, and the purpose of attacking the controller is really to highlight ATC's responsibility in an entirely different disaster, the recent Comair crash. It's an attempt to shift blame to the controller, and to weasil out of pilot responsibilities. I believe you're correct that controller responsibility at best might be a sidebar issue to what is really important; pilot responsibility.

Under various circumstances, where an aircraft is under ATC control, the controller does have a responsibility issue a safety alert...in this case making the recognition during the short alert display time on screen, and the position of the aircraft, had the controller attempted to issue the alert it likely would have been too late, anyway.

 

[Dep676]

I got one thing to say about these accidents where part of the blame is being placed on the controllers. For those that might not know but the controller is not in the cockpit like the two crew members are. So unless the controller gave them a wrong vector, climb or descent, then blame can only be placed on the crew.

It is called CRM folks. Taking off near mountainous terrain at night with no radio contact is asking for trouble. This accident proved that point.

So let's take a little responsibility of our own and quit trying to blame the controllers for the faults of irresponsible crews.

This accident did not involve a couple private pilots that just got there tickets and the ink was still wet.