IFF: Although you disagree with me
way too much - you're a good moderator
BTW - no need to pick on female pilots - I've flown with some great aviatrixs. This Mesa mess IMHO also involved the training department - this sort of flying / decision making should have been eliminated before signing the candidate up for the type ride...
Here's the NTSB prelim - I love the part about going around "not being an option" during the brief:
NTSB Identification: NYC02LA013
Scheduled 14 CFRPart 121 operation of Air Carrier Mesa Airlines (D.B.A. US Airways Express)
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 16, 2001 at Roanoke, VA
Aircraft:Embraer EMB-145LR, registration: N825MJ
Injuries: 33 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 16, 2001, at 2114 eastern daylight time, an Embraer 145LR, N825MJ, operated by Mesa Airlines as US Airways Express flight 5733, was substantially damaged while landing at Roanoke Regional/Woodrum Field Airport, Roanoke, Virginia. The 2 certificated pilots, 1 flight attendant, and 30 passengers were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the scheduled passenger flight. The flight was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan under 14 CFR 121.
According to Mesa Airlines personnel, the flight originated at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. No problems were reported with the en route or approach phases, and the flight had been vectored for a visual approach to runway 33.
According to the captain:
"…While on short final approach to landing at Roanoke (...[reported winds] of 280 at 25 [knots] gust to 40 [knots]), there was an abrupt drop in indicated airspeed. Upon simultaneous notification of the stick shaker, I applied power accordingly and landed without apparent incident.
As the landing was more firm than usual, the first officer and I mutually agreed to visually inspect the aircraft upon arrival at the gate. The visual post flight inspection noted nothing unusual, nor any damage to the aircraft.
As the occurrence noted no damage to aircraft, passengers, or crew, no further action was taken."
According to the first officer:
"…We arrived into the Roanoke area approximately 9:45 PM, and began a visual approach to runway 33. The captain briefed that a go-around was not an option due to hills on the other side of the runway. Takeoffs were not authorized on 33 during night and IFR operations. Although we had a quartering crosswind at 15 mph gusting to 21 mph, I do not think there was any wind shear. The approach was normal until approximately 300 feet AGL, when I called that we were one dot high on the PAPI and Ref +5. The captain appeared to pull the thrust levers to idle and placed both hands back on the yoke. At 200-300 feet I called Ref -5, Ref -10, then the stick shaker activated for one second and we began to sink rapidly. I saw the airspeed reach 110 KIAS, the captain pushed the thrust levers up, but the engines did not spool up in time, and the stall stick shaker went off [again]. At this point, approximately 100 feet AGL, the aircraft seemed to stall and within seconds hit the end of the runway. The main gear hit the runway very hard, then the nose gear followed quickly. I do not recall the pitch attitude. The events happened very quickly, and by the time I thought about going around it was too late.
Immediately upon deplaning I inspected the entire aircraft with a flashlight, paying particular attention to the landing gear. I did not notice any damage to the aircraft, and if I had, I would have reported it immediately. The captain verified that there was no damage and said that it was not necessary to have maintenance inspect the aircraft. I felt uneasy but complied."
The flight attendant stated:
"I strapped in, heard all the necessary commands from the computer in the cockpit: '300', '200', '100'...then right after I heard the computer say the 100...I heard this alarming shaking noise and rapid beeping alarm...The aircraft immediately slammed to the ground…."
According to a check captain for Mesa Airlines:
"At approximately midnight on October 16, 2001, I received a phone call from Captain... telling me she thought I was taking her plane the next morning...she told me about her arrival into ROA in strong gusty winds. She described it as a rough ride with a possible stick shaker and a hard landing at the end. I asked her if there was any damage to the aircraft. She said the FO and her had inspected the landing gear and tires during post flight and found no damage. I told her that if she was in doubt, she needed to report it as a hard landing...Upon arrival at the airport the next morning, I discovered that the Charlotte crew had the [accident] airplane and not myself. Wanting to pass on the information to...[that captain], I summarized the story from the night before...."
The accident airplane was subsequently flown to Charlotte, North Carolina, where a crew swap took place. The new flight crew discovered the damage during the pre-flight inspection.
The airplane was removed from revenue service and further inspected. A ferry permit was then issued, and the airplane was flown to a heavy maintenance facility for further examination. There, it was determined that the airplane had broken and cracked frames and stringers, popped rivets, and the skin had been worn through in the lower aft pressure vessel. Scraped skin was also visible on the lower aft fuselage, in an area about 10 feet long by 3 feet wide.
There were no notations in the airplane's log sheets regarding a hard landing at either Roanoke or Charlotte. However, the accepting crew at Charlotte entered a maintenance discrepancy of a tail strike due to overrotation.
The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder were retained for further investigation. According to the flight data recorder, the maximum g load at the time of touchdown at Roanoke was +2.75 fir 0.25 seconds.
The 2054 and 2154 weather observations at Roanoke reported winds from 300 degrees at 17 knots with gusts to 22 knots, and winds from 280 degrees at 16 knots, with gusts to 23 knots, respectively.
The captain's total flight experience was about 2,500 hours. She had accumulated 200 hours in the EMB-145, all within the preceding 90 days. She had upgraded from the Beech 1900, where she had been a first officer.
The first officer's total flight experience was 1,850 hours with 750 hours in the EMB-145. She had accumulated 90 hours in the preceding 90 days. She had upgraded from the Beech 1900, where she had been a first officer.
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