The Rogue and the Professional

[Alamanach]

Am I a rogue? A year and a half ago I had the privlege of going to New Orleans to help with the clean-up efforts. My job was to supervise truck crews that were removing moldy, ruined refrigerators that people had left out on the streets. The works crews did this with something called a knuckle boom; this was a heavy truck with an articulated boom arm that had a large claw on its end. The arm could pluck refrigerators off the street and stack them carefully in the truck bed. The boom arm operator sat in an open seat on top of the truck.

Somebody several pay grades up decided that since this open seat was on a vehicle, it had to have a seat belt. Now mind you, nobody was ever in this seat when the truck was moving; stabilizer legs held the truck stationary whenever the boom was in operation. Also, hoisting a refrigerator from the side of the street, there was always a slight chance the truck could roll over. If that happened, the operator's only chance to avoid being crushed was to jump clear, and hope he didn't twist an ankle. A seat belt, then, was clearly a safety hazard.

I didn't enforce that seat belt rule. I was supposed to, but I quietly ignored it. This was a judgment call, and in my mind there's no doubt that it was the right one.

Now, it seems to me that pilots are in a similar situation. We have sets of rules to operate by (generally a much better set of rules, fortunately), but does not the pilot in command have the right to violate those rules to the extent necessary to ensure the safe operation of his aircraft? Mindlessly following the checklist all the way into the terrain is not the professional thing to do. No matter how good our SOPs and FARs are, we will always have to include judgment in our decisions. And judgment is inherently subjective, fuzzy, and gray.

So if we try to say "this pilot is a professional, but that one is a rogue," the distinction cannot have an objective, unambiguous basis. 95% of us will be somewhere in the middle. (And I would point out that Rez O. Lewshun stated as much at the top of this thread.) Much easier, and more useful, would be to say "These sorts of actions are more professional, but those sorts of actions are more rogueish." Becuase all of us pilots are some mix of both.

That being said, here's my point: Vague word portraits of the "professional" pilot and the "rogue" pilot, while cathartic, are not helpful; those pilots are idealizations, and don't actually exist. What we need are specific things we can do to encourage professional flying and discourage rogue flying. If Kern doesn't discuss that somewhere, then I'm inclined to side with his critics; the book would amount to puffery.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Another way to look at it is....

What are the risks?

Some of the case studies in Kern's Rogue book deal with pilots taking risk and viloating policy for personal benefit and the expense of the organizaton and passengers.

I think if a professionanal pilot violated a rule and could justify it to company, organization and gov't, like the seat belt example in your case, then that would be justified...

Your thoughts?

 

[Alamanach]

I think as far as it goes, you and I agree; reckless disregard of the rules is a bad thing. I don't know anybody who would argue differently.

But that being said, what are we supposed to do about it? We can make "rogues" out to be the bogeyman, but then what? A witch hunt?

I haven't read Kern's book, so I can't help you answer that question. But if you can show that Kern offers some constructive ideas beyond just labelling people, it will answer the charge that he's just writing for political gain. Show me that this guy actually brings something to the table.

Or, forget Kern. Let his critics eat him. The thread originally wasn't really about him anyway. What it was about was the issue of rogue pilots. I say, such a characterization is idealized, and not helpful. I say, let's focus on defining rogue behaviors, and identifying what brings those behaviors about.

 

[avbug]

If the golden standard is offering something useful, nearly anybody can do that and be justified.

When Kern met with us and learned what the job entailed, far from the methodical scientifically quantified and calculated theoretical world in which he peddled his theory, he thought he'd found the motherlode. He saw a rogue industry...one operating outside the norm. He catered to military pilots, airline pilots, corportate pilots. He catered to universities and safety organizations...mostly groups that flew so far inside the "box" that the boundaries were as foriegn to them as the real world.

Kern was suddenly among a group that didn't consider him a peer, and never would, and that was clearly well beyond his experience and quite apparently, his comprehension. He expected a standing ovation, and he was met with silence. In fact, the only thing was well received in his presentation was a video of mlitary crashes that he'd play at each intermission. That was entertaining.

Kern was involved in a mid-air collision during his military career. That brush with destiny seemed to flavor his thinking such that he felt he had been there and done that, and knew the limits and boundaries well enough to preach about them....or expound the gospel upon the backs of accident reports and tales of incidents until the world could learn what he had learned.

The books weren't his political gain...his destruction of the tanker industry did that; it was his leg up after left the military and began his political aspirations through governent to private sector think tank. He certainly succeedd in boosting his salary by a substantial margin.

The problem with the theory of what consitutes rogue and what constitutes professional is that it's too bland, and doesn't consider operational necessity. Kern failed to see that the "rogues" around him were as professional as they come, taking truly challenging operational conditions and turning them into routine operations with an absolute eye toward safety. I believe he was disturbed by pilots who took extreme operational challenges in stride, nonplussed, and who to this day continue to reaffirm that "it's not an emergency, it's our job."

The actual politics of what occured aren't important here, though I won't stomach for a moment acclaimations toward a man with such low morals as to pounce on opportunity at the expense of lives and property as he did. Much, much more is involved, and it's largely very, very dirty politics that were used in an opportunistic fashion.

Classification such as rogue and professional is hardly conducive to perpetuation of safe practice, nor does it enhance understanding of poor behaviors. It tends to categorize and whitewash the issue. The exemplary professional who flies inside the box and who is conservative by all accounts need only make one mistake to kill everyone...has he now become a rogue?

Is the pilot who lands on sandbars for a living, who reconfigures on the roll, who does his runups on the downwind, who gauges weight and balance in the field by the weight of the tail in his hands...is he the rogue? Or the consumate proessional in the bush? The difference is largely in who's asking and in who's being asked. Kern found the consumate professionals in the bush, utility pilots who knew exactly what they were doing...but he didn't. He founded an entire theoretical mold upon it.

I'm flying for a utility operation right now, in the middle east. In a discussion a few weeks ago, a senior pilot told me he believed I'd been hired because of my can-do attitude, and my willingness to do anything. He was shocked that I'd grounded an airplane due to maintenance, and refused to do certain things on the basis of safety. He told me that when the operator here learned I'd crashed during a fire last year and immediately flown out and continued flying, they were impressed and believed that here was a pilot who would and could do anything they asked.

I told him that never happened, and detailed to him the entire process. He said he hadn't heard about how involved it was, and suddenly wasn't nearly impressed. Why, it sounded too much like a real live, professional operation with advanced inspection and repair, and an increadible amount of oversight. Not roguish at all. He thought with my background I'd be much more aggressive. He was disappointed to learn that I strive to make every flight as routine as possible. Even an approach and a drop in a burning canyon is handled as every one of us makes a routine traffic pattern, with a downwind, base and final, an preplanned exit...all with oversight above and below, flight following, tracking, etc. Better maintenance in many cases than most airliners, and so on. Not at all what he thought. I think he wanted a rogue, and got a professional.

Perhaps the rogue to some is the one who flies into that burning canyon...that's not a professional thing to do, after all...the book writing college kings can't comprehend such an irresponsible act...must be rogueish. Shut them down, don't let that wild atttude exist where it could corrupt or contaminate society in aviation.

We fear what we don't know, and classification under one name or another doesn't change ignorance to brilliance. One man's rogue is another man's professional, and the difference is often only in the undertanding. Until Kern has been there done that and does have the stack of tee shirts he doesn't impress me much, nor does his psychobabble.

But, it sells books...and impresses others who are lacking in tee shirts, too...

 

[Alamanach]

So you're saying that whether a behavior is professional or not depends on context. That makes sense.

If you're in a cockpit with a pilot who, in context, is a reckless rogue (and before I even finish writing this sentence I realize you're right; this word is an unhelpful whitewash), how do you handle it?

Let me reask that, because that 'rogue' word isn't working for me: have you ever found yourself working with a pilot whose style was systematically reckless? What did you do in that situation? (I'd share some of my own experiences, but some of you guys have flown more types than I have hours; I have no stories to share on this topic.) If you're already up in the air with him, it's not like you can step out of the room and let him kill himself. But trying to take control from him could be dicey, too. How do you guys handle it?

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Since you haven't read the book, I will tell you it is full of case studies. Pilots that have destroyed aircraft, crew, themselves and property. All for personal thrills, ego trips and/or causing fear in others....

There aren't too many books like that specific to pilots so I'll give Kern credit for that....

Avbug-

I like your second response... Perhaps Kern was out of his element in the tanker industry...

Maybe he thinks carrier pilots are rogues...

Again, what are the risks and what is to be gained.

I've flown with guys that don't turn on the anti-ice cause the temperature is 9C (w/ moisture). I ask why and they shrug thier shoulders.... Doesn't seem like a good reason not to do it...

Landing on a sand bar to deliver mail and food to a isolated community.... well of course...

 

[Alamanach]

What causes people to fly this way?

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

What causes people to fly this way?

Culture...people despertly want to fit in... in the case studies, specifically the USAF's Mr. Air Show, who treated a B-52 like a tactical jet.... he demonstrated his rogue behavior infront of superiors but they turned a blind eye... and because he was likable and a cool dude at the squadron.... He killed everyone...

This is a rogue....

http://www.patricksaviation.com/videos/Enrouk/1492/

http://www.crm-devel.org/resources/paper/darkblue/darkblue.htm

 

[Alamanach]

Wow, thanks! That took a while to work through, but some interesting stuff. Now I see where you were coming from when you asked a few posts ago, "What are the risks?" I've long believed that in life generally, taking risks is appropriate, if the situation calls for it and there is some worthwhile point to it. Stupid risks are just stupid.

Still, I think I pick up on what Kern's critics are talking about. The article, though pretending to be objective, was pretty drastically one-sided. I don't doubt that Holland had become a reckless, dangerous pilot, but even in a story like this, there is another side. Kern mentions that Holland had his own clique of buddies who supported him. But we never hear from them. This is a major weakness, because it possibly prevents us from finding out what ever happened to Holland to make him start behaving like this.

Kern's job, then, is an easy one: find good pilots who've gone bad and tell lurid stories of their turpitude. Without an even-handed (and perhaps even sympathetic) study of why his subjects did what they did, this is just infotainment.

Safety, by the way, is the easiest target in the world for Monday-morning quarterbacking. After the fact, we can always dream up a dozen different arcane safety measures that could have been employed, but weren't. (I'm not saying Holland was safe-- he wasn't. I'm just saying.) Sometimes those measures are legitimate (like keeping the plane within a reasonable bank angle) and sometimes they're not (like seat belts on a knuckle boom). It's very easy for someone like those New Orleans folks or Mr. Kern to insist that any possible safety measure should always be implemented. But what they overlook is that in order to do the job safely, we first have to do the job.

I guess it's all a pretty complicated issue. I don't see any clear black-and-white here.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Kern mentions that Holland had his own clique of buddies who supported him. But we never hear from them. This is a major weakness, because it possibly prevents us from finding out what ever happened to Holland to make him start behaving like this.

What for example, could they possibly say?

 

[Alamanach]

Heck if I know. All the more reason to hear from them. Maybe they can let us in on some wrinkle in his personal life that caused him to lose his mojo. Or maybe some of what we've heard from his detractors is overblown or, somehow, out of context. We need to hear both sides, especially if we want to prevent the next Bud Holland from ever going rogue.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

I don't know.... maybe he was locked in a closet and beaten by his lazy eyed uncle?

Maybe a chick at the O'club told all the other girls he has a really small pitot tube.

Nonetheless, he was a USAF Col. and he choose to behave that way. Maybe there is a pshyco analysis that can explain, but it doesn't justify....

And back to Kern.... why is he, receiving criticism for pointing out bad behavior? (avbug.... nothing to do with the tankers...)

 

[avbug]

Some years ago we experienced a death on a fire. At the end of the year at the industry meeting in Reno, a debrief was offered on that fatality. I believe that the conditions were such that a USFS Baron was damaged, rolled inverted and had spar damage, over the fire. As the situation played out, pilot after pilot stood and admitted that he thought conditions were bad. He knew they were bad. He thought that if someone didn't pull the plug, someone might get killed. Someone. Someone. Someone. Someone did. Each pilot admitted he was waiting for someone else to say when, to say enough, to shut down the show. Nobody wanted to be the bad guy. Everyone wanted to be the man who could be counted on to do his job.

Was the pilot who died the agressive, rogue? Were the pilots who failed to shut down the show the rogues? Were the government pilots or the ultimate oversight, the incident command system and commander(s) responsible? Or was everyone a professional doing a demanding job?

Clearly hesitation hurts. Sometimes badly. I've shut down the show before, and I've taken the brunt as the bad guy. I don't care. Conversely, I've also been lead down the prim path to a place where I found myself saying those immportal pilot words, "Oh Sh....." I'm conservative. Yet I've been there too. Several years ago I arrived over a fire on the lee side of some very cut up terrain, which was being driven hard by the wind, and which was moving rapidly with the terrain I was first on scene, what we call the "initial attack." It falls to this person to investigate the atmospehre, the hazards, and the fire, and make decisions as to how to start working the fire. I was in contact with other aircraft on the way in. I made my drop, and determined right away that this wasn't something I wanted to repeat. It was very violent, and more than a little unpleasant.

I gave report to the next aircraft in, a government lead aircraft, and my advice was pull back. The Lead said he'd be the judge. He rolled into the same place I had gone, and a few moments later ordered all the aircraft off the fire. He told me he'd broken his headset...a david clark. That's hard to do. It was rough.

Was he a rogue? I don't think so. We were both paid to use professional training and judgement to make some very critical decisions. My role was to assess the fire and treat it one step at a time in cooperation with other resources. His, however, was to assess the fire, and continue asessing it for several hours. He stayed in that environment and worked it at low level...it's all he did. He noted my input, and then applied his own professional observation. Had he listened to me, what happened to him wouldn't have happened...but then he wouldn't necessarily have been fulfilling his role, either. So...rogue? I'm not sure about that.

We can have an operator in the cockpit who is the consumate professional, who makes one single lapse. I flew with one such pilot, and I'm not going to say he made a lapse. I will say he was occasiionally agressive, and I will say he was very talented, very professional, and one to whom I would look up this day, were he still among us. I crewed with Steve, he was a good man. Well respected, and he earned it. He didn't demand it, but he got respect because he earned every ounce of it...he certainly earned mine, and I'm not easily impressed. If he were here, I'd fly with him today without thinking twice.

Steve died several years ago when both wings separated from his aircraft. With him was Mike, who was also a consumate professional. Mike was deeply religious, concerned about everyone, and also by all accounts, a good man. A good pilot, an excellent flight engineer. With him was Craig, a new pilot, but an eager one. I flew with Mike, and trusted him implicitly. I checked Craig out in several company aircraft, flew with him on several occasions. He was a known quantity.

Steve, Mike, and Craig died within three feet of each other one day, acting as a team, doing their job as professionals. I'm deeply saddend to hear of their loss today as I was then. It hurts. I can close my eyes and smell the interior of that airplane. I lived in it. Literally. As did many others. I won't say they made a mistake, that's not my point. I won't say they acted foolishly, because I have no such information. They were very, very good, and did a very important job.

 

[avbug]

Rogues, or professionals. Ask me, I'll tell you they were professionals. Ask me and I'll tell you their aircraft saw more frequent maintenance than any airliner. And it was flown not only by highly qualified pilots, but pilots who were also all mechanics, all qualified to inspect and work on the aircraft. It underwent regulary wing inspections each week, to say nothing of daily inspections. Mike was fanatical about overseeing the condition of that aircraft. Another C-130 was lost ten years prior under similiar circumstances, though nobody knew it....someone knew it...certain information from a certain source, not the one named, knew it, and with held it. I can't say who or why...who was the rogue?

Steve knew he was taking a heavy airplane into rough conditions on a daily basis close to the ground to deliver a heavy payload. He knew what that did to the wings, to say nothing of the frequently strong even severe turbulence. Was he a rogue for going there?

The fractures that shed the wing were put there by another organization nearly 40 years before. In an area deemed undamagable. I personally physically replaced both wings on that aircraft a few years before, after two wings failed on me in that airplane in Mexico. We found the problem, knew it, fixed it. Was I the rogue? Working through industry professionals, manufacturers, designated engineering and airworthiness representatives, the FAA, the DoD, USFS, OAS, and many others...we made the necessary repairs, adjusted the inspection program to account for what we'd found, and had wall full of awards recognizing the quality and success of the inspection program.

Except for that one, little crack.

Who is the rogue?

Or do we have a lot of professionals and a single, solitary, quarter inch mistake that was hidden in five layers of 7075 T-6 40 year old aluminum in a place no one had suspected...put there by someone making approved improvements on the structure?

Steve wanted us to question him. He certainly questioned us. He thought it was healthy. He was very laid back. He was a musician. He was an instructor. He was a corporate pilot, and a glider instructor. And a great guy. He was a professional. I was with him outside Kalmath falls on a fire descending into Crater Lake, when he made a mistake. I was in that same airplane, and the wing missed the ground by a few feet on a steep descent to a drop. We trailed out the load down the hill, over a road, and a little retardant went in the water. By the time we were back at K-Falls to reload, we were shut down and had word that the Indians were up in arms...we'd just poisoned their fish, rained down death and destruction...that cowboy pilot...nearly killed us, nearly killed the lake...what was he thinking?

He made a mistake. He knew it, didn't try to back away from it, admitted it, took ownership of it. I made it two; I ratified his decision to make that drop, it was my mistake too. We made several attempts to do it, and elected after discussing it and trying it from several angles, to approach from the top of the hill, and retract the flaps as we went over the edge. We reasoned the descent with the flap retraction would match the hill angle and it did...but rolled and nearly put a wingtip in the hill, punched off the load in one long salvo as we went down instead of a small targeted drop. We had no choice at that point.

Was Steve a rogue? No. He made a mistake. As did I. As a professional, he took ownership of it, and offered to pay out of pocket for the fish. Of course, the government wasn't going to have him do that, and he knew it, but his offer was sincere. He'd give you the shirt off his back, if you asked, and we all knew it.

Where does rogue end and professional begin? I know what went on in those cockpits. I can tell you (but I won't) what those men were seeing and what they were thinking and feeling up until impact. I know. I cherish their memories. By remembering them highly, am I hiding rogueish errors that could change mankind, and thereby becoming a rogue myself? Or am I just a professional who did my job as they did theirs, who hasn't yet paid as high a price for my service as did they?

Man is far to quick to point a finger. I'll certainly condemn stupidity myself; it has no place, but neither does arbitrary classification between rough-hewn titles such as rogue and professional, perhaps polar opposites, help quantify the intangible. All it takes is one little mistake to fall from hero to hated, professional to rogue. In so many "accident" chains, that's all it takes. Just one little thing. One little rivet hole lead to that entire tragic loss. One little rivet, and a crack between two rivet holes, buried under five thick layers of metal. I dont' think the person who drilled that rivet was a rogue, either. Perhaps he or she failed to debur. Perhaps he or she used a dull bit. Perhaps the facility heat treating the metal that day failed in some small way, leading to an element of intergranular corrosion which supported the stress fracture that propogated over decades to become a compression failure atop the right wing...or perhaps it was just a bad day.

Are we collectively the rogue? Are we collectively responsible for each other, as well as ourselves? I say yes, and at the same time, a resounding NO.

As pilots in command, we take the ultimate responsibility ourself, and when all outside factors are filtered away, all we can do is blame ourselves, which is where true responsibility in life always lies. With ourselves. Like Craig and Mike, I was an inspector on that aircraft too. Perhaps I'm the rogue, because perhaps it was me that failed to find what eluded everyone else, and perhaps I'l spend the rest of my life wondering.

I will.

Perhaps. Am I the rogue?

Aren't we all?

 

[avbug]

.....

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

av bug.. you are missing the point.....

 

[The_Russian]

This is good reading. Thanks guys!

 

[avbug]

Is not the point exploring where rogue ends and the professional begins or visa versa...or do you have another particular agenda?

What is the point?

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

avbug-

It is obvious that you can't objectively critique Kern's book. maybe he came to the tanker industry and said "you guys are rogues". It is clear that Kern's behavior in dealing with the tanker industry was not well recieved amongst all party's. Maybe he thought the risk/reward wasn't worth it. Maybe other did. Maybe he was right and there better ways to fight fires, or the industry needs to use modern aircraft... However, this is not the point....

His book stands as a definitive analysis of poor pilot behavior. Rogue pilots are a problem. Holland wasn't the last. The airline industry recently, in 2004, had two rogues destroy an aircraft. Kern didn't make this stuff up... he just quantified it....

 

[Alamanach]

I don't know.... maybe he was locked in a closet and beaten by his lazy eyed uncle?

Maybe a chick at the O'club told all the other girls he has a really small pitot tube.

Nonetheless, he was a USAF Col. and he chose to behave that way. Maybe there is a pshyco analysis that can explain, but it doesn't justify....

And back to Kern.... why is he, receiving criticism for pointing out bad behavior? (avbug.... nothing to do with the tankers...)

I'm not trying to justify Holland's flying. If you're going to suggest that Holland is due some punishment, I would point out that you're too late; Bud Holland is dead. His story is over. We can't help him anymore. We can label him a "rogue", but that doesn't accomplish anything beyond irritating avbug.

That Holland was a bad pilot is self-evident. For Kern to point it out is to point out the obvious. (Although for twenty years, Holland was a very good pilot. Somehow he changed. Very mysterious.) I think the criticism of Kern comes in when he points out Holland's shortcomings, but has no follow-up. After reading what he wrote about Holland, I'm not better able to identify warning signs in other pilots, or in myself, or recognize life situations that promote rogue behavior, or anything else. I'm no wiser for having studied Kern's work. (His criticism of the wing's leadership was equally unhelpful.) He's brought nothing to the table except, as I've already described them, lurid stories. I have to conclude that Kern's real objective is merely to entertain.

Now, avbug may be obnoxious and disagreeable, but I think this time he does have a point. This is an inherently dangerous profession requiring a considerable amount of human judgment. By its nature, that judgment cannot be right all the time. So when we introduce polarizing terms like rogue and professional, we create a situation where some people are going to be unjustly villified. It is all the worse when "rogue" is being defined by somebody like Kern, who's not interested in an objective, detached analysis.

I think there are a lot of lessons to be learned by studying pilots like Holland. But I also think Kern isn't teaching those lessons. He's just going for cheap polarization.