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Shutting off the fuel in a Seneca I

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Like I said, a lot have people have made the same mistake, some of them fooled by a similiar experiment to what you did. Complacency.

When debris moves to block something during the takeoff, or a partially opened valve causes the failure...you'll wind up in the same boat as a great many others who have made the same mistake.

Nobody ever believes until it happens to them. Too bad.
 
When debris moves to block something during the takeoff, or a partially opened valve causes the failure...you'll wind up in the same boat as a great many others who have made the same mistake.

No mistake, my friend.

"Test, don't guess." It is an axiom that is tried and true.

If you are having a fuel problem, such as inadequate flow due to a partially blocked valve, you will find out about that current condition during the runup in this airplane.

If a blockage occurs after the runup, it happens long after the fuel selectors have been returned to the "on" position, and after the testing required by the checklist. Then, the strongest possiblity might be assymetric thrust on the takeoff roll. If the failure happens at rotation, I will abort the takeoff. It's all training, and the willingness to follow the training.

At that point, I have the same likelihood of having a failure as any other twin, and I have proven that the crossfeed is capable of operation if I need to use it following a real inflight engine failure. I would be in big trouble if I had not beeen in the habit of following the checklist testing of the valves, and at the time I needed to use them, found them failing to operate. I think that is a far bigger problem than having a failure during runup.

Apparently, so does Piper.
 
Piper places the information in the normal proceedure to cover themselves. There is no need, nor requirement, that it be done during taxi. A checklist is not a "do" list. It's nothing more than a list to ensure that you've covered everything. Great lattitude is possible in the method by which it's conducted.

"Test, don't guess." It is an axiom that is tried and true.

So what you're really saying, then, is that it's okay, because it hasn't happened to you. Yet.

It's happened to many others. Just not you. Yet.

Good logic.

Or perhaps you're just saying that because it didn't do it one time, it won't do it any other time. Also good logic. Similiar logic is found in dehorning all the cows each time the chicken coop burns down.
 
Piper places the information in the normal proceedure to cover themselves. There is no need, nor requirement, that it be done during taxi. A checklist is not a "do" list. It's nothing more than a list to ensure that you've covered everything. Great lattitude is possible in the method by which it's conducted.

According to the checklist for this airplane, the valves are to be placed in the "x-feed" position during the taxi. It is very plain about it. The runup portion of the list makes equally plain that the valves are to be returned to "on" for the runup portion.

Every Fed and DPE I know, which is inclusive of the one's that flew with both myself and students in the airplane in question regard every checklist item as a "requirement." In fact, it was a fed that suggested the idea of returning to "on" before reaching the runup area in order to ensure proper operation of the fuel system.



So what you're really saying, then, is that it's okay, because it hasn't happened to you. Yet.

No, not at all. "Test, don't guess" is an axiom of mechanical repair. If you have tested a device or system, instead of guessing that the system will perform properly when called upon, you have a far better chance of having that system or device perform as intended when it is needed. For example, no one would fail to take a compression reading on a cylinder during an inspection for fear of disloging some dirt or grit during the removal or reinstallation process.

What gets me is you know this.


Logic? This is the logic of the preflight, the logic of the runup, the logic of the annual inspection, the basis of quality control theory, and the foundation of the self-checks that computers use before loading the operating system.

To not test these valves would be illogical.



Or perhaps you're just saying that because it didn't do it one time, it won't do it any other time. Also good logic. Similiar logic is found in dehorning all the cows each time the chicken coop burns down.

I'm saying that this check is a requirement of the operation of the aircraft, and that regular adherance to this procedure helps to keep the moving parts of these valves clean and lubricated with fuel, and decreases the chance of having a problem with these valves when needed to perform in flight.

Besides, we sold off most of the chickens and I burned down the coops personally, when I was 11.

It was on my father's checklist.

:D
 
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No, not at all. "Test, don't guess" is an axiom of mechanical repair.

As a working aircraft mechanic and inspector, I suppose I've missed that, over the years. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. Axiom, is it?

Placing the fuel valves in the crossfeed position during taxi was never on any checklist in the airplane when I flew the Seneca.

If you have tested a device or system, instead of guessing that the system will perform properly when called upon, you have a far better chance of having that system or device perform as intended when it is needed. For example, no one would fail to take a compression reading on a cylinder during an inspection for fear of disloging some dirt or grit during the removal or reinstallation process.

Really. Tell that to the crew of Alaska Flight 261. While there's no doubt as to the misuse of grease on the jackscrew that failed, there's also no doubt that overuse and overtesting lead to the failure. The same may be said for the failure of many components that have only so many cycles or repititions in them.

As for making a bizarre connection between moving a fuel selector prior to the most critical phase of flight (takeoff), and performing a compression test during a routine mechanical inspection, it's nonsensical and stupid. One can kill you, the other can save your life. Dislodging degris or releasing debris that has been stopped at the selector can do harm, whereas debris isn't an issue in any respect during a compression test. To say it's an apples and oranges comparison would be to make an understatement. Not even in the same ballpark.

Logic? This is the logic of the preflight, the logic of the runup, the logic of the annual inspection, the basis of quality control theory, and the foundation of the self-checks that computers use before loading the operating system.

Again, a nonsensical statement.

Moving selector valves, especially shutoff valves, or switching to a fresh tank before takeoff, is dangerous, stupid, and gets people killed every year. Even examiners. Being an examiner doesn't mean one's brilliant, intelligent, or even much of an authority. It means one can administer a practical test and determine that a student has met a minimum particular practical standard. End of story.
 
I know someone that almost died from their instructor shutting off the fuel valve on the seneca 1 in the pattern. Happened a few years ago at Flagger Co airport in FL. Just north of DAB. It was the Phil Air crash. Anyways the owner of the school was checking out 2 new MEIs so they could teach in the seneca. Sometime in the pattern Phil turned off the fuel selector and of course the engine failed. Somehow they got slow and they also failed the right engine with right hand traffic pattern. So they got low and slow and then tried to feather the prop before hitting power lines...but too late did a Vmc roll into the ground and caught on fire. The 2 guys up front werent too hurt although Phil almost lost a foot, the MEI in the back was burned up pretty bad and spent months in the hospital. I guess my point is get a new MEI man. I taught in the PA 34 for over 200 hours. I never shut the fuel selector off below 3000 feet. Throttle only till then. With throttle the airplane feels like its on one engine but youve got an out if you need it. And our checklist called for checking the fuel valve in cross feed for one min before we left the parking spot.
 
I know someone that almost died from their instructor shutting off the fuel valve on the seneca 1 in the pattern.

That was a BIG mistake that never should have happened.

I never shut the fuel selector off below 3000 feet. Throttle only till then. With throttle the airplane feels like its on one engine but youve got an out if you need it. And our checklist called for checking the fuel valve in cross feed for one min before we left the parking spot.

Good. You can expect this regime to serve you well.
 
As a working aircraft mechanic and inspector, I suppose I've missed that, over the years. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. Axiom, is it?

The vast majority of mechanics don't work on airplanes. Happy to share that axiom with you. I was bitten on the keister several times before I began to regard testing as an axiom.

Placing the fuel valves in the crossfeed position during taxi was never on any checklist in the airplane when I flew the Seneca.

Okay...

It was on both Seneca I checklists I used, in two examples of the airplane.

Apparently, it was on "great cornholio" 's checklist.

And this afternoon, I found it also on an aftermarket checklist for the same airplane in a pilot shop while purchasing some charts.

That's three unrelated instances of the same operation during the taxi phase for this airplane.


Really. Tell that to the crew of Alaska Flight 261. While there's no doubt as to the misuse of grease on the jackscrew that failed, there's also no doubt that overuse and overtesting lead to the failure. The same may be said for the failure of many components that have only so many cycles or repititions in them.

Apparently, this was a problem that was unrelated to "testing", and that wear resulted form use. Without causing massive thread drift, I think I can say that I know you (and respect you) enough to say that you might agree with me that anything a human designs might be subject to flaws. Maintenance procedures are often changed as a response for our inablility to design "perfect" machines, as was the case with the jack screws.


As for making a bizarre connection between moving a fuel selector prior to the most critical phase of flight (takeoff), and performing a compression test during a routine mechanical inspection, it's nonsensical and stupid. One can kill you, the other can save your life.

Apparently, those nonsensical guys at Piper see this in a different light. Checking compression on a cylinder is a good idea to allow you to have a reasonable expectation of service from an engine.

Similarly, the engineers who designed this aircraft want us to prevent problems by use, not over use in the checking and assurance of the function of the crossfeed fuel system before every flight. Their preflight routine makes the fuel valves just one more in an entire series of moving parts that must work in all phases of flight, critical and non critical.

Now here is an area where I bet we agree.

Say that a pilot never uses the crossfeed check during the taxi, and has never had to use it in flight. Not for training, not for a real engine failure. What will happen when someone DOES make the check? Maybe exactly what you are suggesting; a piece of packing or dirt might be dislodged and a possible engine failure could result. Maybe this would happen on takeoff, and maybe, just maybe, the valve would fail completely if asked to perform its crossfeed function in a real emergency.

Personally, I would rather be working with a device that has a history of operation, demonstrated repeatedly, than to rely on a device that I have not tested based on a fear of failure and against the recommendation of the manufacturer.

Dislodging degris or releasing debris that has been stopped at the selector can do harm, whereas debris isn't an issue in any respect during a compression test

You must work on some very clean engines. Not me. :)

Anytime you disturb a spark plug, things that have been outside of the combustion chamber gain an opportunity to enter. The reward of checking the compression and the plug electrodes, maybe even the opportunity to use a scope to have a look inside the cylinders far outweighs the risk of dirt or debris entering that cylinder. It's a good trade, one I'm sure you'd agree with.

Similarly, a valve which is operated regularly and within its tolerances and design limits, which isn't really in question with a hand operated fuel valve, it seems to me, has little chance of creating a problem from anything being dislodged. A valve which is ALWAYS in one position certainly can build up sediment or dirt in that position, and moving that valve could indeed cause that dirt to be dislodged.

Maybe that's why Piper wants that valve moved and checked for proper operation. At least, that's my impression. I'm sure not an A&P, and I don't pretend to have a working knowlege of the differences in design of magnetos made by Bedix or its competitors, or any of a hundred topics that I have no business knowing about. This topic, however seems easily within the realm of my experiences with engines and plumbing.

Remember the hazardous attitudes for pilots? Maybe this antidote is pertinent here: "follow the rules, they are usually right."

Logic? This is the logic of the preflight, the logic of the runup, the logic of the annual inspection, the basis of quality control theory, and the foundation of the self-checks that computers use before loading the operating system.

Again, a nonsensical statement.

No, my friend. An illustration of how devices require checks for correct operation. Piper has determined what they think is a prudent check for their equipment. I agree with their assesment.



Moving selector valves, especially shutoff valves, or switching to a fresh tank before takeoff, is dangerous, stupid, and gets people killed every year. Even examiners. Being an examiner doesn't mean one's brilliant, intelligent, or even much of an authority. It means one can administer a practical test and determine that a student has met a minimum particular practical standard. End of story.

I don't think anyone is nominating examiners for MENSA membership, or even talking about using a "fresh" tank.

Now I grant you, as above, that moving a valve that is never moved as a part of normal ops might be a mistake. This particular valve, the one we are discussing, gets moved before every flight, if done according to the checklist. I know of NO, not even one, instance of this check causing a problem in the Seneca.

Now, we can talk about the necesssity of switching fuel tanks in the normal operation of other Pipers, including all of the singles I've flown, and the main and aux tank valves in the Navajo, if you like. None of those planes have much utility at all if you can't move the fuel valve. In fact, not moving the fuel valve in the singles HAS killed pilots.

An interesting irony, isn't it? That would be the end of the story, would it not?

Follow your checklists kids, and do it every day.
 
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The vast majority of mechanics don't work on airplanes.

The vast majority of mechanics don't work on airplanes? Do we work on submarines? Handguns? Reticulated Orgasmatrons? What?

As an aircraft mechanic, I work on aircraft. Go figure.

Apparently, this was a problem that was unrelated to "testing", and that wear resulted form use.

Actually, it really was related to testing and running checks. Had they put the airplane on the ground instead of screwing with it, they'd be alive, pure and simple. They tested it to death. Literally.

Maintenance procedures are often changed as a response for our inablility to design "perfect" machines, as was the case with the jack screws.

This was not the case with the jackscrew. There was nothing wrong with the maintenance program; the work card had been falsified (as is often the case, unfortunately), and the wrong grease had been used. If the work had been done properly, there would never have been an issue. The proceedure was fine. Company issues and personnel issues caused the failure.

Apparently, those nonsensical guys at Piper see this in a different light. Checking compression on a cylinder is a good idea to allow you to have a reasonable expectation of service from an engine.

Oh, so very wrong. No mechanic with any understanding or experience believes a compression test says anything about engine life, because it doesn't. General standards are provided stipulating that 75% of the input pressure should remain during a compression test, but that provides NO insight into the life of an engine. Oil analysis does, but compression testing does not; compression testing varies with engine temperature, with the user, and with the test set. Even varies with the same test set and user, and even with the same relative engine temperature. Laymen and the uninformed see it as some great panacea of engine information; the compression test means almost nothing.

Maybe exactly what you are suggesting; a piece of packing or dirt might be dislodged and a possible engine failure could result. Maybe this would happen on takeoff, and maybe, just maybe, the valve would fail completely if asked to perform its crossfeed function in a real emergency.

Absolutely not...not unless you attempt to take off with the crossfeed in use. Is there a place on your checklist where you are directed to do so, or is it prohibited? Case in point. You won't have an engine failure on takeoff related to moving the selector valve during taxi...unless you move the selector valve during taxi. Exactly my point; thanks for making it.

Personally, I would rather be working with a device that has a history of operation, demonstrated repeatedly, than to rely on a device that I have not tested based on a fear of failure and against the recommendation of the manufacturer.

Perhaps so. But with more experience, you'll learn that some components have limited life in them. Published, or not. They'll only work through so many cycles and tests. Running exhaustive tests may mean that you're going to have component failure in use. Think about it; it will either fail when you're testing it, or using it in practice. If you test it more than you ever use it, you're probably going to cause it to fail eventually during testing...but if not, then you've put yourself in the position of wearing it out in testing, and not having it when you really need it. Sometimes it's far better to just leave alone until you need it.
 
As an aircraft mechanic, I work on aircraft. Go figure.

That's right, you do. Most mechanics are not aircraft mechanics. Most work on other things, but the commonalities are the basic physics and knowlege base of internal combustion engines. Mechanics are more alike than they are different, IMHO.

Go figure?



Actually, it really was related to testing and running checks

As you later said:


There was nothing wrong with the maintenance program; the work card had been falsified (as is often the case, unfortunately), and the wrong grease had been used. If the work had been done properly, there would never have been an issue. The proceedure was fine. Company issues and personnel issues caused the failure.

The company "issue" was the use of a "procedure" of falsification. Of course, falsification was not the "official" procedure, but it was the one being used, apparently. The de facto procedure, so to speak.

Other maintenance procedures which are modified on aircraft in general happen because we are fallible humans, and we are unable to make a "perfect" device, or even to service that device perfectly, 100% of the time. All of the information on the CD-roms that mechanics use point to this design ability deficiency on the part of humans, the thousands of AD's, the modified procedures, the limited service life values. Think Parker Hannifin. They get a lot of blame when pilots can't fly partial panel, or haven't a good standby electric gyro on board. We are fallible humans, always looking to blame someone else for our faults.

So, we have a jackscrew that was not even being maintained to accepted standards, nor was the approved lubricant being used. If your argument is that the valve could be worn out by this moving and checking, as was the improperly maintianed jackscrew, that might be possible in a very extreme case. I'd imagine most cases are far from extreme. I'd move that valve rather gingerly, actually, because it was expected to function on almost every training flight. It had done so (functioned well) for several years, and since it is a checklist item, I expect it to do so for years to come. The mechanics who work on the aircraft are generally pretty sharp, and they no doubt check that valve themselves.


No mechanic with any understanding or experience believes a compression test says anything about engine life, because it doesn't.

It does not say EVERYTHING about engine life, but it does speak to the condition of the engine, which is a large component of how we might judge the egine's "life." You cannot return an engine to service if the compression is not up to snuff. How many cylinders and and other parts such as valves and rings, are serviced or replaced every day due to loss of proper compression? Hundreds? Thousands? Why? Because compression is an essential element of an engine in good condition. A condition that lends itself to service life. If wear or damage makes compression too low, you have effectively run out of service life. If it is getting lower over time, you can see a trend that means you will soon be out of service life.



General standards are provided stipulating that 75% of the input pressure should remain during a compression test, but that provides NO insight into the life of an engine.

If the engine compression does not meet the standard, can it be considered for continued service, ie: life? No, it cannot. It is then deficient, and cannot be used in that condition. A part that cannot be used can certainly be considered "dead," or at the end of its life. It can resurrected, yes, but until then, it's over. The Easter theme is not intentional, for those about to accuse me of thread drift. :)



Laymen and the uninformed see it as some great panacea of engine information; the compression test means almost nothing.

A "panacea?" I don't know ANY mechanics that see it that way. In fact, even when I had tens of thousands of dollars worth of specialized electronic equipment at my disposal, I never though of anything, not any tool, as a panacea. Okay, you were being scarcastic. That's cool.

At it's most simplistic, you can count on compression decreasing as the service life is spanned, and it is a reliable tool whether you use a leak down set or a classic compression gauge. When troubleshooting an engine performance problem, for example, a reasonable level of compression is considered fundamental by all manufacturers of engines. The purpose of the engine is to provide power, whether you are talking about a G-V engine or a Briggs and Stratton atop your backyard lawnmower. Without compression, you have no ability to produce power using current technology.

Oil analysis is a wonderful tool for judging engine wear, including bearings, rings, almost anything that rubs against something else with oil. In liquid cooled engines, the oil lab routinely looks for evidence of coolant. At one point, I had a fleet to maintain from Ford Tempos to LN9000 dumps and IH TT's, and every kind of implement and bulldozer, loader, and backhoe in between. Oil analysis was a teriific tool. It no doubt saved us a lot of time and trouble, to say nothing of tens of thousands of dollars.


Absolutely not...not unless you attempt to take off with the crossfeed in use. Is there a place on your checklist where you are directed to do so, or is it prohibited? Case in point. You won't have an engine failure on takeoff related to moving the selector valve during taxi...unless you move the selector valve during taxi. Exactly my point; thanks for making it.

I read this a couple of times and I'm not sure of what you might have intended to say. I can observe that the valve being returned to "on" before even beginning the runup IS a checklist item, and that all of the items are intended to be performed as required.

Are you saying that following the checklist might lead to an inadvertent takeoff in crossfeed? Perhaps, but not if you are exercising due dilligence.



But with more experience, you'll learn that some components have limited life in them. Published, or not. They'll only work through so many cycles and tests. Running exhaustive tests may mean that you're going to have component failure in use. Think about it; it will either fail when you're testing it, or using it in practice. If you test it more than you ever use it, you're probably going to cause it to fail eventually during testing...but if not, then you've put yourself in the position of wearing it out in testing, and not having it when you really need it. Sometimes it's far better to just leave alone until you need it.

Good. I had no problem at all with that.

In fact, I agree with your principle. There is, however, a corollary. That is that something which is not checked or exercised, like a muscle or joint, or a valve, cannot be considered to provide reliable service when called to operate. You're a jumper, aren't you? Isn't there some sort of limit date on a packed chute, beyond which it must be opened and repacked before it can be used? It seems I read someone mentioning this here at some point. One day I'll take the jump course and go up. Some of the posters here no doubt would rather I skipped the use of the parachute. :) In November, they may volunteer to jump without one.

At any rate, I have to have some level of faith in the record of use of this valve in the many Senecas still in service, along with the example of Piper being able to design and manufacture a reliable valve in the singles (not that electric thing that fails in the Aerostar) as a basis for following the checklist and an expectation of a reasonable number of life cycles for the valve. If this moving during taxi has caused these valves to fail in the past few decades, I haven't seen a report that suggests that is the case, or an AD on the valve that suggests that Piper has found this valve to hold a design defect.

Nothing is perfect, except for, well, you know. :)
 
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Rick1128 said:
While there is NO requirement for an actual engine shutdown during multi-engine training, it is an excellent idea for the student to actually shutdown and restart an engine in flight. That being said, however, it is one of the dumbist ideas out there in the training enviroment to shut one down below 3000 feet. There are way too many things that can go wrong to play that game. Even at the professional level, that I am doing my instruction at.

Yes, it is required in both private and commercial ME PTS. Check task X.A. in the commercial PTS.
 
avbug said:

On the subject of going around single engine, I once had an examiner demand to see a single engine go-around in a Seneca II. He told me I would be flying a single engine ILS under the hood, then executing a single engine go around. I told him I wouldn't. The checkride was for a small 135 operation. He told me I'd not pass, I told him I didn't care. He told me it was a test standard, I told him it wasn't.

AVBUG,

there is a requirement for a single engine go-around in the ATP PTS (Task V.F)
 
Words to "live by," Bandit.

We always simulated an engine failure below a minimum of 3,000 AGL (I always liked that additional 500 feet at 3,500) by use of the throttle and a "fake feather." Training should follow the safest methods possible.
 
I'm not a fan of inducing an actual emergency for training purposes. Simulated failures are probably good enough. In the good old days, it was very common (the FAA encouraged it) for instructors and examiners to pull the mixture or cut fuel right after liftoff - and the accident rates reflected what often happened.

I took my multi-engine checkride in an Aztec. The examiner was one of those guys who shut off the fuel. When the time came to fail an engine he distracted me and reached down to the fuel levers between the seats. Thinking that he had his hand on the LH lever, he shut off the fuel to the RH engine. Moments later, when the RH engine quit, I correctly went through the entire engine failure drill - including feathering the RH propellor. A few moments after the RH engine quit windmilling I witnessed, for the first time, a person (my examiner) having a heart attack - in his mind he had shut off the fuel to the left engine and I had just shutdown and feathered the right engine. - not a good position to be in at pattern altitude. You've never seen a guy start to sweat so profusely. :D Once he realized what he had done he settled back down and the rest of the checkride was pretty mellow.

For what it's worth, light-twin engine failures in the "real world" aren't anything like the carefully choreographed training exercises that most of you are familiar with. You all be careful ya hear.

Lead Sled
 
wow, there's a lot of 'great spirits' sharing their wisdom with us lesser aviators:D
One of my personal mottos since I became a pilot, has been that, as soon as you start to think you know everything about flying and cant learn from anybody anymore, you become a liability, to yourself, your passengers, crew, people in the airspace with you and people below your flightpath.

I only have 45....ok, 44.9 hours on the PA34 Seneca I, and 1100ME, but I'd like to chip in my 2 cents....

During training, my instructor did fail an engine using the fuel cutoff. I think he did it more because of the position of the fuel selector switches and being able to reach them surreptisiously than anything else! But, he never failed an engine below ....say 3000'? (this is in South Africa b.t.w.)

My personal SOPs, for every aircraft, be-it SE or ME, that has the capability to select one tank only, or crossfeed, I check that this function will work.
On the C402C I fly regularly, early during the taxi, I crossfeed, then select normal feed and test the aux pumps on high, well before I get to the holding point and do my runups. This way I know that the crossfeed will work, the aux pumps will provide fuel at high pressure to the engines if an engine driven pump will fail, and during the runup I can see the engines feeding off their respective tanks without problems.

One instructor, during my F406 rating, had me do single engine circuits and landings, with one SE go-around. The 'failed' engine was set at zero thrust only, on the landings I got the failed engine back to use, but the go-around was SE only.....,man was that some hairy s-h-i-t ! Not fun at all, luckily it is a pretty powerfull machine and empty with the two of us one engine's 500horses was enough....but still not cool.

During upper air work the one engine was feathered (at idle) and we did Vmca and steep turns etc. Sweating like a pig, I was.

A ME aircraft on one engine is not a beast to play around with.
Especially an underpowered one like a Seneca I.
 
OK, I've got a little time on my hands and I'm thinking that my fingers need a little exercise, so me thinks that I'll climb up on my soapbox for a few minutes...

I've had the feeling, for a long time, that many pilots don't properly respect the capabilities of light twins. They're just so excited about flying them that they really don't spend enough time thinking about what they've really got themselves into, but it doesn't matter - they're finally able to have "a fist full of throttles".

In most cases, light twins have pretty good performance - on both engines. However, it must be understood that, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, they have two engines because they need two engines. Single-engine performance in any piston-powered light twin is abysmal. Loss of power is the primary culprit. Remember, normally aspirated aircraft lose power with altitude. An aircraft's climb ability is directly proportional to the amount of "excess" power that it has available vs. what is needed to maintain level flight. For example, if a 200 HP normally aspirated airplane requires 100 HP to maintain level flight it would (at SL, ISA day) have 100 "excess" HP to use for climb. At 10,000' MSL, the engine might only be able to produce 130 HP, leaving it with a 30 HP surplus. This is the reason why turbocharged aircraft perform so well - you would be able to maintain SL power up until you reached the "critical altitude" for the particular engine. In some cases, this can be as high as 18,000' MSL.

This is also why light twins typically perform so poorly on one engine. Take, as an example, a Twin Comanche with two 160 HP engines. If that airplane required, say, 150 HP to maintain level flight it would have 170 "excess" HP to climb with. If it lost an engine, it would have lost 50% of its available power, but with just 10 "excess" HP, it may have lost 95% of its ability to climb. This, of course, will also appliesy to all other light twins. If you only learn one thing from this post, it should be that light twins have two engines because they need two engines.

There are some other operational differences that you should be aware of…

If you're in a single and you loose the engine, the laws of physics dictate what will happen next. Leaving the gear down until you have no more "usable" runway left only makes sense. It will leave the airplane in much better condition should the engine decide to pack it on while you're still over the runway. (By the way, I've had it happen to me once.) I've seen some "hotdoggers" rotate and immediately suck the gear up. A while back, I even heard of a guy who would place the landing gear in the up position as he took the runway. His thinking was that the squat switch would keep the gear from coming up while the airplane was on its takeoff roll and immediately start the retraction process as soon as he broke ground. What a weenie - his practice came to light one morning when he rotated a bit too early and the airplane settled back onto the runway. You don't need a PhD in Physics and Aeronautical Engineering to figure out what happened next.

(By the way, these are usually the same guys who immediately pull the throttle back to climb power as soon as the gear is in the wells. Statistically, that's the time when you’re most likely to have an engine come apart.)

Multiengine aircraft are an entirely different matter - you want to get the airplane cleaned up as soon as possible. In the case of most piston twins, their ability to maintain controlled flight depends upon the pilot getting the gear up, the propeller feathered, and the flaps up. Failure to this often results in the airplane being turned into a lawn dart.

I don't want anyone misunderstanding my comments on the need to get gear up on light-twins ASAP. I'm not implying that you need to get the gear cycling the moment the aircraft breaks ground. You don't need to be cocked and on a hair trigger - just get to it as soon as you can get around to it. Sure, there will be situations where you can delay it; I used to fly out of an ex-military airportwith a 10,300-foot runway and there was no need to be in a rush with the gear. You could takeoff and land most twins 3 times on this runway. However, I believe that on a more typical runway, once the airplane's up and climbing, having the gear out becomes more of a liability than an asset if and when an engine decided to "go south" on you.

We tend to take engine reliability for granted, but I believe that this is a very dangerous thing to do. Most light twins simply won't maintain altitude with a windmilling propeller and/or the gear down. The old Metroliners had a rocket bottle in the tail to buy the flight crew enough time to get the gear up in the wells. Auto-feather systems are on most, if not all, turboprop twins. The manufacturers wouldn't put up with the increased costs and complexity of doing this if there wasn't a true need for it. They put this stuff on the turboprops that have significantly better single-engine performance than piston-twins. It really ought to be on the "little" twins, but no one is willing to pay for it. Like I said, light twins lose up to 90%+ of their climb capability. The figure is probably even higher than that - I've seen several non-turbo'd twins that wouldn't climb out of ground effect and several turbocharged twins that could barely achieve climb rates of 100 fpm or so. But never the less, the point is that twin engine aircraft have two engines because they need two engines and under certain conditions they can maintain controlled flight on one engine IF THE PILOT DOES EVERYTHING RIGHT. You don't have time to dawdle, it has to be done right and right now.

OK, my fingers are cramping - it's time to climb down off of my soapbox.

Lead Sled
 
Lead sled...let me help you down!

Well said lead sled...Uhhmmmm(best throat clearing)

Pulling the fuel flow to the engine is the WORST thing you can do to the motor, it will run near its maximum temp for a minute or two and then shut down...losing all heat rapidly. This alone is major concern for the engine to make TBO, but alas it can do great damage to the ignition system as well as spark plugs over temp can and often do change their gaps. now you have a cold engine that doesnt want to run, due to plugs not doing their jobs.
Yes it is required to shut down and engine in ALL the multi PTS's, but the POH has procedures for this devised by Test pilots and engineers to reduce the stress on the system.

I am in complete agreement that training hould be made as realistic as possible........but not to the point of increasing your exposure to a REAL emergency...........Not something that ME students and MEI's do well when its real. The stats prove that!
I have witnessed 4 fatal accidents and DO NOT want to see yours! Please remember we teach so that they might learn....not scare the hell out of them or jeapordize our students, or for that matter our own lives!!! just follow the procedures of the manufacturer and FLY SAFE!

Humble and always learning,
Kevin
PC12Cowboy
 
Realistic Training

Two (2) things I've noticed over the years of training students how to fly and control airplanes and helicopters:
Sometimes; not usually, but sometimes, a student who I have trained with safe simulation, when experiencing the real thing will go completely berserk and react hysterically to the situation.
(1) When sneaking the fuel valve off and the engine actually quits.
(2) When first encountering actual IMC conditions.
(3) Oh - and also accidentally entering a spin.
Some of the accidents that occur are a direct result of this lack of training in our system. I say some, but I believe most. There are no statistics to reveal it. Pilots don't admit it. "I was so scared when I actually went IMC that I just couldn't focus on the instruments - I was consumed by the wierd feelings in my body which I had never felt before - next thing I knew, evrything was spinning around! Lucky I broke out high enough to recover."
They don't say - or even remember that.
Exposure to the real thing may not be required to get the rating, and usually it isn't required - most people will respond with their trained habits - but the once-in-a-while guy who loses it in the initial exposure to a real engine cut, a spin, or actual weather, and then recovers with a few exposures to the actual - well, I bet you just saved his life.
And more than that - you made him confront his fear and overcome it.
 
Good post nosehair. But unless you are suggesting cutting the engine for real below 3000' AGL, you're arguing the same point as everyone else.
 
My initial question has risen a great deal of insight on teaching in a twin, as well as instructing in general. I flew with my first multi engine student the other day and boy let me tell you it felt like I just got my cfi all over again.
But to say the least it was great! The guy I flew with just wanted to do some checkride prep.

And 'yes' I did shut the fuel off below 3000'.
 
Some people never learn....
 
labbats said:
Some people never learn....

That is the reason for training, to learn right?

As the localizer starts to come alive fuel goes off. Normally around 2300' ish. After he goes through his procedure fuel goes back on, zero thrust simulated. I feel that is the best way to go. If the engine doesn't want to come back alive there is plenty of time to call home and talk about it.

Although my time is low, I'm very safety concious. If you read my first post. I was concerned about the practice that the mei was using. I didn't feel it was the safest way to go.
 
Pulling the fuel flow to the engine is the WORST thing you can do to the motor, it will run near its maximum temp for a minute or two and then shut down...losing all heat rapidly. This alone is major concern for the engine to make TBO, but alas it can do great damage to the ignition system as well as spark plugs over temp can and often do change their gaps. now you have a cold engine that doesnt want to run, due to plugs not doing their jobs.

While shutting off fuel does have the potential to cause damgae to fuel-lubricated wetted components, it does not do any of the things you described.

Shutting off the fuel will not change the mixture setting; it will not therefore change the temperature while the engine is producing power. Only when the fuel runs out will the temperature change; it will then drop. Once shut down, you are correct, temperature then decreases.

Spark plugs do not overtemp when shutting of an engine using the fuel control (mixture or fuel selector, in this case).

Spark plugs do not vary their gap according to temperature, except in cases when excessive electrode errosion has taken place. Electrode errosion takes place based on the firing of the plug itself, not the burning that takes place in the cylinder.

Excessive temperatures in a cylinder lead to burned valves and occasionally a melted piston...but the primary problem with running at critical temperature settings isn't the temperature, it's the potential for detonation...which does the real damage. During a fuel shutoff, power drops drastically, and any variances that might briefly occur in fluctuation with fuel flow won't lead to any damage caused by temperature, or detonation. Detonation issues are critical at power settings above 75%, not below, and with loss of fuel flow, power drops and any attendant danger of detonation and associated damage drops with it.

Tatheplilt, having heard the testimonies and information from many pilots here more experienced than yourself, and having heard the recommendations from the FAA, including those posted in the practical test standards, why did you do that??

As the localizer starts to come alive fuel goes off. Normally around 2300' ish.

Is there any valid earthly reason why you would do this instead of setting zero thrust on one engine? Not only are you shutting off fuel below 3,000, you are doing it while flying an approach, descending. Not smart.

After he goes through his procedure fuel goes back on, zero thrust simulated. I feel that is the best way to go.

Why do you feel this way? Perhaps it's time for you to listen to virtually every other professional pilot in the business, the FAA, the industry, etc...don't try to reinvent the wheel. There's a reason that many of today's practices are conducted the way they are...because when it was done the way you seem to want to go, a lot more people got killed in training than in actual accidents. That's not right.

If the engine doesn't want to come back alive there is plenty of time to call home and talk about it.

You really think so? What do you do in the meantime if the other engine quits, or the student screws up and fails the wrong engine. Don't think it can happen? Think again. And don't do that any more.

Although my time is low, I'm very safety concious.

Possibly so, but it doesn't show. Don't try to make a name for yourself by reinventing the wheel, or you'll end up making a name for yourself...if you know what I mean. You don't have the experience right now to be innovative in trying what you think might be best or safest. Don't try. Stick with what is safest, and that is exactly what we've been talking about here. Simulate those failures on the approach with the throttle, set zero thrust, and don't go around on one engine. Land, taxi back, warm the engine up again, and go try it once more.
 
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One good reason why I did that was because it has been done with me and I do feel that it is a safe way to go. Another reason was because when I did do my mei check ride I asked the examiner what did he reccomend and do you know what he told me? He said don't do fuel cut-off's below 500' feet agl!

I do respect his advice him being a CP for CO. And a 35k hour pilot, although I would never cut the fuel that low. I don't listen to advice that 'everybody' gives me, even this examiner. If I don't feel like something is safe than I won't do it. (In the case of my first post.)

Is there a valid reason why I would shut off the fuel durning localizer intercept? Sure. To give the applicant the chance to think.
Is it me or has anyone here had a cfi do partial panel in the clouds? I did, and the first time it bugged me out. When the cfi first covered up the instruments in imc I said, you guys really do that *hit. But you know what I guess he was confortable doing that. And after doing it for a while I thanked him because I got to see how it was do shoot a real partial panel approach. During more of my mei training I flew with a different mei a couple of times and do you know what this guy did? You got it he shut the fuel off as the localizer came alive... in 'IMC'

reinvent the wheel? No sorry I don't have that much time to do so? am I the only one that has gone through this type of training. Is FRG that far from the rest of the world, because this is the type of training that I have been through since day one since becomeing a pilot.

What if the other engine quits? Nah not too likely.
What if he fails the wrong engine? What exactly does that mean?
 
What if the other engine quits? Nah not too likely.

You really think so? You don't have the experience to be thinking that kind of foolishness. Wake up.

What if he fails the wrong engine? What exactly does that mean?

You don't know? Then what on earth are you doing sitting in the position you're in? You shut down one engine and the student identifies and feathers the other...don't think it can't happen? I've been in working professional cockpits and prevented it from happening. It can happen. And while it's happening, you have nothing to fall back on because guess what? You just shut down the only powerplant you had left. Good guess.

I recall watching the Smothers brothers years ago. One had done something foolish. The other said, "If I told you to go jump off a cliff, would you do it?" The first thought for a moment and said, "Well, not again."

You do everything the way you were taught? I hate, absolutely hate, to hear someone say, "but that's how I was taught." I don't give a rats umbillical cord weather you were taught something. My only reply is, "but what do you know?" I don't care what you can parrot from a former instructor. The flying world is filled with a heritage of inexperience. One new instructor teaching another...each passing on "but that's what I was taught" to the next. That's a chain of emptiness if ever there was one.

Always leave yourself an out. Don't ever make the stupid mistake of thinking that something is unlikely, or it won't happen to you. It will. And you won't like it.

Ever seen an airplane break apart in flight? I just watched two aircraft I flew do just that. Don't think it can't happen? Ever watched your engine catch fire? I have. It happens. Ever had a two engine failure? My fist tanker job was being drafted into an airplane that had just lost it's crew...who quit after all four engines failed in IMC, enroute from a fire. It happens. But apparently not to you, because it's "not too likely." Do you base all your safety of flight decisions on what's likely?

During my last sim recurrent, I was climbing out on departure, and an engine failed. A moment later, the sim instructor, parroting ATC, wryly asked me where I bought my fuel. I could see that one coming, and immediately started a turn around. The other engine failed post haste. He was making a point, and it was a valid one. Don't think it can happen. Probably not. Not to you, anyway.

Your thirty five thousand hour examiner can toot all he wants. A great deal of my flight experience has been at and below 500' in all sorts of airplanes, all sorts of weather, and almost always in less than favorable circumstances. Much of it in multi engine airplanes. Even in four engine airplanes, shutting one down low isn't something we ever did frivolously...even with a fire, a separated cylinder, smoke, a wing covered in oil or other fluids, etc. I'd stack any single hour of that time up against five hundred of your examiner's point to point (presumably airline) hours, and still tell him he's a bloody fool if he's shutting engines down without need at low altitudes.

And you, a brand new instructor who should be sticking to the syllabus, what are you thinking?
 
Dear Mr Avbug. Did you even read my last post? I don't think so because if you did you would clearly understand that I'm not being a parot. (doing only as I'm taught)
You said fail an engine, that didn't make sense because I was looking for the term feather. When I was with the student it was clear before we even left the ramp that if and emergency arose I would take the a/c and handle it. If something happend during training and I did nothing, than it would be considered training. And we made it clear that if an engine needed to be feathered, that I would do it.

Mr. Bug I do thank you for your insight as it all helps. Although your tone seems to be quite condescending. Yo tote inexperience, inexperience, inexperience towards me yet I look to people like you for advice. I never said that I do what I want to neither did I say I'll do things exactly as people do them. If you read my last post you will understand that.
 
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Tathepilot.

I would suggest you listen to what avbug's message is rather than dissect how he presented it.

Because he is correct in what he is trying to tell you.

None of us who know this business want to see some new commer get killed because of being wrong headed and just plain wrong about the safe way to train.

Cat Driver
 
tathepilot said: "When I was with the student it was clear before we even left the ramp that if and emergency arose I would take the a/c and handle it"
So you are actual single engine at the marker, the student f's up, engines chokes, whatever... yet you're 5 miles from the runway at1500 agl
And what, exactly, will you do to "handle" that glider you just built?

Let me attempt to summarize for you what has been laid out in great detail and with wise words.

Don't paint yourself into a corner!

Shutting off an engine, voluntarily, down low is NOT NECESSARY. Furthermore it is foolish and dangerous. It serves absolutely no purpose.
Do you really think you are fooling an applicant by using the fuel rather than simulated? If so, that applicant is already in over his head and needs to be doing remedial airwork- not engine failures. He should be trained to always expect an engine failure, especially on a stinking training flight. There is benefit to an actual inflight shutdown. Therefore it is included in the PTS. But do it with a safety net, ie. altitude to spare.
I challenge you to prove, to yourself, that it is more beneficial than dangerous to shut down an engine.
I don't care if you try to save face on this stupid message board. All that really matters is how you fly that next flight. Think it over before you endanger your next student. Fly smart.
 
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I'm the new kid on the block, but I've been around the block a few times. A while back, someone told me a story about a fellow aviator who, after a royal screwup, found himself waiting in line at the Pearly Gates (behind his passengers). Saint Peter asked him how he got there. His reply, "I have no idea, It's never killed me before."

I have little patience for "high time" pilots who do stupid tricks and I consider pulling an engine below 3,000' AGL a stupid trick. Tathepilot, I've known 20,000 hour airline captains that were total screwups (Thankgoodness for ALPA.) and 500 hour pvt pilots that were very competitent and consciencious. Personally, your friend may have a bazillion turbine hours, but that might only give him a false sense of security when it comes to the dangers of flying piston-twins. If I seem a bit touchy about this it is because I am. I've had three friends killed pulling those kinds of stunts in two separate accidents.

Bottom line is this, if you induce an emergency and you end up in an accident or incident you will be liable. Period. Simulated zero thrust will not only protect your fanny, it will protect your license. Save the engine shutdowns for the simulators.

Lead Sled
 

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