Southwest "exits" runway.....again.

[Fins Up]

.......That said, SWA does taxi faster, on average, than any other airline. I've seen SWA many times operate in a way that is less than professional in order to try and cut in front of other airplanes ( although the worst I ever saw was one of my colleagues doing it to competitor about 20 years ago, but that's a different story) and flying like you are Tony Stewart does undermine safety. It's the only reason a SWA 737 went off the runway in BUR. You guys can get away with it because you spend your entire career doing nothing but fly 737's and doing lot's of segments so you are good at flying them, but it isn't a very professional way to operate.

Seen the same here. Taxiing out of BDL the SWA behind me was all in a fluff because I wasn't going fast enough for his taste. That crap makes me slow down even more.

I don't think anyone can deny that SWA taxiis faster than everybody else. And it seems like they're on the news more than anyone else for departing pavement. No, I don't have numbers so feel free to post statistics contrary to this observation.

SWA Bubba seems very defensive. Admitting there may be a problem is tough I guess.

Oh BTW, I'm a Jetblue guy if you care.

 

[SWA Bubba]

Well the truth be known Bubba, I just switched to the A330 and brake temps are BIG issue when taxing. The recommended technique is to allow the speed to increase to 30kts or 35 kts before slowing the A/C down! The reason is to minimize the number of brake applications to keep the temps below 300 degrees before takeoff.
Make no mistake about it, most SWA flights I see taxing are as smooth and professional as anyone. But the few cowboys you see from time to time do usually seem to be SWA, and I have seen a few doozies .

Must be the brakes of the future. Our -800s have carbon brakes now instead of the steel ones in our other planes. We're told something similar about speed and number of brake applications.

Hey, thanks for being civil and reasonable in your discourse, even when you don't agree. Happy New Year yourself! Being junior, I'll be flying of course....

Bubba

 

[SWA Bubba]

Seen the same here. Taxiing out of BDL the SWA behind me was all in a fluff because I wasn't going fast enough for his taste. That crap makes me slow down even more.

Thanks for your very professional response to a perceived problem!

Bubba

 

[B6Busdriver]

OK I'll bite.....and admit I am basing my opinion on recalling a report that said he was at the outer marker clean and doing something in the neighborhood of 250 kts. That's all I remember of the accident report. If that's true though, the fact remains, he was in a hurry, that's why he went off the runway.
Don't know where you get I am afraid of taxing 30 kts in a straight line. I'm talking about rushing to get ahead of others, going fast and then having to jam on the brakes so hard you can see the airplane rock back and forth etc etc.

I agree with what Dan has to say. I really don't care how fast WN pilots taxi, however I'm real tired of being cutoff. I was cutoff by a WN pilot in LAS that had to be going 50kts. He was told to give way and poured the coals to it to be first, I had to slam on the brakes to prevent from hitting the guy. One of the most unprofessional things I have ever seen. Also I saw it happen in OAK and just recently in MCO. Maybe it's a perception problem on my part but it seems way too many guys at WN think they are better than everyone else. I know that doesn't apply to the majority of your pilots but you guys definitely have some cowboys.

 

[BILL LUMBERG]

MCO and FLL are the worst for letting "it" happen.... (See my Line below)

 

[Just thinking]

NTSB report
At 1805:08, the SCT Woodland controller instructed flight 1455 to “turn left heading one
six zero.” A comparison of the recorded radar data of the accident airplane to 70 other airplanes
that had landed at BUR on runway 8 between 1000 and 2200 on June 13 and 14, 2000, showed
that of the 16 airplanes vectored from the north side of BUR to land on runway 8, 12 were
vectored to intercept the final approach course between 9 and 15 nm west of the runway
threshold. Flight 1455 was given vectors that resulted in interception of the final approach course
about 8 nm west of the runway threshold. This vector put the airplane in an unfavorable position
for final approach, complicated the accident flight crews approach planning and execution, and
contributed to the unstabilized approach.
Further, the controllers restriction to flight 1455 at 1808:19 to “cross Van Nuys at or
above three thousand” was ambiguous. According to the Pilot/Controller Glossary, restrictions
are defined as “[a]n altitude or altitudes, stated in the order flown, which are to be maintained
until reaching a specific point or time. Altitude restrictions may be issued by ATC [air traffic
control] due to traffic, terrain, or other airspace considerations.” The flight was on a160° heading, and crossing over the specific point of Van Nuys was not part of the accident
flights approach. The flight passed abeam of the Van Nuys very high frequency
omni-directional range navigation transmitter by about 2 miles but was not supposed to cross
over Van Nuys. This ambiguous clearance might have caused the flight crew to delay descent
longer than necessary.
In summary, the Safety Board concludes that the actions of the SCT Woodland controller
positioned the airplane too fast, too high, and too close to the runway threshold to leave any safe
options other than a go-around maneuver.
In post-accident interviews, the flight crew told investigators that, during the approach, the
captains navigation radio was tuned to the ILS frequency for runway 8, and the first officers
radio was tuned to the Van Nuys VOR. They indicated that the autopilot was engaged in the
VOR/LOC mode7 and that the airplane captured the localizer course but then overshot the
centerline before correcting back.8 The captain stated to investigators that as the flight passed
about 2 miles west of Van Nuys at 3,000 feet at approximately 220 to 230 knots, he deployed the
speed brakes.
According to the CVR, at 1809:28, when the airplane was at an indicated airspeed of
about 220 knots, the captain called for “flaps five.” At 1809:32, the flaps began to extend.
At 1809:43, the captain called for “gear down.” The captain indicated in a post-accident
interview that at this point in the flight, he noted a 20-knot tailwind indication on the flight
management system (FMS) screen.9 At 1809:53, the BUR tower controller stated, “Southwest
fourteen fifty five, wind uh-two one zero at six [knots], runway eight, cleared to land.”
Simultaneously, the captain called for “flaps fifteen.”10 At 1810:01, the captain again called for
“flaps…fifteen” and “[flaps] twenty five.”
From 1810:24 until 1810:59, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) alerts were
being continuously broadcast in the cockpit, first as “sink rate” and then, at 1810:44, switching to
“whoop, whoop, pull up.” At 1810:29, the captain stated, “flaps thirty, just put it down.”
At 1810:33, the captain stated, “put it to [flaps] forty. t won’t go, I know that. t’s all right.
[F]inal descent checklist.” After the GPWS “whoop, whoop, pull up” alert sounded at 1810:47,
the captain stated, “that’s all right,” at 1810:53. A final “sink rate” warning was recorded
at 1810:55. The first officer stated in a postaccident interview that instead of reading the final
descent checklist,11 he visually confirmed the checklist items and remembered seeing the captain
arm the ground spoilers. The first officer also stated that when the captain called for flaps 40°,
the airspeed was about 180 knots and went as high as 190 knots during the approach.12 The first
officer indicated that he pointed to his airspeed indicator to alert the captain of the flap limit
speed of 158 knots at flaps 40°.
The captain told Safety Board investigators that he remembered hearing the “sink rate”
warning from the GPWS but that he did not react to the warning because he did not feel that he
had to take action. He stated that he did not remember any other GPWS warnings during the
approach. The first officer indicated in a postaccident interview that he heard both the “sink rate”
and the “pull up” GPWS warnings but that he believed that the captain was correcting.

PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this
accident was the flight crew’s excessive airspeed and flightpath angle during the approach and
landing and its failure to abort the approach when stabilized approach criteria were not met.
Contributing to the accident was the controller’s positioning of the airplane in such a manner as
to leave no safe options for the flight crew other than a go-around maneuver.

 

[B6Busdriver]

MCO and FLL are the worst for letting "it" happen.... (See my Line below)

LOL Bill, that's a good one!

 

[HA25]

it would be funny to see how southwest pilots adjust to a wide body added to their fleet (hypothetical).. Especially an under trucked one like the MD11 or A330... I'm pretty sure you'd have airplanes turning back to the gate before they got to the end of the runway for break over-temps. lol

sorry, couldn't resist.... I love Southwest, really do... enjoy the business select product.. best bang for the buck in the domestic market.

 

[HA25]

Must be the brakes of the future. Our -800s have carbon brakes now instead of the steel ones in our other planes. We're told something similar about speed and number of brake applications.

Hey, thanks for being civil and reasonable in your discourse, even when you don't agree. Happy New Year yourself! Being junior, I'll be flying of course....

Bubba

I finally got to meet "Dan" in person and he's even a bigger gentleman in person... Seems like most guys I've bumped into at HAL have been.

 

[IBNAV8R]

"PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this
accident was the flight crew’s excessive airspeed and flightpath angle during the approach and
landing and its failure to abort the approach when stabilized approach criteria were not met."

15-20 years ago, SWA had a CULTURE of high and fast gliding (unstabilized) approaches. Word was that this was for "fuel savings". "It can't be dangerous, we've never had a fatality." "This was the controller's fault"

While a "directive" may have been issued by the co., it wasn't until a little boy was killed that I actually started seeing SWA consistently fly "more" stabilized approaches (even though the latter accident had more to do with thrust reverser deployment) "Icy runway's fault"

When I say this:
I once saw a corn-dog-colored -200 taxi off 26L in PHX, taxi past "S" on what is now "D," stop, and then start again, without talking to anyone, and blowing over a GA plane (on "S") in the process. When I mentioned that to another SWA CA, "It was the stupid GA pilot's fault."

That's anecdotal (and true, I witnessed it first hand).

It's quite different when MOST times I see the orange and blue taxi, it's WAY too fast. It's even MORE different that virtually all my colleagues have the same impression.

A wing of one of your planes went over a ramper's head and you say "speed wasn't a factor, so it's all good?" Or, "the ramper was on a taxiway" - so caution was not in order? Are you f'n kidding me? Whether the wing was really "over" the head is not the issue. The response, however, is quite alarming.

When I pair this with having NEVER heard ANY SWA pilot reflect even a hint of crew blame in any of these incidents, or even acknowledge any action by any of their crews might be unsafe it is NOT anecdotal. It is evidence of a dangerous CULTURE.

Zero accidents does not equal safe.