Teterboro Accident - CL600

[jimpilot]

As for mugs and gimme's at Simuflite and flight safety, I've never had a mug, and apparently I've been fortunate in my training...because instructors at either institution have never failed to challenge me or force me to fly right. As for failures...the last time I was at Simuflite, my "sim buddy" failed and was held back for additional training and a checkride. He wasn't cut any slack or given any breaks. I flew home, he stayed behind.

If you think that you've been forced to do something unsafe, then you've failed...not the company, not the employer, not the airplane. If you cave in to pressure then look no farther than your own fingertips. A poor carpenter blames his tools. What do you blame?

If you've been getting easy passes at training facilities, getting pushed by employers, accepted less than acceptable maintenance, and flown into unsafe conditions, then who have you to blame but yourself?

Those to whom these comments are addressed know who they are, and need not reply.

Avbug - You said it better than I could ever hope to. All I can add is AMEN!

 

[Texasskicker]

Bravo, NY Times!

NEW YORK TIMES

February 5, 2005

Safety Official Says Pilot Told of a Stick That Jammed

[size=-1]By PATRICK McGEEHAN [/size]

he pilot of the corporate jet that crashed on takeoff at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on Wednesday told investigators yesterday that the control stick jammed when he tried to lift off, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board said.

The pilot, John Kimberling, said that, with the plane moving fast enough to take off, he could pull back the steering yoke only about one inch, said Debbie Hersman, a safety board member. Normally, she said the pilot should be able to pull back the yoke three or four inches at takeoff, causing the nose to lift toward the sky.

Ms. Hersman briefed reporters on an interview that investigators had conducted with Mr. Kimberling at Hackensack University Medical Center. She said investigators had reached no conclusions about what might have caused the accident and had not ruled out any factors.

But Ms. Hersman said a surveillance video from the airport revealed no frost on the windshield of the small plane. She said that the plane's wings were not de-iced before the flight and that only one plane was de-iced at Teterboro that morning, about an hour before Mr. Kimberling tried to take off.

A freelance pilot from South Florida, Mr. Kimberling, 58, commanded a three-person crew that had intended to take eight financial executives to Midway Airport in Chicago. At about 7:20 a.m., they accelerated northward on the shorter of Teterboro's two runways, reaching 153 knots, or 176 miles an hour, which Ms. Hersman said should have been enough to get the plane airborne.

But, according to her description of Mr. Kimberling's account, when the yoke would not pull back enough, he aborted the takeoff, hitting the brakes and deploying the engine thrust reversers. Knowing he could not stop before the plane broke through a metal fence and hopped a drainage ditch, he said he tried to steer across the highway toward the parking lot in front of a warehouse, Ms. Hersman said.

None of the passengers was seriously injured. But two men in a Toyota on Route 46 were seriously injured when the plane sheared the roof off the car. One of those men, James Dinnall, 66, of Paterson, is in critical condition at the medical center in Hackensack; the other, Rohan Foster, 35, of Paterson, was released on Friday from Holy Name Hospital in Teaneck.

Mr. Kimberling broke an ankle and has some other injuries to a leg. His co-pilot, Carlos W. Salaverria, 31, is recovering from multiple leg fractures in Hackensack University Medical Center and has not spoken to investigators.

The safety board's inquiry is complicated by a problem with the flight data recorder that was recovered from the plane. It contains only 10 seconds of data that begins after the plane had reached takeoff speed and ends before it crashed. During that segment the plane slowed from more than 175 miles per hour to less than 105 miles per hour, Ms. Hersman said.

"We're still trying to find out why it started when it did and why it stopped," she said of the data recorder, which she said was installed in the bottom of the plane's baggage compartment. In Washington, analysts will try to sync up that short segment of data with the tape from the cockpit voice recorder to help determine what happened and when, she said.

Investigators also will lift the damaged plane to look underneath for signs of mechanical problems. In addition, they will weigh all the baggage as they remove it and try to determine how much the fuel weighed, to see if the plane was too heavy to take off.

The maximum weight for that type of plane, a Canadair CL-600, is 41,000 pounds, Ms. Hersman said. The two side fuel tanks spilled their contents but the center tank still holds as much as 750 gallons of fuel, which she said may be left in the plane until after it is moved to a nearby storage facility where the investigation will continue.

Another plane of the same type ran off a runway at Teterboro in December 2003 and came to a stop in muddy ground, according to safety board records. The pilot complained afterward that the aircraft did not respond when he pulled back on the control yoke.

Leo Knaapen, a spokesman for Bombardier Aerospace, which makes the planes, said that the investigation into that case concluded that the plane had been overweight.

"That plane was too heavy, sir," Mr. Knaapen said. He said he would not speculate about what might have caused the problem Mr. Kimberling and Mr. Salaverria reported, but he said the company's 600 series of jets is "known throughout the industry as mature, very reliable and remarkably accident-free."

A lawyer representing Mr. Kimberling and the charter company that hired him, Platinum Jet Management of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., said that Mr. Salaverria was telling a similar story about the failure to lift off.

Mr. Salaverria's lawyer, Manuel Epelbaum, said last night that the accounts of the two pilots were "almost verbatim." Mr. Salaverria, who was sitting on the right side of the cockpit, said that Mr. Kimberling called for his help and he pulled back on his own yoke, Mr. Epelbaum said.

"When neither one of them could pull it back, they decided to abort," he said Mr. Salaverria told him. Mr. Salaverria turned on the thrust reversers and then, Mr. Epelbaum said, "they did everything they could to keep the plane on a straight path" as it tore across the highway toward the warehouse.

"If they had turned the plane to the left or the right, one of the wings would have hit the ground and that would have been it," Mr. Epelbaum said. "Those wings are full of fuel."

He said his client would cooperate and give a full statement to the investigators next week. But first, he said, Mr. Salaverria, whose right leg shattered, needs to have a missing chunk of his right calf replaced.


Copyright 2005 The New York Times.
____________________________________________________________

I say bravo for findin the previous incident involvin the CL600. This should be a strong hint for those lookin for how and why this could possibly happen. Some history to back it up.

Still too early to be jumpin to conclusions.

Tex.

 

[VA AV8R]

Is the elevator/horizontal stab on the CL600 hydraulic powered? If a pre-takeoff flight control check was accomplished, what could have caused a jam (let's just say it is a jam for argument's sake) so soon thereafter?

 

[avbug]

I say bravo for findin the previous incident involvin the CL600. This should be a strong hint for those lookin for how and why this could possibly happen. Some history to back it up.

Before you start cheering too loud about the previous incident, tex, I believe the previous incident involved an aircraft loaded over gross with a CG beyond the forward limits.

 

[Texasskicker]

Dont miss my point

Avbug, I dont cheer for incidents or accidents. Watch that.

My point is finally the media is lookin around for answers within the history of both the aircraft and this airport.

Dont forget, the P.A.N.Y.N.J. wants to use this event to show their "concern for safety" by "cutting back" on flights at TEB, we all know the Feds are not going to allow that cause of AIP grants. They must keep the airport open and unrestricted. Except for the 100000 pound restriction in place, they cannot illegally restrict flights.

Where were the calls for restrictions when the 2003 incident happened? None, cause it didnt get press. It stopped within the a/p boundary and no one was hurt. Probably didnt make the am radio news. Who knew? Now that we have had this high profile unfortunate event, the politicians are doin their thing.

Point is that, for those who are scratchin their heads, that last incident is one example of how an aircraft can be unable to take off...in almost the same set of circumstances, unknown to the crew until way too late. Post V1 surprises are not what FAA had in mind during certification. No way to plan enough runway for a V1, VR...rotate, ROTATE ROTATE!!!! ABORT!!!!!!!!! scenario. Will they find something to tag on the pilots, of course! Why didnt they choose the longer runway, did they complete their required 135 W&B and leave a copy behind, did they use actual pax weights, how much luggage, did they use actual luggage weights, where were the passengers seated... we all know that they will find some aspect to say the crew was partially responsible. Did they do a control check? Did they perform a static takeoff? I saw the flaps were down from the pics, but .....

So, Ill say again, it is way too soon to jump to conclusions, AVBUG. Thats what i said before, but you told me im cheerin for the incident. Not sayin its the same thing, just that it illustrates how this can happen to THIS aircraft type...after all it was the same CL600 type aircraft, coincidentally at the same airport. That unfortunate event sheds light on this one in more ways than one.

 

[avbug]

did they complete their required 135 W&B and leave a copy behind, did they use actual pax weights,

Leaving a copy behind hasn't been required for a long time now, and actual passenger weights are permissible only where OpSpecs don't specify standard weights. Same for baggage weights.

Thats what i said before, but you told me im cheerin for the incident.

No, mate. I did not. I only quoted YOU! Don't like it? Then be more careful what you say. Only you can do that. I'm not your mother.

Neither did I suggest or state that you are pleased another aircraft had an incident. What I did state is that if you're looking to a previous incident to support this one or provide some positive light, don't get too excited about a previous incident in which the crew operated over gross and with a forward CG outside limits. That does NOT help the present case. It hurts it. Digging it up won't make things better; it can only add fuel to the fire. Think about it.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

Is the elevator/horizontal stab on the CL600 hydraulic powered? If a pre-takeoff flight control check was accomplished, what could have caused a jam (let's just say it is a jam for argument's sake) so soon thereafter?

I used to fly with a co-pilot who always had a little soft flight bag with him that he stuck down by his feet. He'd been doing it for a while until I made him stop. He claimed that some captain had showed him there was no way it would interfere with the yoke. I still didn't think it was safe. Pretty stupid to put anything down there in my opinion.

Also, I don't know what kind of control lock the CL has.

Ace

 

[C.Warrior]

I am thinking the trim is electric.


No control lock on hydraulic controls.

 

[Gatorman]

411

Just to answer some questions that were asked in some of the previous post....

Yes, the elevators are hydraulically actuated and no there are no locks on the controls.
Yes, the pitch trim is electric, driven by two motors. I changed that particular unit out of that aircraft for slipping in flight myself two years ago.
And before the next question is asked about the hydraulics, if the engines were running (and they were) system #1 and system #2 hydraulics were operating @ 3000psi. Sys #1 running the left elevator and sys #2 running the right. System #3 runs both elevators and it is highly likely that the crew had that system on as a part of their pre engine start checks.

Something that had me thinking since the news about the information about the brakes not being applied is weather or not they were able to be applied with weight off wheels (which they are not). But, the same senerio would be true for the thrust reversers being weight off wheels.
Since the T/R's were deployed, that means thet the aircraft was weight ON wheels and therefore the pressure to the brakes was available if they were to be applied.

I do find interest in the whole control yoke not moving theroy that is currently running....again, another pre takeoff check, "Flight control freedom of movement"

 

[Bandit60]

Just a thought...what if the auto pilot was engaged accidently before takeoff. I have heard that this is a possiblity on this airplane.

I have no real idea but just a thought.

 

[avbug]

I do find interest in the whole control yoke not moving theroy that is currently running....again, another pre takeoff check, "Flight control freedom of movement"

Amid all the wild speculation, seems to me that nobody said the controls wouldn't move...more implied that they wouldn't move the airplane. The issue of the former Challenger overrun at TEB was brought up, which involved an aircraft with a forward CG and being operated over gross. In that case, the pilot indicated directly following the overrun that he was unable to raise the nose...though that turned out to be only because he was loaded too far forward and too heavy.

I won't begin to speculate on what applies here, but what I'm hearing are folks running away with an out of context idea that may, or may not, apply.

 

[A Squared]

Amid all the wild speculation, seems to me that nobody said the controls wouldn't move...more implied that they wouldn't move the airplane. The issue of the former Challenger overrun at TEB was brought up, which involved an aircraft with a forward CG and being operated over gross. In that case, the pilot indicated directly following the overrun that he was unable to raise the nose...though that turned out to be only because he was loaded too far forward and too heavy.

The account that I read did specifically refer to not being able to move the control yoke the normal amount of travel. Of course this is a quote on Avweb from a new york times article quoting hte NTSB quoting the pilot, so who knowswhat the pilot *actually* said.

"According to The New York Times, the pilot in Wednesday's crash, John Kimberling, told NTSB investigators that with the airplane at takeoff speed on the runway, he could only pull back the yoke about an inch instead of the normal three to four inches of travel."

But you're right, it doesn't help to draw parallels with an incident which the NTSB believes was caused by being overweight and having cg forward of the forward limit.

 

[Gatorman]

"According to The New York Times, the pilot in Wednesday's crash, John Kimberling, told NTSB investigators that with the airplane at takeoff speed on the runway, he could only pull back the yoke about an inch instead of the normal three to four inches of travel."
QUOTE]

I find that actually hard to believe. The design is set up with an anti-jam mechanism in the PCU. If the yoke was not moving back all the way.......

I think it was an earlier post where someone talked about an object between the yoke and the seat preventing the yoke from freedom of movement.


.....the yoke will move, even if there is something restraining the elevator phisically.

P.S. The anti-jam is checked every 300 or 600 hours as a part of the Chapt. 5 inspections.

 

[Bandit60]

"According to The New York Times, the pilot in Wednesday's crash, John Kimberling, told NTSB investigators that with the airplane at takeoff speed on the runway, he could only pull back the yoke about an inch instead of the normal three to four inches of travel."
QUOTE]

I find that actually hard to believe. The design is set up with an anti-jam mechanism in the PCU. If the yoke was not moving back all the way.......

I think it was an earlier post where someone talked about an object between the yoke and the seat preventing the yoke from freedom of movement.


.....the yoke will move, even if there is something restraining the elevator phisically.

P.S. The anti-jam is checked every 300 or 600 hours as a part of the Chapt. 5 inspections.

Will the yoke move if the auto pilot is engaged accidently? I was told from a few guys that have lots of time in a CL600 that this is possible as there is not much indication that the autopilot is engaged.

 

[Gatorman]

No, the auto pilot cannot engage on the ground.

Unless it is in the ground test mode

 

[Alchemy]

Did anyone see the Flight Attendant's interview on CNN? Hot **CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED**....

 

[Bandit60]

No, the auto pilot cannot engage on the ground.

Unless it is in the ground test mode

Are you 100percent sure. I got this information for a couple of guys that I work with that have thousands of hours in a CL600. They made sure before every takeoff that the autopilot was not engaged. They said the switch is on the pedastal and is very easy to hit by accident.

 

[LXJ31]

This doesn't plausible to me either. I don't know much about the CL600, but if I were in that situation, unable to rotate, I would try rolling nose-up trim on the yoke trim switch which would disconnect any autopilot, assuming it was working.

 

[Bandit60]

This doesn't plausible to me either. I don't know much about the CL600, but if I were in that situation, unable to rotate, I would try rolling nose-up trim on the yoke trim switch which would disconnect any autopilot, assuming it was working.

I would agree with you too,but it is easy to be monday morning pilots. It would be hard to say what any of us would have really done in the heat of the moment.

 

[Ty Webb]

Glad I'm not flying corporate/charter anymore.

When I flew charter or Part 91, it was every bit as safe as 121, maybe even safer. Why? Because I was in an environment where I could increase the level of safety above and beyond the FAR's and SOP's, if I thought it prudent, and that was that. All you had to do was be able to convey that to the owners/passengers in an articulate manner, and that was it. I never had anyone complain when the obvious reason for the delay/added cost/inconvience was safety, but a little pre-planning to minimize the delay sure helps.

Sure, there are some scum-bag operators out there, but if someone is at one of those, do whatever you have to do to get out of that environment ASAP. Those are usually the crappiest places to work, anyway . . . . so what are you waiting for?

As for the guy advocating flying the airplane off the runway using trim- I think that most of us are so conditioned to abort the takeoff if you have a control problem that the first instinct would be to follow your training and abort . . . who wants to get airborne with a jammed stab, anyway?

They all lived, so what he did worked, I guess.

 

[LXJ31]

I guess if I had to choose between blasting into a brick building that says "Strawberry" on the side at a 100kts or taking an undetermined problem into the air, I'd go with the one that would keep me alive in the near term. I'm somewhat shocked and pleasantly suprised there weren't any fatalities, although the occupants of the car that got T-boned aren't out of the woods yet. It depends on the situation; if you are at a smallish airport with densely packed buildings across the street a la Midway, its a different scenario than say Omaha where there is plenty of runway and not much around it. There are too many variables that come into play: what kind of control issue? Is it frozen? Do you have some movement? Are you getting full movement but no pitch up? Does the trim even work? What kind of aircraft, takeoff distance calculated etc? So no, I wouldn't agree to abort under all circumstances past rotation with a perceived control problem.

Bandit 60 is right, it is Monday morning quarterbacking and I shouldn't even be speculating.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

This doesn't plausible to me either. I don't know much about the CL600, but if I were in that situation, unable to rotate, I would try rolling nose-up trim on the yoke trim switch which would disconnect any autopilot, assuming it was working.

Nose up trim on an aircraft with a trim tab would actually make the aircraft go down more if the control was stuck. Also, at Vr, you are over V1 and any abort is going to be in the 'test pilot' arena (no data is available for accel / stop above V1). If you really think that you would take the time to roll in trim, you would only be making matters worse. Every second in that situation would result in hundreds of extra feet of overrun.

Ace

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

When I flew charter or Part 91, it was every bit as safe as 121, maybe even safer. Why? Because I was in an environment where I could increase the level of safety above and beyond the FAR's and SOP's, if I thought it prudent, and that was that. All you had to do was be able to convey that to the owners/passengers in an articulate manner, and that was it. I never had anyone complain when the obvious reason for the delay/added cost/inconvience was safety, but a little pre-planning to minimize the delay sure helps.

Sure, there are some scum-bag operators out there, but if someone is at one of those, do whatever you have to do to get out of that environment ASAP. Those are usually the crappiest places to work, anyway . . . . so what are you waiting for?

As for the guy advocating flying the airplane off the runway using trim- I think that most of us are so conditioned to abort the takeoff if you have a control problem that the first instinct would be to follow your training and abort . . . who wants to get airborne with a jammed stab, anyway?

They all lived, so what he did worked, I guess.

Good points. I flew charter for some years and was always safe. Part 135 is MORE regulated and restrictive than part 91. So, if a pilot wants to be safe, fly 135 or 91 and FLY SAFE. It IS that simple.

Ace

 

[Gulfstream 200]

Not sure...


I have HEARD of more than one Challenger and DA900 that have been trimmed into the air after they were possibly out of CG. At VR the aircraft would not get into the air, even full aft...a few bursts of trim were able to get it flying...

test pilot area for sure...but I have seen it!

Ill take that over a 160KT abort anyday...

Nose up trim on an aircraft with a trim tab would actually make the aircraft go down more if the control was stuck. Also, at Vr, you are over V1 and any abort is going to be in the 'test pilot' arena (no data is available for accel / stop above V1). If you really think that you would take the time to roll in trim, you would only be making matters worse. Every second in that situation would result in hundreds of extra feet of overrun.

Ace

 

[LXJ31]

Nose up trim on an aircraft with a trim tab would actually make the aircraft go down more if the control was stuck. Also, at Vr, you are over V1 and any abort is going to be in the 'test pilot' arena (no data is available for accel / stop above V1). If you really think that you would take the time to roll in trim, you would only be making matters worse. Every second in that situation would result in hundreds of extra feet of overrun.

Ace

Again, it depends on the situation. In this case, we do not know if the yoke was stuck, unresponsive, or limited in travel. The fact that we are way past rotation speed puts you in that situation I described: the accelerate/stop calculation is out the window and you have no idea how far off the airport you are going to run. Perhaps you'll get lucky and hit a pillow factory, but in some circumstances I'll take my chances in the air. Each situation is unique.

 

[Ty Webb]

There is a big difference between an abort at V1 and 165 KIAS. Don;t know about the Challenger, but VR with dry runway numbers is only a knot or two over V1 in my airplane, and using wet runway numbers it is still only five knots.

If I hear "V1, VR" and pull back on the yoke, and it is stuck or the plane is not responding, the abort is happening. . . . and a few knots north of V1 may result in a low speed departure from the runway, but to me that's much better than being airborn with a primary control surface jammed, for crying out loud.

You want to go playing around with a stab problem, knock yourself out. Suggest you re-read the NTSB report on the AK MD80 flight first, if you're feeling like Bob Hoover.

 

[Ace-of-the-Base]

There is a big difference between an abort at V1 and 165 KIAS. Don;t know about the Challenger, but VR with dry runway numbers is only a knot or two over V1 in my airplane, and using wet runway numbers it is still only five knots.

If I hear "V1, VR" and pull back on the yoke, and it is stuck or the plane is not responding, the abort is happening. . . . and a few knots north of V1 may result in a low speed departure from the runway, but to me that's much better than being airborn with a primary control surface jammed, for crying out loud.

You want to go playing around with a stab problem, knock yourself out. Suggest you re-read the NTSB report on the AK MD80 flight first, if you're feeling like Bob Hoover.

Agreed! I would much rather be skidding off the end of the runway than taking a plane into the air with a primary flight control not working. But, opinions are like you-know-whats...everyone's got one.

Intentionally flying with a stuck elevator...sheeesh!

Ace

 

[LXJ31]

There is a big difference between an abort at V1 and 165 KIAS. Don;t know about the Challenger, but VR with dry runway numbers is only a knot or two over V1 in my airplane, and using wet runway numbers it is still only five knots.

I don't know either.

If I hear "V1, VR" and pull back on the yoke, and it is stuck or the plane is not responding, the abort is happening. . . . and a few knots north of V1 may result in a low speed departure from the runway, but to me that's much better than being airborn with a primary control surface jammed, for crying out loud.

We're not that far apart on this. In a perfect world you have plenty of runway, plenty of clearway and in that case I'd opt for the highspeed abort as well. But there are instances, and I see some of them from rotation to rotation, where the runways are short (calculating T/O distance down to the gnat's arse or using airport analysis,) unattended airports (forget about ARFF,) with substantially lethal obstacles (buildings, forests, rising terrain) such that assuming we survive the collision, we probably wouldn't survive the fire. In cases like these, the calculated V speeds and takeoff distance means very much and little extra padding exists. I'll say it again, each situation is unique so a one-size-fits-all approach to problem solving may not work.

You want to go playing around with a stab problem, knock yourself out. Suggest you re-read the NTSB report on the AK MD80 flight first, if you're feeling like Bob Hoover.

I don't want to play around with a stab problem or high speed aborts any more than I want to choose between getting lung cancer or having a stroke. I don't understand the adversarial tone of your posts...

 

[LXJ31]

Agreed! I would much rather be skidding off the end of the runway than taking a plane into the air with a primary flight control not working. But, opinions are like you-know-whats...everyone's got one.

Intentionally flying with a stuck elevator...sheeesh!

Ace

See my previous post. When you say "Intentionally flying with a stuck elevator....sheeesh!," its minimizing what actually is occuring. Its not a simple choice, in some cases, of deciding that I'd enjoy the death-defying challenge of flying a malfunctioning airplane, or that I think aborted takeoffs are for quitters, but rather using one's head to analyze the situation before you even leave the chocks. In some cases, and I've given a couple of examples, a test-pilot RTO above VR (how far above? who knows...the TEB Challenger aborted more than a few knots above rotate, somewhere around 160) with a stand of old-growth pines at the end of a slick runway ready to shred a moderately moving aircraft loaded with Jet-A, it may be preferable to try things that go against conventional wisdom.

So, we are talking about an extremely unlikely occurence of almost lottery-winner odds, but it could happen. Would you take a sick airplane into the air, or abort into an object that may end up killing you. Each situation is unique.

 

[Ty Webb]

So, we are talking about an extremely unlikely occurence of almost lottery-winner odds, but it could happen. Would you take a sick airplane into the air, or abort into an object that may end up killing you. Each situation is unique.

Amen, and well-put. Evidently, what they did worked- a worst-case scenario and everyone lived. Hope they don't turn around and hang him in the court of public opinion. After all, he did "miss the runway on takeoff", you know.