more from GAO
more about the AF procurement incompetence:
First, we agree with Boeing that the SSET erred in concluding that the [Deleted] in tanker refueling operations was not a current Air Force procedure.[61] See HT at 638, 735; Air Force’s Post-Hearing Comments at 19. As noted above, the contemporaneous evaluation record shows that the agency interpreted the solicitation requirement to comply with “current [Air Force] procedures” to mean compliance with the procedures set forth in the agency’s flight manuals for the KC‑135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft, and expressly informed Northrop Grumman during discussions that the flight manuals for the KC-135 and KC-10 established the current Air Force procedures for refueling operations. See AR, Tab 184, EN NPG‑MC1-003a, at 1, wherein the agency stated “[a]erial refueling procedures were contained in T.O. 1-1C-1-3 and 1-1C-1-33 for the KC-135 and KC-10 respectively when the RFP was released.”[62] These manuals show that current Air Force procedures provide that tanker pilots [Deleted] in refueling operations. For example, the KC-135 manual under Section IV, Air Refueling Procedures, warns tanker pilots that they “must be prepared to assume aircraft control [Deleted],” and under Section V, Emergency Air Refueling Procedures, instructs tanker pilots that in a breakaway situation, if a climb is required, they must “[Deleted].” See AR, Tab 289, Flight Manual KC-135 (Tanker) Flight Crew Air Refueling Procedures, Supp. III, T.O. 1-1C-1-3, Jan. 1, 1987, as revised Sept. 1, 2004, at [Deleted]. Similarly, the KC‑10 flight manual provides under Section III, Air Refueling Procedures, that the “[Deleted].” Id., Flight Manual, KC-10A Aircraft, Flight Crew Tanker Air Refueling Procedures, USAF Series, T.O. 1‑1C-1-33, Sept. 1, 2002, as revised Jan. 31, 2005, at [Deleted]. In this regard, Boeing provided the statement of a retired Air Force pilot, who had extensive experience as both a KC-10 and KC-135 tanker pilot and had operated each aircraft as both a tanker and a receiver in refueling missions; this individual stated:
Refueling is more demanding and difficult for both tanker and receiver aircraft if the tanker [Deleted]. For the tanker pilot, [Deleted]. For the receiver pilot, [Deleted]. Due to these realities, existing refueling guidelines dictate that [Deleted] should be used for refueling under normal circumstances. [Citations omitted.] Beginning aerial refueling [Deleted] should it become necessary, violates this policy. As previously noted, [Deleted].
Boeing’s Comments, attach. 14, Declaration of Retired Air Force Pilot, at 3-4. Although the Air Force and Northrop Grumman generally disagree with Boeing’s consultant that the Air Force’s current procedures provide for the [Deleted], neither the agency or intervenor have directed our attention to anything in the KC‑135 or KC‑10 flight manuals or to any other source that would establish that Boeing’s view, which appears to be reasonable on its face, is in error.
We also find unsupported the agency’s conclusion that Northrop Grumman’s proposed solution of [Deleted] did not also involve [Deleted]. In its EN response, Northrop Grumman informed the Air Force that 330 KIAS was the normal design maximum operating velocity of the commercial A330 aircraft, and that “selection of a [maximum operating velocity] drives overall design characteristics of the aircraft, specifically aerodynamic and structural design limits, handling quality definition, and thrust.” See AR, Tab 184, Northrop Grumman Response to EN NPG‑MC1-003a, at 2. Northrop Grumman explained that its [Deleted] limited the aircraft to its maximum operating velocity, but that the firm could [Deleted] to exceed the maximum operating velocity. The awardee then stated “three cases . . . to illustrate the performance of the KC-30 with and without [Deleted].” Id. at 3. The three cases that Northrop Grumman identified and separately described were (1) KC-30 [Deleted]; (2) KC-30 [Deleted]; and (3) KC-30 [Deleted], which indicated that the KC-30 could only meet the overrun requirement under the third case where both the [Deleted]. Id. at 3-6.
The SSET read, as described by the testimony of its mission capability factor team chief, Northrop Grumman’s EN response to describe a “fourth case” (although not identified as such) under the “third case” heading, but located at the end of that section, where, the agency contends, the KC‑30’s [Deleted] but the [Deleted]. See HT at 664. However, we are unable to accept such a reading of Northrop Grumman’s EN response. It ignores the logical structure of Northrop Grumman’s response to the agency, which only identified and described three cases. Moreover, nowhere in its response to the agency’s EN does Northrop Grumman suggest a “fourth case” where the [Deleted]; rather, the only reference to both the [Deleted] in the third case expressly states that the [Deleted] (“Case 3: KC-30 [Deleted]”).[63] See AR, Tab 184, Northrop Grumman Response to EN NPG‑MC1-003a, at 6. In any event, given the uncertainty surrounding the agency’s interpretation of Northrop Grumman’s solution to a matter the agency believed could render the firm’s proposal unacceptable, see HT at 625, 649, this is something the agency should have continued to clarify and resolve during discussions with the firm.[64]
Even apart from the agency’s apparent misreading of Northrop Grumman’s EN response and disregard of the current Air Force procedure to [Deleted], the record does not establish that the agency had a reasonable basis for concluding that Northrop Grumman’s proposed solution would allow its aircraft to obtain the requisite overrun airspeeds to satisfy this KPP threshold. The witness that the Air Force produced to support its arguments on this point testified that the SSET had concluded that the KC-30 had the “inherent capability” of reaching airspeeds greater than [Deleted] KIAS (the aircraft’s certified maximum operational airspeed) based upon the far greater airspeed ([Deleted] KIAS) identified by the firm for its certified dive velocity.[65] See HT at 624-28; Air Force’s Post-Hearing Comments at 17‑18. In this regard, the SSET apparently believed that simply [Deleted] would enable the aircraft to achieve its indicated dive velocity airspeed as its operational airspeed.
Although the SSET mission capability factor team chief repeatedly testified that the dive speed indicated that the aircraft would have the structural ability to fly at the dive speed limitation, see, e.g., HT at 674, he also admitted under cross examination that he did not know what the relationship was between maximum operating airspeed and design dive speed:
Q: What’s your understanding of what the general margin is between maximum operational velocity and dive velocity?
A: I’m not aware.
Q: Was there somebody on your team that was advising you about what the general margin is or difference is between maximum operational velocity and dive velocity?
A: There could have been. We had advisors for handling qualities.
Q: I know you had advisors. I’m asking you, were there any advisors who actually helped you with understanding the difference between dive velocity and maximum operational velocity?
A: They did not help me, no.
Q: Did they help the team?
A: Not that I’m aware of.
HT at 669-70. The SSET mission capability factor team chief’s (and presumably the SSET’s) lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between maximum operating airspeed and design dive airspeed[66] is particularly troubling given the definition of maximum operating limit speed in FAA’s regulations:
The maximum operating limit speed . . . is a speed that may not be deliberately exceeded in any regime of flight (climb, cruise, or descent), unless a higher speed is authorized for flight test or pilot training operations. [The maximum operating limit speed] must be established so that it is not greater than the design cruising speed . . . and so that it is sufficiently below [dive speed and velocity] to make it highly improbable that the latter speeds will be inadvertently exceeded in operations.
Incompetence is what lost the KC-X bid.
