PCL ALPA Statement on 3701

[Inconceivable]

DATE: June 13, 2005

FROM: MEC Chairman Wake Gordon

RE: Pinnacle Flight 3701 accident

Fellow Pinnacle Pilots:

The Pinnacle 3701 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident hearing
begins today in Washington, D.C. This hearing will focus on the loss of two
pilots and a Bombardier CRJ on Oct. 14, 2004, in Jefferson City, MO. This
hearing will be a challenge for our pilot group—many of the facts brought out by
the investigation may not reflect well on our company or the pilots involved. I
have been working side by side with our MEC safety team (led by Aaron Rose) and
with the ALPA National accident investigation unit to ensure that we are fully
engaged in every aspect of the investigation and that our perspectives are heard
throughout.

This next week will be critical for us. It is essential that we remain united as
a pilot group and work together to ensure that the facts, rather than rumors,
remain the basis of our understanding of the events taking place in Washington.
I assure each of you that I will keep you fully informed, to the extent
possible, of developments at the NTSB hearing as they occur. After the
conclusion of the hearing, I intend to visit each crew room to answer any
questions you may have.

Right now, I would like to outline the general course of events and the pilots’
perspectives that I will advance in the media and that our aviation safety team
will communicate during the hearing. As you may know, an NTSB public hearing is
a proceeding intended to gather additional factual information regarding
transportation accidents. This hearing takes place at NTSB headquarters and is
expected to last three or possibly four days. As its name implies, it takes
place in the public eye and can be attended by the public, but the public cannot
participate in the hearing itself. ALPA, along with the other interested parties
to the investigation (such as the FAA, Pinnacle Airlines, Bombardier, and
General Electric) will participate.

In the NTSB’s own words, “The hearing is being held for the purpose of
supplementing the facts, conditions, and circumstances discovered during the
on-scene and continuing investigation. This process will assist the Safety Board
in determining the probable cause of the accident and in making any
recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future.” The public hearing
marks the point in the investigation process when the existing body of factual
information (the “docket”) becomes available to the general public. The Board
will not issue a determination of cause during the hearing. The NTSB’s
determination will be announced at a subsequent “sunshine meeting,” which will
be scheduled later.

The ALPA team is focusing on several key issues. As with every accident, a chain
of events led to this tragedy. Two of our colleagues paid the ultimate price as
a result of this accident. It is our duty to learn all that we can about each
link in the accident chain, and apply the lessons to prevent future accidents.
The key ALPA issues include:

* CF-34 core lock: This phenomenon, which was previously unknown to most
airlines and virtually all pilots, placed the aircraft in a situation from which
the flight crew could not recover. While the crew made some questionable
decisions prior to the flameout, the pilots followed the checklist they had, and
the two engines should have restarted. These pilots could not possibly have
known that their engines were not going to restart, and the implications of this
problem reach well beyond this accident, this airline, and this aircraft. You
will be hearing more about this issue in coming weeks.
* Airline Training Practices: The current airline industry environment—in
which regional airlines like Pinnacle have experienced explosive growth while
adding ever more sophisticated aircraft—has made it more likely that less
experienced pilots will be placed in command of high-performance airliners with
far less “seasoning” than has been normal in the past. To make sure we fly as
safely as possible, our training must provide the necessary skills and
experience. The industry and our company have been slow to recognize or act on
this change.
* Lack of Proactive Safety Programs: Prior to this accident, ALPA had
attempted to work with Pinnacle to implement proactive safety programs that many
other carriers already use. These programs (such as FOQA and ASAP) are
cost-effective, nonpunitive, and confidential ways for the operators to detect
and then correct safety deficiencies. These programs have been extremely
successful at every carrier that uses them, and ALPA is continuing to push for
their implementation at Pinnacle.
* One Level of Safety: As passenger and cargo air transportation demand
continues to increase, the challenge of making sure the safety lessons learned
by the mainline carriers are passed on to the regional airline industry will be
more important than ever. The FAA and the NTSB must set the pace for progress by
ensuring that all airlines adhere to the same level of safety—not only in
theory, but also in practice. Some circumstances at Pinnacle provide examples of
how both theory and the practice of safety have not yet penetrated to all levels
of the industry.



In addition to the hearing participants, the news media will certainly be
present. I will caution you right now that you will be exposed to information
that will not reflect well on the accident pilots, on you and your fellow
pilots, or on the Company itself. Your first reaction may very well be to jump
to the defense of any or all of these entities. However, I am asking each of you
to help safeguard our ability to be involved in the NTSB investigation by
refraining from commenting on the investigation, and to let me defend our lost
pilots.

While ALPA’s efforts to advance pilots’ perspectives may not be obvious, please
feel assured that we are fully engaged in every aspect of this investigation. In
a few months, ALPA will be able to publicly discuss the issues and causes of
this accident, but in accordance with NTSB rules, we are extremely limited in
what we can say about the investigation at this time. Like all NTSB
investigations, this is a process with rules and certain pre-defined steps, and
I promise you that ALPA is making every effort to ensure that this is a thorough
and balanced investigation.

Obviously, the stakes are significant for both the Pinnacle pilot group and for
ALPA. It is critical that we maintain our professionalism during this difficult
period and that we all abide by the applicable rules and guidelines.

It is also important to present a unified appearance in support of our accident
investigation team, which has been actively participating with the various
investigative groups since the accident occurred. These ALPA team members have
shown great dedication to determining and understanding the issues related to
the accident. Please show your appreciation for their work, and pass along your
thanks. If you have any safety issues that you feel need to be addressed, please
send them to the ALPA Engineering and Air Safety staff, who have been supporting
the investigation as well.

On a final note, I know that you want to understand all of the facts surrounding
this accident. Let me assure you that you will get them. As a party to this
investigation, we are operating under NTSB rules and are unable to report the
full information to you at this time. We will have the complete details to you
in the next few days, as soon as we are cleared to release them.

Wake

 

[FL000]

Why do I feel like I just had my ear pressed to a glass on the wall?

 

[pilotkppsg]

I suppose that the professional FO's from GIA have mad it "more likely that less experienced pilots will be placed in command of high-performance airliners with far less 'seasoning' than has been normal in the past."

 

[airmasn]

I wouldn't blame the Gulfstream guys...Pinnacle managment are the ones allowing low-timers into the cockpit of a sophisticated jet aircraft via whatever agreement they have with GIA...they (I'm sure) were made aware of the risks and decided it was a non-issue.

 

[blade230]

T-Gates,


I agree completely, this had absolutely NOTHING to do with Gulfstream or PFT or even low Total Time. It is an OBVIOUS combination of, unfortunately, poor decision making/judgement, and poor training in the CL-65 (not B 1900D) systems and operations.

The Captain had more total hours than many RJ Captains in this country.

On a side note, I am not aware of any accidents that have happened at Gulfstream, and that place has almost ALL low time pilots, PFT or not, the training program is probably much better.

 

[BigShotXJTdrvr]

Who wants to bet that there is going to be a much more restrictive green-on-green rule added to pt121 as a result of this accident? And that airline management will fight it every step of the way.

 

[PCL_128]

On a side note, I am not aware of any accidents that have happened at Gulfstream, and that place has almost ALL low time pilots, PFT or not, the training program is probably much better.

True, GIA has never had a single major accident. The biggest thing I remember ever happening there was a gear collapse on landing (mechanical fault, not crew's fault). PFT, low time pilots, all this stuff has nothing to do with this kind of accident. This is about the training program, management's attitude towards safety, and the attitude of the overall pilot group about SOP and standardization.

 

[Gateau]

True, GIA has never had a single major accident.

YET!!

 

[flap operator]

However, low time = low experience. Wether it's low time from GIA, Riddle, UND or where ever... low time means low experience. You cannot honestly say that a low experience level combined with numerous other factors (poor training, company policy, standards etc...) might have played a role is this awful accident?


FO

 

[PCL_128]

YET!!

No accidents in 15 years of commercial flying is a pretty darn good record. The training program at GIA is top-notch. Certainly far superior to the training we have at Pinch-Nickle.

 

[The_Russian]

YET!!

Yeah, you little a$$hole. And when I come down because I am so worthless and inexperienced, I'll make sure to do it on your fcuking head.

 

[nimtz]

No accidents in 15 years of commercial flying is a pretty darn good record. The training program at GIA is top-notch.

I think the pilot profession in the US has reached a new low if we are now to believe Gulfstream has 'top-notch' training.

 

[PCL_128]

I think the pilot profession in the US has reached a new low if we are now to believe Gulfstream has 'top-notch' training.

You've got to understand that the training at GIA is not done by the low-timers (for the most part anyway). My sim instructor was a former rEAL 727 Captain that has roughly 27,000 hours TT in everything from F-104s to 727s. There are many like him there, although some of them are of the SCAB persuasion. They may be SCABs, but they know a lot more about flying than the former ramper that taught my ground school at PCL.

 

[another cfii]

Guys, you gotta be realistic. We are all in the same ship. It's a very unfortunate accident, and no one in this industry is affected now more than PCL. If experience is one thing our pilot group lacks, i can say that most of the pilots here do really try their best to learn to fly the CRJ as well as other more experience operator in this industry.

If you want every CRJ operator to be highly experience, then they better start pay a lot more, so they can hire the NW furlough to fly instead of us!

In summary, "GIVE US A BREAK!!!"

 

[79%N1]

Yeah, I'm with PCL_128 here...

My groundschool instructors at Pinnacle:

>Guy with a subsitute-teaching background

>Guy who was a former ramp agent turned ground school instructor

>Guy who was a KC-10 boom operator for 20 years

(None of the above 3 even have a Private certificate)

>Furloughed DAL pilot who was so in love with himself, his "Jet Upset" course involved insulting all the furloughed NWA guys in the class, followed by comments such as "Sometimes I put on my Delta uniform and look at myself in the mirror."

Lets talk about sim training....my first Instructor in the sim would talk on his cellphone while we were flying. One day he invited his mistress into the simulator to watch. By watch, I mean take him out of the loop and make out with him.

No, I'm not kidding.

Never once was there any training on high-altitude considerations.

Never once did I see the climb charts come out in the class, or the cockpit.

The high-altitude training in the sim consisted of us being slewed up to 350 and yanking the controls around a little bit.

I don't care what your experience level is... If you have that above training and your common sense is low, you're an accident waiting to happen. Plain and simple.

WOW!!! I imagine the FAA/NTSB would like to talk to you and hear this!!!!

 

[BoilerUP]

However, low time = low experience. Wether it's low time from GIA, Riddle, UND or where ever... low time means low experience. You cannot honestly say that a low experience level combined with numerous other factors (poor training, company policy, standards etc...) might have played a role is this awful accident?

A low experience level combined with numerous other factors almost certainly played a role in this accident.

However, don't make the blanket catch-all assumption that low time always equals low experience.

 

[Gateau]

Yeah, you little a$$hole. And when I come down because I am so worthless and inexperienced, I'll make sure to do it on your fcuking head.

Fine with me, just give me ample warning so that I can bring an umbrella! I would hate to get blue juice rained down on my shirt just because you flush yourself down the lav.

Nevermind, your little planes don't have a lav, do they?

 

[flap operator]

It is a valid blanket statement. Low time DOES equal lack of experience. I know FAR more now about the avro and line flying after flying it for 4 years than I did when I was a new hire. I learned not only how to best operate the avro, but I gained a lot of line flying experience that only flying the line can provide. You cannot say that a new hire has more experience than someone who has flown the line for years! There is direct correlation to the time spent in airplanes and flying the line to your experience level. That doesn't mean that people with experience can't be reckless, unprofessional or have a lack of common sense though. My point is that through building time, you gain experience and become a better operator of your airplane.


FO

 

[AAflyer]

Russian,

Becareful, telling people in a public forum that you will take a commercial airliner, albeit a BE1900 and bring it down on someone could land you in hot water. Everyone from the FAMS, TSA, and the FAA are gunning for pilots these days.

Becareful out there guys.

AA

 

[Standby 1]

It is a valid blanket statement. Low time DOES equal lack of experience. I know FAR more now about the avro and line flying after flying it for 4 years than I did when I was a new hire. I learned not only how to best operate the avro, but I gained a lot of line flying experience that only flying the line can provide. You cannot say that a new hire has more experience than someone who has flown the line for years! There is direct correlation to the time spent in airplanes and flying the line to your experience level. That doesn't mean that people with experience can't be reckless, unprofessional or have a lack of common sense though. My point is that through building time, you gain experience and become a better operator of your airplane.


FO

Great post...very true. Look, no matter how offended people may get over it, you cannot escape the fact that time in a/c type = experience. Frankly, I'm not sure exactly why people get so offended by this basic fact....there's nothing to be embarassed about if you are new to an a/c and still learning.

Nothing is going to change regional airlines' hiring practices. The bottom line is money and to keep wages low, they have to hire low time pilots. But what should change is the training at many of these airlines (not just PCL). And even if they don't change their training, it's up to each pilot to learn it themselves.

I don't pretend to know if training, flight experience, or systems knowledge would have changed the outcome of this accident (none of us were there and none of us know for certain), but we can hedge our bets by constantly educating ourselves about the a/c we fly.





.

 

[BoilerUP]

FO did not say "new to an aircraft" in his original post.

I don't question that time in type equals experience, but the tone of FOs original post made it sound like low TOTAL time equals low experience. Of course if you have never flown an airplane you aren't going to be experienced in it! The only way to gain that experience is through actually flying the darn thing. And you can have a 500 hour wonder or a 2500 hour CFI or a 5000 furloughed pilot - put them in an RJ when the last thing they've flown is a Dutchess or Navajo or a 757 and watch them struggle in the new plane as they learn. Although I would hope the mainline guy knows a thing or two about high-altitude swept wing aerodymanics...

Taken under the "time in type" context, I have no beef with that argument. You could have flown the same airplane for 10 years, and you still should be learning. Regardless of experience, some things NEVER change.

 

[PCL_128]

The only way to gain that experience is through actually flying the darn thing. And you can have a 500 hour wonder or a 2500 hour CFI or a 5000 furloughed pilot - put them in an RJ when the last thing they've flown is a Dutchess or Navajo or a 757 and watch them struggle in the new plane as they learn.

The problem at PCL though is that we have street Captains that have zero time in type flying with brand new FOs that are also new on type. When neither pilot has significant time in type, then you have a recipe for disaster.

I flew with a brand new Captain last month that never flew in the right seat of the CRJ. He came straight into the left seat. The only turbine equipment he had time in was a BE-1900 at GLA. He was a pretty knowledgeable guy overall, but what happens when you put him with a brand new FO that's never flown anything bigger than an Aztec? One guy that's new on type is OK, but paired with a new FO also you're just asking for trouble. Unfortunately, it happens at PCL.

 

[328dude]

The problem at PCL though is that we have street Captains that have zero time in type flying with brand new FOs that are also new on type. When neither pilot has significant time in type, then you have a recipe for disaster.

I flew with a brand new Captain last month that never flew in the right seat of the CRJ. He came straight into the left seat. The only turbine equipment he had time in was a BE-1900 at GLA. He was a pretty knowledgeable guy overall, but what happens when you put him with a brand new FO that's never flown anything bigger than an Aztec? One guy that's new on type is OK, but paired with a new FO also you're just asking for trouble. Unfortunately, it happens at PCL.

SO what your saying is if someone upgrades into a CRJ as a Captain without ever flying as an FO, he's not qualified or competent to act as PIC?

 

[kmox29]

SO what your saying is if someone upgrades into a CRJ as a Captain without ever flying as an FO, he's not qualified or competent to act as PIC?

I am not sure what he was saying. However, having flown with a lot of captains (5.5 years worth), I can make one observation: While having time in type does not necessarily determine whether or not you're qualified, I will say there is a DEFINATE loss of overall CRM with some captain who never had to be a gear beotch for someone. I believe being an FO is a great learning experience...IF you have the right captain. Sounds like this guy on the Pinnacle flight was very good at making poor decisions.

 

[Top Gum]

Never once was there any training on high-altitude considerations.

Never once did I see the climb charts come out in the class, or the cockpit.

I am not sure how much the chart would help anyway. The climb/cruise capability chart appears to give ballpark figures at best.

The conditional note at the top left of the chart has the aircraft at a CG of 25%.

It seems that the typical CRJ load would require a lower CG % and therefore limit the max altitude to more than what the chart demonstrates.

 

[jbDC9]

I hate to divert the thread from all the lovely bashing and backstabbing going on here... but what's up with the "CF-34 core lock"? I haven't heard of this, what's the story behind it? Also, I know jack squat about systems on the CRJ... are the engine starters pneumatic or electric? I'm wondering why, after they kept trying, they couldn't get a relight. Seems like after that many tries and roughly 18 minutes of glider time an engine should have re-lit.

 

[PCL_128]

SO what your saying is if someone upgrades into a CRJ as a Captain without ever flying as an FO, he's not qualified or competent to act as PIC?

No, what I'm saying is that a new Captain with no time in type should be paired with an FO that has been flying the plane for at least 1000 hours. Green on green is a bad combo. I just think that one of the two pilots should have significant time in type. If you take two turboprop drivers and put them into a brand new jet that neither has any time in and throw an unusual situation at them (unusual attitude, dual flameout, engine fire, etc...) then you're going to get a bad result. Someone needs to have some experience in type and experience at the company. You shouldn't have two newbies in the same flight deck.

 

[kmox29]

At Mesaba, when we were receiving the RJ85's does anyone know about a special exemption we had for green-on-green? I seem to remember that we had new hire FO's paired with new captains (as the aircraft was brand new to the property). I thought we had some special provision to allow this with some major restrictions on the crew's operating environment. Does anyone remember this?

 

[Lear70]

http://www.alpa.org/DesktopModules/...View.aspx?itemid=1616&ModuleId=1316&Tabid=256

 

[flap operator]

Actually... I did mean low time = low experience. I just used the new to type as an analogy. I could use another one if you like. I remember when I had been instructing for awhile and realized how much I was learning as an instructor. As I gained time teaching folks how to fly, what to do and what not to do, I gained in my own experience. So yea, low time relates to low experience.

Let's take aviation out of it completely... do you agree that you are a better driver now, say roughly 10 years after getting your license? I know I sure am! I was an awful driver when I got my licence. I had no experience and was imature. In my 13 years of driving cars I've learned what is smart and what is not. I learned through mistakes, big and small. As I built "time" driving a car, I also built the wisdom and knowlege that one finds when you're experience level increases.

So I think I've made it very clear... low time = low experience. And as Standby 1 says, there is nothing wrong with it. We were all NEW at one point. We were all a little less experienced at one point. That's why we as pilots will never know it all and will constantly be learning and getting better... with TIME.


FO