Travis Barker Blames Pilots, Equipment for Plane Crash

[ILOVEBEER]

Yet, you and your family will continue to board airliners to travel that use the FADEC system.

Actually, I was not aware that the TR system on the Lear 60 operated the way it does, until this accident. Furthermore, I was unaware that all FADEC systems operate the TR's in the same way as the lear 60, as you infer.

squat switches exposed to tire debris in the event a tire blows????? Which can disable the thrust reversers because the plane goes into air mode, just like what happened on the Barker Lear 60.

How do you know this? Where did you read it?


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[Coool Hand Luke]

"The urge to shift blame becomes even uglier when the accused has left feast."

Seems I remember that quote: Earnest Gann - The High and the Mighty?

 

[metrodriver]

If the Fadec / TR / squatswitch combination has the problem as discussed in a different thread, then the lawsuit is legit. If the tires of this series / production batch have an issue, same thing.
How worn were these tires, how were the pressures? Pilot's responsibility to inform maintenance. If one's pressure is low, which can be hard to see, there is a good chance the other one that's carrying the weight will blow. The remaining low pressure tire probably will blow too from friction, bending and heating.
Does this plane have tire pressure monitoring equipment? If not, why not?

Sometimes a lawsuit like this can lead to product improvements, something everybody will benefit from.

 

[snow-back]

It seems to me the question of whether the TRs worked or not is irrelevant. All accelerate stop data is computed giving no credit for TR use. There isn't even a takeoff penalty in the MEL (in any plane I've flown) for inop TRs. If proper SOP is followed, a go/no-go decision at V1 SHOULD result in a successful outcome.

 

[AbOvo]

As long as the brakes work and you have tires.

 

[b707guy]

Can reverse reverse thrust be selected (I presume with levers on the throttles) but not deployed in this situation, such that you get increased engine speed but with forward thrust? That's what happens in a CFM powered DC-8 anyway if you have no hydraulics.

If so, that would throw out all the runway analysis figures, as none of the analysis I'm aware of provide for any forward thrust beyond idle during a reject.

 

[CX880]

Before we all join the don't blame the pilots and screw everyone that sues band wagon, look at what he sued for. It wasn't 1.4 billion dollars for emotioinal distress. It was for 25K. Loss of pay and medical bills. You all would probably sue for more. I know I would.

 

[metrodriver]

This is from the Charter thread, posted by Basil. Read senario 3.

Quote:
Originally Posted by ~~~^~~~
What I'm really wondering, is can you get the TR handle up and in use, while the TR are actually stowed because the squat switch is damaged resulting in a false aircraft in flight signal.


If I read your question correctly, the answer is yes and no depending on the order of events. Keep in mind that the LR-60 requires that BOTH squat switches must be in the ground mode and both thrust levers must be at idle in order to ARM the T/Rs. When BOTH Thrust Reversers indicate that they are DEPLOYED, a solenoid actuated balk in the thrust lever quadrant is released and the piggybacks are free to move fullly aft beyond the idle position and command additional thrust from the FADEC.

Scenario #1 (all LR-60s)
-Aircraft on ground
-Squat Switch (either or both) damaged and now in air mode
-Thrust Levers to Idle
-No ARM for either T/R
-Piggybacks could be moved slightly aft to idle deploy position but no farther due to solenoid balk
-No movement of T/Rs and no thrust increase

Scenario #2 (pre s/n 276 and no SB 60-78-7)
-Aircraft on ground
-Thrust Levers to Idle
-Both T/Rs ARM
-Piggybacks to Idle Deploy
-FADEC moves N1 Bugs to limit available N1 based airspeed, etc
-T/Rs deploy
-Solenoid Balk released
-Squat Switch damaged=Air Mode
-T/Rs Autostow, FADEC commands Idle regardless of Thrust Lever or Piggyback position
-Solenoid Balk re-engaged
-after T/Rs stow, FADEC positions N1 bugs to Max Takeoff N1
-During the entire sequence, Thrust was at Idle because the piggybacks were never pulled aft of the idle deploy position

Scenario #3 (pre s/n 276 and no SB 60-78-7)
-Aircraft on ground
-Thrust Levers-Idle
-Both T/Rs ARM
-Piggybacks pulled to Idle Deploy
-FADEC repositions N1 bugs to Reverse schedule
-T/Rs Deploy
-Solenoid Balk Release
-Piggybacks pulled fully aft (beyond balk)
-Thrust increases to max reverse allowed by FADEC
-Squat Switch damaged=Air mode
-FADEC commands Idle and T/Rs autostow
-Engines reduce thrust to idle
-Solenoid Balk re-engages, but piggybacks are already aft of balk
-After T/Rs stow, FADEC repositions N1 bugs to computed Takeoff N1.
-Engines accelerate toward Takeoff N1, though may not actually achieve it. I suspect that you could expect around 90% N1. Note the the FADEC cannot distinguish between Thrust Lever versus Piggyback movement. The FADEC receives an input from a rotary switch in the thrust lever quadrant which is moved by both the thrust lever and piggybacks.

Scenario #4 (s/n 276-ish and up or aircraft with SB 60-78-7 [includes N999LJ based on s/n])
-Aircraft on ground
-Thrust Levers-Idle
-Both T/Rs ARM
-Piggybacks pulled to Idle Deploy
-FADEC repositions N1 bugs to Reverse schedule
-T/Rs Deploy
-Solenoid Balk Release
-Piggybacks pulled fully aft (beyond balk)
-Thrust increases to max reverse allowed by FADEC
-Squat Switch damaged=Air mode
-Thrust Reversers are receiving an input from wheel speed detect box (originally used for Autospoilers) and disregard the squat switch air mode input, thereby remaining deployed. This was a result of the N1DC accident in which the T/Rs stowed after the aircraft struck deer on rwy and damaged squat switch, creating a "scenario #3" event.

I think that what doomed N999LJ was that somehow the wheels locked up, thereby nullifying the protection that the wheel speed detect box provides to the T/Rs to prevent on-ground autostow when the wheels are spinning. This lockup could have been caused by the loss of antiskid associated with the failure of a squat switch or the loss of antiskid from use of emergency brakes. This would effectively make N999LJ a "Scenario #3" aircraft.

 

[Fly91]

It seems to me the question of whether the TRs worked or not is irrelevant. All accelerate stop data is computed giving no credit for TR use. There isn't even a takeoff penalty in the MEL (in any plane I've flown) for inop TRs. If proper SOP is followed, a go/no-go decision at V1 SHOULD result in a successful outcome.

But when you abort beyond V1......all the ACC/STOP numbers go out the window. If you're not on a 13,000 foot runway, you're going off the end with no tires, brakes or reversers and a max gross take-off situation.

 

[snow-back]

But when you abort beyond V1......all the ACC/STOP numbers go out the window. If you're not on a 13,000 foot runway, you're going off the end with no tires, brakes or reversers and a max gross take-off situation.

Exactly! Notice I mentioned "proper SOP".