Research: Incidents involving navaids and instrument approaches..

gkrangers

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I'm going to write a paper on safety issues, common mistakes, etc in reference to using navaids and flying instrument approaches.

I want to use accidents as support for my thoughts...so if you remember any "good" accidents involving equipment malfunction, pilot error, pilot being an idiot, etc...I'd appreciate any help. I'll be searching the NTSB database myself, as well.
 

gkrangers

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Thanks..thats a topic I will want to touch on...making sure all documentation is current, etc...
 

NYCPilot

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AA 965 flight in Cali, Columbia....incorrectly set up the FMS due to acknowledging an incorrect ID autocomplete.
 
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minitour

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The crash in Houston last year...didn't they have the VOR tuned instead of the ILS?

-mini
 

Andy Neill

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Try a TWA 727 accident Dec 1, 1974 near Berryville, Va. 92 fatalities. I think the report will mention deficiencies in company training, approach plate format, and gneral instrument practices of the day.
 

Flying Illini

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Mini beat me to it. They did indeed have the VOR tuned instead of the ILS. The CVR is interesting reading.
 

gkrangers

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Flying Illini said:
Mini beat me to it. They did indeed have the VOR tuned instead of the ILS. The CVR is interesting reading.
I've been looking for a case like this...tracking to the wrong VOR, or a VOR instead of an ILS, etc...

I've also got a personal, albeit VFR (thank god), experience with tracking to the wrong VOR.
 

gkrangers

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Flying Illini said:
Mini beat me to it. They did indeed have the VOR tuned instead of the ILS. The CVR is interesting reading.
Any specifics on that one? Searching Houston didn't turn up anything.

Was it the GIII crash? The NTSB doesn't have a report on it yet, so no actual data.
 
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minitour

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Flying Illini said:
The CVR is interesting reading.
Yep...If my memory serves me they were BSin about all sorts of stuff...how many times they'd done this, etc.

gk: can't remember where I read it at and don't remember the aircraft type but it was last year and they crashed close to the airport (can't remember how close) if that helps.

-mini
 

NYCPilot

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If you know anyone with a few copies of "IFR Refresher" that might be helpful. They detail a lot of accidents due to these kind of operational errors. Mostly outside of 121 flying though, but may be helpful. Lots of 135 and 91 accidents - I guess thats where a lot of them occur unfortunately.
 

cforst513

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what about that post about the family that's suing ATC b/c they didn't spoon-feed the pilot his approach on an ILS?
 

mar

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Here's a good one.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19920608-0

This page has links to the CVR and the complete accident report.

Briefly, loss of Situational Awareness, crew tracks outbound on the backcourse, thinks they're inbound on the front course, begins descent.

Significant accident because it's one of the very first where the NTSB primarily blamed management for this crew pairing.
 

typhoonpilot

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The Korean Airlines crash in Guam involved the VOR with mis-identification of distance to the airport. The Flying Tigers crash in Kuala Lumpur involved an NDB and again, mis-identification of distance remaining to the airport. Both very good examples for any paper you are writing.

TP
 

Andy Neill

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I don't think the Kuala Lampur event was so much not knowing how much distance to the airpport as it was misunderstanding the descent clearance. The controller said "descend 2 400" and the crew heard "descend to 400". TO be sure there were many other factors involved (confusion as to which NDBs to use for what, by whom, & where, not having the apporach properly briefed, and ignoring eight GPWS warnings), but the most significant, IMHO, was the descent altitude.
 
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