Continued
In other instances, if an independent company was looking at land to build a refinery, the site was purchased to prevent it from being built. If there was still investment interest, oil companies would temporarily reduce wholesale gasoline prices in that territory to convince the would-be buyer that it would be unprofitable.
In addition, refining capacity among the companies was controlled by sharing information on gasoline production. One company's memorandum to another company that discussed plans to shut down a refinery included instructions to destroy the document after it was read.
At one point, according to the FTC report, the companies thought demand would increase significantly. But the companies "contrary to their individual business interests, did not expand refining capacity or take other actions to meet anticipated demand" - delaying or canceling refinery projects.
The companies also sought to keep from dumping too much gasoline on the market by following the "leading firm" in each market regarding how much gas to refine to sell to that market.
"The system worked in firming up prices," concluded the FTC document.
During and after the FTC's investigation, the oil companies denied the allegations that they worked together to restrict capacity. Some argued that the government was merely looking to blame the industry for high energy prices. They contended that business decisions were individual responses to the pressures of a competitive free market, not an organized effort to use their market power to thwart competition.
Shortly after Ronald Reagan became president, in September 1981, the FTC withdrew its case, saying further proceedings were "not in the public interest." At the time, the commission noted that the decision to dismiss did not represent a decision on the merits of the case, and it left open the option of addressing competition in the industry at a later date. The case, which alleged some specific examples of "collusive" actions, was the largest ever brought by the FTC.
A generation later, the oil industry sees the dismissal as exoneration of the antitrust allegations.
"There have been numerous claims but there has never been a finding of collusion," said Edward Murphy, group director of refining and marketing for the American Petroleum Institute, which represents the oil companies. "The fact is this has been and continues to be a very competitive industry."
Cutting capacity
To be sure, Big Oil has at times had a legitimate reason to be concerned about overcapacity.
Even as the industry sought to reduce capacity, an unprecedented slump in demand during the recession-ridden early 1980s meant that U.S. refineries could make far more gasoline than needed.
But that didn't last. U.S. refinery capacity dropped from 18.6 million barrels of oil per day in 1981, to 15.7 million barrels a day in 1998, as demand soared.
The domestic refining industry, which used as little as 70 percent of capacity as recently as the early 1980s, in recent years has reached as much as 97 percent of capacity - effectively operating at full steam because some capacity is always down for maintenance or retooling. And that lack of spare capacity makes prices more volatile.
Edward Galante, a senior vice president for ExxonMobil, speaking at an energy conference in Houston in February, said a "dramatic" spike in global demand for gasoline in 2004 made the market tight.
"And in tighter markets, one can expect higher margins," he said.
But Galante said it was unlikely that any company would invest the billions that it takes to build more refineries in the United States. He argued that there is still the possibility that demand could decline and refinery margins would follow. Building more capacity, he said, could contribute to another surplus, returning the industry to the darker days of the early 1980s.
"Some say we have entered a `Golden Age of Refining.'" Galante said. "Of those I ask: How long is an age?"
Clearly, free-market adjustments explain some of the decline in capacity. Inefficient small refineries, for example, were among those closed. But other forces, say some critics, were also afoot.
"This is an industry rigged for profits," said Jamie Court, president of The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights.
"People think it is OPEC that's the reason for high gas prices, and it just isn't so."
The concern about surplus refining capacity remained a recurring theme in the industry, even as use pushed past 90 percent.
In a 1995 internal memo obtained by U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon, whose office has investigated the industry in recent years, Chevron discussed an industry meeting at which an analyst warned that if capacity wasn't reduced further, there would be no substantial increase in refining margins.
In a 1996 internal memo, Mobil officials called for a "full court press" to stop an independent company from restarting a refinery in California that might reduce gas prices by 3 cents per gallon. The effort was successful.
Company officials say such efforts reflect legitimate business strategies. "There have been various investigations that have concluded there has been no wrongdoing by the oil companies and the industry in general," said Carolin Keith, a spokeswoman for ExxonMobil.
And a Texaco memorandum, also in 1996, stated too much capacity was hurting refinery profits.
"Significant events need to occur to assist in reducing supplies and/or increasing demand for gasoline," according to the document.
A spokesman for Chevron, which later acquired Texaco, said the company has continuously upgraded and expanded existing refineries. He referred to a recent speech by a Chevron executive for the company's position on building new refineries.
Patricia Woertz, executive vice president of Chevron's downstream operations, said expansion of the nation's refining infrastructure would seem an obvious solution. But Woertz said any company would be hard pressed to find a community that would welcome a new refinery.
"Even if you believe the investment economics have become more favorable, other discouragements remain," she said at an industry conference in San Francisco.