Re: You said it, not me
enigma said:
Surplus1.
Please notice that I didn't name any of the suspected loudmouths. 
Noted, but I'm also a realist. No offence taken. I'm sort of proud of it anyway. Somebody has to yell every now an then, even if few listen.
Seriously, you did give answers I was looking for. I was breezing happily along flying a corporate Lear55 when the RJ's were introduced, and I really had no intention to return to airline flying at the time; so I didn't really pay much attention.
I'm glad you found the answers of interest. I think most pilots in the large airlines were also "not paying much attention". It's unfortunate that many of them would now like to compensate for their lack of attention by threatening my job and future.
I would like to be able to make a cogent argument for the premise that RJ's are not some plot from the Worths, nor the Lorenzos, of the world to screw pilots. I think, and would like to be able to state for certain, that the RJ was a legitimate vehicle to produce profits. The RJ's were just another part of the evolution of the business, and should be dealt with accordingly, not on a personal level that many have stooped to.
I think your premise is accurate. The airiplane is just another business tool made available by evolving technology. It fills a gap that was vacant and will be here to stay until replaced by a better tool. That better tool will not be a DC-9 nor a 737. It will be a better and bigger "regional jet" and it will be flown by the same people that are now flying the current version.
I can assure you with absolute certainty that my company did NOT decide to introduce the RJ in an effort to screw pilots, and none of Comair's pilots were "screwed" as a result. The exact opposite is true, we benefited greatly and so did the Company. The decison was a decision of Comair management exclusively, not motivated by some external force and funded by our own money. We made the decision and we took the risk. Obviously, our executives were not wrong.
The intent was definitely to increase profits, provide growth and get the jump on our competition. That intent was accomplished in each instance.
Contrary to be belief of many, we didn't take any flying from anyone. We developed new markets on our own, grew our own Company and became "the" most profitable airline in the business (in this country). Prior to our acquisition by Delta, Inc., approximately 60% of our passengers never set foot on a Delta airplane. The other 40% was feed.
The marketing agreement with Delta was of course mutually beneficial. However, we could have done it with someone else, just as readily. We did not spend Delta's money to do what we did. They paid us for what we did for them and we paid them for what they did for us. Both benefited from the agreement. They did not buy us because we were failing. They bought us because we were too successful to continue outside their sphere of control and would not agree to their "fee per departure" gimmick. Essentially they had two choices, buy us or do without us. Which one they took is self evident. While it was true that the "tail" wasn't going to wag the dog anytime soon, it was also true that the particular dog couldn't live with a severed tail, so he spent a couple billion to guarantee it wouldn't fall off.
Now that we are a subsidiary of a large company, I have no idea what the plans or intent of our new owners/managers might be, but I suspect it has nothing to do with screwing pilots at Delta Air Lines. That is a figment of their vivid imagination.
The fact that major airlines did not acquire regional jets to be operated by the "mainline", is IMO, directly related to economics and the premissiveness of mainline pilot groups. They made a fatal decision to allow subcontracting (long before the RJ existed). When the RJ came into existence, they decided it was a "threat" and directed the union (which they control totally) to adopt a policy designed to prevent its use, rather than embrace it. That policy took the form of increasing Scope restrictions. Up to a point, the "new Scope" was effective, in the sense that it prevented the operation of this aircraft type by the mainline itself and therefore, did not dilute the average compensation of the mainline pilots.
However, it also had a down side that so far has proven to be far more onerous than sharing drinking fountains with the "other" class. The new Scope was totally ineffective in preventing the proliferation of the aircraft type and also created a two tiered structure within the union, effectively dividing it against itself. Repeated opportunities to correct that problem were repeatedly ignored. Market forces continued to ensure ever increasing numbers of RJs. If you didn't fly them, you couldn't compete with Comair. Everywhere we went, we took the market share of those who did not operate them. It did not take long for management of other carriers to recognize that fact and begin to acquire RJs at their subcontractors or wholly owned subsidiaries. It took Bethune 4 years to wake up, but look how many he has now.
Those large carriers whose pilots were able to negotiate the new Scope, before management saw the light (such as USAir) have suffered the consequences. Since that time, each time a mega airline sits at the bargaining table the RJ issue is there, either as a result of the pilots desire for more Scope or the management's desire for less. Every major airline with highly restrictive Scope has been forced to relax it at the bargaining table. AA has yet to "give" so AMR is simply finding innovative ways to circumvent it. Reverse code-share may well prove to be the fatal blow.
The Delta pilot group was derided within the union for years because it's Scope was allegedly too loose. That looseness has given their Company the best balance sheet of the mega carriers, but they still don't "get it". When their management decided to acquire ASA and CMR, they were already "at the table" and bargaining to "tighten Scope". They had an opportunity to change their flawed scope strategy from one of exclusion to one of inclusion, but adamantly refused to do so. Instead, their MEC succumbed to the political pressure of their peers in the union, and the union itself, succumbed to political pressure from them, abdicating its responsibilities to other members in the process. As evidenced, the strategy failed and they did not succeed in returning the Genie to the bottle.
Recent events at USAirways have further demonstrated the futility of the exclusion strategy. The RJs over there will now outnumber the mainline aircraft and the price the union and the AAA pilots are paying is far higher, IMO, than it could have been or should be. Once more, the prejudices of the mainline pilots have set a course that is not in their own interests or that of anyone else. They have also put the union in a precarious and vulnerable position as it steps on more regional pilots. Not only have they lost the RJ battle, they are opening the door to the same "code-share" concept that will ultimately cause them to lose the "big" airplanes they have remaining. Instead of protecting their flying they are in fact giving it away. I predict another TWA and think it a question of when, not if.
What Woerth's personal opinions might be, I don't know. He's a politician and to keep his job, he must acquiese to the demands of the big 5 MEC's. Together, they may well destroy the union as we know it. They may be able to defeat the small pilot groups and screw those members in the process (that's what they're doing), but they can't stop the RJs or the market forces. Instead of containing the subcontracting, their flawed thinking is actually increasing it. Apparently the mega pilot groups would like the regional pilot groups to bare the brunt of their own folly. That may work for awhile, but its not an enduring condition. If it continues too long, they may well lose much of the current narrow-body flying, to the lowest bidders. Life without ALPA is far from impossible.
Management isn't trying to screw the mainline pilots. They're just trying to make a buck any way they can and many of the mainline pilots have priced themselves, egoed themselves or both, out of the market.
Obviously, there are those who differ with me. Interestingly, all of them fly for mega carriers. I suspect that their vision is clouded by fear which has been projected as protectionism via isolation. It is not unusual for the nouveau riche to see themselves as people of a "higher class". That will backfire, again as a result of market forces. When the market changes, those who change with it prosper. Those who don't risk falling by the wayside. Time will tell who among us has the right thinking on this.
Yes, I am a Spirit pilot. I was hired after ya'll backed out of the buyout, so I don't know much about it. I'm not even sure that you all backed out instead of Spirit.
regards
8N
I suspected you were. I'm quite sure who backed out (since I've seen the purchase agreement). What I'm not really certain of is why. I know the "official" reason, but I suspect another reason under the table. I still think it was a mistake to back out. It may or may not have prevented us from being acquired (something I would personally have prefered), but as pilots I think we'd be better off either way over the long haul.
Best regards
