Pinnacle Pilots: "Just wanted to have fun"

[Rogue5]

One of my coworkers said it best: hopefully this will cause enough of a shakeup to get the company to implement a REAL training program, hire QUALIFIED individuals by paying enough to attract them, and hopefully this loss of life will educate enough people to one day prevent another such tragedy with even greater loss of life.

Looks like they've already begun:

JOB INFORMATION
COMPANY: Pinnacle Airlines DATE: May 27, 2005
POSITION: CRJ Lead Instructor

DESCRIPTION: Works under the direction and supervision of the CRJ Program
Manager. Oversees standardization of instructors, check airmen
and the training process. Acts as coordinator of training issues
between ground instructors, flight/sim instructors and check
airmen. Serves as principal guide to flight crew instructional
staff in curriculum, module and lesson plan development. Assists
the CS, Inflight and MX program managers in development of
operational procedures and training procedures. Maintains high
level of knowledge in Company policy, FOM, FOTM, FAR’s, Ops
Specs, CRJ Aircraft Flight Manuals. Participates in
review/revision of FCOMs, FOTM and other related manuals. Assists
in courseware and flight crew training program development
including FAA acceptance or approval. Coordinates with CRJ
Program Manager in the selection of instructors and check airmen.
Assists with instructor payroll activities. Liaisons with
Maintenance to monitor maintenance issues and assists CRJ Program
Manager with implementation of changes to pilot training as
necessary to improve safety and reliability. Provides leadership
and guidance to both ground and simulator instructors. Monitors
scheduling of simulators, instructors, check airmen and students
to maximize utilization. Participates in internal audit program
as required. Minimum Requirements: Four-year college degree or
equivalent work experience. Two years of airline operations
experience. Airline Transport Pilot certificate and type rating
CRJ aircraft. Excellent leadership, interpersonal, and
organizational skills. Superior knowledge of Company policies,
procedures, and standards. Intermediate typing skills and
knowledge of Word, Excel and PowerPoint software Some repetitive
motion such as typing. Position requires some physical exertion
such as pulling, pushing, reaching, bending, standing, walking
and light lifting of boxes, bags and training equipment not in
excess of 30 lbs. Can involve long periods of sitting and
standing. Office work for the majority of time. Occasional
airport operations activities in all types of weather. Airport
ramp operations are noisy and can be hazardous. Special
Requirements: Must be willing to work occasional evenings, and
weekends. Some travel required. Concurrent internal and external
recruitment.

CONTACT INFORMATION
Telephone: No phone calls
Fax: 1-901-348-4162 (click on the FAX number to instantly FAX your resume)
Email: Electronic applications accepted via ~I-Apply.
Mailing Address: Attn: Buddy Casaey
Pinnacle Airlines
1689 Nonconnah Blvd., Suite 111
Memphis, TN 38132-2102

Web: www.nwairlink.com

 

[Lear70]

Naahhh... that opening is because in the last 10 days we have lost EVERY SINGLE GROUND INSTRUCTOR except for one.

That means we have one ground instructor to teach all 50 new-hires this month AND conduct recurrent ground.

The instructors got pissed off and found other jobs, they weren't recalled back to where they came.

Don't look for positive change from within Pinnacle without Federal oversight (as in, "We'll shut you down if you don't clean up your act.")

 

[BID]

Just finished reading much of the information regarding this accident, WOW, what a true dissappointment. My definition of "fun" is a quite a bit different from what I have read here. That's too bad.

 

[Towelie]

Did he get his verbiage wrong because he was rattled and only move them to idle but said "shutoff"? During the initial briefing (very beginning of the hearing) the synopsis says they did the restart attempts but makes no mention that they were done incorrectly - something I believe would be important in the hearing.

Apparently he had difficulty with that very issue in training (saying one thing and doing another). God only knows how each one of us would react in this type of event, but I guess that is why it is so important to get it right in training. I'm not stirring the pot here... just pointing out a few facts.

From the Human Factors report:

• He further stated that when reading a checklist, Captain Rhodes would sometimes misstate the status of an item. Additionally, he would sometimes read a checklist item and action but not accomplish it or he would take action on the opposite airplane system instead of the system noted in the checklist.
  
  The simulator instructor said that he had seen those types of deficiencies during training with FO candidates but it was unusual to see them from a captain in upgrade training. His concerns regarding Captain Rhodes’ deficiencies manifested themselves during simulator session four and were validated in simulator session five. He said that he debriefed Captain Rhodes on both occasions. He said that the biggest weakness he saw in Captain Rhodes was critical decision-making and judgment; however, he flew the airplane just fine.
  

 

[Hung Start]

Ohhh, grand!!! That just is like saying a monkey can fly the plane fine,, just doesn't do well with decisions. Wonderful!!!

 

[FN FAL]

Too much altitude for the RJ at 410.

In space, no one can hear you scream.

 

[ataopsdave]

Naahhh... that opening is because in the last 10 days we have lost EVERY SINGLE GROUND INSTRUCTOR except for one.

That means we have one ground instructor to teach all 50 new-hires this month AND conduct recurrent ground.

The instructors got pissed off and found other jobs, they weren't recalled back to where they came.

Don't look for positive change from within Pinnacle without Federal oversight (as in, "We'll shut you down if you don't clean up your act.")

Lear70

That is not entirely true. We lost our Program manager because he went back to Delta. 2 of our ground instructors got promoted to sim instructors, 1 got another promotion and one other left to work for Flight Safety.

 

[SRMairlines]

7. The transcripts show that THE CREW DID THE DUAL ENGINE FLAMEOUT CHECKLIST IMMEDIATELY. THE CREW DID THE RELIGHT ATTEMPTS PROPERLY! That's right folks, they did just about everything by the numbers once they got in that position. .

Lear70, one of the major topics is that they didn't do the windmilling relight properly. To get 12% N2 rotation don't you need 300kts as per the QRH. They never made it past 235kias and never received any rotation. QRH never says to discontinue or alter relight if no N2 is received. Correct me if I am wrong after you hear more.

 

[Inconceivable]

Did anyone notice the Bomb folks saying that they are not memory items, but "immediate action" items--if the operator chooses to make them memory items, that is their business--but not recommended by Bomb's training?

I was told 5+ years ago that the verbatim memory cr@p requirement came from Pat M. when she was still the APOI.

Do other airlines have better wording of them, or is it the same stilted franco-canuck translations?

 

[Biatch5]

The training program at Pinnacle is indeed absolutely terrible. QUOTE]

Well with OUTSTANDING training from Gulfstream Academy, I bet you can change the training over at Pinnacle!

 

[100LL... Again!]

Truly superb pilots need little more than minimal training.

Those who are lazy, or demand spoon-feeding might be more concerned with training issues.

You DID get a manual right? There ARE resources on high-altitude aerodynamics, right? The FAA puts out a fantastic advisory circular on high altitude issues - you did read it, right?

 

[PCL_128]

Truly superb pilots need little more than minimal training.

Those who are lazy, or demand spoon-feeding might be more concerned with training issues.

You DID get a manual right? There ARE resources on high-altitude aerodynamics, right? The FAA puts out a fantastic advisory circular on high altitude issues - you did read it, right?

I agree with you that pilots should take the initiative and read things on their own. That's the only reason I know about the climb capability chart, because I can assure you that it was never even seen in training. However, training departments do have at least some responsibility to make their pilots aware of issues like performance, aerodynamics, emergency procedures, etc... We can't just assume that pilots are educating themselves on these things. Should they? Absolutely. Are they? Well, I think this accident proves that they are not. This crew's lack of knowledge on these things is not unique at Pinnacle. Most of the crews that were interviewed by the NTSB after the accident could not answer basic questions on high altitude aerodynamics and other relevant issues. I doubt you find the same problem at Comair or ASA because their training departments cover these things.

 

[100LL... Again!]

We can't just assume that pilots are educating themselves on these things. Should they? Absolutely. Are they? Well, I think this accident proves that they are not.

True, but for how much the typical pilot likes to spout off about professionalism and "deserving" certain levels of compensation, I think that a little more self-study and proactive behavior might raise the image of pilots as a whole.

This transcript and the articles I am seeing in the paper are going to give the worst possible impression about pilots as a whole. For those who think that educating the general public on how poorly regional pilots are paid - I might wait until this incident is a dim memory.

Perhaps it would do well to look for these types of personality characteristics in pilot candidates, instead of raw hour requirements or time in type. Plenty of accidents from high time-in-type pilots, you know.

Maybe the interview process needs to be a bit more stringent.

Certinly the company bears a lot of responsibility to train pilots, but the longer I am in this business, the more I am beginning to think that there are not very many of these determined self-educating, self-improving individuals.
This is one of the most disappointing things I have found in this business. I really had expected so much more in terms of professionalism.

But as many of us have seen, there are a lot of people who are perfectly happy with 80%.

And when other guys in class start asking about getting the gouge on the oral, I want to scream. I have never asked for a gouge once in my entire career. Those who 'train for the test' have no business in airplanes, in my very un-humble opinion.

Most of the crews that were interviewed by the NTSB after the accident could not answer basic questions on high altitude aerodynamics and other relevant issues.

Surprise, surprise. The company can shoulder some blame here of course, but this is the 21st century. There are boks, advisory circulars, trade magazines, the internet, etc.

How many of the self-described professionals at PCL or anywhere else for that matter are digging into these resources and improving their knowledge?

Not many, I bet. Why are people who are given a multi-million dollar aircraft to fly not appreciative enough to want to become as skilled as they can be?

I doubt you find the same problem at Comair or ASA because their training departments cover these things.

See above.

Look at it this way - ultimately the pilot(s) of an aircraft are responsible.
If dispatch gives you an illegal release, are you off the hook? Nope.

Just because you were not told something does not mean it is not important.
A true professional will continue to seek out as much information as possible to ensure that they are fully competent to do the job.

I do not think that a lot of low-time RJ drivers fit this description.

 

[J32driver]

A true professional will continue to seek out as much information as possible to ensure that they are fully competent to do the job.

I do not think that a lot of low-time RJ drivers fit this description.

I'd be willing to bet you are thinking wrong.

 

[Dodge]

This is all true. Now, the Avro doesn't get up to 410, but we do go into the mid 30's. Mesaba had no high altitude performance in the Avro program. Maybe they do now. What I know, I had to get books and teach it to myself. I'm sure every other regional is about the same.

Remember.... $afety comes first at the regionals!!!

 

[PCL_128]

True, but for how much the typical pilot likes to spout off about professionalism and "deserving" certain levels of compensation, I think that a little more self-study and proactive behavior might raise the image of pilots as a whole.

This transcript and the articles I am seeing in the paper are going to give the worst possible impression about pilots as a whole. For those who think that educating the general public on how poorly regional pilots are paid - I might wait until this incident is a dim memory.

I agree that this doesn't look good for the profession at all, but I also don't think that this is fully representative of the "regional" pilot group as a whole. The general public may perceive that this is how all regional pilots behave, but those of us in the industry shouldn't jump to that conclusion.

Perhaps it would do well to look for these types of personality characteristics in pilot candidates, instead of raw hour requirements or time in type. Plenty of accidents from high time-in-type pilots, you know.

I think both things need to be looked at. I've found that time in type is quite important, especially when green-on-green is a possibility like it is at Pinnacle. We should be looking at all aspects when hiring pilots: total time, time in type, personality type, CRM experience and training, etc...

Maybe the interview process needs to be a bit more stringent.

Agreed.

Certinly the company bears a lot of responsibility to train pilots, but the longer I am in this business, the more I am beginning to think that there are not very many of these determined self-educating, self-improving individuals.
This is one of the most disappointing things I have found in this business. I really had expected so much more in terms of professionalism.

But as many of us have seen, there are a lot of people who are perfectly happy with 80%.

All very true. I think this is possibly an unfortunate side-effect of the seniority system. Pilots feel that their seniority will assure them of upgrade and bigger equipment and don't feel the need to better their knowledge and skills in order to advance. I think the only way to correct this is to drastically increase standards on initial training, PCs, and especially upgrade training. Letting pilots skate by on basic knowledge shouldn't be allowed.

Surprise, surprise. The company can shoulder some blame here of course, but this is the 21st century. There are boks, advisory circulars, trade magazines, the internet, etc.

Again, I agree with you, but the FAA has an oversight responsibility to protect the flying public from idiot pilots. The only way to do that is to ensure that the companies are providing the relevant training. The FAA can't just assume that pilots are studying on their own. They have a responsibility to the public to assure that pilots are minimally competent to handle a jet aircraft.

 

[flap operator]

Dodge - I don't know when you went through training. When I went through the England training about 4.5 years ago we had a whole day devoted to high alt aerodynamics, taught by Dave Bangs. I felt like I was back in my aerodynamics and performance classes in college.

I recently had recurrent and they had a high alt module they went through. They said it was the basis of the high alt training for our CRJ program. It was a little lacking, but a lot of it doesn't aply to the avro as the avro is not as slippery and swept as the CRJ.

Never the less, we have lots of info in the POM regarding high alt ops. The climb profiles, the pleads to level off if we can't climb, don't go below Ver blah blah blah. I do wish we had a climb chart, much like they have on the CRJ.


FO

 

[DoinTime]

It was a little lacking, but a lot of it doesn't aply to the avro as the avro is not as slippery and swept as the CRJ.

Aaaaha....I knew you would someday admit that the avro has a straight wing!

 

[flap operator]

Conche de la vaca!!! I never said it was straight =) You'll never get to me to admit it... but I will concede it's not quite as swept as yours.



FO

 

[Dodge]

Flap Operator,

Yeah, I went through in MSP. Our instructor is mechanic. The POM does say not to climb in VS mode and watch your IAS, but we never talked about high altitude performance. We also have pilots who refuse to fly flaps up below 200kts regardless of weight/Ver. While that is on the safe side, it does show some lack of aerodynamic knowledge about the aircraft.

The short version is that regionals need to do a better job teaching high altitude/high performance aerodynamics if they want low time and prop drivers flying high altitude/high performance machines.

 

[PCL_128]

The POM does say not to climb in VS mode and watch your IAS

If you don't climb in VS mode, then what are you using? Some sort of IAS or MACH hold? Does the AP do well in that mode without big pitch oscillations? I've jumped up front on an AVRO, but I can't remember what AP modes were being used.

 

[Dodge]

Yes, the POM prohibits anyone from using VS other than in a decent. And then only to 10000', because we are not good enough pilots to hold our speed below 250. The IAS mode doesn't do a very good job in the climb. Lots of leveling off and descending in the climb to get to your cruise altitude. But, that's what the POM says to do. So what if you can't maintain a 500 fpm climb. I just tell center that Mesaba won't let me pick up the climb rate. We'll take a lower altitude.

 

[flap operator]

Ah... you got the JM ground school. Dave has been on a leave for awhile, but presented a terrific day on high altitude operations. IT should have been captured on video to show all the subsequent classes that have since been through avro training.

If you climb in VS you see exactly why they tell us not to... because the a/s bleeds off, if you use LVL CHG you get some oscilating, but it's not that bad. It's worse in turb, but it's pretty effective.

I hope that this accident will inspire Mesaba to add to the program.


FO

 

[Lear70]

That is not entirely true. We lost our Program manager because he went back to Delta. 2 of our ground instructors got promoted to sim instructors, 1 got another promotion and one other left to work for Flight Safety.

And another one went to work for Mesaba... he was teaching ground school all last month in DTW and told us about the mass exodus from the training department.

I find it VERY odd that the company would allow promotions from within and leave them with ONE ground instructors... then again, this company has never been known for their stellar staffing abilities.

 

[furlough-boy]

Apparently he had difficulty with that very issue in training (saying one thing and doing another). God only knows how each one of us would react in this type of event, but I guess that is why it is so important to get it right in training. I'm not stirring the pot here... just pointing out a few facts.

From the Human Factors report:

• He further stated that when reading a checklist, Captain Rhodes would sometimes misstate the status of an item. Additionally, he would sometimes read a checklist item and action but not accomplish it or he would take action on the opposite airplane system instead of the system noted in the checklist.
  
  The simulator instructor said that he had seen those types of deficiencies during training with FO candidates but it was unusual to see them from a captain in upgrade training. His concerns regarding Captain Rhodes’ deficiencies manifested themselves during simulator session four and were validated in simulator session five. He said that he debriefed Captain Rhodes on both occasions. He said that the biggest weakness he saw in Captain Rhodes was critical decision-making and judgment; however, he flew the airplane just fine.
  

What about the checkride history of these guys too:

Captain:

CFI Checkride - Failed twice
CFII Checkride - Failed
J41 Oral - Failed
J41 F/O sim - Failed
ATP/BE-1900 Type - Failed

Fired from TSA for abuse of sick time, unable to contact on reserve, etc...

F/O:

Commerical Multi - Failed.

Wow.

 

[PCL_128]

What about the checkride history of these guys too:

Captain:

CFI Checkride - Failed twice
CFII Checkride - Failed
J41 Oral - Failed
J41 F/O sim - Failed
ATP/BE-1900 Type - Failed

Fired from TSA for abuse of sick time, unable to contact on reserve, etc...

F/O:

Commerical Multi - Failed.

Wow.

Alright, Jesse's checkride history is somewhat, umm, colorful, but Peter only failed one checkride. I think it's safe to say that most pilots fail one checkride in their training. It just happens sometimes. Bad day, examiner's in a bad mood, whatever. I will concede that Jesse's history is very interesting though. Where did you get all those details? I didn't see it in the Human Factors report from the NTSB. Did I just miss it?

 

[furlough-boy]

It's in the NTSB Group Chairman's Factual Report - Operations/Human Performance Group.

Certainly a history in the Captain's background. How do you get hired with 6 failed checkrides and being terminated from your previous airline?

Not much chance for the F/O to have much of a history with only 700 hours.

 

[Towelie]

Alright, Jesse's checkride history is somewhat, umm, colorful, but Peter only failed one checkride. I think it's safe to say that most pilots fail one checkride in their training. It just happens sometimes. Bad day, examiner's in a bad mood, whatever. I will concede that Jesse's history is very interesting though. Where did you get all those details? I didn't see it in the Human Factors report from the NTSB. Did I just miss it?

Yeah, it's in there.

To me, Peter's failed checkride doesn't mean half as much as his 700 total time (hired with 500 total). While were at it, what business does Jesse have dicking around in a plane when he is barely off high mins? I don't care if he was an FO in the thing or not. No one should screw around, especially two people who have less than 400 hours combined in their two seats. Really, really not a good idea.

What's the most depressing is that Jesse left behind three kids, one of whom he never met. It's one thing for your dad to die in an accident, but when he dies in an accident because he was intentionally screwing around... Senseless.

*sigh*

 

[100LL... Again!]

Unfortunately, PRIA only requires the records to be provided, not that a sensible decision be made based on them.

A record like that isn't very encouraging.

 

[CatYaaak]

Maturity Isn't an "act" for Pax.

The unrelenting level of immaturity revealed here is nothing short of shocking.
The immature person....

....banks and yanks and stresses airplanes not their own, without any thought for who may be flying it after them, or the pax who will be in it later.

....shows a complete disregard for the notion of "setting an example" for a relative new-hire.

....doesn't question when another pilot, even if more experienced, is doing obviously stupid things and making decisions the one's signing the paychecks wouldn't approve of....a situation, btw, that was probably posed to them hypothetically in an interview, and undoubtedly answered that they WOULD question the other person in the interests of safety. (Along those lines....)

...Lies. To the company, to ATC, to themselves. They think nothing of it. It's their world, they think, and everybody else is just livin' in it.

.... does things for "the fun of it" along the lines of lying on highway centerlines, playing with guns, and clawing for altitude even when they know they shouldnt be doing any of them. They can't differentiate between "fun" and "stupid". This is because immaturity also has them believe that a squished torso, a splattered brain, or winding up in a smoking hole is something that happens "to someone else", reams of historical evidence regarding their types in general notwithstanding.

....walks, acts, and talks like a child when they think nobody's looking, dude.

..is in denial and oblivious to anything they don't see with their own eyes, and doesn't bother to find out something they don't know of their own volition, even if it's their profession, and a big-boy/girl one at that. They can even be in denial after you've put yourself smack in the middle of the World of Hurt.

...can't excercise good judgement over any period of time because judgement requires knowledge in addition to the experience, and immaturity while engaged in edeavors that require critical thought spells Ignorance.

Is there any question that poor judgement driven by immaturity is at the heart of this accident?

From the FDR and CVR data:

At a known weight, at ISA +10 temps, flew off the performance charts available to them. On the way up, playing "Zoomie" numerous times complete with stick shaker...the first immediately after T/O. Seat swap with nobody at the controls. Request an unchecked-by-chart altitude for "the fun of it", 8,000' above what they were dispatched for. Continued climb well below profile Mach #, knowingly. Focus on FF instead of where it should have been. High altitude climb using VS instead of Mach Hold. No discussion (and therefore apparent unawareness) as to their razor-thin and unmaintainable situation. No references to Temps Aloft at their new, unplanned altitude. Immature glee to have clawed up there despite ridiculously/dangerously low Mach. Noted decaying Mach in level flight numerous times. Immaterial references to IAS. After arriving at the predictably unmaintainable altitude, PF exhibits his ignorance of the "Altitude Question" by questioning PNC (Pilot Not in Cockpit) PIC, who repeatedly displays amusement and confirms that they won't be able to stay there. ATC notes not only high altitude, but most importantly decaying groundspeed to the point it's mentioned between controllers.

No sense of urgency from either of the crew to get lower NOW while speed decays and pitch increases until the A/P diconnect and the shaker. After the shaker, the pusher...then numerous pushers each followed by what the FDR would indicate to be the PF pulling the aircraft into every-higher nose-up attitudes, exacerbating the problem by trying to maintain altitude AND NOT LETTING THE AIRCRAFT DO WHAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO DO, which is to get headed earthward in a controlled manner. During, and probably because of, these occillations the engine airflow was blanketed to the point the cores completely spooled-down. You want "core lock"? Do what they did and not what the airplane is wanting to do! Kept up the PIO to the point a wing dropped...82 degrees of bank. Apparent unawareness to smoked #2 engine due to pegging out ITT at any point from then on.

Oh, and this little ommision.....

THEY AVOIDED AND PURPOSELY DID NOT COMMMUNICATE TO THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOW A GLIDER TO ATC, WHO WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY BEGUN ADVISING THEM AS TO LOCATION AND OFFER VECTORS TO THE CLOSEST AIRPORT. IN FACT, THE REPORT INDICATES THEY HAD THREE OF THEM AT THAT POINT.

Never achieved windmilling re-start IAS in the glide after starting APU. Not even hand-grenade close. No attempt to achieve it prior to windmilling re-light envelope. Seeming consternation as to why no N2 indications, or a re-try for min windmilling speed after the proper checklist was finally read. Instead, immediately focusing on APU start and low best-glide speed when achieving book windmilling speed but seeing no resultant core rotation where it should have been MIGHT HAVE CLUED THEM IN THAT THEY WERE A GLIDER AND NUDGED THEIR BRAINS INTO THAT HARSH REALITY, AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY WHEN THE OPTIONS WERE BETTER....FIND A PLACE TO LAND...DO EVERYTHING ELSE AFTER DOING THAT.

but instead...

STILL NO COMMUNICATION TO ATC OF THEIR DIRE SITUATION. CREW PURPOSELY KEPT UP THIS RUSE BY USING PHRASES SUCH AS "getting the OTHER engine started" WHEN DIRECTLY QUERIED. Is this the Clinton Approach of trying to mitigate or downplay a mistake that might paint you in an unfavorable light?...."Yes, I tried pot once" (yes, we went too high and stalled the airplane), "I didn't like it" (We are now doing the right thing and asking for lower)...."Didn't inhale!" (Hey, we'll pretend we only lost one engine so it won't seem so bad!). And importantly, no discussion even amongst themselves as to WHERE TO LAND THE FRIGGIN' AIRPLANE IF THEIR "A$$HOLES AND ELBOWS" APPROACH TO AIRMANSHIP AND SWITCH-FLIPPING DIDN'T WORK.

Swapping seats again..nobody at the controls. APU start doesnt work. and finally...finally....

an admission to ATC that they have lost both engines, at 8,500' AGL...about 30,000' too late, and even then it seems to come because they know ATC will see they can't maintain altitude. It's only at the last moment they seem to realize the gravity of the moment...their reality.

You know guys/gals.....

Machinery, even highly-reliable and proven engine types like CF-34s can fail if you abuse them. He11, these guys were semi-abusing this airplane structurally throughout the climb. Thats why they have limitations. For those saying that "there's no reason the engines shouldn't have re-started", go back and re-read the FDR starting just before FL410 shaker until losing electrical. Think about the recorded AOA's, pitch angles, column forces, airflow, engine temps, OAT, G's, oil, fuel scheduling, and what those engines went through. Compare that with what an engine would go through if they had let the pusher do it's job and established a hand-flown descent when they should have. If you still think it's a suprise they couldnt be re-lit, well I wouldn't even trust you with my car and no doubt still can't figure out why the airplane didn't fly at it's "certified altitude".

Training is never perfect. And yes, this airline's training prior to the accident regarding high altitude flight obviously sucked....they depended on their pilots sticking to flight plans, thereby operating well-within the aerodynamic womb...not on the fringe, and they didn't sufficiently stress the dangers of going outside it. But it remains that if the crew had stuck to, or even marginally adhered to the plan, it wouldn't have happened. And like someone else has mentioned, for lack company training neither pilot reflected a self-education of knowledge (that even if the company didn't provide it) is very basic to flying jet aircraft at high-altitudes and is readily available from many sources. Educating yourself to a higher degree than what any company can spoon-feed you is part of what proffessionals do, and i make no apologies for saying that if you're getting paid to captain a jet you better know this basic %@#@.

Everyone can make mistakes, and everyone does. Everyone has lapses in judgement, but usually singular and temporary. This whole event, on the other hand, is a friggin' showcase of immaturity from the get-go. This is the kind of thing only peer pressure can solve. I know the vast majority aren't like this. Hopefully, they'll apply the pressure to maintain standards and change those who can find a maturity level that befits the profession, or drum out those who can't.

RIP to those guys, but it's only sheer luck they didn't kill or maim someone on the ground as they sat in their living room, layed in their beds, or drove down the street. To any who still think "No Pax =Playtime" and airplanes are just a big 'ole toy, it's NOT just your World, and there ARE other people living in it. If you want to play find another way, like rent a Pitts, go find a remote area and get your ya ya's out like I do. Or something. However you do it, it's just like your mother told you, there's a time and a place for everything.

The whole thing, and some of the responses excusing it, disgust me.