Number$Cruncher:
You present some well thought-out, but not necessarily accurate, IMHO, perspectives.
Should BH decide to divest itself of NJA, although at this time I don't see it happening, NJA would not necessarily just "disappear." Assuming the basic "fractional model" originally designed by Santulli is not inherently and fatally flawed (as I, and WB, and you (?) all apparently agree), if any provider is best positioned to dominate (read: expand, prosper & eventually profit), it should be NJA, and a lot of smart & well connected (socially, financially, and, politically?) folks know that. This concept has now even made it's way into smaller, piston aircraft, and we've had time share properties for how long?
NJA produces huge, valuable cashflow, as well as a captive customer for BH's other division, FlightSafety, covering fixed expenses over there, even at "negociated, discounted" fee structures. In holdings as vast as BH, it all can add up...
And the the fracas from the actions of those owners, along with their 1-15 partners, whom have been handed the keys to a jet that has far more hours on it than "they've" utilized (remember, an owner may never fly in their own jet, but they're flying in someone's, that poor devil, as they fly off their contract hours) in a suddenly over supplied and soft market will be an attorney's bonanza in itself. BTW, when is it ever too late to take the bar?
Should BH "tire" of NJA, there would exist an opportunity that it could go the way it may have already gone had WB not jumped in, to become a public company. Now that may be contrary to Santulli's overall goals of control and self-determination, but I've learned to "never say never..." Circumstances, value and market opportunities could end up being a powerful aphrodisiac for Santulli and WB. NJA is still Santulli's "baby," and BH holds portions of many, many other public companies. Could the settlement of this contract (as the T/A is written) be a new prom dress in NJA's ultimate future?
Could there be a need for a realignment of costs, or a "tweaking" of the fractional model? Possibly, but from what I've read about ineffiencies and out-right waste at NJA, this contract is not the wisest place to start, or to view as the answer to NJA's ultimate "profitablity," which as I stated earlier, I do not believe is the current tactic. Despite what Santilli's, NJA's upper leadship, and even WB's feelings may be about their pilots, they are "stuck" with them because as you've said, NJA is not an airline-type company. Nor are they really an aircraft operating comapny, as you've indicated in your cost comparison to SWA/JB. Both those companies do own their aircraft.
NJA is a service company (and admittedly a sales company, however that "division" is totally dependant on "service..."), even more so than SWA and JB may see themselves, for the above asset management rather than ownership reason, not that I'd believe profit is not generated through the hourly occupied fees. NJA pilots are the rank-and-file, day-to-day, frontline providers. Why Santilli/management/HB, or any wise manager with a supposed eye on the long term, would not want to guarantee the aircraft owner's expected level of satisfaction (read: repeat customers, referrals, future sales, etc.) has me puzzled...How much long term damage has been done in this tactic? The fact that the owners have not become involved yet sounds like it may change with a "new MEC."
NJA will have to become very creative in thier marketing message & strategy if they plan to sell themselves as the most solid, most experienced, most safe provider, if they put in place an environment that does not encourage those same values in their pilots, one of their main "service providers."
My understanding is that there will be a sizable portion of the existing work force that will not choose NJA as a career, while NJA will attract less experienced, less committed "time-builders" or "type-seekers" as already indicate on this board. This just doesn't bode well for a supposed "high-level, service company," nor for bottom line training and turnover costs, if this is supposed what management is hoping to contain.
And face it, were not talking about an eventual "Wal-martification" of this fractional industry as has occurred in the airline seat/commodity industry, because the financial commitment by the owners is waayyyy out of reach of anybody other than this country's established and privileged elite--indeed, the whole fractional, particularly NJA's, image is designed to be anti-mass, "Anti-WalMart."
My understanding is that once NJA "sells out" an aircarft, it no long is an assset to NJA--the profits of the sale contibute to the bottom line (somewhere.) I agree that core aircraft are a part of NJA's asset base, but that alone does not count for the growth of the net value of NJA, unless some rather deceptive accounting has been applied, which I stongly doubt.
BH does, or should care, about the ""need" for Netjets' lift," because that is what NJA and the fractional model is all about, unless BH or NJA just wants to be an aircraft broker.
The
"return on invested capital, profits, cash generated from operations" is there and again, were I Santulli/BH I may have considered the same tactic, but in the end it could undermine those same long term strategies they ultimately pursue. There seems to be a disconnect in BH/NJA long term goals and the current tactics, whether they are successful in getting this T/A passed or not, unless I'm missing something.
This will be an interesting, drawn out, but hopefully not sad, eventual process for all involved...stay tuned.