The Rogue and the Professional

[Alamanach]

Am I a rogue? A year and a half ago I had the privlege of going to New Orleans to help with the clean-up efforts. My job was to supervise truck crews that were removing moldy, ruined refrigerators that people had left out on the streets. The works crews did this with something called a knuckle boom; this was a heavy truck with an articulated boom arm that had a large claw on its end. The arm could pluck refrigerators off the street and stack them carefully in the truck bed. The boom arm operator sat in an open seat on top of the truck.

Somebody several pay grades up decided that since this open seat was on a vehicle, it had to have a seat belt. Now mind you, nobody was ever in this seat when the truck was moving; stabilizer legs held the truck stationary whenever the boom was in operation. Also, hoisting a refrigerator from the side of the street, there was always a slight chance the truck could roll over. If that happened, the operator's only chance to avoid being crushed was to jump clear, and hope he didn't twist an ankle. A seat belt, then, was clearly a safety hazard.

I didn't enforce that seat belt rule. I was supposed to, but I quietly ignored it. This was a judgment call, and in my mind there's no doubt that it was the right one.

Now, it seems to me that pilots are in a similar situation. We have sets of rules to operate by (generally a much better set of rules, fortunately), but does not the pilot in command have the right to violate those rules to the extent necessary to ensure the safe operation of his aircraft? Mindlessly following the checklist all the way into the terrain is not the professional thing to do. No matter how good our SOPs and FARs are, we will always have to include judgment in our decisions. And judgment is inherently subjective, fuzzy, and gray.

So if we try to say "this pilot is a professional, but that one is a rogue," the distinction cannot have an objective, unambiguous basis. 95% of us will be somewhere in the middle. (And I would point out that Rez O. Lewshun stated as much at the top of this thread.) Much easier, and more useful, would be to say "These sorts of actions are more professional, but those sorts of actions are more rogueish." Becuase all of us pilots are some mix of both.

That being said, here's my point: Vague word portraits of the "professional" pilot and the "rogue" pilot, while cathartic, are not helpful; those pilots are idealizations, and don't actually exist. What we need are specific things we can do to encourage professional flying and discourage rogue flying. If Kern doesn't discuss that somewhere, then I'm inclined to side with his critics; the book would amount to puffery.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Another way to look at it is....

What are the risks?

Some of the case studies in Kern's Rogue book deal with pilots taking risk and viloating policy for personal benefit and the expense of the organizaton and passengers.

I think if a professionanal pilot violated a rule and could justify it to company, organization and gov't, like the seat belt example in your case, then that would be justified...

Your thoughts?

 

[Alamanach]

I think as far as it goes, you and I agree; reckless disregard of the rules is a bad thing. I don't know anybody who would argue differently.

But that being said, what are we supposed to do about it? We can make "rogues" out to be the bogeyman, but then what? A witch hunt?

I haven't read Kern's book, so I can't help you answer that question. But if you can show that Kern offers some constructive ideas beyond just labelling people, it will answer the charge that he's just writing for political gain. Show me that this guy actually brings something to the table.

Or, forget Kern. Let his critics eat him. The thread originally wasn't really about him anyway. What it was about was the issue of rogue pilots. I say, such a characterization is idealized, and not helpful. I say, let's focus on defining rogue behaviors, and identifying what brings those behaviors about.

 

[avbug]

If the golden standard is offering something useful, nearly anybody can do that and be justified.

When Kern met with us and learned what the job entailed, far from the methodical scientifically quantified and calculated theoretical world in which he peddled his theory, he thought he'd found the motherlode. He saw a rogue industry...one operating outside the norm. He catered to military pilots, airline pilots, corportate pilots. He catered to universities and safety organizations...mostly groups that flew so far inside the "box" that the boundaries were as foriegn to them as the real world.

Kern was suddenly among a group that didn't consider him a peer, and never would, and that was clearly well beyond his experience and quite apparently, his comprehension. He expected a standing ovation, and he was met with silence. In fact, the only thing was well received in his presentation was a video of mlitary crashes that he'd play at each intermission. That was entertaining.

Kern was involved in a mid-air collision during his military career. That brush with destiny seemed to flavor his thinking such that he felt he had been there and done that, and knew the limits and boundaries well enough to preach about them....or expound the gospel upon the backs of accident reports and tales of incidents until the world could learn what he had learned.

The books weren't his political gain...his destruction of the tanker industry did that; it was his leg up after left the military and began his political aspirations through governent to private sector think tank. He certainly succeedd in boosting his salary by a substantial margin.

The problem with the theory of what consitutes rogue and what constitutes professional is that it's too bland, and doesn't consider operational necessity. Kern failed to see that the "rogues" around him were as professional as they come, taking truly challenging operational conditions and turning them into routine operations with an absolute eye toward safety. I believe he was disturbed by pilots who took extreme operational challenges in stride, nonplussed, and who to this day continue to reaffirm that "it's not an emergency, it's our job."

The actual politics of what occured aren't important here, though I won't stomach for a moment acclaimations toward a man with such low morals as to pounce on opportunity at the expense of lives and property as he did. Much, much more is involved, and it's largely very, very dirty politics that were used in an opportunistic fashion.

Classification such as rogue and professional is hardly conducive to perpetuation of safe practice, nor does it enhance understanding of poor behaviors. It tends to categorize and whitewash the issue. The exemplary professional who flies inside the box and who is conservative by all accounts need only make one mistake to kill everyone...has he now become a rogue?

Is the pilot who lands on sandbars for a living, who reconfigures on the roll, who does his runups on the downwind, who gauges weight and balance in the field by the weight of the tail in his hands...is he the rogue? Or the consumate proessional in the bush? The difference is largely in who's asking and in who's being asked. Kern found the consumate professionals in the bush, utility pilots who knew exactly what they were doing...but he didn't. He founded an entire theoretical mold upon it.

I'm flying for a utility operation right now, in the middle east. In a discussion a few weeks ago, a senior pilot told me he believed I'd been hired because of my can-do attitude, and my willingness to do anything. He was shocked that I'd grounded an airplane due to maintenance, and refused to do certain things on the basis of safety. He told me that when the operator here learned I'd crashed during a fire last year and immediately flown out and continued flying, they were impressed and believed that here was a pilot who would and could do anything they asked.

I told him that never happened, and detailed to him the entire process. He said he hadn't heard about how involved it was, and suddenly wasn't nearly impressed. Why, it sounded too much like a real live, professional operation with advanced inspection and repair, and an increadible amount of oversight. Not roguish at all. He thought with my background I'd be much more aggressive. He was disappointed to learn that I strive to make every flight as routine as possible. Even an approach and a drop in a burning canyon is handled as every one of us makes a routine traffic pattern, with a downwind, base and final, an preplanned exit...all with oversight above and below, flight following, tracking, etc. Better maintenance in many cases than most airliners, and so on. Not at all what he thought. I think he wanted a rogue, and got a professional.

Perhaps the rogue to some is the one who flies into that burning canyon...that's not a professional thing to do, after all...the book writing college kings can't comprehend such an irresponsible act...must be rogueish. Shut them down, don't let that wild atttude exist where it could corrupt or contaminate society in aviation.

We fear what we don't know, and classification under one name or another doesn't change ignorance to brilliance. One man's rogue is another man's professional, and the difference is often only in the undertanding. Until Kern has been there done that and does have the stack of tee shirts he doesn't impress me much, nor does his psychobabble.

But, it sells books...and impresses others who are lacking in tee shirts, too...

 

[Alamanach]

So you're saying that whether a behavior is professional or not depends on context. That makes sense.

If you're in a cockpit with a pilot who, in context, is a reckless rogue (and before I even finish writing this sentence I realize you're right; this word is an unhelpful whitewash), how do you handle it?

Let me reask that, because that 'rogue' word isn't working for me: have you ever found yourself working with a pilot whose style was systematically reckless? What did you do in that situation? (I'd share some of my own experiences, but some of you guys have flown more types than I have hours; I have no stories to share on this topic.) If you're already up in the air with him, it's not like you can step out of the room and let him kill himself. But trying to take control from him could be dicey, too. How do you guys handle it?

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Since you haven't read the book, I will tell you it is full of case studies. Pilots that have destroyed aircraft, crew, themselves and property. All for personal thrills, ego trips and/or causing fear in others....

There aren't too many books like that specific to pilots so I'll give Kern credit for that....

Avbug-

I like your second response... Perhaps Kern was out of his element in the tanker industry...

Maybe he thinks carrier pilots are rogues...

Again, what are the risks and what is to be gained.

I've flown with guys that don't turn on the anti-ice cause the temperature is 9C (w/ moisture). I ask why and they shrug thier shoulders.... Doesn't seem like a good reason not to do it...

Landing on a sand bar to deliver mail and food to a isolated community.... well of course...

 

[Alamanach]

What causes people to fly this way?

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

What causes people to fly this way?

Culture...people despertly want to fit in... in the case studies, specifically the USAF's Mr. Air Show, who treated a B-52 like a tactical jet.... he demonstrated his rogue behavior infront of superiors but they turned a blind eye... and because he was likable and a cool dude at the squadron.... He killed everyone...

This is a rogue....

http://www.patricksaviation.com/videos/Enrouk/1492/

http://www.crm-devel.org/resources/paper/darkblue/darkblue.htm

 

[Alamanach]

Wow, thanks! That took a while to work through, but some interesting stuff. Now I see where you were coming from when you asked a few posts ago, "What are the risks?" I've long believed that in life generally, taking risks is appropriate, if the situation calls for it and there is some worthwhile point to it. Stupid risks are just stupid.

Still, I think I pick up on what Kern's critics are talking about. The article, though pretending to be objective, was pretty drastically one-sided. I don't doubt that Holland had become a reckless, dangerous pilot, but even in a story like this, there is another side. Kern mentions that Holland had his own clique of buddies who supported him. But we never hear from them. This is a major weakness, because it possibly prevents us from finding out what ever happened to Holland to make him start behaving like this.

Kern's job, then, is an easy one: find good pilots who've gone bad and tell lurid stories of their turpitude. Without an even-handed (and perhaps even sympathetic) study of why his subjects did what they did, this is just infotainment.

Safety, by the way, is the easiest target in the world for Monday-morning quarterbacking. After the fact, we can always dream up a dozen different arcane safety measures that could have been employed, but weren't. (I'm not saying Holland was safe-- he wasn't. I'm just saying.) Sometimes those measures are legitimate (like keeping the plane within a reasonable bank angle) and sometimes they're not (like seat belts on a knuckle boom). It's very easy for someone like those New Orleans folks or Mr. Kern to insist that any possible safety measure should always be implemented. But what they overlook is that in order to do the job safely, we first have to do the job.

I guess it's all a pretty complicated issue. I don't see any clear black-and-white here.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Kern mentions that Holland had his own clique of buddies who supported him. But we never hear from them. This is a major weakness, because it possibly prevents us from finding out what ever happened to Holland to make him start behaving like this.

What for example, could they possibly say?